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ABSTRACT 
SEARCH FOR A COMMON NORTH CAUCASIAN IDENTITY: THE 
MOUNTAINEERS’ ATTEMPTS FOR SURVIVAL AND UNITY IN RESPONSE 
TO THE RUSSIAN RULE 
 
ÇELİKPALA, Mitat 
Ph. D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
 
February 2002 
 
Throughout the history, the North Caucasian region has hosted a number of 
peoples, whose numbers are occasionally limited to some hundreds, and whose 
mother tongues are quite different from each other. Beyond this ethnic and linguistic 
complexity, the religious pattern has been an additional factor to complicate the 
matters. Nevertheless, despite the existence of this great diversity, all the inhabitants 
of the North Caucasus have come to share the same way of life, traditions, customs, 
and even the costume dictated by harsh mountain conditions and thus they are unified 
by broad cultural similarities. It is believed that all these commonalities have created a 
mode of life, or a common identity encompassing the peoples of the North Caucasus 
called Gortsy or the Mountaineer identity. As a consequence, the Russians define all 
these peoples of the North Caucasus with the general name of Mountaineer and then it 
was accepted even by themselves. 
These peoples, until the arrival of the Russians to the region, had continued a 
life in an atomized state and never felt it necessary to form a common, comprehensive 
organization or state. The feeling of freedom, culture and the 
  iv 
 common way of life were transformed to a conscious bond by the emergence of an 
alien power –the Russians. By the late 16th century, the long-lasting struggle of the 
Mountaineers with the Russians had begun. 
The main concern of this study is, thus, to scrutinize the North Caucasian 
Mountaineers’ long-lasting struggle of establishing North Caucasian identity and 
independence, inside and outside their homelands. This thesis, which aimed to 
analyze the stages of this struggle, intends to be the first comprehensive study on the 
North Caucasian struggle of independence in this length. 
 
Keywords: North Caucasus, Mountaineers, Mountain Republic, Union. 
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ÖZET 
 
MÜŞTEREK BİR KUZEY KAFKASYALI KİMLİĞİ ARAYIŞI: 
DAĞLILARIN RUS HAKİMİYETİ KARŞISINDA VAROLUŞ VE BİRLİK 
MÜCADELESİ 
 
ÇELİKPALA, Mitat 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
 
Şubat 2002 
 
 
Kuzey Kafkasya, tarih boyunca, dilleri ve etnik yapıları birbirinden farklı çok 
sayıda halka ev sahipliği yapmıştır. Bölgenin dini yapısı da bu farklılığa değişik bir 
boyut kazandırmış ve karmaşık bir toplumsal yapının oluşmasına katkıda 
bulunmuştur. Bu karmaşık durum ve birbirinden farklı etnik grupların varlığına 
rağmen Kuzey Kafkasya halkları, zorlu coğrafi koşullar tarafından şekillendirilen 
benzer yaşam tarzları, gelenek, örf ve adetleriyle ve hatta benzer giyim biçimleriyle 
ortak bir kültür çerçevesinde benzeşmektedirler. Bu benzerliklerin, Gortsy ya da Dağlı 
olarak nitelendirilebilecek olan ve Kuzey Kafkasya’nın tüm halklarını kapsayan bir 
ortak kimlik yarattığına inanılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede Kuzey Kafkasya halkları Ruslar 
tarafından Dağlı Halklar olarak adlandırılmış ve bu, Kuzey Kafkasyalılar’ın kendileri 
tarafından da benimsenmiştir. 
Bu halklar, Ruslar’ın bölgeye gelişlerine kadar, herhangi bir bütüncül yapı ya 
da devlete ihtiyaç duymadan dağınık bir biçimde varlıklarını sürdürmüşlerdir. 
Yabancı bir güç olarak Ruslar’ın Kuzey Kafkasya’ya sızmalarıyla birlikte 
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özgürlük, ortak kültür ve yaşam tarzı gibi kavramlar ortak bir kimliğin ve bilincin 
yaratılmasının unsurları olarak önem kazanmışlardır. Böylece 16. Yüzyılın ikinci 
yarısından itibaren Dağlıların uzun soluklu özgürlük ve kimlik mücadelesi başlar. 
Bu çalışmanın temel amacı da Kuzey Kafkasya halklarının, ister vatan 
topraklarında olsun ister sürgünde, bu uzun soluklu kimlik ve dolayısıyla özgürlük 
mücadelelerini incelemek ve devamlılıkları ortaya koymaktır. Bu çerçevede bu 
çalışma, mücadelelerin tüm safhalarını kapsayan ilk kapsamlı çalışma olmayı 
hedeflemektedir. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kuzey Kafkasya, Dağlılar, Dağlı Cumhuriyeti, Birlik. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, an attempt has been made to look into the common identity 
building process of the native peoples of the North Caucasus. The identity building 
process normally requires various factors, such as common religion, language, 
geography, common history and sometimes a working economic network. In the 
case of the North Caucasus, however, these factors sometimes play a role, while 
some other times they do not. 
The point here to be borne in mind is that the history of the region, as well 
as the social structure, is quite sui generis. Throughout history, the region has 
hosted a number of peoples, whose numbers are occasionally limited to some 
hundreds, and whose mother tongues are quite different from each other. The 
example of Dagestan, the eastern part of the North Caucasus, with more than 30 
ethno-linguistic groups can give a clue to a reader on the structure of the region. 
It is interesting to note that although the region changed hands several 
times, the outsiders (such as Sassanian, Golden Horde, Crimean and etc.) hardly 
interfered with the traditional law and order. And the Ottoman rule over the region 
was no exception: it scarcely made any attempt to alter the traditional rule. 
Despite the existence of great ethno-linguistic diversity, all the inhabitants 
of the North Caucasus shared the same way of life, traditions, customs and even the 
costume determined by harsh mountain conditions and thus they unified by broad 
cultural similarities. 
It is also believed that all these commonalities created a mode of life, or a 
common identity encompassing the peoples of the North Caucasus called Gortsy or 
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the Mountaineer identity. In line with that all these peoples of the North Caucasus 
defined with the general name of Mountaineer by the Russians and then it was 
accepted even by themselves. 
The peoples of the North Caucasus, however, had continued a life in an 
atomized state. This atomized peoples and structures never felt it necessary to form 
a common, comprehensive organization or the State. Until the 16th century tribe 
was the main source of identification among the peoples of the North Caucasus and 
in this period the most widespread form of settlement was a village that comprised 
mainly of one tribe. This diffused structure was only strengthened the 
particularistic nature of the North Caucasus. 
Beyond the establishment of some loose alliances, there was no 
comprehensive body or the state in the North Caucasus. Peoples continued their 
lives withinin their own domains, mainly the small villages, without a need of 
establishing a common organization, state, or like. Later, in time, because of the 
economic and legal relationships, and of security concerns, more comprehensive 
settlements, or rural communes comprised of several tribes began to form. These 
bodies, however, not permanent political formations and thus did not caused the 
emergence of the feeling of belonging to the same organization or the body. 
The feeling of freedom, culture and the common way of life were turned 
into a conscious bond by the emergence of an alien power: the Russians. By the 
late 16th century, the North Caucasus emerged as the main target for the Russian 
expansion. The Russians endeavoured to establish firm and centralised 
administration, which soon caused havoc in terms of the survival of the traditional 
system. 
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The natives were quick to put up strong resistance. The Russians, on the 
other hand, who were basically at the head of a centralised state of their own, did 
their best to shake and destroy the existing system, which they considered a 
potential threat to the maintenance of their rule. With the outbreak of the struggle 
of the natives to push the Russians out, the Pandora's box had been opened. Indeed, 
hardly any outsider would have predicted that from the 19th century onwards, the 
region would become plagued with waves of struggles, mostly fought in the name 
of independence by the natives, and violence committed by the Russians. 
This process of Russian expansion and consolidation took more than two 
centruies and created a more conscious motive and strengthened the feelings of 
solidarity among Mountaineers. Thus the history of common struggle against the 
Russian forces took its shape in this period. 
 
The initial power or the driving force, which took the above-mentioned 
commonalities and turned them to the more-consciuos and indispensable 
components of North Caucasian struggle and identity was the Islam. Islam, through 
the guidance of Naqshbandi tariqat took the lead and organized the peoples of the 
North Caucasus in one and consolidated idea of common front. By this time, Islam 
against a common enemy, i.e. Russians became one of the most important 
components of the North Caucasian identity. 
Being aware of the differences between the North Caucasian peoples, 
tariqats and its leaders were aimed at the creation of a common ground that defined 
and determined by Islam. This common ground stregthened by the idea of ghazavat 
and turned into a all-comprehensive idea of struggle. In this struggle, the Imams, 
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under the name of Muridism bridged the gap between the ‘political’ and ‘spiritual’ 
Naqshbandiya and merged the two into a united movement. 
 
From this ground, the North Caucasian peoples, for the first time in their 
history established a unified North Caucasian State encompassing mainly Dagestan 
and Chechnya and nominally the Circassian lands. Despite the following exiles, 
deportations and mass killings in their history, in pursuit of their independence, the 
Mountaineers created a common history of struggle and in line with it shaped 
distinct North Caucasian tradition of life and identity. Thus it is the aim of this 
work to trace the emergence and consolidation of this ‘common identity’ among 
the peoples of the North Caucaus by following the course of these struggles. To 
achieve this end, the detailed study of late 19th centruy became necessary but not 
sufficient. 
 
The main concern of this study is, thus, to scrutinize the North Caucasian 
Mountaineers’s long-lasting struggle of independence, inside or outside their 
homelands. This thesis, which aimed to analyze all those episodes of the struggle, 
intends to be the first comprehensive study on the North Caucasian struggle of 
independence in this length. From the methodological point of view, this case study 
is designed as a historical-comperative research using qualitative data from primary 
and secondary sources. During the evaluation process of the data, maps, charts, and 
tables will be used as an additional evience to increase reliablity and validity. In 
order to show whether the continuity does exist or not, the utilization of a huge 
amount of material was required. Thus the major impediment in making 
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comprehensive and deatiled study in this field is emerged at that point: the 
discouragingly scattered nature of the relavant source material. 
To accomplish the primary aim, the study is divided into two six chapters. 
As an introductory part, the first chapter discusses the scope and primary objective 
of the study. The second chapter, beyond the geographical, religious and ethno-
linguistic charecteristics of the region, underlines the emergence and the 
consolidation of above mentioned common Mountaineer identity. In relation with 
that, the process of Russian expansion and the politization of Islam will also be 
analyzed. The second chapter, in continuation of the initial period, discusses the re-
emergence of the independence movement following the February and October 
1917 Russian Revolutions. In this period, comparing with the earlier period, the 
external powers mainly the Ottomans, Germans and then the British participated in 
the course of events and affected the Mountaineers’ and their Independent States’ 
destiny. In the fourth chapter consolidation of Soviet power and the emergence of 
the emigrants and their movements in Europe is discussed. Far from their 
homeland, these groups tried to shape a North Caucasian identity in exile. They 
published a bulk of literature and established close contacts with the foreign 
powers. The fifth and sixth chapters explain Phoenix-like revival of a distinct North 
Caucasian identity and unity, after the collapse of 70 years long Soviet rule. In 
1989, the North Caucasians put their classic demand once more but this time under 
different circumstances and world. Finally, the conclusion chapter is devoted to the 
overall analysis of the conflict.  
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CHAPTER I 
THE NORTH CAUCASUS, THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE AND THE 
NEED FOR UNIFICATION 
The Caucasus, the name used from the earliest times, for the chain of the 
mountains, has at all times been a point where the civilizations of Christianity and 
Islam or East and West met and mingled. This exceptional geographical situation 
has always given the Caucasus a role, which has transcended its borders. The 
region is situated between the two seas and two continents, at the junction of 
historical trade routes. Thus in each and every period of history, the Caucasus 
witnessed the passing of peoples and civilizations. 
The main chain of the Caucasian mountains, which stretches for 
approximately 1,100km from the Taman Peninsula in the Black Sea in the north-
west to the Apsheron Peninsula in the Caspian Sea in the south-east, divides the 
area into two: the South (or the Transcaucasus) and the North Caucasus. Currently, 
the South Caucasus is divided between the three sovereign states of Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan, while the North Caucasus, populated by numerous ethnic 
and linguistic groups, is divided into several distinct administrative units within the 
Russian Federation. 
This present work deals primarily with the North Caucasus. For the purpose 
of this study, the North Caucasus is defined, geographically, as the area included 
within the present borders of the North Caucasian autonomous republics1 and 
                                                 
1 From the west towards the east Adygea, Karachay-Cherkessiya, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Osetia 
or Alania, Ingushetia, Chechnya or Ichkeriya, and Dagestan. 
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Krasnodar and Stavropol Krais, where the mainland Russia can be said to begin in 
the north. For the southern borders of the North Caucasus, it is very difficult to 
determine the exact demarcation line. While, the Transcaucasian Republics 
constituted an administrative border, historically and ethnically, the areas along the 
southern slopes of the Great Caucasus mountain chain inhabited by the Abkhaz, 
South Osetians (currently in Georgia), Tats and Lezgins (currently in Azerbaijan) 
are also included. 
 
1-The North Caucasian Geography:2 
The Caucasus is essentially a mountain region and the meaning of the term 
itself reflects this. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam the word Caucasus or 
‘kabk’ may be derived from the Middle Persian word ‘kāfkāh’ which means ‘the 
mountain of ‘Kāf’ (or Qaf). In Firdawsi we find the Caucasus called ‘kūh-i kāf’. 
The Turks, of the same origin, called the region the ‘Kavkaz’ or ‘Kafkas’.3 
Similarly, according to Karl Menges, this name is not of Caucasian origin. The 
region, which was known to the ancient Greeks and thus to the entire West by the 
name ‘Kaukasos’, from which comes the Latin Caucasus, adopted by all other 
                                                 
2 For a detailed description of the geography of the Caucasus in general, and the North Caucasus in 
specific see Karl H. Meyers, “Geographical Setting” in Tibor Halasi-Kun and et al., 1956. The 
Caucasus, New Haven: Columbia University Language and Research Center, 17-263. T. Halasi-
Kun, “The Caucasus: An Ethno-Historical Survey,” 1963. Studia Caucasica, 1, The Hague: Mouton 
& Co. Ronald Wixman, 1980. Language Aspects of Ethnic Patterns and Processes in the North 
Caucasus, Chichago: The University of Chichago, Department of Geography, 45-56. W.E.D. Allen 
and Paul Muratoff, 1953. Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on The Turco-Caucasian 
Border, 1828-1921, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-21; John F. Baddeley, 1999. The 
Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, Surrey: Curzon Press, xxi-xxxviii. 
3 See E. van Donzel and et al., 1978The Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 341-
352. Also see Meyers, 20. 
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European languages. This word, he pointed out, may well be derived from the 
ancient Persian ‘Krau-kasis’ which means ‘ice-covered’ or ‘ice-resplendent’. 
“The seafaring traveller from the West sees these mountains slowly 
emerging from the sea, their white peaks rising the skies, as the ship 
advances to the East until it drops anchor in one of the ports of Colchis.” 4 
 
The topographic, climatic and soil characteristics have all been influential 
in the establishment of the present complex ethnographic and demographic 
structure of the North Caucasus. The inhabitants of the region, without any 
hesitation, voluntarily acquired the name of the Mountaineers to refer to 
themselves.5 As Baddeley put it, “it may be said without exaggeration that the 
mountains made the men; and the men in return fought with passionate courage and 
energy in defence of their beloved mountains, in whose fastness, indeed, they were 
wellnigh unconquerable.” 6 
In geographical terms within the North Caucasus three types of landscape 
can be distinguished: 
1) The low coastlines along the Black and the Caspian seas. 
2) The fertile plains and the low hills. 
3) High Mountains. 
In the north, the slopes of the main chain of the Caucasian Mountains 
descend to the North Caucasian steppe. The Stavropol plateau divides this fertile 
plain and the low hills into two somewhat vaguely definable sectors: the western 
                                                 
4 Meyers, 19. 
5 The natives of the North Caucasus called as Mountaineers. This was derived from their living area, 
that is Dagestan and the mountainous parts of the North Caucasus. Dag means mountain in Turkish, 
moreover some other ethno-linguistic groups also called themselves Daglı or Tavlı, the 
Mountaineers, as such Avars called themselves as Maarulal, literally means mountain dwellers. 
Then the Russians inspired from it named those peoples as Gortsy, Mountaineers. 
6 Baddeley, xxi-xxii. 
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and eastern sectors. The western sector has been called as the Kuban, traditionally, 
after the Kuban River. The eastern sector is called as the Nogay steppe, after the 
Nogay nomads who inhabited the region.7 
The Kuban region, because of its geographic situation, is influenced by the 
moist climate of the Black Sea basin. It experiences heavy rain and snowfall, and 
therefore has subhumid to humid climatic conditions. In contrast, the eastern sector 
is drier and climatically more continental. Because of this agriculture is not 
possible in much of the Nogay steppes without irrigation, although the western 
sector has rich grasslands and rich and fertile agricultural potential. In general, 
there is extensive agricultural activity in the North Caucasian coastlines, plains and 
low hills. Wheat, corn, sunflowers, sugar beet, tobacco, rice, fruit and vegetables 
flourish and, even some sub-tropical plants, such as cotton, can be grown. 
Vineyards and orchards abound in the foothills, while animal husbandry, raising 
cattle and fine horses, is another important activity in the region. 
 
A high wall-like barrier, the Caucasian Mountain chain stretches from the 
Black Sea to the Caspian varying from 32 to 180 kilometres in width.8 
The Caucasus is the highest mountain range in the European continent, and 
the highest peaks in Europe are to be found there: Elbrus (5633 meters), Diktav 
(5203 meters), Koştan Tav (5150 meters), and Kazbek (5047 meters) are all higher 
                                                 
7 Wixman, 46. 
8 Related with the width of the Caucasian Mountain chain there were diversified figures. This 
above-mentioned figures are quoted from Moshe Gammer, 1994. Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: 
Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan, London: Frank Cass, 11. Hereafter, Muslim 
Resistance. 
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than Mount Blanc, the highest peak in the Alps.9 Moreover, the entire length of the 
mountains there are only 4 mountain passes: Daryal, Krestovoy, Klukhor and 
Mamison. These are found in close proximity to each other. 
The Caucasus mountain range can be divided into three distinct sections: 
the western, central and eastern sections.10 The western section stretches from the 
Black Sea to the Elbrus and is densely covered in forest. With approximately 40 
peaks over 4,000 meters the central section is the highest part of the Caucasus. The 
eastern Caucasus, in contrast to the other sections, but in parallel with the plains 
and foothills, is much drier and more arid than the Caspian side. There are lots of 
isolated valleys and gorges. All these three sections are above the permanent snow 
line and hence their nickname is ‘snow’ or ‘ice’ mountains in Russian sources.11 
Because of these geographic and climatic conditions, the plains, and the 
foothills of the North Caucasus, especially the western section was the area where 
the native or indigenous peoples primarily settled. Thus, while densely populated 
large number of towns and urban settlements were emerging in the west, there is a 
relatively low rural density and sparsity of towns mainly in the east and the central 
parts. In Dagestan, in contrast to the western part of the North Caucasus, only the 
isolated valleys were populated, and thus compared to the plains and foothills, the 
mountain region supported a larger population. As a result, the eastern parts of this 
region remained predominantly a pastoral zone of extensive grazing, with only a 
small part of the land in cultivation.12 
                                                 
9 Wixman, 52. 
10 Baddeley, xxii. 
11 Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 338. 
12 Wixman, 55-56. 
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All these features caused isolation and great ethnic heterogeneity in the 
North Caucasus region, specifically in Dagestan. 
 
2-Ethnic and Linguistic Formation:13 
Ethnically and linguistically the North Caucasian region is one of the most 
perplexing regions of the world. In the early Greek sources, such as Strabo, stated 
that the town of Dioskurias, (present day Sukhum) was frequented by people 
speaking no less than 70 different languages.14 Timosthanes put the number at 300 
and said, “afterwards we Romans conducted our affairs there with the aid of 130 
interpreters”. 15 Even in the early Arabic sources, such as in Abu’l Feda Dagestan is 
named as Jabal-al-alsun (the Mountain of the Languages).16 
Modern sources still give varying figures on the number of languages 
spoken in the region. In Dagestan alone, no fewer than 30 ethno-linguistic groups 
inhabited the area. Currently, people from the three main different linguistic 
families are living in the region (see Appendix 1). The people who belong to the 
Ibero-Caucasian language group, which were named as Kas or Kirkas (Circas) have 
inhabited the lowlands and the mountainous parts of the Caucasus since as early as 
the Palaeolithic period and thus they are considered to be the indigenous people in 
                                                 
13 Alexandre Bennigsen and Enders Wimbush, 1985. Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide, 
London: C. Hurst. Shirin Akiner, 1986. Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union, London: Keagan Paul. 
Amiram Gonen et al. (eds.), 1993. The Encyclopedia of the Peoples of the World, New York: Henry 
Holt. 
14 Aert H. Kuipers, “Ethnic Groups,” in Tibor Halasi-Kun and et al., The Caucasus, 377-8. 
15 Baddeley, xxiv-xxv. 
16 Karl H. Menges, “Human Geography: Distribution of Settlements,” Tibor Halasi-Kun and et al., 
211. 
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the region.17 Berkok lists the tribes of the ancestors of today’s Mountaineers as: 
Meots, Kerkets, Akhei, Zikhs or Dzikhs, Hanokhs, Basks or Abasks and Sanokhs 
(western Caucasian or Kirkassian groups); Nakhs, Andellals, Laks, Lezgin, and 
Kas-Akha (Kas or central and eastern Caucasian groups).18 
The other groups had came to the region later. Long before the Christian 
era, Indo-European groups, notably the Armenians and some Iranian-speaking 
groups, began to settle in the southern parts of the Caucasus first. Then up until the 
4th and 5th centuries the Animist and Zoroastrianist Persians settled in the territory 
of the present day Azerbaijan. During the 5th and 6th centuries the Iranian speaking 
Alans, the ancestors of the Osetians moved into the central North Caucasus and 
remained in the area until the arrival of the Kipchak Turks in the 11-13th centuries, 
when they were forced to move into the mountains. 
During the 5th and 6th centuries, the Hunnic tribes which admittedly 
included several Turkic speaking groups began to settle in the region, especially 
Kuban area and founded the Kingdom of the Greater Bulghar there. At roughly the 
same time, another group of Turkish speaking Jews, the Khazars moved into the 
North Caucasian territory and conquered and controlled the northern plain area of 
Dagestan as far north as the Volga River. These groups mixed with the indigenous 
                                                 
17 For the early inhabitants of the region see M. O. Kosven, 1961. Etnografiia i Istoriia Kavkaza: 
Issledovaniia i Materialy, Mosow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Hereafter Etnografiia. İsmail Berkok, 
1958. Tarihte Kafkasya, İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası. Şora B. Noghumuka, 1974. Adighe-Hâtikhe 
Çerkes Tarihi, Dr. Vasfi Güsar (trns.), İstanbul: Baha Matbaası. Ramazan Traho, 1991. 
“Circassians,” Central Asian Survey, 10(1/2), 1-63 and Ronald Wixman, 64-81. 
18 Berkok, 132-146. Also see R. Traho, 1955. “Literature on Circassia and the Circassians,” 
Caucasian Review, (Munich), 1: 145. 
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peoples that inhabited the area and it accepted that they formed the present day 
Balkars and Kumuks respectively.19 
In the 9-10th centuries, with the arrival of another Turkic group, the 
Pechenegs, the ethnic structure of the North Caucasus became more complex. 
Although their exact impact on the formation of the ethnic pattern of the North 
Caucasus is not so clear, together with the large number of newly arrived Kipchak-
Turkic dialects speaking nomads, they mixed with the indigenous Caucasian tribes 
and formed the Karachays.20 
As a result, most of the indigenous North Caucasian peoples were being 
forced to retreat into the mountains. Moreover, with the invasion by the Oghuz 
speaking Turkics of the southern parts of the Caucasus and Dagestan, and their 
amalgamation with the native population of the region, the Azeri speaking 
population of the current time emerged. This endorsed the dominant position of the 
Turkic speaking populations in the region.21 
The late comers of the region were the Slavs. The Slavic speaking 
population of the North Caucasus began to come to the region as late as the 16th 
century, during which Muscovite Russia began to show some interest in the region. 
The first Slavs or the chief instruments of Muscovite Russia were the runaway serfs 
looking for freedom and land of their own. They were called as Cossacks 
(originally ‘Kazak’ meaning ‘free man’ or ‘unruly’ in Turkic). They established 
military orders to protect themselves against the Russian State, the nomads and the 
mountaineers. These earlier Cossacks who settled in the eastern plains area 
                                                 
19 Wixman, 69-70. 
20 Wixman, 71. 
21 Wixman, 71. 
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(Grebenskiy, Stavropol and Terek) were Russians, while those who later settled in 
Kuban in the 18th century were Zaporozhian, i. e. Ukrainian Cossacks.22 
Thus by the 18th century the current ethnic and linguistic make up of the 
North Caucasian region has more or less been shaped. However, the Russian 
invasion of the region and the Caucasian Wars, which took place during the mid-
19th century, altered the ethnic and demographic position of the native populations 
of the North Caucasus. Besides the loss in lives due to the war itself, and famine 
and diseases resulting from it, there was mass emigration especially from the 
western part of the North Caucasus, to the Ottoman Empire.23 As the most tragic 
one, the entire surviving population of Ubykhs, around 30,000, who inhabited the 
Black Sea coast emigrated to Ottoman lands.24 As a result, the Russian Empire 
settled large numbers of Slavs in the North Caucasus. After the abolishment of the 
serfdom in 1861, the inogorodnye25 and the landless poor peasants rushed to the 
region. With the influx of merchants, traders, clerks and immigrant workers 
                                                 
22 For the emergence and the settlement of the Cossacks see Philip Longworth, 1969. The Cossacks, 
New York: Halt, Rinehart and Winston, and Maurice Gerschon Hindus, 1946. The Cossacks, 
London: Collins. 
23For the numbers of the North Caucasian immigrants, several numbers of sources are given varying 
figures changing between one and two million. Among these groups, Ubykhs and Shapsugs with the 
almost entire of their population came first. In addition, a striking numbers of Kabardians, 
Karachays, and other Circassian people also forced to immigrate. For the settlements of the 
Circassians on the Ottoman lands see Justin McCarthy, 1995. “Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus,” 
Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 23-58. 
Kemal H. Karpat, 1985. “Population Movements in the Ottoman State in the Nineteenth Century,” 
in Ottoman Populations 1830-1914, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 55-77 and 1980. 
“The Status of Muslims under European Rule: The Eviction and the Settlement of the Çerkes,” 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 1: 7-27. Dr. Hayati Bice, 1991. Kafkasya’dan Anadolu’ya 
Göçler, Ankara: Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları. Abdullah Saydam, 1997. Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri (1856-
1876), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. Süleyman Erkan, 1996. Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri (1878-1908), 
Trabzon: Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi. N. Berzeg, 1996. Çerkes Sürgünü: Gerçek, Tarihi ve 
Politik Nedenleriyle, Ankara: n.p., and İ. Aydemir, 1988. Kuzey Kafkasyalıların Göç Tarihi: 
Muhaceretin 125. Yılı Anısına, Ankara: n.p. 
24 For a comprehensive work related with the Ubykhs Sefer E. Berzeg, 1998. Soçi’nin Sürgündeki 
Sahipleri Çerkes-Vubıhlar, Ankara: Kafkasya Gerçeği. 
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seeking employment in the oil fields and in the growing towns in the area in the 
late 19th century, the region demographically became more complicated. 
 
The first census, thus the first data on the populations of the North 
Caucasus was dated 1897. In this census, the peoples of the Russian Empire were 
asked to declare their native language and religion to the census takers. Therefore, 
these first concrete numbers were the numbers of native speakers of the given 
languages and not necessarily the population of the ethnic group. The peoples of 
the North Caucasus were asked to declare both their ethnic identity and mother 
tongue in the Soviet censuses of 1926, 1959, 1970, and 1989, it goes without 
saying that these censuses reflected the results of the Soviet nationality policy (see 
Appendix 2). 
 
3-The Religious Structure:26 
The overwhelming majority of the Mountaineers are Muslims, but the 
majority of the Osetians, and 30-50 per cent of the Abkhaz are Orthodox 
Christians. The great majority of the Muslim population belong to the Sunni Islam 
but, there is a small number of Shi’is27 living especially in the southern parts of 
                                                                                                                                       
25 Inogorodnye literally means ‘those of other cities’, and was used not only as a designation of 
those Slavs coming in the 19th century, but also of Armenians and Jews who came in to the area as 
traders and merchants. 
26 Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, 1985. Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the 
Soviet Union, London: C. Hurst, hereafter Mystics and Commissars. A. Bennigsen and Chantal 
Quelquejay, 1967. Islam in the Soviet Union, London: Pall Mall Press. Alexandre Bennigsen and S. 
Enders Wimbush, 1985. Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide, London: C. Hurst, and also Shirin 
Akiner, 1986. 
27 Small number of Lezgin and Dargin population that are living at the border of Dagestan-
Azerbaijan. There is also some small number of Muslim Tats which belongs to the Twelves Shi’i. 
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Dagestan. Two different madhabs, or schools of Sunni Islam; Shafi’i28 and Hanafi29 
are predominant among these peoples. Despite the repression and persecutions of 
the Soviet period, a great majority of the North Caucasian peoples preserved the 
observance of the precepts of their religion, a fact which was significantly helped 
by the existence of a extensive Sufi network.30 
 
Islam was first introduced to the Caucasus by the Arab invaders in the 8th 
century. They first conquered the territory present day Azerbaijan and then spread 
northward into Dagestan. Thus Derbent became a stronghold of the Arab-Muslim 
caliphate in the Caucasus. Those Arabic invaders, together with the converted 
Turkic groups, especially the Seljuqs, spread Islam, mainly the Shafi’i madhab, 
among the ancestors of the Lezgins, Laks, Dargins, and Avars. The conversion of 
the Golden Horde, which was controlling the region at that time, to Sunni Islam by 
Berke Khan strengthened the position of the Islam in the North Caucasus. With the 
victory of Timur over Toktamış in 1385, the Islamization of the area became 
inevitable. 
Nevertheless, the real turning point in the process of Islamization of the 
North Caucasus was the 15th century. From this time onwards mostly local agents, 
especially the Laks (who were converted by the Kumuks) became the most ardent 
                                                 
28 The Avars, Dargins, Kumuks, Laks, Tabasarans, Rutuls, Tsakhurs, Aguls, Kaytaks, Kubachis and 
some other small peoples of Dagestan 
29 Nogays, Kabardians, Chechens, Ingush, Karachays, Abazins, Muslim Abkhaz, Adyges, Balkars 
and Cherkess. 
30 For the preservation and the role of Islam among the peoples of the region during the Soviet 
period see, Michael Rywkin, 1991. “The Communist Party and the Sufi Tariqat in the Checheno-
Ingush Republic,” Central Asian Survey, 10 (1/2): 133-145. Fanny E. B. Bryan, 1992. 
“Internationalism, Nationalism and Islam,” in Marie Bennigsen Broxup and et al. (eds.), The North 
Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World, London: Hurst & Company, 
195-218. 
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converting forces of Islam through their active participation in Timur’s military 
campaigns. This was recognised in their newly acquired name: Ghazi-Kumuks, 
warriors for Islam. In the late 15th century, the Laks Islamised the peoples of 
Gidatl, Qarah, Tzunti, Archi and some Avar groups. The process of the 
Islamisation of Dagestan was at least nominally completed by the late 16th century 
when the last Dagestani people, the Dido, were converted to Islam by the 
missionary efforts of the Avar Muslims.31 
Moreover, by the spread of power of Islamic-Turkic Nogay Hordes to the 
steppes in the Kuban region and the North Caucasus, the upper classes of the 
Circassian tribes converted to Islam as early as the 16th century. As a result of these 
tribes increasing influence the Digors, or the western Osetians, also converted to 
Islam. Those who accepted Islam were given better land and allowed to resettle 
onto the plains and thus integrated into Circassian society. The Abaza groups fell 
under a similar influence and Karachays were forced to move up into the 
mountains by the Circassians. 
 
Shi’a Islam introduced into the region during the 15th century, initially 
spread among the Azerbaijanis and then among the other Iranian speaking groups 
the Tats and Talysh. The increase in Ottoman influence and the power of Crimean 
Tatars’ in the western North Caucasus, in the 16th century was decisive in the 
systematic spread of the Sunni Islam among the Karachays, Balkars, Abkhaz and 
the other Circassian tribes. 
                                                 
31 Wixman, 72-73. 
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The Islamization process of the North Caucasus was in general concluded 
with the spread of Islam among the Vaynakh tribes, which began in the 17th 
century. First of all the Chechen tribes (or tuqums) of the Sunja, Aktash, Aksaq and 
Sulak valleys adopted Islam as their official religion. Then the spread of Islam to 
the mountain tribes of the Chechens took a century and a half. Only by the second 
half of the 18th century had Islam become the official religion in virtually all the 
Chechen tribes. Concurrently, the Islamization of the Ingush started in the second 
half of the 18th century. Due to their geographical position on the main route 
between Georgia and southern Russia along the Daryal gorge, the Ingush tribes 
were, in particular, drawn into the sphere of influence of Christianity. Therefore, 
the decisive phase of the Ingush conversion to Islam started as late as the early 19th 
century and was not completed until the second half of the century. 
The real power, which concluded the spread of Islam among the entire 
population of the Caucasus, was the Sufi tariqats, the Naqshbandi and Qadiri, 
which were introduced to the North Caucasus in the 19th century. Through these 
movements Islam took the shape of a political movement and began to control the 
region. 
 
The second most important religion in the North Caucasus is Christianity. 
In addition to the Russians, among the Mountaineers the Osetians constitute the 
bulk of the Christian population. In addition, among the Abkhazians, the peoples 
who belong to Samurzakan tribe are Orthodox Christians. 
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In the Caucasus, the Armenians were the first nation to embrace 
Christianity officially in the 4th century.32 Then the Byzantines spread it among the 
Georgians in the 5th century. From Georgia, Christianity extended into the North 
Caucasus, to Abkhazia, and the Adyge territories in the 6th and 7th centuries.33 
While the Georgians began to spread Christianity throughout the area of current 
day Georgia and into the central Caucasus, (roughly contemporary Osetia) the 
Armenians introduced it into the southeastern Dagestan and among the Udi and 
Tats of Azerbaijan. 
Nevertheless, the Christological controversy divided the Christians in the 
5th century. Those who were under strong Byzantine influence followed Byzantium 
and became Chalcedonic Eastern Orthodox Christians34, whereas the Armenians 
and the peoples converted by them became Monophysite (Armeno-Gregorian) 
Christians.35 Thus, in Dagestan, the autocephalous Albanian Monophysite church 
was established, to which the southeastern Dagestanis, the Udi, and the Christian 
Tats were attached. However, partly, because of the geographical conditions, which 
isolated communities and prevented the infiltration of external elements, and partly 
                                                 
32 For the history of Christianity in Armenia see “Armenia, Christianity in,” in F. L. Cross (ed.), 
1974. The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church. Oxford Un. Press: New York: 106. 
33 Michel Tarran, 1991. “The Orthodox Mission in the North Caucasus –End of the 18th – Beginning 
of the 19th Century,” Central Asian Survey, 10(1/2): 103. 
34 The Fourth Oecumenical Council held in the city of Chalcedeon in Asia Minor, nearly opposite 
Byzantium. At the first meeting, held on 8 Oct. 451, some 500-600 bishops were present, all of 
them Easterns except two bishops. The Council then drew up a statement of faith, the so-called 
Chalcedonian Definition, which was accepted by the Oriental Orthodox Churches. According to the 
Definition the Incarnate Christ is one Person in two Natures and caused the emergence of split 
within the Christian world. For a detailed information see The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian 
Church: 315. 
35 Monophysitism, in contrast to the Definition of Chalcedeon, is a doctrine that in the Incarnate 
Christ there is only one nature, not two. See The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church: 1104-
1105. 
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because of the power of Islam, Christianity could not be effective and spread 
among the peoples of the North Caucasus.36 
The Russians initiated the last attempt, which aimed at the Christianisation 
of the Mountaineers in the second half of the 18th century. In this activity, the 
Russian’s main agents were the Osetians. Through the ‘Osetian Commission’, 
which was established in Mozdok in 1745, Russians achieved limited success. 
Following it, during the second half of the 19th century, these activities were 
assumed by ‘the Society for the Restoration of Orthodox Christianity’ in the 
Caucasus, but the Russian administration did not succeed in converting a large 
number of Mountaineers to Christianity.37 
 
The other religion that attracted attention in the region is Judaism. 
Interestingly, there is a small number of Jews, called Tats or Mountain Jews.38 
These people who were escaping from the assaults of the Sassanian kings of Persia, 
quite probably established a Jewish military colony just south of the present day 
city of Derbent. They spoke a southwest Iranian language, Tat, as did the 
Zoroastrian and Armeno-Gregorian Tats. In addition to these groups, the upper 
classes of the Khazars, who had arrived in Dagestan in 6-7th centuries also adopted 
Judaism. 
 
                                                 
36 Wixman, 67-69. 
37 In addition to Michel Tarran, see Austin Jersild, October 2000. “Faith, Custom, and Ritual in the 
Borderlands: Orthodoxy, Islam, and the ‘Small Peoples’ of the Middle Volga and the North 
Caucasus,” The Russian Review, 59: 512-529. 
38 For a detailed study on Mountain Jews see Laurent Mallet, 1996. “Bir Kafkas “Tuhaflığı”: Dağ 
Yahudileri ve Tatlar,’ Toplumsal Tarih 6(36): 21-27. 
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In brief, despite the existence of several religions from animism to Judaism, 
Islam is the most comprehensive and deep-rooted religion in the region. It 
preserved its dynamic position, as the main feature of the North Caucasian identity 
among the autochthonous peoples of the North Caucasus and strengthened the 
notion of unity with the help of the tariqats. 
 
4-The Social Structure:39 
The social structure of the North Caucasian society was based on the clan or 
tribal system. Although most of the peoples of the North Caucasus have already 
passed the early stages of the social development, the tribal bonds were influential 
in the daily life of some peoples of the North Caucasus, at least until the mid-20th 
century. It was particularly strong among the Vaynakhs, whose the tribal bonds still 
have a role in determining the social and political relations.40 
The first concrete information related to the social structure of the North 
Caucasus went back to the early 15th and 16th centuries which based on Russian and 
Ottoman documents, and the travellers’ books.41 In that period, the North 
                                                 
39 M. O. Kosven, Etnografiia. I. Kh. Kalmykov, 1974. Cherkesy: Istoriko-etnograficheskii Ocherk, 
Cherkessk: n.p. Mekulov, D. H. (eds.), 1991. Cherkesiia v XIX Veke: Materialy 1 Kashekhabl’skogo 
Foruma «Istoriya-Dostoianie Naroda» Maikop: Adygeisski Ordena Znak Pocheta, hereafter 
Cherkesiia. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, “Cooptation of the Elites of Kabarda and Daghestan in 
the sixteenth century,” in Marie Bennigsen Broxup and et al. (eds.), 18-44. Hereafter “Cooptation of 
the Elites,”. 
40 Jane Ormrod, 1997. “The North Caucasus: Confederation in Conflict,” in Ian Bremmer and Roy 
Taras (eds.), New States New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 96. 
41 Julius von Klaproth, 1814. Travels in The Caucasus and Georgia Performed in The Years 1807 
and 1808, London: Henry Colburn. George Leighton Ditson, 1850. Circassia or A Tour the 
Caucasus, London: T. C. Newby. Xavier Hommaire De Hell, 1847. Travels in The Steppes of The 
Caucasus, London: Chapman and Hall.Taitbout De Marigny, 1837. Three Voyages in The Black Sea 
to The Coast of Circassia, London: John Murray. John Longworth, 1996. A Year Among 
Circassians (1837-1838), for its Turkish translation Kafkas Halklarının Özgürlük Savaşı (1837-
1838), trans. by Sedat Özden, Kayseri: rey Yayıncılık. 
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Caucasian peoples had levels of social development from clanic or tribal to the 
‘feudal’ in which the division of the population was along the patrilineal lines. 
These patrilineal divisions lie at the basis of the region’s political, social, and 
economic structure.42 
At the lowest level of the social fabric, in the North Caucasus, there was an 
extended family whose members shared common property and joint 
responsibilities. Closely related extended families formed a clan, and then, as a 
result of the unification of the clans, the tribes were formed. In general, the North 
Caucasian tribes were named after a real or putative ancestor, or could bear the 
name of the most famous man in a tribe or the toponym of its origin.43 
During the late16th and early 17th centuries, only the Kabardians and some 
of the Circassian groups in the western part of the North Caucasus and the Kumuks 
in Dagestan developed stratified social structure in parallel with a developed feudal 
system. 
The Kabardians had the most sophisticated social structure. At the top of 
the pyramid or the social hierarchy, there was a class of prince or pshi. The pshis 
and their families have the highest ranking in the society, which was compared to 
the western barons of the high Middle Ages by Lemercier-Quelquejay.44 The 
children of the pshi had the honorific title of mirza or tuma. The clan of pshi did 
not divide into nuclear families and all the members obeyed the eldest member of 
the clan. They had lands and serfs collectively. Moreover, inheritance was 
                                                 
42 Moshe Gammer, 1995. “Unity, Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus,” in Yaacov Ro’i 
(ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, London: Frank Cass, 164. Hereafter Unity. 
43 In addition to Gammer, Unity, see Ufuk Tavkul, 1993. Kafkasya Dağlılarında Hayat ve Kültür, 
İstanbul: Ötüken. 
44 Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, ‘Cooptation of the Elites,’ 25. 
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devolved from brother to brother not from father to son. These pshis had their own 
clans’ fortresses and, therefore, had a comparative amount of power. 
Next to the princely family came the uork (verk) or the gentry. These were 
the vassals of the princes. This class of gentry can be subdivided into two ranks: 
the most noble (tlakotle) and the less noble (dezhenugo). These nobles, most of the 
time, had a social privilege of establishing ties with a princely family. This social 
cohesion was secured by a custom of atalik, whereby children of princes were 
given to these nobles to be instructed by them in the military art. In this way, 
children of the vassals became foster brothers of pshis’ sons and later, when adults, 
their brothers in arms. 
In the middle of the pyramid there was the most populous class of free 
peasants or tlofoqotle (Tfekotl) grouped in jama’ats. Next came to the peasants, 
called og and loganapit, obliged to perform various chores, and then the slaves, 
Pshitli.45 
 
The other Circassian tribes were more primitive and divided compared to 
the Kabardians. These included the tribes of plains, Bzhedug, Janey, Kemirgoy, 
Abaza, and Besleney, which had a closer, but less rigid social structure to the 
Kabardians.46 At the top of the social pyramid there was a prince (pshi). Then 
nobles, free peasants, serfs and slaves were placed in the social fabric. In contrast, 
the Circassian groups that were living in the mountain regions, the Abadzekhs and 
                                                 
45 For the social structure and ‘classes’ in the Circassian tribes see Jabağhi Baj, 1999. Çerkezler: 
Kökleri, Sosyal Yaşamları, Gelenekleri, Ankara: İtalik, 96-113. Leonti Lyulye, 1998. Çerkesya, 
Tarihi-Etnografik Makaleler 1857-1862-1866, trnsl. by. Murat Papşu, İstanbul: Çiviyazıları. 
46 See Uchenye Zapiski: Istoriia i etnografiia, (vol. IV), 1965. Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe Knizhnoe 
Izdatel’stvo. 
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Hatukays, had no feudal hierarchy and no gentry but consisted of free peasants, 
equal in rights, grouped in jama’ats. 
On the other hand, the other kin of the Circassian groups, the Abazas, had 
reached a fairly advanced stage of feudal development comparable to the 
Kabardians.47 At the top the social pyramid, there was the prince or rather the 
clan’s chief called apsha or akha. Next to him, there was the class of the great 
nobles (amistadi or tawad) and then the small nobles, vassals of the former 
aamista. Then the free peasants called ankhayua, akavi or tefakashau came. Lower 
down the social ladder were the freed serfs forced to perform certain chores called 
azat-lig and the serfs (lig), and finally comes the slaves (unavi).48 
 
In the central parts of the North Caucasus, there were the Vaynakh tribes, 
Chechens and the Ingush. The name Chechen is derived from village Chechen on 
the Argun River, and those people call themselves Nokhche or Vaynakh, the 
Chechen word for people or person. The Ingush received their name from the 
village of Angushta or Ingusht in the Terek valley, and they call themselves as 
Galgay or Lamur.49 Within these communities there were no aristocracy. Instead, 
they were made up of large undivided families and clans whose members 
considered themselves free, noble, and equal to each other.50 
The other people of the central North Caucasus, the Osetians compared to 
the Kabardians had an established stratified social structure although less rigid. At 
                                                 
47 Sh. D. Inal-Ipa, “Ob Abkhazo-Adygskikh Etnograficheskikh Paralleliakh,” in Uchenye Zapiski: 
Istoriia i etnografiia, (vol. IV), 1965. Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 222-246. 
48 Valeri Beygua, 1990. Abhazya Tarihi, transl. Papapha Mahinur Tuna, İstanbul: Asyayın, 49-54. 
49 R. Traho, 1957 “Literature on Checheno-Ingushes and Karachay-Balkars,” Caucasian Review, 
(Munich), 5: 76. 
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the top of the stratification there were the nobles called aldar and badilat, and then 
free peasants, (farsalag), serfs (kavsadar), and slaves. 
 
In the eastern part of the North Caucasus, or the Dagestan, the social 
structure was widely diversified. Among the peoples of Dagestan only the Kumuks 
had achieved a very complex society, almost as complicated as that of the 
Kabardians, represented by a rigid pyramid of social classes upheld by adat, the 
customary law. At the top of the pyramid there was the princely clan; the princes, 
the khans and their relatives who were called mirza, beg or bey and all those 
comprised the Shamkhal. Then came the middle class, the chanka, which 
comprised the children of members of the princely clan and women, who belonged 
to the nobility of inferior rank (chanka or uzden). The third rank called uzden, 
consisted of free noble agricultural workers, vassals of the Shamkal. Below the 
uzden there was a large group of subordinates who were subdivided into several 
groups. Free, but not noble agricultural workers who made up the mass of the 
population assembled into the jama’ats or communities. The group of serfs, called 
cagar or rayat, whose duty to perform certain chores; and finally, at the bottom of 
the social ladder slaves called yasir or qul, in most cases Russian and Georgian 
former prisoners of war, or else purchased in the slave markets. 
The other peoples of Dagestan, especially the tribes of the high mountains, 
had not yet reached the level of development of the peoples of the plains, (mainly 
the Kumuks in the 17th century). In almost all of these tribes, members of the 
community were considered as free and equal members in principle. Generally, 
                                                                                                                                       
50 Şamil Mansur, 1995. Çeçenler, Ankara: Sam Yayınları, 33-36. 
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they were grouped into the communities or jama’ats ruled by the elders of the 
community. 
 
5-The Political Make up: 
As pointed out above, the tribe was the main source of identification, and 
the settled agricultural and pastoral North Caucasian tribes were still living mainly 
in villages, called aul in mountainous regions and yurt in the lowlands. In 15th and 
16th centuries, the most widespread form of settlement was a village that comprised 
mainly of one tribe. Later, in time, because of the economic and legal relationships, 
and of security concerns, settlements or rural communes comprised of several 
tribes named jama’at in Dagestan and tuqum among the Vaynakhs, began to form. 
These rural communes, in late 18th and early 19th centuries became socio-political 
and territorial entities united by common economic and defence aims, rather than a 
purely tribal one. In the late 18th century, (especially in Dagestan) there were about 
60 communities or principalities with a constantly changing social structure. 
Moreover, within the same period, from these jama’ats began to form loose 
confederations in case of external threat, mainly from Russian. 
By the beginning of the 19th century these jama’ats began to develop 
permanent central political formations. The most powerful among them included 
the Shamkalat, the Avar Khanate, the Khanate of Ghazi-Kumuk and the 
principalities of Kaytak and Tabasaran.51 
                                                 
51 For these principalities see Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, “Cooptation of the Elites,” 31-7 and 
Anna Zelkina, 2000. In Quest for God and Freedom: A Sufi Response to the Russian Advance in the 
North Caucasus, New York: New York University Press, 16-20. Hereafter God and Freedom. 
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In almost all jama’ats the ultimate authority was vested in the council of 
elders, which was made up of representatives of each clan and tribe in the 
commune. Over time, with the expansion of these associations, ruling dynasties 
came into being. The way in which these dynasties came into being and the titles 
they used varied from one jama’at to another. While in some parts they took the 
name Khan or Sultan, in others they used the titles of Maysum, Ustmi, Shamkhal or 
Qadi. These central rulers, in parallel with the establishment of their authority, 
began to remove local rulers by appointing their own agents as governors, mostly 
named naib or bek, to the jama’ats under their authority, and in turn they formed 
the local gentry. 
 
The most powerful of these confederation-like structures was the 
Shamkhalat that controlled the northern and norteastern parts of Dagestan 
including the capital of the aul of Ghazi-Kumuk initially, and then Tarku. The 
Shamkhalat population consisted mainly of Kumuks, with a minority of Laks in the 
mountainous regions, and some Chechen, Avar and Nogay free jama’ats, and 
clans. Nevertheless, as in the case of most North Caucasian confederations, the 
Shamkhalat was divided into smaller parts in the 17th century ruled by sultans. 
The Avar Khanate, which was made up of the Avars and small Andi and 
Dido tribes, placed in the high valleys of the Dagestan with its capital in the aul of 
Khunzakh. The rulers of the Khanate had the title of nutsal and were chosen from 
the members of the princely clan and elected by an assembly of elders and gentry. 
At the end of the 17th century the dignity of nutsal became hereditary and with the  
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decline of the Shamkalat, the Khanate became the most powerful principality of 
Dagestan. 
The other important ruling structure, the Principality of Kaytak, to the south 
of the Avar Khanate contained a heterogenous population made up of Dargin, Lak, 
Kaytak, Lezgin and Mountain Jews. The ruler of the Principality had the title of 
utsmi and was the most powerful and respected sovereign of the mountain range. 
In the extreme south of the Dagestan, in the high and mid-level valley of the 
Samur, there was another principality. Two different sovereigns called masum and 
qadi governed the principality of Tabasaran. The population of the principality 
comprised of Lezgin, Tabasaran, and the small tribes of the high mountains, 
Tsakhur, Rutul, and Aguls.  
 
Nevertheless, all these political structures were transitory bodies with 
enduring struggles within themselves and with the outside rival powers. Therefore, 
it is not possible to speak about the existence and even the establishment, of a 
coherent social or political governing body within the territory of the North 
Caucasus. However, as it was pointed out by Lemercier-Quelquejay, although its 
strategic position on the crossroads of vital trade and military routes, the North 
Caucasus was surprisingly a “happy territory” ignored and by-passed by the great 
powers of the time, by the Ottoman empire, the Safavi empire, the Crimean 
Khanate, the Muscovite tsardom and the Shaybani empire in Turkestan.52 
 
                                                 
52 Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, “Cooptation of the Elites,” 21. 
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6-The Russian Advance: 
“Moscow appeared on the scene, beginning its southward drive, and the 
North Caucasus, from the Taman peninsula to the Caspian Sea, became the 
focus of world politics and fierce rivalry. Two hostile blocks were formed, 
each endeavouring to set up its authority over this territory of vital strategic 
importance: on the one hand, the Ottoman Porte and the Crimean Khanate, 
supported by the Shaybanis of Turkestan, and on the other Muscovy with its 
natural allies Transcaucasia, Christian Georgia and, further south, the Safavi 
Shia empire.”53 
 
The Russian interest in the Caucasus, in fact, was a result of the policy of 
establishing a route to warm seas and Middle Eastern markets. This was shaped 
after the notable journey of a Russian merchant, Afanasiy Nikitin, who travelled to 
India and Persia through the Caucasus in the late fifteenth century and wrote a 
classic of old Russian literature, ‘Travels Beyond Three Seas’ (Khozheniy za Tri 
Morya).54 
In compliance with this policy, thus Russian forces appeared in the 
Caucasus for the first time when Ivan the Terrible conquered the Hacıtarhan 
(Astrakhan) in 1556. From then, until the 20th century, the Russians, Ottomans, and 
Persians became the main rivals in the region. Initially, the Ottomans, assisted by 
the Crimean Khans, won the first round gaining control of the region for over a 
century. The region thus disappeared from the arena of world politics.55 
Nevertheless the Russians were not indifferent to the fate of the region; they tried 
to expand their influence by co-opting the ruling groups and making allies of 
                                                 
53 Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, “Cooptation of the Elites,” 21. 
54 Zelkina, God and Freedom, 52 and Marie Bennigsen Broxup, “Introduction: Russia and the North 
Caucasus,” in Marie Bennigsen Broxup and et al., 16. 
55 For the Ottoman accession to the region see Stefanos Yerasimos, 1996 and 1997. “Türklerin 
Kafkasları: Egzotizmle Jeopolitik Arasında I and II,” in Toplumsal Tarih, 6(36): 14-20 and 17(37): 
7-13. Dr. Cemal Gökçe, 1979. Kafkasya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Kafkasya Siyaseti, İstanbul: 
Şamil Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı Yayınları. M. Fahrettin Kirzioğlu, 1993. Osmanlıları’ın Kafkas 
Ellerini Fethi (1451-1590), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. 
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them.56 Throughout this process their task was significantly facilitated by the 
contribution of large numbers of Cossacks planted in the region specifically for this 
purpose. 
Within this period of time, the North Caucasian peoples continued to 
survive under the authority of the state-like organizations and communities. These 
bodies secured their existence by establishing alliances between each other as well 
as with external powers, i.e., Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, in the 
region, a dispersed and unbalanced state of affairs was prevailed. 
The second stage of the Russian advance to the Caucasus began in the early 
18th century. Peter the Great (r. 1684-1725), having modernised the Russian army 
and secured Russia’s possessions in Europe, organised a Persian Campaign in 
1722. As a result of this campaign Russia gained the control of the Caspian coastal 
lands and neighbouring provinces.57 
In that period, the Russians were establishing their enduring presence by 
means of the Cossack armies in the region. Simultaneously, they sought to 
establish or ensure alliances with local peoples and some of the jama’ats. As a 
result, most of those jama’ats accepted the Russian Protectorate. Moreover, to 
further their success, Russians began to establish fortified settlements in the region. 
The first of the Russian fortress, Svyatoi Krest (Holy Cross), was established in the 
Kumuk lowland in 1722 and the establishment of Kızlar, “which up till 1763, was, 
                                                 
56 The main Russian concern in that period was the Kabardian lands. The Kabardians, against the 
Crimeans had relied on Astrakhan and when the Russia conquered it Kabardians almost 
immediately formed a sort of alliance with the Tsar. The first embassies between the parties were 
exchanged in 1552 and in 1557 the Kabardian princes Temruk and Siboq, heads of two most 
important clans offered their submission and asked Moscow to protect them against the Crimea and 
Dagestan. And, in 1561, the Tsar Ivan married the daughter of Prince Temruk and gave Temruk the 
title of ‘Great Prince of Kabarda’. 
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so to speak, the Russian capital of the Caucasus” in 1735, followed it.58 
Nevertheless, this second Russian attempt to advance washalted by the Persian 
forces and the Russians had to withdraw all their forces beyond the Terek River. 
The successes of Peter the Great, however, later gave the Russians a chance 
to claim legitimacy for attempting to gain control of the region. In this period, 
Russians mainly used Cossack military settlements, to organize offensives in the 
North Caucasian territories. 
During this period of time, because of the Ottoman dominance over the 
North Caucasus, especially the western part of it, Islam penetrated almost entire 
region and became the major religion. On the other hand, as a result of the steady 
growth of the Russian controlled Cossack and peasant settlements in the north, the 
Russian interest and influence in the region began to increase. Moreover, Russian 
successes in establishing alliances with the ruling classes prepared the grounds for 
Russian expansion in the region. During the reign of Catherine the Great (r. 1762-
1796), the Russians resumed their systematic military activities in the region. The 
Empress renewed Russian expansion by establishing a new fortress of Mozdok in 
1763. This action started a long-lasting struggle between the Kabardians and the 
Russians. 
The defeat of the Ottomans in the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-74 gave the 
Russians free access from the Sea of Azov into the Black Sea and a free hand into 
the western Caucasus. Moreover, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774 forced the 
Ottomans to accept the Kuban River as the boundary between the Russian and 
                                                                                                                                       
57 See M. S. Anderson, 1978. Peter The Great, London Thomas and Hudson and Vasili 
Klyuchevsky, 1965. Peter The Great, trnsl. by Liliana Archibald, New York: Macmillan. 
58 Baddeley, 10. 
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Ottoman empires, and to surrender all their claims of sovereignty over both Crimea 
and the western parts of the North Caucasus. By the annexation of Crimea in 1783, 
the Russians began to claim sovereignty, albeit indirect over all the tribes and 
associations of the North Caucasus and established its power in the entire Kuban 
area.59 This caused the emergence of renewed rivalries between the Ottomans and 
Russians, over the territories of the North Caucasus.60 
After the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, in order to secure the Ottoman 
existence in the Caucasus Ferah Ali Pasha was appointed governor of Soğucak in 
1780.61 From then on, the primary Ottoman policy was, through their religious 
connections, establishing close links with the regional authorities, ensuring order 
and promoting trade62. In response, the Russians aimed to establish strong military 
positions on the coast, linking them overland to the territory under their control. To 
this end “the Russians established the Lines along the Kuban and the Laba and 
erected the fortresses of Ekaterinograd, Georgievsk and Stavropol’ which would 
later become the Headquarters of the entire Line.”63 
Compared to the nortwestern Caucasus, although it was less advanced, 
Russians made a few advances in the norteastern Caucasus and Georgia as well. 
Responding to the Georgian king’s appeal for help against the Persian threat, 
                                                 
59 For a detailed work on the annexation of Crimea see Alan W. Fisher, 1970. The Russian 
Annexation of the Crimea 1771-1783, Cambridge. 
60 For the Ottoman policy after the Treaty of Kaynarca see Ali İhsan Bağış, 1984. Britain and The 
Struggle for The Integrity of the Ottoman Empire, İstanbul: ISIS Yayımcılık, 9-18 and 1980. 
“Rusların Karadeniz’de Yayılması Karşısında İngiltere’nin Ticari Endişeleri,” in Social and 
Economic History of Turkey (1071-1920), O. Okyar and H. İnalcık, eds., Ankara, 211-14. 
61 Jean-Louis Mattei, 1994. “Kırım ve Kafkasya’da Osmanlı Nüfuzunun Gerilemesi ve Ruslara 
Karşı Kafkas Kabilelerinin Direniş Girişimleri,” Toplumsal Tarih, 1(6): 40-47. 
62 Paul Henze, 1992. “Circassian Resistence to Russia,” in M. Bennigsen Broxup (eds.), The North 
Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World, 76-7. Also see from the same 
author: July 1983. “Fire and Sword in the Caucasus: The 19th century resistance of the North 
Caucasian Mountaineers,” Central Asian Survey, 2(1): 5-44. 
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Russia and Georgia signed a treaty at Georgievsk in 1783 which established a 
Russian protectorate over Georgia. On the way to Tiflis, Russians built the fortress 
of Vladikavkaz (the Ruler of the Caucasus) “where the Terek issues from the 
mountains, and connect it by fortified posts with Mozdok. His [Potemkin] was to 
convert the bridle-path into something in the nature of a road; …that in October 
1783 he was able to drive to Tiflis.”64 This would later be expanded and improved 
into what would become known as the Georgian-Military-Highway –Russia’s 
lifeline to its possessions in Transcaucasus.65 Then the Russians established the 
first Russian province or guberniya, with its centre in Yekaterinodar in May 1785. 
From then on, under the heading of Prince G. A. Potemkin, the namestnik 
(viceroy), the Russian civil and military officials who were granted the rights of 
local civil administration, started to interfere directly in the internal affairs of the 
North Caucasian peoples. 
 
7-The Native Reaction: Emergence of the ‘Muridizm’66: 
In this atmosphere, under the auspices of Naqshbandi67 tariqat68, the first 
local movement, for the liberation of the entire North Caucasus from the Russian 
colonization was emerged. The traditional local authorities cooperative attitudes 
                                                                                                                                       
63 Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 3. 
64 Baddeley, 20. 
65 Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 4. 
66 The Sufi disciple is known as the murid, and in relation with that the Russians referred to the 
North Caucasian Sufism and the struggle as Muridizm. For a detailed study on Muridizm see Aytek 
Kundukh, 1987. Kafkasya Müridizmi (Gazavat Tarihi), İstanbul: Gözde Kitaplar Yayınevi. 
67 A Sunni Islamic tariqat, which was founded by Abu Ya’qub al-Hamadani (d. 1140), but it was 
named after the Sheikh Muhammad Baha’ al-Din Naqshbandi (1318-1389), in Bukhara. It spread 
into the North Caucasus late in the 18th century and surfaced in Dagestan via Shirvan, and from 
there in the middle of the 19th century penetrated the Chechnya and the western North Caucasus. For 
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towards the Russians resulted in the emergence of the Naqshbandiya as the sole 
force, which could reach beyond petty tribal loyalties and offered an ideology 
capable of uniting these various peoples into a broader independent political 
movement. 
As pointed out by Gammer, according to the local traditions, the first 
Naqshbandi leader,69 who combined the national struggle with the religious one 
and as such can be seen as the first in the line of North Caucasian Imams was a 
Chechen from the village of Aldy (Aldi), Ushurma, generally known as Sheikh or 
Imam Mansur.70 
Although Mansur himself never mentioned the name of the brotherhood, 
nor did he try to establish a Sufi network, he left a long-lasting legacy in the North 
Caucasus. Moreover, he laid the foundations of a unified body of resistance 
transcended, which crossed the tribal and ethnic confines and united the 
Mountaineers under the auspices of a broader politico-religious movement and 
became a ‘national’ symbol of a unity.71 
                                                                                                                                       
the spread of Naqshbandiya into the North Caucasus see Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 39-
46; and A. Bennigsen and S. E. Wimbush, Mystics and Commissar, 14-24. 
68 Tariqat, literally way or path, is a mystical method, system or school. 
69 Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 39-40. 
70 There is no exact information in respect to the birth date of Mansur. Even, one of his great-
grandsons, Nart gave contradictory dates in different sources. While in his booklet, Zhizn Mansura 
which was published in Istanbul in 1924, he was giving the date of 1732, in another article which 
was published in the second issue (published in 1925) of Kavkazskiy Gorets in Prague, 1748. 
Zelkina was also refrained to give the exact date, and therefore, she preferred to say “born in the 
1760s.” God and Freedom, p. 59. Nart’s booklet later translated into English and published in 
Central Asian Survey “The Life of Mansur: Great Independence Fighter of the Caucasian Mountain 
People,” 10(1/2), 81-92. In addition to these sources see Tarık Cemal Kutlu, 1987. İmam Mansur, 
İstanbul: Bayrak Yayımcılık; Franco Venturi, 1991. “The Legend of Boetti Sheikh Mansur,” 
Central Asian Survey, 10(1/2): 93-101; E. Kaval, 1953. “Şeyh Mansur,” Birleşik Kafkasya 
(Vereinigtes Kaukasien), (Munich), 9 (26): 17-24 and 1953. “Kafkas Mücahidi Şeyh Mansur,” 
Kafkas Dergisi, (İstanbul), 1(9): 23-24. Dr. Vasfi Güsar, 1953. “Uşurma – Şeyh Mansur,” Kafkas 
Dergisi, (İstanbul), 1(11/2): 4-6. 
71 Zelkina, God and Freedom, 67. 
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He was proclaimed a Sheikh and Imam and adopted the name Mansur, 
which means ‘victorious’ in Arabic, in 1783 but the first Russian reports related to 
him date back only to 1785.72 In his early years of power, Mansur tried to establish 
the dominance of Islam in the North Caucasus. He declared a ghazavat73 against 
the pagan and semi-pagan Ingush and Christian Osetians, first by sending his 
emissaries and, later in June 1785, by organizing two military campaigns against 
them. The Russian authorities saw this as a challenge to their power and they 
staged a military campaign against Mansur’s base, the village of Aldy, to capture 
him. However, Mansur’s surprising victory over the Russian forces earned him his 
place among the North Caucasian peoples. As a result, by sending letters to all 
jama’ats, he propagated Islam and made several attempts to organize the life of 
Mountain peoples. He established the first native army of 12,000 amassed from 
among the Chechens, Kabardians, Kumuk, Avar, Nogay, and Circassians, to 
combat the Russians.74 
Nevertheless his offensive against the most important military centre of the 
region, Kizlar, halted his short-lived successes. Against the overwhelming Russian 
military might, he had to escape into the western North Caucasus in 1787, and led 
                                                 
72 For the first Russian report, from Major General P. S. Potemkin to the viceroy of the Caucasus 
Prince G. A. Potemkin, on Mansur see A. Bennigsen, 1964. “Un Movement Populaire au Caucase 
XVIII Siecle,” Chaiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique II, 5: 159-204. Zelkina (59-60) quoted it. “On 
the opposite bank of the river Sunja in the village of Aldy a prophet has appeared and started to 
preach. He has submitted superstitious and ignorant people to his will by claiming to have had a 
revelation.” 
73 Literary means conquest. In the Caucasus it took the meaning of a holy war for the sake of Islam, 
identical to Islam. 
74 Zelkina, God and Freedom, 64. 
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the Circassians in anti-Russian resistance for three years, until the Russians 
captured him in Anapa in 1791.75 
Although it took not so long period, in the history of the North Caucasus 
Mansur was the first leader who initiated the struggle of independence within a 
unified structure under the banner of Islam. He managed to motivate the 
Mountaineers to join the struggle against the Russians in a consolidated body. Thus 
the Mountaineers’ vivid memories of Mansur and his achievements against Russia 
prepared the ground for the later Naqshbandi Imams who saw themselves as his 
disciples. 
 
“He failed it is true, in his endeavour to unite them [the mountain peoples] 
against a common enemy, but he it was who first taught that in religious 
reform lay one chance of preserving their cherished liberty and 
independence and therefore laid foundation for future union and for the 
great movement which under the name of Muridism was, in the common 
century to set at naught year after year, decade after decade the whole might 
of Russia.”76 
 
By the 19th century, the Russians started to re-implement the dream of Peter 
the Great, traditional policy of expansian towards the Black Sea and began to 
colonise the North Caucasus systematically by constructing a fortified Caucasian 
line and hastened the resettlement of the Cossacks. At the turn of the century, in 
1801, through the manifesto of Tsar Aleksandr I, Russians began to re-implement 
the traditional policy of, above-mentioned, co-optating the local elite once again.77 
                                                 
75 The Russians brought him to St. Petersburg and imprisoned in Schlusselburg castle where he died 
on 13 April 1794. Three days later, on 16 April he was buried on the Preobrazhenskaya hill. 
76 Baddeley, 47-8. 
77 This classic policy which was modelled partly on the Byzantine and partly on the Mongol 
traditions, involved granting economic and political advantages to individuals, social groups and/or 
entire tribes as well as the delegation of power to the local ruler who became the representative of 
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After securing its dominance in the southern parts of the Caucasus with 
signing the Treaty of Gülistan with Persia in 1813, Russian claims over the North 
Caucasus were officially recognised, and the “Russians turned towards the 
mountains to secure their rear and communications.”78 The duty was given to 
General Aleksey Petrovich Yermolov who was appointed the Governor and Chief 
Administrator of Georgia and the Caucasus, commander-in-chief of the separate 
Georgian Army Corps and Ambassador Extraordinaire to the court of Fath Ali 
Shah of Persia. This appointment earned him the nickname of Proconsul of the 
Caucasus. 79 Thereafter, with his chief of staff General Veliaminov, he began to 
implement a new policy of his own, the ‘siege policy’. He aimed to drive the 
Mountaineers away from the plain area and restrict them to the mountains by 
establishing lines of fortresses using the Caucasian line as the first parallel. In 
compliance with this policy, he built the fortresses of the Sunja and Sulaq lines, 
Groznaya (‘Menacing’) in 1818, Vnezapnaya (‘Sudden’) near Enderi in 1819 and 
Burnaya (‘Stormy’) near Tarku in 1821. Through ruthless actions and genocidal 
tactics directed from these new centres, Russians managed to subjugate larger parts 
of Dagestan. 
In this short period of time, although the rulers of Dagestan tried to form an 
alliance against the Russian forces, they failed and were beaten. Then, the pro-
                                                                                                                                       
the Russian sovereign, and sought cultural and linguistic assimilation. See Chantal Lemercier-
Quelquejay, ‘Cooptation of the Elites’. Also see A. V. Fadeev, 1960. Rossiia i Kavkaz: Pervoi Treti 
XIX v., Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR. 
78 Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 7. 
79 For Yermolov see Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 29-38. 
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Russian ones replaced the rulers of the Avar Khanate and Ghazi-Kumuk and those 
of Mekhtuli, Kaytak, and Tabasaran were deposed and their lands were annexed.80 
 
During the 1828-29 Russian-Turkish war, the Russian forces captured 
Anapa and in the Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople), the Turks agreed to give up all 
positions and claims on the northwestern Caucasus or the Circassian lands in return 
for the restoration of Kars and Batum. 
 
8-Re-emergence of the Muridizm: 
In this milieu, in the footsteps of Mansur, Islam once again emerged as the 
major political force capable of crossing tribal and ethnic divides, and uniting 
various peoples in a broad anti-colonial struggle. This new movement, which was 
shaped by Naqshbandi orders, first emerged in the central areas of the North 
Caucasus, in which there was no ruling elites and princely dynasties, and thus no 
co-optation by the Russians. Then, it gradually spread into the eastern and western 
areas. The first Mountaineers’ revolt, under the banner of Islam took place in 1825-
26, under the leadership of Beybulat Taymi81, in Chechnya, and supported by the 
Naqshbandiya heartily. In spite of its importance as a reflection of a centralising 
tendency that began to emerge in the North Caucasus, this revolt had limited 
success.82 
                                                 
80 Rasul Magomedov, 1939. Bor’ba Gortsev za nezavisimost’ pod rukovodstvom Shamilia, 
Makhach-Kala: Daggiz, 21-33. 
81 He was born in 1779 to the family of a Chechen craftsman in the village of Bilty. His courage and 
the other qualities as a statesman rose him to a prominent position of an elder. But the 
Naqshbandiya, especially the most important sheikh, Muhammad al-Yaraghi, supported the revolt 
that he led. Zelkina, God and Freedom, 126-7. 
82 For a detailed account of this revolt see Zelkina, God and Freedom, 121-134. 
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The leader, who bridged the gap between the ‘political’ and ‘spiritual’ 
Naqshbandiya and merged the two into a united movement, was Ghazi 
Muhammed.83 As a Naqshbandi sheikh, he saw the sharia as the only guarantee 
against the corruption of the North Caucasian society by Russian colonial rule. He 
called on Muslims to replace the traditional ‘adat’ system with a sharia-based 
legislation. 
This kind of development in the North Caucasus caused the beginning of 
the Mountaineer-Russian struggle in the entire region and strengthened the vitality 
of the establishment of unified body for a successful resistance. The Russians 
began to implement a policy based on the premises that “fear and greed are the two 
mainsprings of everything that takes place here” and that “those people’s only 
policy is force.”84 Under the command of Yermolov and his successors, Paskevich 
and Rosen, Russian forces stormed entire Chechnya and Dagestan. 
In response, the influence of the tariqats and consequently Ghazi 
Muhammed grew steadily. The local authorities and the people in general inclined 
to Imam and ready to struggle with ‘infidels’, i.e. Russians. At the end of 1829, he 
summoned the Naqshbandi sheikhs and mullahs to a gathering at Gimrah (Gimri) 
and declared a holy war, ghazavat, in early 1830. Until his death in October 1832, 
he managed to establish his authority over the territory of central and eastern North 
                                                 
83 Ghazi Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Gimrawi was born some time in the early 1790s in the village of 
Gimrah. Although nothing is known about his family, it is supposed that it was a common family of 
the Avar uzden. At the age of ten he was sent to Karanay village to study Arabic and the Qur’an, 
and then he visited the other Dagestani centres of learning. In 1825, he went to Ghazi-Kumuk, to 
see the famous Naqsbandi sheikhs, and became one of the ardent murids of Jamal al-Din al-Ghazi 
Kumuyki and Muhammad al-Yaraghi. In early 1827, following his meeting with al-Yaraghi, he 
returned to his native Gimrah, where he established himself as a sheikh in his own right and started 
to take up murids. See Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 49-59, Zelkina, God and Freedom, 135-159, 
and Magomedov, 43-44. 
84 Baddeley, 65. 
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Caucasus, invaded the Kumuk plain, looted the Russian fortress of Kizlyar, 
besieged Burnaya, Vnezapnaya and Derbend, and threatened Groznaya and 
Vladikavkaz.85 
Ghazi Muhammed managed to establish a central authority with the help of 
the Naqshbandi order and thus the Mountaineers understood importance of a 
unified body in the struggle with a powerful external force. Moreover, for the first 
time, he challenged the traditional institutions of power and the entire set of laws 
and customs that governed North Caucasian society, and introduced an alternative 
system of values, which asserted the supremacy of God and His Prophet in all 
matters of law and government.86 
 
After the death of Ghazi Muhammed87, another Avar, Hamza Bek became 
the new Imam in 1833.88 As Zelkina pointed it out, he was not so much interested 
in the spiritual-mystical dimension of the tariqat as its political teaching and 
particularly in its call for ghazavat.89 His most important contribution to the 
establishment of the subsequent ‘unified state’ of Shamil was the extermination of 
one of the most powerful local ruling families, the Avar ruling house. By doing so, 
he changed the traditional balance of power in the North Caucasus. He removed the 
                                                 
85 Magomedov, 47-52. 
86 Zelkina, God and Freedom, 159. 
87 As the last episode of Paskevich’s, the new chief commander of Caucasus, campaign Ghazi 
Muhammad died in the village of Gimrah in October 1832. 
88 Hamza ibn Ali al-Iskander Bek was born in 1789 in Hutsal (new Gotsatl), one of the largest 
villages of the Avar khanate. His father belonged to a side branch of the family of the Avar khans 
and enjoyed the respect of the people in Hutsal and has close relations with the Avar khans. He 
studied Qur’an and Arabic, but he didn’t further his religious education. Unlike both the first and 
third North Caucasian imams, he did not achieve the rank of a Sufi sheikh and had no Sufi murids 
of his own. Nevertheless, his military and political talents and courage brought him a prominent 
position on the eyes of Ghazi Muhammed and his murids. See Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 60-65 
and Zelkina, God and Freedom, 160-168, Magomedov, 52-59. 
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most powerful local force capable of resisting the spread of the Imam’s authority 
and deprived the Russians of their most important allies. After the removal of the 
Avar khans, although not claiming the title of khan, he took Khunzakh, the Avar 
capital as his main residence. Nevertheless, this action caused a bloody feud, which 
resulted in his death.90 Despite the very short term of his service as an Imam, 
Hamza Bek made the rise of the third Imam, Shamil, and the establishment of the 
North Caucasian Imamate possible. 
9-Towards the Sovereign State: The North Caucasian Imamate: 
Following the assassination of Hamza Bek, one of the most prominent 
Naqshbandi sheikhs, Shamil91 became the third Imam in late September 1834. 
Nevertheless, during the period between his becoming Imam and 1837, he had to 
overcome the internal strife within the Naqshbandi order first92 and then regain the 
respect and trust of the North Caucasian peoples, outside the tariqat. Thus, in this 
                                                                                                                                       
89 Zelkina, God and Freedom, 161. 
90 One of the guards of the dead khans, Itim Muhammad urged his sons Osman and Haji Murad to 
avenge the killing of the khans. Although Hamza Bek was urged by one of his loyal murids he did 
not take it seriously. On 19 September 1834 those two organized the assassination and killed imam 
in the mosque. Zelkina, God and Freedom, 167. 
91 He was born in 1797 in Gimrah, to the family of Dengaw Muhammad, an ordinary uzden and 
Pahu Mecedu –the daughter of a branch of the ruling Ghazi-Kumuk family. He received solid 
religious education of the Arabic grammar and the Qur’an, logic philosophy and law. He entered the 
tariqat and spent a number of years with the greatest Naqshbandi Sheikh in the region, Jamal al-Din 
al-Ghazi Kumuyki. At his house Shamil studied Sufi practices and other ‘ulum and after finishing 
his spiritual education, along with Ghazi Muhammad, he went to Muhammad al-Yaraghi who put 
the final touches on his spiritual training. Then Yaraghi nominated Shamil as sheikh in his own 
right. Shamil accompanied Ghazi Muhammad in all his military campaigns and was with the Imam 
during his last battle at Gimrah in 1832. He was appointed by the Imam as his deputy in the 
Koysubu jama’ats. He served the second Imam within the same region. See Zelkina, God and 
Freedom, 170-171, Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 69-80, Magomedov, 59-60. Moreover these 
novels on Shamil by Lesley Blanch, 1960. The Sabres of Paradise, London: John Murray (in 
English) and Tarik Mümtaz Göztepe, 1961. İmam Şamil: Kafkasya’nın Büyük Harp ve İhtilal 
Kahramanı, İstanbul: Inkılap Kitabevi, and Murat Yeşil, 2000. Kafkas Kartalı İmam Şamil Destanı, 
İstanbul: Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı (in Turkish) could be seen. For a comprehensive bibliography 
on Shamil see Moshe Gammer, 1991. “Shamil and the Murid Movement, 1830-1859: An Attempt at 
a Comprehensive Bibliography,” Central Asian Survey, 10(1/2): 189-247. 
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period, he refrained from direct clashes with the Russian forces and instead he 
made a truce with them. On “several occasions he assured the Russian command of 
his loyalty, formally, accepted Russian citizenship, took an oath not to undertake 
any raids in the lowlands and to restrain people in his domain from doing so.”93 
During the early period of Shamil’s Imamate, in fact, in dealing with the 
peoples of the North Caucasus, the main policy of the Russians was to use 
comparatively peaceful means. As a result of Shamil’s growing power, by the late 
1836, Baron Rosen changed the Russian policy to achieve the unconditional 
surrender of the Imam and stop the spread of muridizm in the North Caucasus 
organised a military campaign to the Avar land in April 1837. This campaign, 
however, only served to icrease the popularity of the Imam. Russian troops 
captured Shamil’s base, Khunzakh and Ashilta, stormed Akhulgo, and sieged him 
with his supporters in Tiliq. But, while the Russians besieged him in the village, his 
supporters surprisingly imposed their own blockade on the Russian forces and 
deprived them of any possible reinforcements. At the end of 40 days of double 
blockade the Russians had to conclude peace on the terms offered by Shamil. The 
‘victory’ or the peace of Tiliq was the real turning point for the Shamil’s authority. 
All his rivals accepted his command and he consolidated his power over almost all 
of Dagestan and mountainous Chechnya. Moreover, Tiliq boosted his prestige in 
other parts of the North Caucasus.94 
This was a real danger for the Russian expansion in the region. In order to 
prevent the increase of Shamil’s power Russians had to deal with him. Thus, in 
                                                                                                                                       
92 His other main rival Naqshbandi sheikhs were Tashou Haji al-Enderi, Qibid Muhammed al-
Tilitli, Akhberdy Muhammed, and Sayyid al-Ihali. 
93 Zelkina, God and Freedom, 179. 
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order to understand the situation in the region, Tsar Nicholas I visited in October 
1837. Despite the Russian authorities’ efforts to bring Shamil to Tiflis to see the 
emperor, Shamil, he refused to go. During his tour, the emperor realised that in 
spite of the enormous amount of material and human resources and military efforts 
that had been committed to the subjugation of the region, it still defied Russian 
control. Disappointed and angered at what he had seen in the Caucasus, the 
emperor made subjugation of the northeastern Caucasus the immediate priority for 
1838-39.95 
In compliance with this new priority, Russians started a new campaign 
against Shamil in June 1839 and besieged his base, Akhulgo and trapped him in the 
fortress. Shamil manage to escape luckily but the Russian victory affected his 
position and authority adversely. Thus he was forced to move to Chechnya for a 
while in 1839. With the help of Chechen mullahs and sheikhs, he managed to 
organize his movement and increased his power in Chechnya. By 1840 he had won 
over the majority of Chechens and began his struggle. First of all, he concentrated 
his efforts in Dagestan and achieved great success over the territories of Salatav, 
Andi, and Gumbet. Through these regions he organised assaults against the Avar 
land. Haji Murad’s acceptance of his authority reinforced his position in Dagestan 
and with his support, Shamil spread his authority to the whole of Avar territories 
and Ghazi-Kumuk Khanate.96 
In this period, the Russian policy in the region was to use political means 
rather than force. In order to implement this policy the Tsar appointed Aleksandr 
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Ivanovich Neidhart, commander-in-chief of Russian armies, and to prevent any 
further disasters, he imposed a 2 year long ban on raids and expeditions. This 
policy allowed and helped Shamil to consolidate his power and spread his authority 
over the entire North Caucasus. Thus, from the early 1840s, the struggle of North 
Caucasian peoples began to take the shape of a unified and consolidated movement 
under the control of Imam Shamil. 
 
The North Caucasian Imamate was brought about by a gradual and 
continuos process, which was initiated by the Russians, i.e. infidels, and its 
foundations were laid by the first two Imams on the basis of Shari’a. These Imams, 
in compliance with the Naqshbandi traditions, assumed the role of spiritual guides 
and supervisors of the local rulers and claimed a higher religious authority over 
them. The first Imam, Ghazi Muhammed in particular, did not envisage himself as 
a ruler. He rather regarded himself a guide to the various rulers and communities.97 
Although the second Imam attempted to modify the existing social and political 
order of the North Caucasus, his very short term in the Imamate did not allow him 
to make necessary regulations. It was Imam Shamil who finally set his authority, 
formalised its administrative system, codified the laws and defined the authority of 
each official in this new unified North Caucasian State that mainly extended over 
the territories of Chechnya and Dagestan. Moreover through his deputies he 
nominally set his authority over the Circassian lands. In contrast to the ad hoc 
deputies or the messengers of the first Imam, Hamza Bek and Shamil, through 
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sending regular deputies and missionaries, called naibs, for the first time in the 
North Caucasus, brought the isolated tribes and jama’ats under a unified Shari’a 
based legal system to ensure a coordinated resistance against the Russians. By the 
mid-1850s, the Imam has already established a sovereign state and ruling with 
complex machinery. 
Through comprehensive administrative, fiscal, and military measures based 
on the Shari’a, Shamil eliminated the power base of the traditional rulers and 
created a new central state, which became known as the Imamate of Shamil. In 
order to achieve unification, he combined both the religious and military authority 
in the personality of the Imam, and, as Zelkina stressed, he established a kind of 
‘constitutional monarchy’.98 
First of all, Shamil’s state, without any controversy, was a religious one. 
The Shari’a was its constitution and thus the Imam’s authority was bound by this 
constitution. At the top of the pyramid was the imam. In the early years of his rule, 
he used the title of al-Imam al-a’zam, which meant Great Imam, but in time, in line 
the consolidation of his power, he replaced it with Amir al-mu’minin, the 
Commander of the Believers, which highlighted his claims to have full authority as 
the sovereign ruler of the Imamate.99 
In his Imamate, Shamil established, more or less, a system of balance of 
power. Beyond the all-powerful Imam, there was a legislative assembly called the 
shura al-ulama (the council of scholars). This legislative assembly was comprised 
of religious leaders and had the power to elect the Imam. In the early 1840s, again 
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in line with the enhancement of Shamil’s authority, it was replaced by the congress 
of naibs, known as the Majlis al-nuwwab, and it took the consultative rather than 
legislative character and dealt exclusively with military issues.100 
Then, Shamil began to fulfil the legislative duties by himself, but under the 
control of a privy council, the Shura al-imam or Divanhane, which was comprised 
of the closest confidant Naqsbandi leaders, trustworthy naibs, and respected elders. 
In addition to its consultative and high-level decision-making functions, Divanhane 
served as a body relieving the imam of the burden of daily routine decisions. In 
order to gain legitimacy and achieve compliance with the Shari’a, all the laws and 
initiatives of the imam had to be approved by the Council. All the members of the 
Council had equal vote but as the real authority, the Imam had the power of veto 
over decisions. However, the religious traditions of the tariqat, or the Sufi murshid-
murid bond, in fact prevented any kind of direct clash between the Imam and the 
Council members.101 
Beyond that, as stressed above the Shari’a was the ultimate legislation in 
the Imamate. Shamil’s interpretation of the Shari’a was of the orthodox in nature 
adopted by the Naqshbandiya.102 Basically it was strictly against, and even hostile, 
to the local adat and some innovations or bid’as resulting from contact with the 
Russians. Thus, Shamil’s main duty, as the Imam and the chief competent 
interpreter, was the removal of the entire habits or daily practices of the 
Mountaineers, which contradicted with the Shari’a. To ensure the Muslim way of 
life should prevail over the entire North Caucasus, Shamil prohibited all kinds of 
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customs and habits. Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages were forbidden. 
Women were obliged to dress modestly. Dances and music were limited to 
weddings and circumcisions. Feuds were not allowed between the peoples. 
“In general, religious and administrative functionaries were instructed 
repeatedly to enforce the observance of the Shari’a.”103 Where the Shari’a could 
not provide an answer in the narrowly legalistic term, as a supreme ruler, learned 
Muslim scholar and Sufi sheikh, the Imam had the faculty to pass his own 
judgements or qualified opinions. He never refrained from taking such decisions 
and these decisions constituted a separate set of laws known as Shamil’s Nizams.104 
Shamil’s nizams were the first written sets of regulations that, embracing 
the entire population of the North Caucasus, and challenged and changed the 
existing rules and practices. These nizams included a vast range of domestic, 
religious, political, and military matters and can be compared to the Ottoman 
kânun.105 Through these nizams Shamil irreversibly changed the life of the North 
Caucasian peoples and succeeded in greatly improving the adherence of the 
Mountaineers to the Islamic codes. Moreover, he introduced the concepts of union 
and state by instituting the notion of a crime against state and religion, which had 
never existed before.106 
                                                                                                                                       
102 Gammer put it as “one of the fundamentalist one”, but in fact it is better to put it as an ‘orthodox’ 
one rather than the fundamentalist. See Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 232. 
103 Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 232. 
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These nizams of Shamil can be examined into two broad categories. Within 
the first category there were the nizams of prohibitive character. Those groups of 
nizams were regulated for promoting and reinforcing the shari’a laws in opposition 
to the local adat and laws induced by the Russian administration. Most of the time, 
these nizams repeated the stipulation of shari’a or gave force to a certain 
interpretation of it. 
The other category of nizams were supplementary in character. These 
nizams, had little to do with religious law, involved mainly non-religious 
administrative and military issues. 
One of the most important legal codes of Shamil defined the administrative 
structure, which was inspired from the three main sources: “firstly the Sufi 
framework which he adapted into a lay form of social organisation; secondly the 
structure of the Ottoman empire,…; and thirdly what he had seen of a centralised 
Russian autocracy.”107 
Administratively, again for the first time, he had divided the country into 
smaller structures.108 At the top of the structure there were large military 
administrative districts, vilayats. Initially in 1840 there were only 4 vilayats, but in 
1856 it reached 33.109 All these vilayats, were then divided into smaller districts, 
and than as the smallest unit villages came. 
In order to administer and control these units, Shamil appointed his 
deputies, naibs.110 These naibs were the backbone of the administrative-military 
machinery. They had full authority over all military, administrative and judicial 
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matters in their vilayats. He was responsible for law and order. He had to collect 
taxes, to execute the sentences and to judge his subordinates according to the 
Shamil’s regulations. Most important he was the military commander of his area, 
led its people on to the battlefield and was, therefore, responsible for their 
preparedness for war.111 
“Although many of Shamil’s naibs belonged to the traditional ruling houses 
they reached their posts through their service to the imam and their personal 
merits rather than their noble origin. Furthermore, their power was now 
interpreted not in traditional but religious terms, but rather derived from 
their association with the imam.”112 
 
However, at a later stage, because of increasing abuses of power and to 
prevent the increasing powers of the naibs, Shamil confined their powers to 
military issues and transferred all judicial and religious matters to the jurisdiction 
of specially appointed muftis and qadis who were accountable directly to the Imam 
by a decree in 1847.113 
The smaller units, districts, were headed by a ma’zun or dibir in Dagestan 
and turqkh in Chechnya. These heads of administration performed similar tasks to 
the naibs in vilayats. Again similarly, the judicial authority was vested in the local 
qadis, who were responsible to the muftis. Moreover at village level, authority was 
vested in the hands of elders who were elected by the village settlers. 
As the administration became more complex and difficult to control, Shamil 
instituted the rank of superintendent, mudir. As a watchful eye on the naibs, the 
mudir supervised the different activities of several naibs, and muftis and acted as a 
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naib in his own right in the area of his residence. Moreover he led his inferiors and 
their men in battle. Shamil also appointed inspectors, called muhtasib to exercise 
control over the naibs and mudirs and collect information independent from their 
reports. These muhtasibs, who were recruited from the most loyal and 
knowledgable Naqsbandi sheikhs of the imamate, travelled around and reported to 
Shamil on the activities of his officers.114 
Shamil managed to establish a well functioning and well-defined 
administrative system which was accountable to the Imam and thus to the people 
and God, throughout the country. 
 
In order to make the system’s work possible and maintain the centralised 
system of government, Shamil put the financial affairs in order by making fiscal 
reforms. He systematised the sources of revenue and of expenditure in his state and 
thus the Treasury.115 Ghazi Muhammed, the first Imam, had in fact set up the 
treasury, bayt al-mal. The main source of funding of this treasury was initially 
military revenues, but in time, as a result of the growing state this became 
insufficient.116 Therefore Shamil, in order to maintain the centralised state 
apparatus, introduced a system of regular revenues in the early 1840s. The income 
was driven from several sources. 
The first and the most important one was the taxation. His taxation system, 
naturally, was based on the traditional Muslim system of taxation. The two main 
                                                 
114 See Zelkina, God and Freedom, 203-7 and Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 226-7. 
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taxes were, the land tax, Shar’i kharaj, and income tax, zakat. Second, he set up a 
system of fines for various offences. All the fines paid by the people went to the 
treasury. Through these fines he both attained revenues and established a system of 
control in the society. In addition, the property of people who died without heirs 
also went to the treasury. Third, in his system, all the income of land belonging to 
mosques (awqaf), which had been used for the upkeep of the mosques and their 
clergy now went to the treasury. His last and a special source of income was the 
payment of three silver rubles per household per annum to avoid raids by the 
mountaineers.117 
“In his expenses the imam tried to follow the shari’a. Although deviations 
were unavoidable, as Shamil himself admitted, an attempt was made to keep 
the expenditure from each source of income generally within the area 
destined for it by the shari’a. For this purpose it seems that each source of 
income was handled as a separate account.”118 
 
The other important area in which he made important reforms was the 
military.119 The Imamate’s army, in essence was a volunteer one. In fact, with the 
exception of a few categories of people, who had crucial economic duties, almost 
all male population was considered as trained warriors ready to fight. This pool of 
warriors constituted the bulk of Shamil’s forces. Nevertheless within the time 
period, because of the state’s growing size, Shamil felt the importance of 
establishing a standing army and therefore he established an army of naibi murids. 
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Its nucleus consisted of armed horsemen called murtaziqa who were set up and run 
along the Sufi lines.120 
“In the early 1840s every ten houses were obliged to contribute one armed 
horseman. These horsemen … were freed from any other work –their own 
and their families’ upkeep, their fields, herds, etc. were the responsibility of 
the other nine families- and had to dedicate themselves to military 
service.”121 
 
In addition to this cavalry Shamil established a regular infantry unit, 
inspired by the nizam-ı cedid of Ottoman Empire duly named as nizam.122 Using 
the Russian captives, he also established artillery units. At last, in order to win 
people’s trust and respect, and to enlarge his domain among the Mountaineers, he 
also carried out an ideological or spiritual warfare. In this area of contention he 
utilised his murids who called tariqa murids. 
Then, in order to sustain large-scale campaigns and extend his sovereignty 
he introduced a corresponding system of command structure and military ranks. He 
correlated the administrative structures with military terms. 
“In military terms the vilayat corresponded to the largest military unit –the 
regiment or 1,000 (alf), divided into two battalions or 500 (khamsa mi’a), 
companies of 100 (mi’a) platoons of fifty (khamsin), and squads of ten 
(‘ashara). The corps were divided into cavalry (fawaris) and infantry 
(mushat). Russian deserters who found refuge in the imamate and accepted 
Islam formed the imam’s artillery brigades.”123 
 
Moreover, for the sake of uniformity and discipline, he introduced a 
semblance of a uniform with distinct colours corresponding to each of the services 
in his armed forces and gave the shape of a modern army. Thus, for the first time in 
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the North Caucasus, to carry out the struggle of independence, he established a 
modern standing army: 
“By establishing this strictly defined system of government in the imamate, 
Shamil profoundly changed the existing order under which the North 
Caucasus had lived for centuries. He not only dismantled the traditional 
power structure and deprived the old elite of their power base, but, far more 
importantly, he introduced what amounted to a concept of citizenship, 
whereby for the first time the ruler and the ruled were accountable to one 
system of law and in theory were at least equal in their obligations and 
rights as far as the system of law was concerned.”124 
 
By 1845 Shamil’s domain was at its largest and his power at its peak. Then, 
in compliance with his policy of establishing broader unified state and expelling 
the Russians outside the North Caucasian territory, Shamil decided to extend his 
authority over the lands of Kabardians and the northwestern parts of the Caucasus. 
This was the first concrete initiative to following the footsteps of Mansur, to unify 
the resistance movements of the all North Caucasus. 
Shamil’s main agents in the central and western parts of the North Caucasus 
were the Kabardians. In fact due to their central location, the Kabardians had 
always maintained close links with both their western and eastern neighbours. 
Although, compared to Dagestan and Chechnya the tariqats’ were in a weak 
position in the western parts of the region. Through the Kabardians the ideas of 
Naqshbandi brotherhood started to penetrate into the areas to the west of 
Chechnya. The Imam had established his first contacts with the Circassian tribes 
already in early 1840s and had suggested to the Ubykhs and Shapsugs a plan to 
unify forces against the Russians in 1842. His first naib, Haji Muhammed was sent 
to the region in 1843. After his death a member of the Dagestani ulema, Suleyman 
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Efendi was appointed the naib. Nevertheless both naibs, failed to inspire 
enthusiasm or lead the resistance. The most important and effective name, which 
spread the Shamil’s authority to the region, was Muhammed Emin125, who was 
appointed naib in 1848. Through him the authority of Shamil spread among the 
Circassian tribes, primarily the Abadzekhs and Temirgoys. Within a short period of 
time, Muhammed Emin proved to be a competent leader. He learned the local 
language and integrated himself to the peoples by making a marriage with a 
daughter of princely family. “Several times before and during the Crimean War the 
imam and his naib intended to join their forces in a concerted attack, but none of 
these plans were carried out.”126 Nevertheless, due to the lack of communication 
and coordination between Shamil and Muhammed Emin, as well as the absence of 
a deep-rooted Naqshbandi brotherhood in the Circassian lands hampered the 
establishment of the stable authority of Shamil in this region. The nominal 
authority of Shamil over his naib continued, but never turned into a unified front 
against the Russian forces. Instead, Muhammed Emin had taken the region under 
his control in 1851 and established his domain similar to that of Shamil. Despite 
the existence of local noble opposition, he ruled over the Circassian lands until 
Shamil was surrender. 
 
By the early 1850s Shamil’s power in the North Caucasus began to decline. 
Behind this decline were two main reasons. First, the Russians, in order to combat 
                                                                                                                                       
124 Zelkina, God and Freedom, 207. 
125 Muhammed Emin was born in the Koysubu jama’at and had accepted the Naqshbandi tariqat 
directly from Shamil. See, A. Canbek Havjoko, 1965. “İmam Şamil’in Sadık Naibi, Şimali 
Kafkasyalı Büyük Devlet Adamı: Muhammed Emin,” Birleşik Kafkasya, (İstanbul), 4: 19-25. 
126 Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 249. 
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the threat of the enduring and unified North Caucasian State, decided to make more 
persistent and permanent advances in the region. To achieve this end the Tsar 
appointed Prince Mikhail Vorontsov127 the viceroy of the Caucasus with unlimited 
plenary powers in 1845. 
With the appointment of Vorontsov as viceroy, the status of the Caucasus 
was dramatically changed. Until that time, the North Caucasian territory had been 
ruled by a high commissinoer or literally an ‘administrator in chief’ 
(glavnoupravlia iuschchii), who had usually also been the Territory’s commander 
in chief (glavnokomand uiuschchii). But with the appointment of Vorontsov the 
region gained higher status with a ruler who directly responsible to the Tsar and 
would take the place of the Emperor himself.128 
Vorontsov’s suggestion was the ‘siege policy’ which reminded the policy of 
Yermolov, with some modifications.129 In 1846, in compliance with this policy, 
Russians transferred a considerable amount of military force to stop all gaps in the 
Russian defence line. They started to reinforce the existing fortresses and to 
construct new ones. They build military roads and repaired older ones. They also 
established communication lines. All these were accompanied by a campaign of 
cutting down the Chechen forests to stop the ‘guerilla warfare’ tactics of the 
Mountaineers and clean the lowland areas of all the Chechen population.130 
Second, Shamil faced some serious internal problems. The lack of new 
military achievements, and thus the revenues, caused some disturbances among the 
                                                 
127 For a deatiled accounts on Vorontsov see Anthony L. H. Rhinelander, 1990. Prince Michael 
Vorontsov: Viceroy to the Tsar, McGill-Queen’s Un. Press. 
128 Rhinelander, 123-184. 
129 See Baddeley, 446 and Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 175. 
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population. Moreover, Shamil’s new policies, especially his fiscal reforms caused 
the emergence of estrangement among the peoples. The population that still had a 
‘tribal mentality’ and did not readily accept the taxation system. Moreover, because 
of war-weariness and deprivations, Shamil started to lose the support of the 
ordinary people in the Imamate. Thus, his base and authority began to deteriorate. 
The other important point that caused the Shamil’s failure was the 
emergence of ‘power struggle’ between the Imam and his naibs. By the early 
1850s, the first defections among his naibs began. The first in the line of defections 
was Haji Murad. After a number of conflicts between him and Shamil, Haji Murad 
defected to the Russians in 1851. The basic reason behind his defection was the 
proclamation of Ghazi Muhammed, Shamil’s son, as the successor of his father in 
March 1848. Haji Murad refused to accept this proclamation and publicly 
announced that he might claim the title of Imam for himself after Shamil’s death. 
Later in 1851, because of raising charges against him, Shamil tried to depose Haji 
Murad from his office and ordered the confiscation of his property. Defended by 
his murids, he resisted.131 Later on he defected to Russians. Following him, Bata 
and the some other naibs also defected. 
 
Nevertheless, the Crimean War and his strong will and military genius 
helped him to survive for a time. Shamil greeted the War as the last and the biggest 
                                                                                                                                       
130 Suzanne Goldenberg, 1994. Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder, 
New Jersey: Zed Books, 21. Zelkina, God and Freedom, 226. 
131 Not being able to face life in the Russian camp and shamil’s refusal to allow his family to join 
him, he once again tried to escape into the mountains but was killed by Russian soldiers. Zelkina, 
God and Freedom, 228. For the literary account of Haji Murad’s life and adventures see Leo 
Tolstoy, 1977 ‘Hadji Murad’ in Master and Man and Other Stories, trans. Paul Foote, London: 
Penguin Books. 
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chance. He wrote a letter to the Ottoman sultan and asked for help.132 Moreover 
during the war he tried to establish contacts with the Ottomans, British and French, 
but he failed to acquire what he hoped.133 Although the British, particularly, 
Palmerston, interested in “the romantic Chief of the Circassians” and “for his 
cooperation … were even ready to establish and independent Circassian state after 
the war, to be headed by the imam”134, Shamil did not find any help or material 
support from the British. 
The period between 1854 and 1855 testified the last but the most meagre 
struggles of Shamil and June 1856 was a turning point for his Imamate. Prince 
Alexandr Ivanovich Bariatinskiy, in order to conclude the conquest of the region, 
was appointed as the Commander in Chief of the Caucasian Army. Bariatinskiy, 
together with his chief of staff, Dimitry Alekseevich Miliutin organized a three-
year campaign, which was concluded with the capture of Shamil.135 During the 
spring of 1859, the Russians launched a general offensive, which was completed 
with the seizure and destruction of Shamil’s capital Vedeno on 13 April 1859. At 
the end of September, at last, the Russians captured him in Gunib.136 
 
                                                 
132 For the correspondence between the Ottomans and Shamil in that period see Mustafa Budak, 
1988. “1853-56 Kırım Harbi Başlarında Doğu-Anadolu-Kafkasya Cephesi ve Şeyh Şamil,” 
Kafkasya Araştırmaları I, İstanbul, 52-8. 
133 For some of the letters of Shamil see Pertev Boratav, July-December 1969. “La Russie dans les 
Archives Ottomanes in Dossier Ottoman sur L’Imam Chamil,” Chairs du monde Russe et 
Sovietique, 10(3/4): 524-535. Moshe Gammer, 1991. “Imam Shamil and Shah Mohammed: Two 
Unpublished Letters,” Central Asian Survey, 10(1/2): 171-79. Masayuki Yama’uchi, 1985. ‘I. From 
Ottoman Archives,’ Central Asian Survey, 4(4): 7-12. And also see 1985. “Shamil: New Documents 
and Correspondence,” Central Asian Survey, 4 (4): 1-5. 
134 Gammer, Muslim Resistance, 272. 
135 Moshe Gammer, 1994. “Price Bariatinskii –Conqueror of the Eastern Caucasus,” Central Asian 
Survey, 13(2): 237-247.  
136 For the life of Shamil after his capture see Austin Lee Jersild, 1995. “Who was Shamil?: Russian 
Colonial Rule and Sufi Islam in the North Caucasus, 1859-1917,” Central Asian Survey, 14(2): 205-
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In conclusion, the Imams, Sheikh Shamil, in particular, within a period less 
than fifty years, through a well-defined set of rules of conduct changed the values 
and existing social and political structure of the North Caucasus. At the root of 
these changes there was one main motive: Islam. The Islamic identity that was 
shaped by the orthodox version of Naqshbandiya, mainly as a result of Russian 
assaults which aimed to colonize the region, transformed and politicised itself and 
took the shape of struggle of independence. Nevertheless, in addition to the 
Russians, Shamil had to struggle with the local powers and some of his rival 
groups. Thus, in order to remove those groups Shamil initiated a series of reforms 
and replaced the existing political and social order with a new one. In this process 
the Shari’a was the main guide. Through the basic principles of Shari’a and his 
nizams, Shamil, for the first time in the North Caucasus established a 
comprehensive and well functioning state structure and spread his authority almost 
all over the North Caucasus. 
                                                                                                                                       
223; Mücahit, August 1953. “İmam Şamil Mekke ve Medinede,” Birleşik Kafkasya (Vereinigtes 
Kaukasien), (Munich), 8 (25): 9-11; Zelkina, God and Freedom, 233-4. 
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CHAPTER II 
RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
NORTH CAUCASIAN MOUNTAIN REPUBLIC 
1-From Revolution to Revolution: February-December 1917: 
After the defeat of Shamil, Russian operations and the Mountaineers’ 
struggle continued in the western parts of the North Caucasus until 1864.137 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming dominance of the Russians, with a half-million 
strong army, made the struggle a futile effort. Most of the Circassian population, 
because of the ruthless Russian repression, was forced to immigrate to the Ottoman 
Empire and dispersed throughout the territories from the Balkans to the Middle 
East.138 
“…[S]ome Circassian leaders advocated departure to Turkey and obtained 
the agreement of the Ottoman government for an orderly settlement in 
Anatolia. It was not only bayonets that urged on this wave of migration but 
also religious provocation, deliberately supported by the Russian 
government, which finally caused mass psychosis which gripped not only 
the Circassians but also the other North Caucasians.”139 
 
Therefore, by the last quarter of the 19th century, the Russians managed to 
suppress and subjugate the region. They settled the Cossacks and other Russian 
populations in the North Caucasus, and severely changed the balance of population 
and power in favour of the Russian Empire. As a consequence, disturbances broke 
                                                 
137 A. Namitok, 1956. “The “Voluntary” Adherence of Kabarda (Eastern Circassia) to 
Russia,”Caucasian Review, (Munich), 2: 17-33. Ramazan Traho, 1991. ‘Circassians,’ Central Asian 
Survey, 10(1/2): 40-49. 
138 See Chapter I, footnote 23. 
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out in entire North Caucasus in 1865, 1877, 1898 and 1906 that resulted in the 
arrival of new refugees from the North Caucasus to the Ottoman lands. 
In the central parts and in Dagestan, the Naqshbandiya, the ideological 
driving force lost its leadership cadre, which weakened it’s struggle of 
independence. Despite the appearance of a new religious order Qadiriya140, 
intended to revive the struggle, the Russians easily defeated it and encouraged the 
massive emigration of the Chechens and Ingush to the Ottoman Empire. From then 
until 1917, the Sufi brotherhood discarded the idea of ghazavat and open 
resistance, and developed an underground, semi-clandestine character. However, 
when the opportunity to rebel against the Russians presented itself, they took the 
lead to organize the masses.141 
The leaders of the Mountaineers in exile and the North Caucasians took part 
in every kind of anti-Russian movements and wars, led primarily by the Ottomans. 
In 1877-78 the Mountaineers, headed by Ghazi Muhammed Shamil, Sheikh 
Shamil’s son and Musa Kundukhov Paşa142, engaged in the most determined 
                                                                                                                                       
139 Ramazan Traho, “Circassians,” 46. For an interesting account of voluntary emigration see Musa 
Kundukov, 1978. General Musa Kundukov’un Anıları, trnsl. Murat Yağan, İstanbul: Kafkas Kültür 
Derneği. 
140 The Qadiriya was founded in Bagdad by Abd al-Qadir al-Ghilani in the second half of 12th 
century and brought to the North Caucasus by a Kumuk, Kunta Haji Kishiev in early 1850s. But, he 
was obliged to leave the region because of the hostility of Naqshbandiya towards his pacifist 
sermons. He returned in 1861, after the surrender of Shamil and enjoyed immediate success in 
Chechnya, Avar lands and the northern Dagestan. Then because of the unrest in Chechnya in 1863-
64, the Russian administration arrested him. He was not tried but simply declared insane and 
banished to a prison hospital, where he died in 1867. See, Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders 
Wimbush, 1985. Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union, London: C. Hurst, 9-11. 
141 Marie Bennigsen Broxup, 1992. “The Last Ghazawat: The 1920-1921 Uprising,” in The North 
Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World, ed. by. M. B. Broxup, 
London: C. Hurst, 112-145. 
142 Musa Kundukhov, (1818-?), an Osetian. He was born in the aul of Sanib in the North Caucasus. 
In 1830 he was sent to the Petersburg Pavlovsky Corps to receive a military education. After 6 
years, he graduated as an officer of the cavalry. In 1837 he was the interpreter of Emperor Nicholas 
I during his visit to the Caucasus. After his participation in several wars he became a general in the 
Russian Army. And he was appointed head of the Osetian, and later Chechen military regions and 
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battles on the Caucasian front, but the Ottomans eventually lost the war and the 
Mountaineers’ dream of establishing their own state was left unfulfilled.143 
Moreover with the conclusion of the Berlin Treaty, the Ottomans gave up Kars, 
Ardahan and Batum, and the remaining Mountaineers lost their contact with the 
Ottoman lands and the North Caucasian emigrants. 
 
During this period of time the Russians ruled the region with a military 
governor and considered the Mountaineers to be savages or primitive peoples, who 
could not be educated. They generally left the Mountaineers alone and were 
cautious about interfering with the local traditions and customary law. As a result, 
Dagestan remained a religious centre and within the religious schools Arabic was 
taught. 
By the beginning of the 20th century, initially, the Russians tried to establish 
local schools that used native languages transliterated into Cyrillic script. 
Nevertheless, in order to create a pro-Russian population, the Russian authorities 
discarded this idea and Russian language schools replaced these native language 
schools. As Broxup put it, on the eve of the Revolution, there were only 93 
government schools which has thought in Russian and “these schools were able to 
barely educate small number of natives as the clerks and minor officials.”144 
Beyond thıs, unlike the case among most of the other Muslim peoples of the 
                                                                                                                                       
worked with all the Russian commanders-in-chief in Caucasus in time. But, becoming disenchanted 
with the Russian rule in the region, he immigrated to Ottoman lands with his people. He was also 
promoted to the rank of Paşa in the Ottoman Army. See General Musa Kundukov’un Anıları, and 
Ramazan Traho, “Circassians”. 
143 For the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 see W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, 1953. Caucasian 
Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, Cambridge: 
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Russian Empire, it is difficult to talk about the existence, or the effects, of any kind 
of reformist movement in the region. Moreover, we have no concrete information 
related to the effects of the main reformist movement of Russian Muslims 
‘Cedidzm’ on the peoples of the North Caucasus.145 Thus, beyond the small groups 
of elites who belonged to privileged and wealthier families educated in Russian 
schools, the Mountaineers did not create a class of intelligentsia who could lead the 
society. 
 
When the February Revolution broke out, there was a handful of people 
who had a modern European education, most of them whom studied in Russian 
schools. This so-called ‘intelligentsia’ or ‘elite’ tended to have close relations with 
Russian circles and, can be classed into two distinct groupings, each having almost 
diametrically opposed world outlooks. The first group was aligned with the leftist 
Russian political parties, especially the Socialist Revolutionary party, and the other 
consisted mostly of middle-ranking officials belonging to the influential nobility 
who were faithful to the Tsar and the Russian Empire. Beyond their reputation, 
which ıs carried almost exclusively by their family name, these people had almost 
no contacts with the masses.146 In addition to these groups, there was a group of 
wealthier landowners and merchants who had a basis among the peoples of the 
North Caucasus. These groups carried out their political works within the Russian 
                                                                                                                                       
Cambridge University Press, 105-201 and for the Mountaineers’ part in this war see Musa 
Kundukov. 
144 Broxup, 120-121. 
145 For Cedidizm and its effects, primarily on Crimean Tatars see Hakan Kırımlı, 1996. National 
Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars, 1905-1916, Leiden: E.J. Brill. 
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political parties and local non-political charity organizations, like Dagestan Islamic 
Charity Organization147. Beyond these groups, as was the case in the other parts 
and among the other peoples of the Caucasus, there were no Bolsheviks and thus 
Bolshevik organization among the North Caucasian Mountaineers.148 
Because of this diversity it seemed difficult to establish an earnest and 
unified nationalist organization in the North Caucasus during that period. The 
political milieu in the empire, however, forced at least some of the intellectuals to 
think about the situation in Russia and its effects in the North Caucasus. Thus on 
19 March 1917149, several respected North Caucasian intellectuals, most of whom 
were lawyers educated in St. Petersburg, created a ‘Provisional Central Committee 
of the Mountaineers of the Caucasus’ in Vladikavkaz.150. It was presided over by a 
Socialist Revolutionary Bassiat Abayevich Chakhanov, a Balkar. This Committee, 
which aimed to organise a general congress of Mountaineers and establish an 
                                                                                                                                       
146 İ. Berkuk (Berkok), September 1934. “Büyük Harpte [334] Şimalî Kafkasyadaki Faaliyetlerimiz 
ve 15. Fırkanın Harekâtı ve Muharebeleri,” 94 Sayılı Askerî Mecmua’nın Tarih Kısmı, (İstanbul), 
35: 15. Hereafter “15. Fırkanın Harekâtı”. 
147 Mustafa Beştoy, May/July 1965. “Ahmet Avar’la Bir Mülakat,” Birleşik Kafkasya, (İstanbul), 4: 
49-51. For the emergence and the course of political organizations and activities in early 20th 
century see Severnyi Kavkaz v Period Revoliutsii 1905-1907gg: Mezhvuzovskii sbornik statei, 1981. 
Krasnodar: Kubanskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet. 
148 A. Magoma, January/March 1954. “Kafkas Katliamının X. Yıldönümü,” Birleşik Kafkasya 
(Vereinigtes Kaukasien), (Munich), 1/3 (30/32): 6. Balo Bilatti, February/March 1966. “Şimali 
Kafkasya ve 11 Mayıs 1918,” Birleşik Kafkasya, (İstanbul), 7: 6-11. 
149 See Compte-Rendu des Assemblées des Peuples de la Ciscaucasie et de leurs Travaux 
Legislatifs, 1918. Constantinople: Publié par le Comité des Emigrés Politiques de la Ciscaucasie en 
Turquie, p V. Hereafter, Compte-Rendu. D. Halidov, “Istoricheskaia Spravka o Gorskoy Respublike 
11 Maia 1918 goda i Politiko-pravovye Aspektı Anneksii Gorskoy Respubliki” in Sbornik 
Materialov 1-i Nauchno-prakticheskoi Konferentsii na Temu: «Istoriia Gorskikh Narodov Kavkaza 
(1917-1920 gg) i Nezavisimaia Gorskaia Respublika 11 Maia 1918 goda» (Makhackala, 1992), p 
55. Hereafter, Sbornik. 
150 Compte-Rendu, V and Kurtatag, 26 March 1927. “Istoricheskie Zadachi Gortsev Kavkaza,” 
Vol’nye Gortsy, (Prague), 1: 5. Hereafter “Zadachi”. 
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umbrella organization, consisted of 16 members, most of whom were liberal and 
wealthier landowners and socialists.151  
 
A-The First Congress of the Peoples of the North Caucasus: 
The Provisional Committee managed to convene the First Congress of the 
Peoples of the North Caucasus in d’Olynski gymnasium in Vladikavkaz between 1-
7 May 1917.152 This Congress, with the participation of more than 300 delegates, 
was the first overall meeting of Mountaineers from the shores of the Black Sea, to 
the Caspian. Representatives of the Circassians, Dagestanis, the Abkhaz, and even 
the Turkmens and Nogays took part. Moreover, on behalf of the State Duma, M. A. 
Karaulov, a Cossack, and N. N. Nicolayev; representatives of the Armenians, 
Azerbaijanis; representatives of the Soldiers and the Social Democrats joined the 
Congress and made speeches. 
The delegates to the Congress, after questioning the Tsarist administration 
and oppression, defined the Revolution as a ‘miracle’ and utilized the mottos of the 
French Revolution, ‘liberty, equality, and fraternity’ in each and every occasion. In 
line with that, the basic aim of the Congress emerged as the establishment of a 
union of all the peoples of the North Caucasus, including Nogays and Turkmens. 
                                                 
151 The members were Abdulmejid Tapa Chermoev [Çermoy], Prince Reshid Khan Kaplanov, 
Beshir Dalgat, General T. Ukurov, S. Kochenov, Tavsultan Chakmanov [Şakman], Tajeddin 
Pensulayev, M. Chermoev, S. Thostov, G. Ahriev, Ch. Arsamakov, Prince T. Alhazov, B. Lianov, 
A. Khanukov and I. Abayev. Compte-Rendu, V-VI and 136-7. G. K. I. Kakagasanov also given 
these names, except M. Chermoev, S. Thostov, G. Ahriev and Ch. Arsamakov in “Pervye O’ezdy 
Gortsev Severnogo Kavkaza i Dagestana/Politicheskaia Platforma, Programma i Konstitutsiia 
Gortsev Severnogo Kavkaza i Dagestana,” in Sbornik, 11-23. 
152 Compte-Rendu, and Kurtatag, p. 5. Also see, Dr. Edige Kırımal, May 1953. “Şimali 
Kafkasya’nın İstiklalinin 1918 Yılında Türk ve Alman Matbuatındaki Akisleri,” Birleşik Kafkasya 
(Vereinigtes Kaukasien), (Munich), 5 (22): 7-12. A. Magoma, January-March 1954. “Kafkas 
Katliamının X. Yıldönümü,” Birleşik Kafkasya (Vereinigtes Kaukasien), (Munich), 1/3 (30/32): 4-8 
Hereafter “Katliam”. 
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They believed that all the rights and freedoms that were attained as a result of the 
February Revolution could became absolute. In this Congress, through different 
commissions153, Mountaineers tried to analyze each and every aspect of the 
possible state structure and daily life of the Mountaineers. Moreover, as it was 
stressed by one of the delegates, through the Congress “the peoples of the North 
Caucasus that are differentiated from the perspective of language, are, now getting 
together and uniting on the basis of philosophy of life, traditions and customs and 
common interests.”154 
At the end of the Congress, Mountaineers proclaimed the establishment of 
the Alliance of the Unified Mountaineers of the North Caucasus and Dagestan 
(Soyuza Ob’edinennikh Gortsev Severnogo Kavkaza i Dagestana).155 In this 
framework, the Congress prepared a political program and a draft Constitution156, 
in which the Alliance accepted itself as a constituent part of Russia, and 
undoubtedly agreed with the ideals of the Revolution. In addition, until the 
convocation of the new Russian Constituent Assembly, it recognized the 
Provisional Government in St. Petersburg as the sole legitimate authority and 
declared their commitment to continuing war, and opposition to any kind of 
counter-revolutionary activity.157 
The first and the foremost priority of the Congress was the establishment of 
a Federal-Democratic state structure in Russia. Within the program, Mountaineers 
                                                 
153 Political and social, agricultural, judicial, religious or spiritual, educational and financial 
commissions. Compte-Rendu, 48. 
154 Barasbi Baytugan, 1970. “Kuzey Kafkasya,” Dergi, (Munich), 16(61): 8. 
155 B. O. Kashkaev, 1963. Bor’ba za Sovety v Dagestane (1917-1920 gody), Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoy Literatury, 39. Hereafter Bor’ba. 
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defined Russia as a ‘big mosaic’ and demanded autonomy and self-governance for 
their own territories. Therefore, the Congress was asking for the North Caucasus, to 
be accepted as a separate member of the new federal-republican Russian 
government, and for the restoration of the territories of the peoples of the North 
Caucasus which were confiscated by the Russian Treasury.158 
In order to administer the affairs of the newly established Alliance 
constitutionally, the Congress proposed the formation of a ‘Representative 
Committee’ and of a ‘Central Committee’ (Tsentral’nyi Komitet) as the Alliance’s 
legislative and executive bodies respectively. 
In compliance with the principle of one delegate for every 15,000159 people, 
17 names, representing different constituent parts of the Alliance, were chosen as 
the members of the Central Committee.160 It is interesting to note that this 
committee is a reflection of the strong will of all the different peoples to form a 
comprehensive union, the representatives of the different peoples of the North 
Caucasus, who had different ideological and political stances were elected to the 
Central Committee. Some pro-socialist names like B. A. Chakhanov and Makhach 
                                                                                                                                       
156 For the full text of political platform and program see Sbornik, appendix no. 2: 71-74. For the 
analysis of the Congress see Ali Sultan, May 1934. “11 Mayis 1918,” Şimali Kafkasya/Severnyı 
Kavkaz, (Warsaw), 1: 3. For the text of the Constitution see Compte-Rendu, 139-144. 
157 Compte-Rendu, 139. 
158 Compte-Rendu, 16-18. 
159 See Compte-Rendu, 54 and B. O. Kashkaev, 1972. Ot Fevralya k Oktyabriu (Natsional’no-
Osvoboditel’noe Dvizhenie v Dagestane, Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 35. Hereafter Ot 
Fevralya. 
160 As the representatives of the province of Dagestan; B. Dalgat, Makhach Dakhadayev, Nuh Bey 
Tarkovskiy, Haydar Bammatov, Zubeyr Temirhanov, and Efendiyev. From the province of Terek; 
Pshemaho Kotsev (as the representative of the Kabardinians), M. Mollayev (Balkars), R. H. 
Kaplanov (Kumuks), A. T. Chermoev (Chechens), Vassan Girey Jabagiev (the Ingush), El. Britayev 
(Osetians). As a representative of the Karachays, Halid-Haji Erkenov; for Nogays M. Muhsinov and 
for the Abkhaz S. Bassaria. The names that would have represent Circassians, Abazins and the 
peoples of the Zakatala region would have been nominated later on by the peoples of the each 
region. Compte-Rendu, 153-154. 
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Dakhadayev161; nationalists Haydar Bammat162, Abdulmejid Chermoev163 and 
Vassan-Girey Jabagiev164; and some former pro-Tsarist military names like Reshid 
Khan Kaplanov and Nuh Bek Tarkovskiy165 could easily find a place in this Central 
Committee. 
The basic task of the Committee was the creation of a consciousness, 
among the Mountaineers of the North Caucasus, about the basic principles of the 
Revolution, and in this context, to prepare the population for elections to the 
Russian Constituent Assembly. This meant securing the election of the ‘genuine’ 
representatives of the Mountaineers to the Constituent Assembly. More than that 
the committee was responsible “to ensure order within the Union and maintain 
good relations with the surrounding Caucasian nations.”166 
                                                 
161 Makhach (Magomed Ali) Dakhadayev, (1882-1918), Avar. He was born in the village of 
Untsukul. He married with sheikh Shamil’s grand-daughter Nefiset. After 1905 Revolution, because 
of his socialist ideas, exiled outside of the North Caucasian territory. After the February Revolution 
he became one of the most ardent Bolsheviks and the first president of the Communist organization 
in Dagestan. After his death, the city of Port Petrovsk was renamed as Makhachkale in his 
memoriam in 1921. 
162 Haydar Bammat (1890-1965), Kumuk. He was born in Temir Khan Shura. After his basic 
education in Stavropol he studied law in St. Petersburg. Before the Revolution he had been working 
as a civil officer at the office Caucasian Viceroy. 
163 Abdulmejid (Tapa) Chermoev [Çermoy] (1882-1937), Chechen. He was born in Grozny as a son 
of Tsarist Army General. After his basic education in Vladikavkaz he graduated from the Russian 
Military School and he served in the Tsar’s Special Guard Regiment as a military officer in 
Petersburg between 1901 and 1908. Then he returned the North Caucasus and struggled for the right 
of Mountaineers to hold land in oil rich parts of the North Caucasus prior to 1917. And he became 
one of the most prominent Muslim oil tycoons. 
164 Vassan-Girey Jabagiev [Jabagi or Cabaği] (1882-1961), Ingush. He was born in the village of 
Nasır-yurt. He studied at the Russian Lyceum of Vladikavkaz, at the Polytechnic Institute of Riga 
and at the University of Jena in Germany where he received a Ph.D. in Agronomy in 1908. This 
earned him a position as an agricultural economist for the Ministry of Agriculture in St Petersburg, 
from 1908 to 1917. There he struggled for the right of Mountaineers and together with the Muslim 
deputies of the Duma achieved some success in forcing changes in local administrative practices. 
165 He was the representative of the ancient house of the Shamkal of Tarku who, for some centuries 
until the Russian conquest, had ruled the maritime Dagestan from the mouth of the Sulak as far 
south as the district of Kayakent. 
166 Haidar Bammate, 1929. Le Caucase et la Revolution Russe (Aspect Politique), Paris: l’Union 
Nationale des émigrés de la Republique du Caucase du Nord, 38. For this text’s English translation, 
1991. “The Caucasus and the Russian Revolution (from a Political Viewpoint),” Central Asian 
Survey, 10(4): 14. 
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The other important reference point for participants of the Congress was 
Islam. Islam, as was the case in Shamil’s period, was still one of the most 
important determinants of the Mountaineer identity. During the Congress, on every 
occasion, each speaker made reference to Islam and the Islamic brotherhood. 
Moreover, the prominent religious leaders, i. e., sheikhs and mullahs from different 
sections of the region took an active part in the Congress and, through the 
Religious (or Spiritual) Commission, analyzed the religious issues and Shari’a 
thoroughly, and submitted a report to the Congress.167 
In addition to the colourful Central Committee, a ‘Clerical Council’ under 
the leadership of Najmuddin Gotsinskiy168 was established and given the power to 
tackle spiritual issues.169 
The Congress, in general, served as a discussion platform for the different 
groups, from socialists to tariqats, and played a role, at least for a time, to coalesce 
these groups on the main ideology of North Caucasians: unification. The North 
Caucasus defined the rights and interests of all North Caucasian peoples, regardless 
of ethnic differences, as one and the same. From this perspective, the Congress 
could have been accepted as successful, and by the end of the congress, at least the 
participants thought they were showing to the entire world that the North Caucasus 
                                                 
167 For the report of the Spiritual Commission see Compte-Rendu, 80-91. 
168 He also called as Sheikh Najmuddin of Hotso. He was born in 1860 as the son of a naib of 
Shamil, Dano Magoma, who surrendered to the Russians and later, sided with them during the 1877 
uprising. Gotsinskiy was a distinguished Arabist and a talented poet. Having finished his education 
he joined the horse guards of the tsarist governor, was nominated a judge of the Dagestani National 
tribunal, and later became the ‘chief naib’ of the Koysubul region. In 1903, he spent three months in 
İstanbul, after which he was regarded by the Russian administration as an emissary of the Ottomans 
and was suspected because of several uprisings in 1905 and 1913 by the Russians. 
169 The names of other members of the Council were as follows: Kadı Abdulbeshir Dadayev 
Kazanichskiy and Kadı Jemaleddin Karabudakhtinskiy from the province of Dagestan; Abubakir 
Tsalikov (Osetian), Ilyas Akgaliev (Ingush), Hasan Haji and Abdulkadir Haji (Chechens), Alikhan 
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was “one and vigorous nation”,170 which did not discrimination on ground of race 
and religion. 
 
After the formation of the Alliance, the Central Committee faced two 
immediate problems: land and the army. A solution to the former problem, 
according to Pshemaho Kotsev171, would only be possible with the solution of the 
latter.172 By May 1917, the Central Committee still had almost no military power of 
its own and apparently the existence of deserting Russian soldiers from the 
Caucasian front was threatening the North Caucasus.173 
As an immediate and basic solution, the Central Committee decided to ask 
the new Russian administration for the return of the Caucasian Cavalry Division, 
which consisted of 6 regiments174, to the homelands. To this end, the Central 
Committee issued a declaration and authorized Kotsev to carry out negotiations 
with the Russian Provisional Government on 30 June 1917.175 He talked with 
Kerensky but failed to ensure the return of the Division. Kornilov’s unexpected 
coup attempt made the return of the Division possible only in October 1917. 
                                                                                                                                       
Chaganov (Kabardian) from the province of Terek; Abdulsalih Tangatarov from the province of 
Stavropol. 
170 Aziz Meker, August 1953. “Kafkas,” Kafkas Dergisi, (İstanbul), 1(8): 9. Hereafter “Kafkas,”. 
171 Pshemaho Kotsev [Kosok], (1887-1962), Kabardian. He was born in Nalchik. He studied law in 
St Petersburg. Before the revolution he had been working as a lawyer in Yekaterinodar and after the 
February Revolution, in order to join the Congress, he came to Vladikavkaz. 
172 P. Kosok [Kotsev], 1955. “Revolution and Sovietization in the North Caucasus,” Caucasian 
Review, (Munich), 1: 47-54 and 1956, 3: 45-53. Hereafter Revolution and Sovietization I and II 
respectively. 
173 Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization I,” 50-51. 
174 The North Caucasian Cavalry Regiment, which was established during the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1905 and because of its success it was enlarged to a Division, that was consisted of 6 regiments: 
the Dagestani, Kabardian, Chechen, Circassian, Ingush and Tatar. Mikhail Aleksandrovich, the 
Tsar’s brother commanded this Division, until General Bagration replaced him. The last commander 
of the Division was General Polovtsev. See İ. Natırboff, 1955. “The Circassians’ Part in the Civil 
War,” Caucasian Review, (Munich), 1: 138. 
175 Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization I,” 52. 
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Despite the contradicting attitudes of some officers, the majority of members of the 
Division constituted the main combating force of the Mountaineers.176 On the other 
hand, finding a solution to the land problem was more hardened issue and within 
this early period the Central Committee could, in fact, do nothing. 
 
B-The Second Congress: 
The Central Committee, during the First Congress, had planned to convene 
the Second Congress of the Mountaineers in the village of Andi in September 
1917, in remembrance of Imam Shamil. It is important to note that, with the aim of 
electing delegates for the Second Congress, local meetings preceded this Congress 
during August 1917, and the members of the Central Committee were assigned to 
these meetings.177 
Nevertheless, the gathering of a mass of 20,000 people that was provoked 
by “the Muslim clergy, particularly of Nazhmuddin Gotsinskiy and Uzun –khadzhi, 
in order to demand that the independence of the Northern Caucasus be immediately 
proclaimed” and the threat of the newly emerging Communist elements headed by 
Celâl Korkmazov178 made the convening of Congress in Andi impossible.179 
 
                                                 
176 For the role of the Cavalry and the Mountaineers in the Kornilov affair see Aytek Namitok, 
December 1958. “Ekim Devrimi’nin Çatıştığı Yollarda Kuzey Kafkasya Fırkası,” Yeni Kafkas, 
(İstanbul), 2(12): 82-5. Also see Natırboff, and Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization I”. 
177 Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization II,” 46-7. 
178 Celâl Korkmazov (1879-1938), Kumuk. He was born in the village of Kumtorkala. Because of 
his revolutionary activities in 1905 he exiled to Olonest but until 1917 lived in Paris and studied in 
Sorbonne. Following the February Revolution he turned back and participated to the Bolshevik 
Party. 
179 Related with the convention of the Second Congress there was a contradicting information. 
Several sources were given the date truly but, varying in the place, that is while some were giving 
Vladikavkaz, the others put the place as Andi. See Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization II,” 47; 
Kashkaev, Ot Fevralya, 42 and Kakagasanov, 19. 
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“The members of the Central Committee held a meeting and concluded that 
with such a crowd it would be impossible for the congress of accredited 
delegates to meet. …It was decided that the congress itself would be held in 
Vedeno and the delegates would return there from Andi.”180 
 
This Congress was being perceived as the revitalization of the period and of 
the state of Imam Shamil, which was interrupted by the capture of Shamil181, and 
the Constitution of the Union, which was prepared by the First Congress, was 
finalized and ratified. The basic provisions and the charter on the basis of civil 
codes and local traditions were prepared. Najmuddin Gotsinskiy was elected as the 
Mufti of the entire population of the North Caucasus and Dagestan.182 Following 
the formation of the new Central Committee, which was consisted of five 
members, under the leadership of Abdulmejid Chermoev, the works of the 
Congress was ended.183 
In this early period the leaders of the movement, despite their varying 
ideologies had worked towards the ideal of establishing a unified administrative 
structure that would encompass the entire North Caucasus within a federal-
democratic Russia. In order to represent the rights and interest of the North 
Caucasian peoples in the best manner possible they tried to create a unified body. 
 
                                                 
180 Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization II,” 47. 
181 Ahmed Magoma, 1957. “Komünistlerin İmam Şamil Hakkında Fikir Değiştirmeleri ve Onun 
Sebepleri,” Dergi, (Munich), 3(8): 28, Hereafter ‘Şamil’ and Aziz Meker, “Kafkas,” 10. 
182 The other names which were elected as Najmuddin Gotsinskiy’s religious staff as follows: Ali 
Haji Akushinskiy, Hasan Efendi Kakhibskiy, Abusufiyan Kazanishchenskiy, Ulagay Kadi 
Urakhinskiy and Ali Kadi Kayaev. Kashkaev, Ot Fevralya, 45. 
183 For the passed resolutions of the Congress see Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization II,” 47-8. 
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C-Cossacks and the Mountaineers: 
By September, nevertheless, the situation in the North Caucasus, in line 
with Russia in general, became more problematic. It is important to note that the 
Mountaineers were not alone in their struggle of self-governance within the North 
Caucasian territory. The forced emigration of the Mountaineers and the forced 
settlement of the Cossack and Russian populations already changed the 
demographic balance of the region. The living standards of the Cossacks were 
much higher than that of the Mountaineers. They were also better educated, had 
more land and greater privileges, and more importantly retained their military 
organizations.184 After the revolution in February, through their own representative 
assemblies, called Krug in the Don and Rada in the Kuban, the Cossacks already 
started their own struggle in the region.185 
The Central Committee of the Union of the Mountaineers had been 
following the activities of the Cossacks closely and had close contacts with the 
newly establishing Cossack organizations. On the eve of the Bolshevik coup, the 
Central Committee officially asked for negotiations with the Cossacks in 
Vladikavkaz. As a result, in the same month, October 1917, the Alliance of the 
Mountain Peoples and the Terek Military Government established a new political 
                                                 
184 In the course of the time, in late eighteen century the Cossacks lost their autonomy. And more 
than that, the central government no longer allowed them to choose their atamans. Nevertheless, 
because of their primary role as the main servants of the Russian Tsars during the expansion of the 
Russian Empire towards southward, they allowed organizing themselves into eleven voiskas (an 
autonomous territory or community in which there were no class distinctions and no private land)–
Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan, Ural, Orenburg, Siberia, Transbaikal, Semirechie, Amur and Ussuri. 
Among them the Don and the Kuban were by far the most important. See James Bunyan and H. H. 
Fisher, 1934. The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918. Documents and Materials, California: Stanford 
University Press, 401-402. Peter Kenez, 1971. Civil War in South Russia, 1918: The First Year of 
the Volunteer Army, Berkeley: University of California Press, 37-39. 
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body, Terek-Dagestan Government (Tersko-Dagestanskoe Pravitel’stvo)186, (which 
was to join the Southeastern Union (Yugo-vostochniy soyuz),187 to counter the 
Bolshevik threat.  The objectives of this new organ were the same as those of the 
congresses of Mountaineers and Cossacks previously determined: the 
establishment of the Russian Federal Democratic Republic, the approval of the 
autonomous position of the constituent members, and establishing administrative 
order over the territories of the new organ.188 
 
However, this new government did not last long. The Bolshevik coup took 
place, and on 6 November 1917, the Central Committee together with the Military 
Government of Terek Cossacks issued an extraordinary resolution.189 They 
abolished their stillborn government, or union, and shared the responsibilities and 
sovereignty over their own regions with unclarified borders.190 Then the majority 
of the Terek Cossacks, fearing that they would have to cede part of their land to the 
Mountaineers began to support the Bolsheviks. Thus, in November 1917 the 
                                                                                                                                       
185 Olga Andriewsky, spring 1979. “The Triumph of Particularism: The Kuban Cossacks in 1917,” 
Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies, 6: 29-41. Also see W. G. Glaskow, 1972. History of the 
Cossacks, New York: R. Speller and Sons, 98-132. 
186 In that government, from the side of the Mountaineers, Pshemaho Kotsev, Haydar Bammatov, 
Reshid Khan Kaplanov, Vassan Girey Jabagiev, B. Malachkhanov, Ibrahim Haydarov, H. 
Shakhsuvarov and A. Butayev were chosen as the ministers, and Ali Khan Kantemir was nominated 
as the Speaker of the Parliament. Sbornik, 57; and Kashkaev, Ot Fevralya, 229-232. 
187 Richard Pipes, 1997. The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-
1923. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge Un. Press, 97 and Kurtatag, “Zadachi,” 5-6. Related 
with the formation of this union also see Sefer E. Berzeg, November/January 1964-1965. “General 
Sultan Kılıç Girey (1917-1921 Yıllarında Kuzey Kafkasya- Bolşevik Rusya Mücadelelerinden 
Sahneler),” Birleşik Kafkasya, (İstanbul), 2: 50. Mirza Bala, 1958. “Kafkasya İstiklâl İlânının 
Kırkıncı Yıldönümü Münasebetile,” Dergi, (Munich), 4(12): 9. 
188 Sbornik, 56-57. 
189 Sbornik, appendix no. 3, 75. This resolution was being signed by M. A. Karaulov, B.I. Abramov, 
D. I. Elanskiy, S. A Cherkasov, D. S. Tkachev and M. I. Gujev on behalf of Cossacks, and A. T. 
Chermoev, P. Kotsev, T. Alhazov, R Kaplanov, V. G. Jabagiev and T. Pensulayev on behalf of the 
Central Committee. 
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clashes between the Chechen-Ingush and Cossacks erupted over land dispute and 
these groups started to distance themselves from each other.191 
 
2-From Central Committee to Provisional Government: November 1917-
March 1918: 
On 15 November1917, in response to the above mentioned developments, 
the Central Committee of the Alliance of the Peoples of the North Caucasus, 
depending on the provisions of the Second Congress and its Constitution, decided 
to set up a republican-federal state structure in the territory of the North Caucasus. 
In compliance with the principles of self-determination and self-government, this 
new state structure was proclaimed one of the sovereign constituent members of the 
newly established Russian Federal Republic. The Central Committee renamed 
itself the ‘Provisional Government’ of this new state and elected Abdulmejid 
Chermoev as its president. This Provisional Government, according to the 
declaration, would have absolute executive power in the territory until such time as 
a new democratic centralized government was set up in Russia and accepted by all 
its component parts.192 
Throughout November and December 1917, the Provisional Government of 
the North Caucasian Mountaineers tried to establish contact with its constituent 
                                                                                                                                       
190 By issuing a Declaration on 1 December, the Cossacks of the Kuban Voiska were going to be 
established the Kuban Republic and its government under the leadership of L. L. Bych. See James 
Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, 404 
191 Pipes, Formation, 97-98 and Stephen Blank, 1994. The Sorcerer as Apprentice, Stalin as 
Commissar of Nationalities, 1917-1924, Westport: Greenwood Press, 37. Hereafter Sorcerer. 
192 Vassan-Giray Cabaği [Jabagiev], 1967. Kafkas-Rus Mücadelesi, İstanbul: Bahar Matbaası, 84, 
and Vassan-Giray Jabagi (Cabagi)[Jabagiev], 1991. “Revolution and Civil War in the North 
Caucasus –End of the 19th- Beginning of the 20th Century,” Central Asian Survey, 10(1/2): 121. 
Also see Meker, “Kafkasya,” 13. 
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members and with the Cossacks. It defined its borders as those along the territories 
of Dagestan, six administrative units or the okrugs of the Tsarist Russia with a 
significant Mountaineer population, Karanogay area (uchastok) of the Terek district 
and, Nogay and Turkmen territories of the Stavropol guberniya. Zakatala193 and 
Sukhum regions194 were also defined as the natural parts of this new state but the 
final decision was temporarily abandoned by the Zakatala and Abkhaz national 
committees, which were under the control of Transcaucasian Government.195 But in 
fact, the newly established Mountaineer government was far from taking necessary 
security measures and establishing law and order over its territories. The Central 
Committee still had no insufficient military power and failed to establish its own 
national army. Thus, in order to stop military clashes, secure its borders and 
guarantee its citizens’ rights, the Mountaineer government tried to negotiate a 
friendship treaty and alliance with the Cossacks. Nevertheless, both groups had 
claims of sovereignty over the same territories, and thus, there was no excuse to 
clash on other grounds. 
 
Following the formation of the Bolshevik government in November, 
throughout the last months of 1917, the course of events in the North Caucasus 
changed seriously. In addition to the Mountaineer-Cossacks clashes, and the 
                                                 
193 In Zakatala region the overwhelming majority of the population was Avar who were settled in 
the region by Shamil after his capture of the territory from the Georgians. 
194 As it was pointed out above, Simon Basarya had joined the First Congress and placed in the 
Central Committee as a representative of the Abkhaz. However, the situation was more complex. 
The status of the Sukhum region still remained in question. Within the same period, the Abkhaz 
were struggling for the establishment of politically independent Abkhazia by all means within the 
Transcaucasian Federation. See Avtandil Menteshasvili, 1995. Trouble in the Caucasus, New York: 
Nova Science Publishers. 
195 Kurtatag, “Zadachi,” 7, and Sbornik, appendix no. 4, 76. Also see Cabaği, Kafkas-Rus 
Mücadelesi, 85. 
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emerging Bolshevik Caucuses, the reality of the dominance of anti-Bolshevik 
currents, particularly the Mensheviks and SRs, turned the Caucasus into the centre 
of the counter-revolutionaries. 
 
The elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly took place on 13 
November 1917196. Nevertheless, because of the Cossack Russian majority, which 
was enhanced by the participation of deserting soldiers, the North Caucasians failed 
to win representation ın the Assembly.197 It is important to note that this meant that 
the Mountaineers’ did not have a voice at the Russian Constituent Assembly. This 
contravened the principles of the congresses, and thus at the end of December, a 
provisional government of the Mountaineers took a step further and issued a 
declaration stating, that it had decided not to participate “… in the work of the 
Russian Constituent Assembly, and refused to surrender the right to determine the 
affairs of the North Caucasus to the Russian Constituent Assembly.”198 Bolsheviks’ 
dismissal of the Constituent Assembly on 18 January 1918 strengthened this 
decision and enhanced the estrangement of Mountaineers from the Bolsheviks and 
their government. From this time on, they took up a position of active resistance 
and independence. 
                                                 
196 These elections, because of the time shortage to make new arrangements for the Bolsheviks, 
were based on arrangements made under the Provisional Government. Therefore, Right SRs, with 
the peasant vote held the majority. The Constituent Assembly met on 18 January 1918 and refused 
to support Soviet power or the Bolshevik Government. As a response, Bolsheviks with the support 
of the Left SRs dispersed the Assembly. Related with the elections and the situation in the Caucasus 
in general see U.S. Govrnment Intelligence Bureau’s memorandums “on the Political situation in 
the Caucasus,” The National Archieves, (Washington DC), Records of Department of State, Inquiry 
Documents, “Special Reports and Studies”, 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Documents: 768 and 770. 
197 The North Caucasian Mountaineers joined the elections within the region of Terek-Dagestan 
okrug, or election constituency. There were 11 different lists that were shaped by different political 
currents. For the analysis of the elections and the candidates in the North Caucasus and Dagestan 
see Kashkaev, Ot Fevralya, 197-199. 
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In the meantime, after the Bolshevik’s declaration of withdrawal from the 
war and proposal to start peace negotiations caused the self-demobilisation of the 
Russian Army on the Turkish front. Thousands of deserting soldiers started to 
return north to their homes in Russia.199 This made the situation in the Caucasus 
more complex. On the one hand, this had started to threaten public order in the 
Caucasus and caused an increase in the power of the Bolsheviks200, and on the 
other, it opened the way to the Caucasus for the Turkish Army and thus turned the 
struggle into an international one. 
 
A- The Bolsheviks: 
When the February Revolution took place in St. Petersburg, there was no 
Bolshevik organization of the Mountaineers in the North Caucasus. Moreover, 
nobody defined or declared himself as a Bolshevik.201 Therefore, throughout 1917 
it was very hard for the Bolsheviks to revolutionise the area, and the Bolsheviks 
sought to collaborate with any group that was available to form an alliance.202 Most 
branches of the Soviets of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies in the region were 
in fact set up in the cities, heavily populated by Russians and Cossacks, such as 
Rostov, Yekaterinodar, Grozny, Vladikavkaz and Pyatigorsk most of which were 
controlled by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. 
                                                                                                                                       
198 Jabagi, “Revolution”, 122. 
199 For the Caucasian front and the detailed course of fighting see W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, 
1953. Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 447-450. 
200 See Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization II,”. 
201 A. Magoma, “Katliam,” 6. Balo Bilatti, February/March 1966. “Şimali Kafkasya ve 11 Mayıs 
1918,” Birleşik Kafkasya, (İstanbul), 7: 8. 
202 Blank, Sorcerer, 36. 
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The first pro-Bolshevik socialist bloc was established under the leadership 
of Ulubiy Buynakskiy, with the participation of Makhach Dakhadayev, Celâl 
Korkmazov, Magomed Mirza Hizroev, Said Gabiev, Alibek Takho-Godi, Sultan 
Said Kazbekov, and some others in Temir Khan Shura in May 1917.203 As it was 
pointed above, this group had initially been working together with the other groups 
who played active part in the Alliance and, with the exception of Korkmazov they 
had no contacts with Bolshevik circles. 
During the summer of 1917 the Bolsheviks adopted flexible tactics to 
cooperate with the socialist and non-party Mountaineers through the intensive work 
of Segei Mironovich Kirov. Kirov laid the basis, primarily among the Ingush, by 
propagating on their land problem with the Cossacks. In order to attract the masses, 
in August 1917 under the leadership of Celâl Korkmazov he instigated the 
establishment of the Dagestan Land Committee (Zemel’niy Komitet) to fınd 
solutions to the problems of the Mountaineers and so managed to gain some 
support from the Mountaineers.204 Moreover, Kirov succeeded in organising a 
‘front’ party of Osetians, the Kermen, or Chermen to facilitate the process within 
the same period.205 Then he cooperated with the above mentioned bloc of local 
Muslim socialists, and turned them against Islamic conservatives, nationalists, and 
Tsarist groups. With the help of these names the Bolsheviks started to gain control 
                                                 
203 Kashkaev, Ot Fevralya, 12 and Bor’ba, 35. 
204 The other names that had been working in this Committee were M. Dakhadayev, S. Gabiev, and 
some other well-known pro-Bolshevik names. Kashkaev, Bor’ba, 77. 
205 Kermen was the first revolutionary movement or the party of the Mountaineers. It had 
established by mainly Osetians. It took its name from the legendary Osetian hero, Kermen, a slave, 
who had fought for his rights but killed by the opponents. Although this organization had no definite 
political program, it exercised considerable influence among the Osetian peasants, in favour of the 
Bolsheviks. In May 1918, most of the members of the organization joined the Bolshevik Party and 
formed Osetian Bolshevik organization. The History of the Civil War in the USSR: The Great 
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of the Soviets in the region, by the end of September 1917, and by early 1918 they 
had a considerable amount of support in these organizations and the city centres. 206 
This was detrimental step for the functioning of the Alliance and the 
Central Committee. Through the activities and new organizations of the Bolsheviks 
the leading cadre of the Alliance was scattered and the hostilities began to emerge. 
 
At the end of January 1918, during a power struggle between the pro- and 
anti-Bolshevik Mountaineers, in order to consolidate their power in the North 
Caucasus, the Bolsheviks invited Russian political parties and Cossack 
representatives to a meeting called the First People’s Congress of the Terek Region 
in Mozdok.  Kirov and Buachidze organized this Congress, in order to combine 
forces against non-Bolshevik forces, the so-called ‘invaders from the mountains’. 
At this congress, Pipes pointed out that, all the Russian political parties of the 
Terek Region; Mensheviks; Socialist Revolutionaries; Bolsheviks, as well as some 
radical Osetian parties (this would be Kermen), took part and formed the Terek 
People’s Soviet (Terskiy Narodniy Sovet).207 The main concern in creating regional 
Soviet organs was to attract minorities and then to mobilize them against the anti-
Bolshevik forces. From then on, Kirov and Ordzhonikidze were styled as the new 
                                                                                                                                       
Proletarian Revolution (October-November 1917), 1946. (vol.2), Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 137. Also see Kashkaev, Ot Fevralya, 69. 
206 For the emergence of Bolshevik supremacy see B. O. Kashkaev, Bor’ba and Ot Fevralya. Blank, 
Sorcerer, 36-7, and S. Blank, 1993. “The Formation of the Soviet North Caucasus 1918-24,” 
Central Asian Survey, 12(1): 13-32. 
207 Pipes, Formation, 196 and, Betal Kalmık, 1980. Adiğe Devrim Hareketi Kabartay Balkar’da 
Devrim Mücadelesi, İstanbul: Nıbçeğu Yayınları, 19-20. 
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extraordinary commissars for the entire Caucasus, and enjoyed plenipotentiaries 
powers in the entire area and direct contact with Moscow.208 
Following the conclusion of an agreement, in Brest-Litovsk on 3 March, the 
Bolshevik forces, under the command of Celâl Korkmazov occupied Vladikavkaz 
in the middle of March.209 There, they formed the Terek People’s Soviet Socialist 
Republic (Terskaya Narodnai Sovetskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika) headed by 
Noi Buachidze with the aim of joining Soviet Russia.210 Then the Bolshevik 
controlled military revolutionary soviets (voenrevkoms) were spread all around the 
North Caucasus.211 
 
As a result, the members of the provisional government of the 
Mountaineers had to move to Nazran first and then to Temir Khan Shura.212 At the 
same time, while some members of the government were forced to turn back on 
their native regions to organise military formations against the Bolsheviks, others 
left the North Caucasus to search for economic and military aid.213 Nevertheless 
during the last month of 1917, apart from the natives, the Cossacks and the 
Bolsheviks, a new force had taken position in the region. This was the Volunteer 
Army. 
                                                 
208 Blank, “Soviet North Caucasus,” 13. 
209 After the signing of Treaty, in compliance with the Bolsheviks’ promises the soldiers from entire 
Caucasian front began to desert to the Russian territories. Most of these deserting soldiers were pro-
Bolshevik and stayed in the North Caucasus. Thus, the baseless North Caucasian Bolsheviks of 
1917 surprisingly owned an army of their own. 
210 Pipes, Formation, 197 and Kalmık, 21-2, pointed out that in this structure Osetians had 8, Ingush 
3, Cossacks 8, Chechens 15, inogorodnye 15 and Kabardians 7 representatives respectively. 
211 Kashkaev, Ot Fevralya, 105-107. 
212 “It did this because part of the population in Vladikavkaz, which consisted of Russians, and also 
the entire garrison which had once belonged to demoralized sections of the old Russian Army, 
joined the Bolsheviks and seized the control of city.” Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization II,” 49. 
213 Cabaği, Kafkas-Rus Mücadelesi, 86-87 and Baytugan, “Kuzey Kafkasya,” 9. 
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B-Volunteer Army (Dobrovol’cheskaia Armiia):214 
The name Volunteer was used throughout the civil war period to refer to the 
army organized by General Alekseev, and subsequently expanded by the other 
generals, Kornilov and Anton Ivanovich Denikin. It was mainly an organization of 
officers. They created the Army, set its tone, determined its ideology, and always 
retained leadership in it. But the main combat force of this Army composed of 
neither officers nor Russian soldiers, it was made up rather of Kuban and Don 
Cossacks, and its official name became the Armed Forces of South Russia.215 
Following the Bolshevik coup ın Petersburg, at the invitation of Ataman 
Kaledin216, the Tsar’s last Commander in Chief, General Alekseev arrived in 
Novocherkassk, the capital of the Don, on 15 November 1917. By the end of 
December, the other prominent names such as Kornilov, Denikin, Markov, 
Romanovskiy, and Lukomskiy who had been imprisoned at Bykov for their 
participation in the Kornilov affair217 managed to escape from their confinement 
                                                 
214 For the Volunteer Army, the first hand information could be reached from General A. I. Denikin, 
Ocherki Russkoi Smuty, Vol. II, pp.156-157. A shortened English version has been published in two 
volumes, General A. I. Denikin, 1922. The Russian Turmoil, London: Hutchinson and co., and, 
1930. The White Army, London: J. Cape and co. 
215 Peter Kenez, 37, and George Brinkley, Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917-1921. Notre 
Dame, Indiana: Un. of Notre Dame Press, 297. Hereafter Allied Intervention. 
216 Following the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd General Kaledin assumes control of the Don region 
by issuing a declaration on 7 November. And, “taking into consideration the extraordinary 
conditions of the moment and the lack of contact with the central authorities, [he]… assumes …full 
executive power…The assumption of power is temporary and will last only until the Provisional 
Government and order in Russia are restabilised.” For the text of the Declaration see, James Bunyan 
and H. H. Fisher, 404. 
217 After the February Revolution, uncontrollable strikes and street demonstrations, so-called ‘July 
Days’ had created a crisis and the resignation of most of the Kadets caused the collapse of 
Provisional Government. As a result, Alexander F. Kerensky, the only member of the Petrograd 
soviet in the government as a war minister replaced Prime Minister G. Lvov. But the position that 
Kerensky stood related the war isolated him from all the Soviet Parties and the population in 
general. He insisted on fighting to victory, thus he had to turn to the army. At that point he made his 
mistake and in order to restore the discipline in the army, he appointed General Kornilov to the post 
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and arrived at Novocherkassk. These Tsarist generals get together with the 
intention of using the south eastern region as a base for gathering the remaining 
loyal elements to organize a coherent military power or an army. As Denikin 
himself pointed out, the first goal of the Volunteer Army was to stand against an 
armed invasion of Southern Russia by the Germans or Bolsheviks.218 Then the 
ultimate objective, in compliance with the basic dictum of ‘Russia One and 
Indivisible’, was the restoration of a ‘Free Great Russia’. 
This had caused serious apprehensions among the Bolsheviks, and the 
Sovnarkom219 declared war on the Cossack chiefs. Trotsky then ordered an 
offensive against the Cossacks.220 Thus, Bolshevik forces attacked in December 
1917 and occupied Novocherkassk and the whole Don by February 1918. As a 
result, the generals and the Volunteer Army started to move southwards, towards 
the Alliance’s territory. Consequently, the two rival groups clashed i. e. Bolsheviks 
and the Volunteers, in the North Caucasian territory and put the Mountaineers in a 
disturbing position. 
 
By the early months of 1918, following the December 1917 declaration by 
the Mountaineers, the power configuration of the region changed severely. The 
Mountaineers started to loose their possible partners in the region one by one. 
                                                                                                                                       
of Commander in Chief. This was resulted with a ‘Kornilov Affair’. By the support of the Kadets 
and other royalists Kornilov moved towards Petrograd. Bolsheviks, despite the leadership cadre 
were being arrested or forced to leave the country, were utilized July Days in a best manner. They 
opposed Kornilov and took the lead in organizing the struggle against Kornilov. They organised a 
Red Guard amongst the workers; set up a Military Revolutionary Committee, secured the release of 
the Bolsheviks imprisoned in July. At the end Kornilov was arrested and the Bolsheviks gained 
more reputation among the soldiers and workers. See Richard Pipes, 1997. The Russian Revolution, 
1899-1919, London: Harvill Press, 426-431. 
218 Denikin, Ocherki, 198-199. 
219 Council of People’s Commissariats, which was the highest non-party official body. 
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Cossacks cooperated with the Volunteer Army and the Volunteer Army was acting 
together with the allied powers. Thus at the end, they had a last and only chance, to 
cooperate with the Turks. 
 
C-Turkish Policy towards the Caucasus: 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Ottomans had always close contacts 
with the North Caucasus. Following the establishment of Russian rule in the 
region, a large number of Mountaineers were forcibly settled on the Ottoman lands 
and even participated in the political life of the Ottoman Empire. Initially they 
actively joined the anti-Russian campaigns, hoping to liberate the North Caucasus. 
Nevertheless, after the 1877-78 War, in compliance with Ottoman policy, they had 
to keep silent until 1908. From then on, with the help of a new regime North 
Caucasian émigré organizations began to emerge in İstanbul.  
The Circassian Association of Union and Relief (‘Çerkes İttihad ve Teavün 
Cemiyeti’) was the first North Caucasian émigré organization in İstanbul.221 This 
Association was established by Gazi Mehmet Paşa, the son of Imam Shamil, as a 
social organization which aimed to direct the Circassian community in exile, 
preserve linguistic and cultural peculiarities of the community, teach the national 
history, and maintain their distinct culture. Moreover, it is important to note that 
                                                                                                                                       
220 Bunyan and Fisher, 407-9. 
221 For a detailed work on this association see Sefer E. Berzeg, 1985. Gurbetteki Kafkasya’dan 
Belgeler Ankara, 10-23. Vasfi Güsar, 1975. “Çerkes İttihad ve Teavün Cemiyeti,” Kuzey Kafkasya 
Kültürel Dergi, 47: 28-37. Among the other Caucasian Associations in İstanbul, İstanbul’da 
Kafkasyalılar Arasında Neşr-i Maarif Cemiyeti and Kafkas Teali Cemiyeti could be mentioned. The 
former appears to have provided material assistance for the study of North Caucasian refugees in 
İstanbul, while the latter was another political extension of the same group. Sefer E. Berzeg, 6-7. 
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the organization, naturally, from the outset had a declared aim of seeing the 
motherland liberated.222 
In compliance with the social objectives the Association began to publish 
an eight-page weekly paper Guaze (Guide) in April 1911 and more importantly: 
“Circassians trained in İstanbul were sent by ÇİTC [i. e. ‘Çerkes İttihad ve 
Teavün Cemiyeti’] to found native language elementary schools in the 
Kuban for example, in the years 1910-12. The textbooks employed were 
developed in Istanbul. At this time a lycee and the teachers school was also 
established in Nalchik. As the Russian authorities moved after 1911 to force 
the withdrawal of Ottoman subjects who were engaged in such teaching 
endeavours, 36 local men where gathered and trained over a three month 
period.”223 
 
Nevertheless, the last may be the most important objective of the 
Association. Liberation of the motherland did not develop as an objective until the 
beginning of the First World War. The confluence of interests brought the 
Association and the leaders of the ruling party of the Union and Progress into 
alliance, and the political activities of the emigres increased dramatically. Most of 
the members of these organizations, were in fact already party members.224 When 
the First World War broke out, these North Caucasian’s in exile had conceived a 
confederative state, which encompassed Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and the 
North Caucasus as a ‘buffer state’ between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Enver 
Pasha vehemently supported this idea and took an active part in the activities to 
                                                 
222 For the objectives and the programs see above mentioned sources. 
223 Lowell Bezanis, Lazare of Levant: A Study of North Caucasian Organizing and Publishing 
Outside the USSR, 36. 
224 Among these names Hüseyin Tosun Şhapli, Field-Marshal Fuad Pasha, Rauf Orbay Abuk Ahmet 
Paşa, Aziz Meker, Bekir Sami Kundukh, Dr. İsa Ruhi Paşa were the most renowns. M. Aydın 
Turan, April 1998. “Osmanlı Dönemi Kuzey Kafkasya Diasporası Tarihinden: Şimali Kafkas 
Cemiyeti,” Tarih ve Toplum, 29(172): 50-59. 
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organize an anti-Russian movement in the Caucasus.225 In line with this the Turkish 
Army was ordered to be ready for an advance into the Caucasus to destroy Russia’s 
war supply network.226 
Meanwhile, by the beginning of the World War, the North Caucasian 
emigres, through the initiative of Enver Pasha, organized a ‘Caucasus Committee’ 
(‘Kafkas Komitesi’) in September 1915 in İstanbul.227 This Committee, by 
establishing special commissions, searched for support and patronage from the 
Central Powers in Vienna and Berlin in December 1915. In January 1916, it 
submitted a memorandum on the establishment of the Caucasian Confederation 
comprising Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the North Caucasus in the ‘Captive Nations 
Congress’ in Lausanne.228 
However, in the summer of 1917, because of the Georgian-German 
rapprochement, this committee was scattered and each group founded their own 
organizations. The North Caucasians set up a ‘Committee of North Caucasian 
Emigrants in Turkey’ (‘Türkiye’de Şimali Kafkasya Muhacirlerinin Komitesi’). 
                                                 
225 Kurat stressed that, in August 1914 by the initiative of Enver Paşa, Fuad Paşa had organized a 
mission to the North Caucasus with the aim of carrying out the plan of establishing Islamic State 
under the authority of Ottoman Prince which encompasses Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus. 
Akdes Nimet Kurat, 1990. Türkiye ve Rusya, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 500. 
226 W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, 459-460. 
227 Under the leadership of Field-Marshall Fuat Paşa, Georgians Prince Machabelli and Kamil 
Toghiridze; Azerbaijani Selim Bey Behbutov; North Caucasians Dr. İsa Paşa and Aziz Meker took 
part in this Committee. Dr. G. Jaschke, 1937. “1916 Lozan Kongresinde Rusya Mahkumu 
Milletler,” Kurtuluş, (Berlin), 28: 17-21 and 29/30: 24-28 respectively: 17. Among these names 
Prince Machabelli had already had close contacts with Germans through the Georgian émigré 
organization that was established in 1905 in Berlin. See Fritz Fischer, 1967. Germany’s Aims in the 
First World War, London: Chatto & Windus, 134. 
228 For the congresses of Captive Nations see Jaschke, 20-21. For a detailed work on this issue also 
see M. Aydın Turan, September 1997. “Gothard Jaschke’nin Bir Makalesi,’ Tarih ve Toplum, 
28(165): 13-21.  Fritz Fisher asserted that Prince Machabelli drew up this idea or the plan of 
Confederation in September 1914. “His plan envisaged a neutral Caucasian Federation, with 
Georgia a kingdom under a west European prince, the Armenia and Tatar districts under a 
Mohammedan prince, while the so called mountain peoples were to be under a ruler chosen by 
themselves.” 135. 
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This group was attentively observing the course of events in Russia and in parallel 
with that they established the ‘North Caucasian Association’ (‘Şimali Kafkas 
Cemiyeti’) in the spring of 1918.229 The chairman of this Association, Hüseyin 
Tosun (Şhaplı)230 Bey, was director of the Ottoman National Agency, the 
government’s press agency, and one of the prominent names of the political life in 
İstanbul. In this period, the leaders of the Association and the Ottoman government 
believed in the same cause of liberating the Caucasus, so there was no inherent 
conflict between the Turkish aims and the North Caucasians. For this reason, 
Hüseyin Tosun Bey and the North Caucasian Association played the roles of 
intermediary and conduit for the Mountaineers in the North Caucasus and the 
Ottoman government. And the Trabzon Conference, the first meeting place of these 
three groups became the intersection.231 
 
                                                 
229 For the North Caucasian Association see Berat Bir, 1988. “Şimali Kafkas Cemiyeti ve Şubelerine 
Gönderdiği 1919 Tarihli Bir Talimname,” Kuzey Kafkasya Kültür Dergisi (İstanbul), 68/70: 12-14. 
Sefer E. Berzeg, 1991 “Şimali Kafkas Cemiyeti Nizamnamesi Hakkında Bazı Notlar ve Şimali 
Kafkas Cemiyeti,” Kafkasya Gerçeği, (Samsun), 3: 28-32. Mustafa Butbay, 1990. Kafkasya 
Hatıraları, Ankara: TTK Yayınları. 
230 Hüseyin Tosun Şhapli, his birth date was unknown. He was an interesting personality. Because 
of his revolutionary activities, he exiled to Tripoli in 1896. But he escaped to Europe and took part 
in the First Congress of Ottoman Liberals held in Paris in 1902. He was among the founding 
members of the ‘Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti,’ which was headed by Prince 
Sebahattin. He was involved in publishing the Association’s organ Terakki. In 1907 he travelled to 
Russia but arrested there. Then he returned to İstanbul and in 1908 was elected representative for 
Erzurum. Died in 1930. 
231 Later on after the collapse of the Union and Progress government, this Association changed its 
name to the Association of Relief for the North Caucasian Emigrants and closed on 21 June 1919 by 
the British and its leaders were exiled to Malta. The other names were as follows: Dr. Mehmed 
Reşid Bey, Bekir Sami Kundukh, İsmail Canbulat, Yusuf İzzet Paşa, Aziz Meker, Hüseyin Kadri 
Şhaplı, and Hayriye Melek Hanım 
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3- Independence: April 1918- November 1918: 
A-The Conference of Trabzon: 
It is important to note that the isolation of the Transcaucasian Republics 
was among the Ottoman war aims. The conference in Trabzon was organized to 
negotiate a separate treaty between the Turks and the Transcaucasian Commissariat 
(Zakavkazskii Komissariat)232. During the negotiations in Trabzon, Turkish 
delegates, in line with this policy and with the help of the Azeris, insisted on the 
Transcaucasians’ declaration of independence and declared that, if the 
Transcaucasians do not declare independence they would support the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty was null and void.233 
While the negotiations were going on, the North Caucasian delegation 
consisted of Abdulmejid Chermoev, Muhammed Kadı Dibirov and Haydar 
Bammat,234 who were chosen by the Provisional Government in Temir Khan 
Shura.235 
In Trabzon, the North Caucasian delegation made a statement in which it 
pointed out that: 
                                                 
232 The Transcaucasian Commissariat, or the Transcaucasian temporary government was established 
on 11 November 1917 in order to replace the already defunct Special Transcaucasian Committee or 
Ozakom (Osobyi Zakavkazskii Komitet) which had established in March 1917, following the 
abdication of the Tsar, in order to take all the civil authority in the region. The task of this 
temporary government was to maintain order until the time when the All-Russian Constituent 
Assembly had established a new government for the entire Russian State. For a detailed work on 
Azerbaijan and the Transcaucasian government see Tadeusz Swietochowski, 1985. Russian 
Azerbaidzhan 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community, Cambridge: 
Cambridge Un. Press, and Pipes, Formation, 193-5. 
233 For the course of Conference and the Turkish side’s attitudes see Kurat, 480-484 and W. E. D. 
Allen and P. Muratoff, 460-466. 
234 Haidar Bammate, Le Caucase, 39-40 and “The Caucasus,” 15. Şerafettin Erel, (1961), added the 
names of Ali Khan Kantemir and Zübeyr Temirhanov in Dağıstan ve Dağıstanlılar, İstanbul. 
235 According to the statement that was given to the newspaper Ati on 27 April 1918, the 
representatives of the North Caucasus stressed that they left Vladikavkaz on 2 April. The route that 
they were followed was Temir Khan Shura-Baku-Gence-Tiflis-Batum-Trabzon. See A. Hazer Hızal, 
1961. Kuzey Kafkasya: Hürriyet ve İstiklâl Davası, Ankara: Orkun Yayınları. 
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“Transcaucasia cannot exist as an independent state without links with the 
territory of the peoples of Daghestan and the North Caucasus. The creation 
of a unified Caucasian state is dictated by geographical, economic, strategic 
and political considerations. …[W]e would like to believe that all the 
peoples of the Caucasus are motivated by the same burning desire to create 
the conditions favourable to peace, friendship and unity within the 
Caucasus, and to act as a unit in drawing up our foreign policies.”236 
 
It is apparent that the mountaineers, on their way to Trabzon, had contact 
with the Dagestani and Azeri groups of the Transcaucasian Government. Bammat 
stressed that “in March …the delegation of the government of the North 
Caucasus,… stopped in Baku and Tiflis to deliberate with the national councils, the 
different political parties and the government of the Transcaucasian Diet.”237 There 
it is possible that, against Georgian-German relations, the Azeris and the North 
Caucasians pro-Turkish stance was reiterated. 
In Trabzon the parties could not reached any agreement. While the 
Transcaucasian delegation was turning to Tiflis to clarify their policy against 
Ottoman demands, the Mountaineers turned their faces decisively towards the 
Sublime Porte. They had a chance to meet with Enver Pasha in Batum238 and then, 
in order to establish some close contacts with the Ottoman government, they 
moved to İstanbul together with him and stayed in Perapalas.239 
Following the arrival of the delegation, the Turkish media, with the 
initiative of the North Caucasian Association started to publish several articles and 
                                                 
236 Bammat, “The Caucasus,” 15 and Jabagi, “Revolution,” 124. 
237 Kurtatag, 3 May 1927. “Istoricheskie Zadachi Gortsev Kavkaza II,” Vol’nye Gortsy, (Prague), 2: 
3-4. Hereafter “Zadachi II”. Bammat, “The Caucasus,” 15. 
238 At that time Enver Pasha, in order to appease the Ottoman-German dispute, had been making 
talks with a German General Hans von Seeckt. Kurat, 485. 
239 Tanin, 26 April 1918, see Hızal, Hürriyet ve İstiklâl. 
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interviews with the delegates.240 In Istanbul the delegates, A. Chermoev, 
Muhammed Kadı, and Haydar Bammat met with the Grand Vizier Talat Paşa and 
Ministers of War, Enver Paşa and Naval Minister, Colonel Hüseyin Rauf Bey. The 
declared mission of the delegation was to conclude an agreement of cooperation 
and friendship with the Ottomans. In response, as Bammat stressed, the Sublime 
Porte gave its assurance that Porte was ready to recognize the independence of the 
Caucasian peoples and would take the necessary steps to obtain the same 
recognition from its allies. Then, after all these talks in İstanbul, the Union of the 
North Caucasian Mountaineers declared its independence by giving a diplomatic 
note to the world from İstanbul, on 11 May 1918. 
 
“We, the plenipotentiary representatives of the government of the Union 
of the Native Peoples of the North Caucasus [Şimalî Kafkasya Ahali-i 
Asliyyesi İttihadı]241 who have undersigned have the honour to declare these 
following points to the attention of all governments. 
The peoples of the North Caucasus have elected a national assembly in 
concurrence with the appropriate procedures. This national assembly, which 
was gathered in May, and September 1917 had proclaimed the foundation 
of the Union of the Native Peoples of the North Caucasus, and delegated 
the executive powers to the current government whose members include the 
signatories below. The government of the Union of the Native Peoples of 
the North Caucasus, in the presence of prevailing anarchy in Russia, had 
acknowledged below-mentioned particulars relying on the right of 
determination of its own political future freely for the nations of Tsarist 
Empire which was affirmed by the Petrograd government: 
1. The Union of the Native Peoples of the North Caucasus determined to 
separate from Russia and to establish an independent state of its own. 
                                                 
240 For the activities of the North Caucasian delegation and reflections to the Turkish media see A. 
Hazer Hızal’s serial article “Kuzey Kafkasya İstiklâli ve Türkiye Matbuatı, (1918),” published in a 
periodical Birleşik Kafkasya’s, (İstanbul), nos. 2-12, between 1964-1967 and A. Hazer Hızal, 1961. 
Kuzey Kafkasya: Hürriyet ve İstiklâl Davası, Ankara: Orkun Yayınları. To check the published 
articles see the newspapers Tanin, Tasvir-i Efkar, Vakıt, and Atî between 26 April and 30 May 1918. 
241 In general, this Republic was known as the North Caucasian Mountaineer Republic. Although 
these representatives, most of the time, used the name North Caucasian Mountaineer Republic 
[Şimali Kafkas Cibaliyyun Ittihadı Cumhuriyeti] in their correspondence with the Ottoman 
government, in this case they preferred this title. 
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2. The borders of the newly established state, in the north, will be the 
boundaries of the provinces and districts of Dagestan, Terek, and Stavropol 
of the former Russian Empire. The western and the eastern borders will be 
the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea respectively. The southern borders will 
be determined in compliance with further talks with the Transcaucasian 
government. 
3. The plenipotentiary representatives, who have the signatures below, 
have been authorised to declare these above mentioned points and the 
foundation of the Union of the Native Peoples of the North Caucasus to the 
knowledge of all governments with this notification. In consequence, 
thereof, the undersigned proclaim that as of this date the Independent State 
of the North Caucasus has been duly established.”242 
 
This declaration, in the words of Haydar Bammat, “was the logical 
consequence of and gave official sanction to the historical process which began 
with the century long fight for independence” against the Russian Empire, and by 
this declaration the peoples of the North Caucasus had “at last obtained tangible 
results” of their struggle.243 Within a year of this declaration, the Mountaineers, in 
order to survive as a sovereign entity on the North Caucasian geography, 
revitalised the idea of unification and the need to establish a single political body. 
 
The Bolshevik government protested about the Ottoman policy in the 
Caucasus in a note dated 23 May. In this note the main concern was the Turkish 
Army and its operations. Later, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs 
submitted another diplomatic note, on 30 May 1918, concerning the Mountaineers’ 
declaration of independence. In this note, Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs, denied the Alliance and the Mountaineer Government and thus the 
representatives who had signed the declaration. He mentioned the leaders of the 
                                                 
242 This notification was signed by Abdulmejid Chermoyev and Haydar Bammatov and, published 
in the newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar and Vakıt on 14 May 1918 in Istanbul. For the Russian text see 
Kurtatag, “Zadachi II”, 4. 
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Alliance as the ‘adventurous and deceitful gang’ and stressed that they could not 
have any legal right to represent the Mountaineers population.244 
In addition, in order to prevent possible German acceptance of the new 
Republic, Chicherin sent a telegram, in which he reported the situation, to the 
ambassador of the RSFSR to Berlin on 31 May.245 The real protesting note 
however, was passed on almost half a year later, on 15 February 1919, to the last 
Ottoman ambassador to Moscow, Galip Kemali [Soylemezoglu] Bey.246 In all these 
documents, the leaders of the Mountaineer Republic were accepted as counter-
revolutionaries and the Republic was defined as baseless. According to Moscow, 
the peoples of the North Caucasus have never accepted this so-called Republic and 
have even opposed it. It is interesting to note that the Turkish government, 
however, never replied any of these Bolshevik notes. Instead, Enver Paşa send a 
directive to Galip Kemali Bey on 19 July 1918 and asked for efforts to obtain 
Bolshevik acceptance for these new Republics. But this never happened and both 
of Ottoman and Bolshevik governments began their own operations in the region. 
 
The course of events in the Caucasus, interestingly enough, disturbed first 
and foremost the Germans, the biggest ally of the Ottomans. The basic reason 
behind this German upset was closely related to pre-war German plans to exploit 
the region economically. The region’s ores, oil, cotton, wool, and cereals, and in 
                                                                                                                                       
243 Haidar Bammate, “The Caucasus,” 15. 
244 Documents No 211 and 213 in Dokumentiy Vneshniy Politiki SSSR, 1957. Vol 1, Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoy Izdatel’stva, respectively 335-338 and 338-9. Also see Galip Kemali 
Söylemezoğlu, 1953. 30 Senelik Hatıralarımın Üçüncü Cildi 1918-1922, İstanbul: Ülkü Yayınları, 
49-50. 
245 Söylemezoğlu, 49-50. 
246 Söylemezoğlu, 59-65. 
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brief all the raw materials needed by German factories. Moreover, the Germans had 
an important political purpose, i. e. balancing Great Britain in India. In order to 
achieve this end, the Caucasus was seen as a bridge and main route to Persia and 
Central Asia. Therefore the Caucasus could not lie exclusively in Turkish hands.247 
Thus to balance the Ottoman existence and power in the Caucasus, Georgia 
and the Georgians emerged as the main allies or the agents of Germans. The 
increasing Ottoman threat in fact made the Georgian leaders already more receptive 
to the Germans. 
It was in this atmosphere that the interrupted negotiations of Trabzon were 
being reopened in Batum on 11 May 1918, the exact day of the North Caucasian 
declaration of independence. For this time, Ottoman and German interests were 
mutually exclusive and the Germans, through von Lossow,248 intervened in the 
negotiations. During the negotiations in Batum the main German objective was the 
internationalization of Batum, but the Turkish side naturally rejected it. Thus, the 
next best solution for the Germans remained concluding peace and alliance, and 
then to recognize Georgia. “Germans could then negotiate separately with Georgia 
and would thus not lose her point d’appui in the Caucasus.”249 
In compliance with these developments, the Germans pushed the Georgians 
to declare their separation from the Transcaucasian republic and establish a 
                                                 
247 F. Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 550-51. 
248 He as a representative of German general staff was empowered to conclude the preliminaries of a 
peace between the German Reich and the Transcaucasian government on 29 April 1918. He was an 
uncompromising advocate of German supremacy in the Caucasus and was prepared to oppose 
Ottomans’ plans flatly. 
249 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 556. 
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sovereign state under the protection of Germany. Even, Chenkheli proposed 
Georgian incorporation within Germany or some other form of union.250 
 
Meanwhile the Germans also contacted the representatives of the 
Mountaineer Republic. Lossow opened separate negotiations with Haydar Bammat 
and offered him German recognition of North Caucasian independence. Moreover, 
as a political means of securing this end, Lossow proposed, a ‘politically skilful 
general’ and ‘if possible, two divisions should be sent to Novorossisk and Tuapse.  
“The one way of ensuring the continued existence of the North Caucasian 
state was, he said, and Bammat expressly agreed with him, to attach it 
closely to the German state, not by an ordinary alliance, but by a close 
union, ‘unity of government on the highest level, of foreign policy, of 
currency, customs area, army and navy.’”251 
 
With the declaration, in İstanbul, of the independence of the North 
Caucasian Republic by the Mountaineers, and bid for help from the Great Powers, 
the situation in the North Caucasus was dramatic. The Bolsheviks already occupied 
the territory defined therein. The Bolsheviks, having captured Petrovsk, with the 
help of fresh troops sent from Astrakhan via Caspian, were moving towards Temir 
Khan Shura, the capital city of the newly established North Caucasian State. 
Therefore, most of the members of the Mountaineer government had already left 
the capital for the mountain regions of the North Caucasus or contingent areas.252 
                                                 
250 In the last part of May 1918, partly because of the Turkish pressures and partly the German 
activities the Transcaucasian assembly met to dissolve the republic and first Georgia on 26 May and 
then Azerbaijan and Armenia on 28 May declared their independence. While the Georgians asked 
Germany to take the country under its protection and the Armenians asked for help in their 
desperate situation, Azerbaijanis choose the Ottomans. 
251 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 556. 
252 Baytugan, “Kuzey Kafkasya,” 9 and Kurtatag, “Zadachi II,” 5. 
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Thus, confident of Ottoman support, on 12 May 1918 representatives of the 
North Caucasian government applied to the Porte and ask for help.253 In this 
recourse through its representatives, the North Caucasian Republic, having stressed 
the situation in the region and inadequate military resources in the Republic, asked 
for the deployment of troops to the region as quickly as possible. The Turkish 
government, naturally, replied immediately and, the Ministry of War issued its first 
order for military aid to North Caucasus. 254 With that order, the Ministry proposed 
to send, one infantry, one cavalry division and one artillery regiment to the North 
Caucasus, initially. Furthermore, with that order, all the rights and responsibilities 
of the officers and troops sent to the region were defined. 
At the beginning of May 1918, the Turkish Army initiated the second phase 
of the Transcaucasian offensive. The Ottomans concluded treaties of friendship and 
cooperation, first with the Azerbaijani and then the North Caucasian governments, 
on 4 and 8 June 1918 respectively255, in a bid to counter the growing Bolshevik 
threat and German influence256 in the region. By summer 1918 the situation in the 
region became more complex. While the Bolsheviks were trying to control the 
                                                 
253 The text of recourse which was signed by M. Karı (on behalf of Haydar Bammat) and A. 
Chermoev, the representatives of the government of the North Caucasus, dated 12 May 1334 
(1918), to the Porte could be seen from Kurat, appendix no. 24, 671-72 and “Kuzey Kafkasya 
Cumhuriyeti, Azerbaycan ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Arasında Anlaşmalar,” autumn 1999, 
Kafkasya Yazıları, 7: 78-9. 
254 The order no 2456 of the Ministry of War dated 13 May 1918. See M. Erşan, 1995. Birinci 
Dünya Harbinde Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kuzey Kafkasya Siyaseti (1914-1918), Erzurum: Atatürk 
Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 97-8. 
255 For the text of the agreement Kurat, appendix no. 24, 672-674 and “Kuzey Kafkasya 
Cumhuriyeti, Azerbaycan ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Arasında Anlaşmalar,” autumn 1999. 
Kafkasya Yazıları, 7: 79. This treaty was being signed in Batum on 8 June 1334 (1918) by the 
Minister of Justice and the President of the Council of State Halil Bey [Menteşe] and Commander 
in-chief of Ottoman Armies on the Caucasian Front, Vehib Pasha, and H. Bammatov, A. Chermoev, 
Ali Khan Kantemir, Zubeyr Temirhanov and Mehmed Karı. 
256 On 3 June, 2 German battalion sent from the Crimea, landed at Poti. This caused the emergence 
of something like a real conflict between the Turks and Germans. See Allen and Muratoff, 477 and 
Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 560. 
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region with the military formations organized by Ordzhonikidze257, the Ottomans 
were organizing a Caucasian Army or the ‘Army of Islam’.258 Nuri Paşa, the 
brother of the Enver Paşa, was appointed commander of this new Army and 
stationed in Gence. Moreover, a Circassian Ottoman, Yusuf İzzet Paşa who was 
one of the most prominent members of the North Caucasian Association, was 
appointed both military and political representative of the Ottoman government to 
the North Caucasian Republic.259 
 
B-Bicherakhov and the British Forces: 
In the meantime, an important new factor, the Allied Powers, especially the 
British, entered into events. The rapprochement between the Bolsheviks and the 
Germans, and the advance of Turkish troops towards the Caucasus, forced the 
allied governments to establish contact with anti-Bolshevik elements in the 
Caucasus. The British had tried to be influential by using a native actor: an ex-
Tsarist officer Colonel Lazar Bicherakhov. 
On 14 January 1918, Major-General Dunsterville was appointed Chief of 
the British Mission to the Caucasus and British representative at Tiflis. His sphere 
of operation was to extend over all Russian and Turkish territory, south of the main 
chain of the Caucasus over with the Transcaucasian Commissariat claimed 
                                                 
257 Blank, “Soviet North Caucasus,” 13-14. 
258 For a detailed information on the composition and the structure of the Army of Islam see İ. 
Berkuk, “15. Fırkanın Harekâtı”, 7 and Allen and Muratoff, p.468. 
259 In addition to Yusuf İzzet Paşa, some other Circassian officers of the Ottoman Army, as such 
İsmail Berkuk (or Berkok), also send to the region with an official duty of establishing North 
Caucasian Army. In addition to the above-mentioned article of Berkuk see Kaymakam Mehmed 
Tevfik [Bıyıklıoğlu], 1927. “Şimalî Kafkas Muharebeleri,” Askerî Mecmua, (İstanbul), 64: 129-157. 
E. Kur. Yb. Süleyman İzzet, October 1936. “Büyük Harpte (1334-1918) 15. Piyade Tümeninin 
Azerbaycan ve Şimali Kafkasya’daki Hareket ve Muharebeleri,” 103 Sayılı Askerî Mecmua’nın 
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control.260 Dunsterville took the command of a spearhead force of some 12 officers, 
41 men, and 41 Fords that left Baghdad on 27 January 1918261 and arrived in 
Enzeli, the port city at the south of Caspian Sea, on 17 February 1918. There, he 
met with Bicherakhov and decided to co-operate with him to ease his introduction 
to the Caucasus, primarily Baku. As a result, on 5 July, Bicherakhov landed with 
his Cossacks at Alyat, a point some 40 miles south of Baku.262 Because of the 
presence of the Turkish Army, he changed his plan and instead heading towards 
Baku, turned northward towards Derbent, the gate to the North Caucasus. He 
captured the city on 12 August and was stationed in Petrovsk by the beginning of 
September. Meanwhile, although Dunsterville, with an incomplete brigade, had 
arrived in Baku he decided in desperation that further efforts to hold Baku would 
be a waste of time and of British lives. He left the city before the Turkish forces 
captured it. Thus, by September 1918, Bicherakhov became the only remaining 
British foothold in the region.263 
 
This internationalization of the Caucasus made the North Caucasus 
uncontrollable. The initiators of the Congresses and the Alliance were diffused and 
the leading cadre of the newly established Republic was far from controlling the 
region. Moreover they had to move outside the territory of the Republic and they 
                                                                                                                                       
Tarih Kısmı, (İstanbul), 44. Halil Bal, 1997. “Kuzey Kafkasya’nın İstiklâli ve Türkiye’nin Askeri 
Yardımı, 1917-1918,”Kafkas Araştırmaları III, (İstanbul,), 29-91. 
260 Richard H. Ullman, 1961. Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921: Intervention and War, Vol.I, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 305. 
261 For the mission and the operation of the Dunsterforce see, L.C. Dunsterville, 1920. The 
Adventures of Dunsterforce, London: Edward Arnold. 
262 He had an army of 1200 Cossacks and six guns. Allen and Muratoff, 488. 
263 For the telegram on Bicherakhov dated 7 September 1917, from the North Caucasian Command 
to the Caucasian Islam Army see Erşan, 90-94.  
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tried to reclaim their state from Tiflis and other cities outside the North 
Caucasus.264 
This openly caused the emergence of local rulers. Some of the names, who 
had played an active part in the events of 1917, lacked information on the activities 
of the representatives of the Mountaineer Republic outside. They started to explore 
the possibilities of establishing their own authority. As such, in Dagestan Nuh Bey 
Tarkovskiy, with the support of Ali Hasanov and Colonel Resul Kaytbekov 
declared himself dictator in the city of Temir Khan Shura. His declaration was 
made in collaboration with the Turks, but with the arrival of the Bicherakhov he 
changed his stance without any hesitation. After the talks, Tarkovskiy and 
Bicherakhov agreed to share authority over Dagestan whereby Bicherakhov would 
control the coast and Tarkovskiy the interior. The British hoped to use 
Tarkovskiy’s bands to put an end to Bolshevism in Dagestan and pronounced 
Prince Tarkovskiy the provisional military dictator of Dagestan.265 In the beginning 
Tarkovskiy did not upset his allies and in compliance with this agreement, clashed 
with the Bolsheviks and killed one of their most prominent members who was a 
participant in the North Caucasian Conference in May, Dakhadayev.266 
 
                                                 
264 “This happened, -wrote Sergei Kirov,- when the so-called Mountaineers’ Government (or the 
government of the ‘Orient’ hotel) upon selling North Caucasus to Vehid [Vehib] Pasha under a 
treaty of ‘Peace and Friendship’, was brought in on the bayonets of the Turkish askars aimed against 
revolutionary Dagestan, and, trampling upon the dead bodies of revolutionary mountaineers headed 
by comrade Dakhadayev, set itself up in Temir-Khan-Shura.” M. A. Daniyalov, 1982. Soviet 
Daghestan in Foreign Historiography, Moscow: Nauka Publishing Hause, 27. 
265 Brinkley, Allied Intervention, 69-70. 
266 Daniyalov (33), quoted from the letter to Ordzhonikidze from Lenin dated 12 October 1918. 
“Bicherakhov on British orders is retaining the coast of the Caspian Sea, including Derbent and 
Port-Petrovsk. The officer bands of Bicherakhov-Tarkovsky brutally tortured and murdered the 
most popular Soviet functionary in Dagestan engineer Dakhadayev. Socialist Dagestan has suffered 
a grave loss.” 
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During this period, leaders of the North Caucasian Republic were, naturally, 
collaborating with the Turks. In order to coordinate the activities of Ottoman 
armies in the region, two representatives of the government, Pshemaho Kotsev and 
Vassan Girey Jabagiev came to Tiflis. From there, it was planned to organize a 
military expedition to Dagestan, relying mainly on a battalion mainly of Turkish 
Circassians, led by Yusuf İzzet Paşa.267 Turkish occupation of Baku on 15 
September 1918 gave them a big advantage over other groups. In this period, the 
president of the North Caucasian Republic, Abdulmejid Chermoev had always 
travelled with Yusuf İzzet Pasha and on 2 October they moved to Baku from 
Batum together. As a result, the second phase of the advance of the Turkish troops 
went northwards, to Derbent and Petrovsk. They captured Derbent on 6 October 
1918, and Yusuf İzzet Paşa, together with A. Chermoev arrived in the city on 10 
October and Tarkovskiy also joined them. The official independence ceremony of 
the North Caucasian Mountaineer Republic, with the participation of Nuri Paşa, the 
Commander of the Army of Islam, was held five months later and the official flag 
of the Republic was hoisted on 13 October 1918.268 
During this ceremony Chermoev appealed to the population of the North 
Caucasian Republic to support its government’s efforts to establish law and order 
and to lead the country to the Constituent Assembly. In this appeal, a program of 
                                                 
267 The first Turkish military mission that was composed of 3 officers, Muzaffer, Mithat and İ. 
Berkuk arrived in the North Caucasus region from Azerbaijan and settled in Gunib in early June 
1918. See, Berkuk, “15. Fırkanın Harekâtı”, 25; and Jabagi, “Revolution,” 124-5. 
268 Berkuk, “15. Fırkanın Harekâtı”, 73. 
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the government’s policy that was based on strictly democratic principles was also 
introduced.269 
On the same day, in a meeting, which included Chermoev and other 
Ottoman officers, the situation in the region was evaluated. The existence of 
Bicherakhov and his troops in Petrovsk was recognised as a big threat to the 
survival of the North Caucasian Republic. Therefore, as a next step, it was decided 
to move towards Petrovsk. Accordingly, the 15th infantry division remained under 
the command of the North Caucasian Army for a time.270 A letter was sent to 
Bicherakhov asking him to evacuate Petrovsk on 17 October 1918. In his reply, on 
16 October, he not only refused to abandon Petrovsk but also threatened to attack 
Derbent. In response, the Republic and its army sent a final ultimatum and ordered 
him to evacuate the territory by 20 October 1918.271 
 
Unfortunately at that time, the Republic was faced with the difficulty of 
creating a state with the help of Ottoman military support. Because of failures on 
other fronts, the Union and Progress Party Government, chaired by Talat Paşa, 
resigned in the beginning of October and the newly appointed Grand Vizier Ahmet 
İzzet Paşa ordered the abolishment of the Caucasian armies and the retreat of 
troops.272 The armistice of Mudros, moreover, signalled the end of the short time 
success. 
                                                 
269 Jabagi has given the date as 12 October, “Revolution,” 125. In Derbent in addition to Chermoev, 
Yusuf İzzet Pasha and Nuri Pasha made speeches. The President of the North Caucasian 
Mountaineer Republic Abdülmejid Chermoev issued a call for the help of the peoples for the 
restoration of order and supporting the national assembly. Cabaği, Kafkas-Rus Mücadelesi, 90. 
270 Berkuk, “15. Fırkanın Harekâtı”, 74-5 and Erşan, 107. 
271 For these letters see Erşan, 108-112 and the Appendix no.5, 169-171. 
272 Berkuk, “15. Fırkanın Harekâtı”, 95. 
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Despite the order of retreat and armistice, the Turkish army, accompanied 
by the troops of the North Caucasian Republic, carried out the operation and 
captured Temir Khan Shura on 31 October. Then, in order to secure the previously 
defined geographical space, the troops, as was planned, turned towards Petrovsk. 
The last note signed by Yusuf İzzet Paşa, the Commander in Chief of the North 
Caucasian Army to Bicherakhov was sent via the Commander of 15th Infantry 
Regiment Süleyman İzzet Bey on 27 October 1918. He again refused to 
evacuate.273 
The last operation of the Turkish Army in North Caucasus began on 5 
November 1918. Bicherakhov’s primary support, the British, sent help via the 
Caspian Sea. When the British reached Petrovsk on 6 November the city was 
already under heavy artillery fire and Bicherakhov was advised to evacuate. The 
North Caucasian Army’s troops captured Petrovsk on 8 November 1918.274 
 
From then on, the leaders of the Republic attempted to establish authority 
over the territories of the Republic and a fully functioning state structure. On 12 
November 1918, in a meeting of representatives of the North Caucasus and 
Dagestan, President Chermoev made a speech and submitted a report concerning 
the activities of his government. This Assembly first changed the name of Petrovsk 
to Shamilkale (from Sheikh Shamil) and then the representatives, based on this 
report issued a resolution reiterating the reliance of the peoples of the North 
                                                 
273 For the text of note see Erşan, 122. For the capture of Petrovsk A.N. Kurat has given the date 6 
November, but A.H. Hızal 7 November and, M. Erşan 8 November. For the last days and hours of 
Bicherakhov in Dagestan have been described in detail in the recollections of the British Lieutenant-
Colonel F. French, who was with the British squadron and personaly took part in negotiations with 
Bicherakhov. F. French, 1920. From Whitehall to the Caspian, London. 
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Caucasus on the government. Moreover the government was charged with the duty 
of defending the country’s independence that and ensuring the worldwide 
acceptance of this independence.275  
 
While the Turkish troops were preparing to evacuate the North Caucasus, 
the new Allied forces, mainly composed of British forces, set sail from Enzeli to 
Baku, in 20 ships, with Bicherakhov’s troops, under the command of General V. 
M. Thomson on 16 October 1918. The immediate goal of the expedition was to 
enforce the Armistice and to expel any remaining Turks or Germans in the area.276 
This was still not the end of Turkish action in the area. Before the 
evacuation of the troops Yusuf İzzet Pasha concluded a treaty with the North 
Caucasian government.277 Accordingly, the Ottoman and the North Caucasian 
governments allowed officers and soldiers of the Caucasian Army to stay in the 
region after agreeing contracts with the North Caucasian government. In 
compliance with this Yusuf İzzet Pasha and a considerable number of the troops 
stayed in the North Caucasus.278 Thus, from then on, Yusuf İzzet Pasha signed 
everything with the title of Republic’s Army Commander. But this Turkish military 
                                                                                                                                       
274 Berkuk, “15. Fırkanın Harekâtı”, 95. 
275 For this report and the resolution see “Ot Pravitel’stva Respubliki Soyuza Gortsev Kavkaza. 
Obrashchenie k naseleniiu Respubliki,” Kurtatag, “Zadachi II,” 5-6 and Jabagi, “Revolution,” 125. 
276 Brinkley, Allied Intervention, 91. 
277 The order of Porte to evacuate the region was dated 24 October and allowed the volunteer 
officers and soldiers to stay in the region for a fixed period of time. In compliance with this order 
the treaty was signed by Yusuf İzzet Paşa on behalf of the Ottomans and the President Chermoev 
and the Minister of War Nuh Tarkovskiy on behalf of the Mountaineer Republic. See Berkuk, “15. 
Fırkanın Harekâtı”, 95 and for the text of treaty see Erşan, 139-141. 
278 At the same time Nuri Paşa, the commander of the Army of Islam became the commander of the 
Army of Azerbaijan. For the account of Turkish volunteers in addition to Berkuk see Kâzım Kap, 
August 1967-April 1968. “Şimali Kafkasya-Bolşevik Rusya Mücadelelerinden Sahneler,” Birleşik 
Kafkasya, (İstanbul), 13-14-15: 36-41. Tarık Cemal Kutlu, autumn 1999. “1918-1921 Yıllarında 
Kuzey Kafkasya’daki Mücadelelerin Bilinmeyen Komutanı,” Kafkasya Yazıları, 7: 36-57. 
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presence was not long lasting. Under pressure from the British, the Ottoman 
Ministry of War withdrew its order to allow Turkish officers to stay in the North 
Caucasus and issued a new one, dated 29 October, instructing all troops to leave 
the region.279 
Thus, by the end of 1918, with the exception of a British detachment 
stationed in Petrovsk, the North Caucasus presented a military and political 
vacuum. The Bolsheviks used this vacuum first and, intensifying their activities 
began a propaganda campaign aimed at the Mountaineers. The Bolshevik paper 
‘Revolutionary Mountaineer’ written on 17 November 1918 as part of this 
campaign, stated that: 
“Neither the Turks nor the Chermoyevs will save us, but only we ourselves, 
our united mountaineer democracy with the masses that have reared 
together, with the rest of Russia, the banner of the Soviets, the banner of the 
revolution…All mountaineers should equally know that the support which 
is given to the ‘Mountaineers’ Government’ in Tiflis and Yelisavetpol is a 
noose that is being tightened on the neck of the mountaineers of North 
Caucasus and Dagestan by Menshevist Georgia and bourgeois-khan 
Azerbaijan, who are dreaming of creating a buffer ‘Mountaineers’ 
Republic’ or ‘Mountaineers’ Alliance’ between the great Soviet Russia and 
themselves… Cursed be those of us mountaineers, who deliberately or 
unwittingly lead our small peoples to such peril!”280 
 
The government of the North Caucasian republic, fearing the Bolshevik 
threat, sent a letter to the Transcaucasian governments reiterating the importance 
and necessity of establishing a close union of Caucasian republics.281 At the same 
time, in order to retain the gains made, and to guarantee the independence of the 
                                                 
279 Berkuk, “15. Fırkanın Harekâtı”, 95-6. For a detailed analysis of Turkish troops in the Caucasus 
in addition to Berkuk and Erşan see Nasır Yüceer, 1996. Birici Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı 
Ordusu’nun Azerbaycan ve Dağıstan Harekâtı: Azerbaycan ve Dağıstan’ın Bağımsızlığını 
Kazanması, Ankara: Genel Kurmay Yay. Halil Bal, 1997. “Kuzey Kafkasya’nın İstilali ve 
Türkiye’nin Askeri Yardımı,”Kafkas Araştırmaları III, İstanbul, 29-91. 
280 Daniyalov, 26. 
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North Caucasian Republic, as a last attempt, contact was established with the 
British command in Baku. At the end of November 1918, the Mountaineer 
government appointed Ali Khan Kantemir282 as the Mountaineer government 
representative to the British and sent a delegation to Baku presided by the President 
Chermoev himself. The aim of the delegation was to understand the attitudes and 
plans of the British government in the region. 
On 26 November, the delegation met with General Thomson, the 
commander of the British forces in Baku and the Allies’ representative. During 
these talks, Chermoev explained their previous reliance on the Turks and the 
present necessity for British aid to prevent a reconquest of the entire area by the 
Bolsheviks. In response, General Thomson told the delegation, that the Paris Peace 
Conference would settle the matter of the North Caucasian Republic’s 
independence. Until that time, he stressed, the government of the North Caucasian 
Republic would have the opportunity to administer the country according to the 
same principles, which were applied by the allies to Azerbaijan.283 
Moreover he gave a note in the name of the Allied Powers in which he 
criticized the political program of the Mountaineer Government and asked for the 
removal of all the remnants of German and Turkish troops. He stressed, among 
other things, that “Englishmen and their Allies consider it necessary to help Russia 
to restore order.” “It is our duty” he went on “to defend order in the country and to 
                                                                                                                                       
281 For the text of this letter see Bammat, “The Caucasus,” 16 and Kurtatag, 28 July 1927. “Zadachi 
III,” Vol’nye Gortsy, (Prague), 3: 3. 
282 Ali Khan Kantemir, (1886-1963), Osetian. He was born in Vladikavkaz. He studied in 
Vladikavkaz and then law in St. Petersburg. Following his graduate settled in Baku and worked as a 
lawyer with the first premier of Azerbaijani National government Fethali Khan Hoyski. Before the 
February Revolution he was the governor of Kars but then he removed from office and elected as a 
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help the local population in their efforts to destroy Bolshevism.” “The Allies are 
here”, he concluded, “to assure justice and peace for everybody”.284 At last, he 
asked for help in the establishment of contacts between the Allies and the Denikin. 
In addition, in order to control the North Caucasian government and to see 
that the evacuation of the Turkish troops was carried out, General Thomson 
appointed Colonel Rawlinson as British representative to the North Caucasian 
Republic.285 
4- The End of the North Caucasian Republic: December 1918- May 1919: 
By December the fate of the Mountaineer government was seriously at risk. 
The situation in the region remained quite fluid, and the authority of the North 
Caucasian government was already being challenged by two outside powers; the 
Bolsheviks and the Whites, seeking to establish control over the North Caucasus. 
Under these circumstances the Mountaineer government of Abdulmejid 
Chermoev resigned on 12 December 1918 and the Union Council or the Parliament 
approved the resignation on 15 December. The setting up of a new government was 
delegated to Pshemaho Kotsev and in spite of some set backs he presented his 
cabinet on 19 November. The new cabinet consisted of Pshemaho Kotsev 
(President), Nuh Bey Tarkovskiy (Minister of National Security), Reshid Khan 
Kaplanov (Minister of Interior), Haydar Bammat (Minister of Foreign Affairs), 
Vassan Girey Jabagiev (Minister of Finance), B. Malachkhanov (Industry and 
                                                                                                                                       
representative of Kars to Seym. He served as the deputy Foreign Minister of the Transcaucasian 
Government. At last he was the representative of the North Caucasian government at Baku. 
283 Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization II,” 50. 
284 For the text of General Thomson’s telegram to the North Caucasian Republic’s government see 
Kurtatag, “Zadachi II,” 7. Related with the issue also see Jabagi, “Revolution,” 125-26 and also see 
Denikin, Ocherki, Vol 4, 123-124. 
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Trade), Ibrahim Haydarov (Transportation), H. Shakhsuvarov (Education), A. 
Butayev (Agriculture and National Estates).286 
During the same meeting, Kotsev delivered a speech and commented on the 
situation in the region. He also emphasised that one of the main tasks of the new 
government was to strive, together with Azerbaijan and Georgia, for worldwide 
recognition of the countries independence.287 In order to accomplish this aim, a 
delegation was sent to the Paris Peace Conference, consisting of A. Chermoyev, 
İbrahim Haydarov, Haydar Bammat, and Dr. Hazarakov.  Before a decision was 
taken in Paris, the Whites attacked North Caucasus. 
 
By 1919 the North Caucasus had a new and aggressive enemy: Denikin and 
his anti-Bolshevik White Army. Before the main blow towards the north started, 
Denikin wished to secure his position and guarantee the flow of British support 
from the south. He therefore decided to make his first task the clearing of the 
mountain region and the coast between the Kuban and the Transcaucasian states. 
This made the North Caucasian Republic his first target. Early in 1919 his army 
began its operations towards the North Caucasus and took the territory known for 
ıts mineral waters, Kislovodsk, Pyatigorsk, Zheleznovodsk, and Esentük. In early 
February he advanced to Vladikavkaz, which at that time had been recently 
                                                                                                                                       
285 Kurtatag, “Zadachi II,” 7; Bammat, “The Caucasus,” 19; and Kosok, “Revolution and 
Sovietization II,” 52. 
286 For the ministries of Justice, Labor and, Health and Public Relief and to the National Control 
nobody was nominated. Cabaği, Kafkas-Rus Mücadelesi, 94 and Jabagi, “Revolution,” 127. 
Pşimaho Kotsev, May-June-July 1965. “Yeşil Mayıs,” Birleşik Kafkasya, (İstanbul), 4: 3-8. 
287 For the text of Kotsev’s speech see ‘Deklaratsiya P. Kotseva,’ in Kurtatag, “Zadachi III,” 3-4 and 
also see Jabagi, “Revolution,” 127. 
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captured from the Bolsheviks by the Ingush troops and thus was in the hands of the 
Mountaineer government.288 
This was not to last, but was one of the most important threats to the well 
being of the North Caucasian government. Despite the talks between the authorities 
of the Mountaineer Republic and Denikin, the parties could not reach an 
agreement. Thus Kosok, the President of the North Caucasian Republic personally 
visited General Thomson in Baku on 9 February 1919 and asked him to intervene 
to halt the advance of the Whites.289 Despite his promises to control Denikin and to 
stop the White advance, the British supported Denikin unconditionally and thus all 
requests and protestations were in vain.290 
Denikin rejected reconciliation with the Mountaineers and the North 
Caucasians. He appointed General Liakhov as the governor general of the mountain 
region, including Dagestan. The Mountaineer government sent a delegation headed 
by Zubeyir Temirhanov to Liakhov to Yekatarinodar. This delegation was to 
inform the Volunteers that the Mountain Republic would join the struggle against 
the Bolsheviks, but insisted on its independence and the exclusion of Volunteer 
troops from its territory, until the final conclusions of the world conference in 
Paris, to which a special delegation has been sent.291 
The negotiations continued for two weeks.292 General Liakhov explained to 
the delegation that his authority covered the entire area but indicated that each of 
                                                 
288 Jabagi, “Revolution,” 127 and Bammat, “The Caucasus,” 18. 
289 Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization II,” 53. 
290 Bammat, “The Caucasus,” 18. 
291 For a detailed account of events see Brinkley, Allied Intervention, 148-151. For the report of 
delegation to the North Caucasian Parliament see A. Takho-Godi, 1927. Revoliutsiia i 
Kontrrevoliutsiia v Dagestane, Makhachkale: Dagestanskoe Gosizdat, 189-197. 
292 Kotsev, “Yeşil Mayıs,” 6. 
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the various Mountain peoples could form autonomous local governments. Under 
the governor-general a special local governor of native birth would be appointed 
for each region, and the administrative organs could be developed as each saw fit 
within this framework. In short, the Mountain Republic, as such, did not exist for 
the Volunteers, and the compromise offered by Liakhov was the only concession, 
which would be made.293 
In response, the Mountaineer government issued a statement of protest 
against the profound coercion by the Volunteer Army and ordered the mobilization 
of all armed forces to defend the territory against the volunteers. The first group to 
face the Volunteers was the Chechen-Ingush.294 The Whites’ ultimatum to the 
Ingush caused bewilderment.. They responded to this ultimatum by appealing to 
the North Caucasian government for an explanation of the situation, as they 
recognized only this government and acted according to its orders. Nevertheless, 
the government in Temir Khan Shura had neither the opportunity nor the time to 
come to the aid of the Ingush. As a result, the Volunteer Army under the command 
of General Heimann defeated the Ingush after a seven-day fight. 
“After this defeat, experienced by the most courageous tribe and the one 
most devoted to the idea of independence, which, according to General 
Heimann, constituted an ‘iron gate’ to the North Caucasus, there was 
nothing to prevent them taking Vladikavkaz and the whole territory 
between there and Groznyi.”295 
 
Kotsev in a last attempt appointed General Khabaev, an Orthodox Osetian, 
commander in chief of Chechen troops. However, Khabaev compromised with 
                                                 
293 Brinkley, Allied Intervention, 149-150 and see Takho Godi, 196-7. 
294 Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization II,” 53. 
295 Jabagi, “Revolution,” 128. 
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Denikin who appointed him governor (pravitel) of the Osetian region.296 This 
situation caused disputes among the members of the North Caucasians government. 
Kotsev was accused of passivity and failure. He was forced to resign from the 
government. To ensure his resignation Nuh Bey Tarkovskiy, Reshid Khan 
Kaplanov and Vassan Girey Jabagiev resigned from their posts in early March. In 
addition, Kotsev got no support from the British and his government collapsed on 
20 March 1919.297 Nevertheless, in spite of strong opposition, Kotsev was once 
more given the duty of setting up a new government. This new Kotsev government 
included military names like Butayev and Pensulayev. However this second cabinet 
of Kotsev resulted in a split between the Mountaineers. 
 
Seeing the split within the members of the Mountaineer government 
Denikin himself journeyed to Grozny in April to use the situation to his advantage. 
In early May, because of increasing criticisms the second Kotsev government was 
resigned and after much discussion, General Mikail Halilov was appointed 
President of the Republic and given the duty of setting up a new government. 
Halilov was unable to create a cabinet, however.298 During this general confusion, 
without encountering any opposition, the Volunteer Army captured first 
Shamilkale (Petrovsk), and later Derbent. The Dagestani section of the Parliament 
                                                 
296 Baytugan, “Kuzey Kafkasya,” 10. 
297 Kotsev, “Yeşil Mayıs,” 7. Cabaği, Kafkas-Rus Mücadelesi, 99-100. Mikhail Halilov or Mikhail 
Halil Paşa in his reply to Denikin in Gortsy Kavkaza has given this date as 18 May. See Mikhail 
Halilov, 1934. “Otvet Generalu Denikinu,” Gortsy Kavkaza, (Warsaw), 50: 16. 
298 Jabagi, asserted that the decisive factor in the election of Halilov was the support of the pro-
Denikin group headed by Danyal Apashev, a former tsarist police officer and landowner. 
“Revolution,” 131. And Halilov stressed that he did not want to be a President initially. He defined 
himself as a military man not politician therefore he said that he was not ready or suit to the 
Presidency but despite this reality the North Caucasian Parliament elected him unanimously to the 
post of Presidency. See Halilov, “Otvet”, 16. 
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of the Mountain Republic decided to separate from the Mountain Republic ‘for an 
indefinite time’ to establish a provisional Dagestan Government under General 
Halilov on 23 May 1919. Moreover it authorized him to enter an agreement with 
Denikin along the lines suggested by the British. With this decision the peoples of 
the North Caucasus lost their ephemeral independence. Denikin appointed native 
names as local governors in compliance with his general policy. The last president 
of the Republic, Mikail Halilov was appointed as the governor-general of 
Dagestan. General Aliyev, General Khabaev, and General Bekovich-Cherkaskiy 
were appointed as the governors of Chechen, Osetian, and Kabardian territories 
respectively. General Hacı Murat Orozhkhanov was appointed regional commander 
of Temir Khan Shura. “The latter tried, on the order of the parliamentary 
opposition after some stormy scenes in Parliament, but twelve of them managed to 
escape via Baku to Tiflis.” In this way, the independence of the North Caucasus 
Republic came to an end.299 
 
Following the disintegration of the North Caucasian Mountaineer Republic, 
the leading political figures of North Caucasians were divided into four distinct 
groupings: (1) a group of former Tsarist generals who collaborated with Denikin; 
(2) a group of Mountaineers controlled by the religious leaders or sheikhs; (3) the 
Bolsheviks and, (4) the group of leading nationalist figures of the Mountaineer 
Republic which has to move outside of the North Caucasus. 
 
                                                 
299 Baytugan, “Kuzey Kafkasya,” 10. 
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In early June, the first group appeared to be in a stronger position than the 
others. Having securing Transcaucasus, the British established a demarcation line, 
which left the North Caucasus to Denikin and his collaborators, and issued a 
statement to the population in which they labelled any kind of anti-Denikin 
movement as Bolshevik. This step provoked reaction and hostilities against 
Denikin, and against the British.300 But, because of the military might of Denikin 
they managed to keep their authority in the region. 
The most popular and powerful group of the other three groups was the 
religious one led by Gotsinskiy and Uzun Haji301. Following the arrival of the 
Denikin and the collapse of the Mountaineer Republic Uzun Haji continued his 
struggle and declared a theocratic state, the North Caucasian Emirate in Upper 
Chechnya, modelled on Shamil’s state. Although initially he had co-operated with 
Bolshevik forces against Denikin, he in fact hated all Russians indiscriminately, 
and treated them all as enemies. Moreover, because of his co-operation with 
Denikin, he wrote to Mikail Halilov that whoever symphatised with the Cossacks 
would be eternally damned and would fall under the ‘rage of God’.302 Nevertheless, 
Uzun Haji died in March 1920, and Gotsinskiy took over and developed the 
military might into the strongest of the four factions. 
 
                                                 
300 Denikin, Ocherki, Vol.IV, 135. 
301 Uzun Haji, (1848-1920). He was born in the village of Salty in Dagestan. He took a religious 
education and opened his own religious school in Salty in 1882. Because of his anti-tsarist activities 
and struggle for liberation exiled to the Siberia, to stay in a labour camp in 1892. Then, by the help 
of the Muslim merchants of Astrakhan he retuned and stayed in Astrakhan until the February 
Revolution. 
302 Takho-Godi, 110-111. 
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The nationalist groups of the time were forced to leave the North Caucasus. 
While some of them were trying to establish contacts and find help in European 
capitals, others stayed in Baku and Tiflis, the nearest place to the North Caucasus, 
and searched for the ways of establishing contact with the other Caucasian 
republics in order to survive the struggle of independence. Nevertheless, they lost 
their ‘authority and power’ over the peoples of the North Caucasus and waiting for 
the initiative of any kind of a rebellious movement. 
Among these four groups, the Bolsheviks used the situation most skilfully 
and agitated the hostility of religious groups against the Volunteer Army. 
Meanwhile, because of Denikin’s supremacy, the leadership cadre was forced to 
leave the region for Baku and organized the North Caucasian ‘socialist group’ 
there. In autumn, this group attempted to set up a comprehensive anti-Denikin 
organization and Celâl Korkmazov established contacts with the ‘nationalist’ 
leaders Haydar Bammat and Ali Khan Kantemir, and managed to conclude an 
agreement, in which the establishment of a ‘North Caucasian Defense Council’303 
was proposed. 
The agreement aimed to embrace all components of the North Caucasus 
against Denikin. This Council was given the duty of organizing military activity 
against the occupying forces first and then, after defeating the enemy, would be the 
core of the possible national government. In order to obtain the participation of 
religious groups into the Council, Celâl Korkmazov and Ali Khan Kantemir 
                                                 
303 For the Defense Council see Bammat, “Revolution,” 18-9, Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization 
II,” 53. Some other names like Ahmet Tsalikhov and Nuri Pasha were also took active parts in this 
Council. 
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travelled to Lavasha, the base of Ali Haji and convinced him to act together with 
the other groups against Denikin. 
Thanks to this umbrella organization, the anti-Denikin front in the region 
was strengthened. Actually almost from the beginning the Bolsheviks dominated 
the Council and exploited this situation successfully. Moreover, in order to control 
the whole region, they established the Bureau for Establishing the Soviet 
Domination in the North Caucasus. This consisted of Ordzhonikidze, Kirov, 
Stopani, Mdivani and Nerimanov, and was directed centrally. As a result of the 
activities of this Council and the increasing Bolshevik military presence, Denikin 
was forced to leave the region in February 1920 and in March the remainder of the 
troops under his command were evacuated to the Crimea with extensive allied 
assistance. The Bolsheviks or the Red Army gained control of the region without 
any difficulty. Revolutionary committees controlled by the Bolsheviks quickly 
spread over the territory, even into villages. “Formed rapidly on the ground, they 
were the initial military, political authorities in the North Caucasus.”304 
The next step for the Bolsheviks was the liquidation of the Defence 
Council. At first, Council had moved to Petrovsk and on 11 April 1919, by the vote 
of Bolshevik members, was dissolved itself and turned into the Revolutionary 
Committee of the whole Caucasus. The non-Bolshevik members of the Council 
were dismissed and executed. The troops loyal to the Council were disbanded and 
the Bolshevik policies of divide-and-rule for controlling the region were initiated. 
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In summary, the Russian forces, in this case Bolsheviks, once more ruined 
the second main attempt of the Mountaineers to establish a unified, sovereign 
North Caucasian State. In this struggle, Mountaineers did not have the chance to 
create a long-lasting, effective, and comprehensive state structure and bureaucracy. 
Moreover, in different parts, as in Shamil’s period, the Mountaineers took varying 
attitudes towards the existing authorities of the various groups, or the peoples who 
declared their own rules and could easily establish contradicting and ephemeral 
alliances with one another. 
In this period, again in contrast to Shamil’s, the foreign powers participated 
directly. The Turkish advance provided the opportunity to establish a Mountaineer 
Republic, but the collapse of the Ottoman Empire halted the activities of the 
Mountaineers for that period. Thus, until then each party, in pursuit of its own 
interests, usually chose one of the powerful external powers. The religious groups 
on the other hand, although they had a considerable power base among the native 
population, didn’t establish contacts with foreign powers and because of their 
discourse, which has constructed solely on the religious motives alienated other 
initial support groups. Moreover, some other groups that were closely associated 
with Denikin caused the emergence of Bolshevik dominance and lost their prestige 
among the Mountaineers. 
With the exception of the first Congress of May 1917, the North Caucasian 
Mountaineers, because of the continuing military clashes, never had a chance to 
deal with the social dimensions of the North Caucasian unity and found themselves 
in a scattered position. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE 
ACTIVITIES IN EXILE 
 
1- The Establishment of Soviet Power: 
By 1920 the Bolshevik forces controlled the entire region. The 
Mountaineers last resistance movement, led by Said Shamil, (great-grandson of 
Imam Shamil) and the religious leaders, Uzun Haji and Najmuddin Gotsinskiy 
continued until summer 1921. Some of the former tsarist army officers who fought 
sided with Denikin now, head by Colonel Kaitmas Alikhanov, an Avar, also joined 
this last attempt together with them. Although, initially, they achieved some 
success, with the arrival of the 11th Red Army, the Bolshevik forces suppressed the 
movement in spring 1921.305 However, “from 1922 to 1943, the history of 
Chechnia and Daghestan was an almost uninterrupted succession of rebellions, 
counter-expeditions and ‘political-banditism’ –uprisings took place in 1924, 1928, 
1936-…”.306 
 
                                                 
305 For a detailed account of uprising see Marie Bennigsen Broxup, 1992. “The Last Ghazawat: The 
1920-1921 Uprising.” In M. B. Broxup, eds., The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance 
Towards the Muslim World, London: C. Hurst, 112-145. Alexandre Bennigsen, July 1983. “Muslim 
guerilla Warfare in the Caucasus (1918-1928),” Central Asian Survey, 2(1): 45-56. Also see N. 
Samurskii, “Grazhdanskaia Voina v Dagestane,” Novyi Vostok, (Moscow): 230-240. Al. Todorskii, 
1924. Krasnaia Armiia v gorakh: Deistviia v Dagestane, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo ‘Voennyi Vestnik’. 
Daniyalov, 58-9. 
306 Broxup, “The Last Ghazawat”, 143. For a detailed account of above-mentioned uprisings see 
Abdurahman Avtorkhanov, “The Chechens and the Ingush during the Soviet Period and its 
Antecedents,” in The North Caucasus Barrier, 146-194. 
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In this atmosphere of uprisings and disorder in the North Caucasus, the 
Bolsheviks initiated the process of establishing Communist rule.307 Stalin and his 
commissariat of Nationalities, Narkomnats308, took the lead by 1920. 
Stalin, formulated the nationalities policy of the Bolshevik party as a 
response to Lenin’s request in his article titled ‘Marxism and the National and 
Colonial Questions’ against the Austro-Marxist theory of ‘extra-territorial cultural 
autonomy’ for national minorities309 and the policy of assimilation. In this article 
Stalin provided a restrictive conception of nationhood: “A nation is an historically 
evolved, stable community of people arising on the basis of a community of 
language, territory, economic life, and psychological make up as manifested in a 
community of culture.”310 
 
Based on this definition, and directed by Lenin, he developed the Soviet 
interpretation of self-determination. In resolving the Russia’s nationality question, 
Lenin’s main concern was the adoption of a political strategy through which the 
                                                 
307 For the establishment of Soviet rule in the North Caucasus see Stephen Blank, 1993. “The 
Formation of the Soviet North Caucasus 1918-24,” Central Asian Survey, 12(1): 13-32. Hereafter 
“the Soviet North Caucasus”. Stephen Blank, 1994. The Sorcerer As Apprentice: Stalin as 
Commissar of Nationalities, 1917-1924, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. Hereafter The 
Sorcerer. 
308 The Narkomnats was established on 25 October 1917 during the Second All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets. On the activities and the history of the Commissariat see Blank’s above mentioned book 
The Sorcerer In addition see Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, 1987. The Great Challenge: Nationalities 
and the Bolshevik State, 1917-1930, transl. by Nancy Festinger, New York: Holmes & Meier, 101-
106. 
309 For Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, the most prominent Austro-Marxists, the multiethnic character 
and growing political salience of ethnic divisions made the role of nations in the establishment of 
socialism and their future position in a socialist society a far more problematic affair than in the 
established nation-states of Western Europe. There was also the problem of those nationality groups 
living outside their national territories. For them territory was not to be a prerequisite feature of the 
nation; rather, the nation was deemed to be a product of a common history. Consequently, nations 
should be granted cultural autonomy without regard to the compactness of their geographical 
settlements. 
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establishment of a unified body of equal citizens based on the principles of 
Communism is made possible. One of the most important elements of Lenin’s 
policy was the right of nations to self-determination, which he saw as linked 
exclusively to the right to political secession. He believed that even if small nations 
did seize the opportunity to declare themselves independent states, they would soon 
realise the benefits of being part of a larger territorial unit and would opt for 
reincorporation.311 
“For Lenin the ethnic constitution of such a polity included proposals to 
divide the country into autonomous and self-governing territorial units 
according –among other things- to nationality; freedom and equality of 
languages, and the protection of the cultural and educational rights of 
minorities. With socialism’s establishment, such a programme also 
envisaged the sblizhenie (‘coming together’) and eventual sliyanie 
(‘merger’) of the proletariat of different nations.”312 
 
In other words, the Soviet solution to the nationality question was the 
strategy of ethno-territorial proliferation: 
“The Soviet solution was to extend their system of national-territorial units 
downward into smaller and smaller territories, the smallest being the seize 
of a single village. …Territorially dispersed nationalities would no longer 
be threatened with assimilation, and therefore, according to Soviet theory, 
the potential for defensive nationalism and the resulting ethnic conflict 
would be defused.”313 
 
In compliance with this policy, Stalin participated the Congresses held in 
the North Caucasus in November 1920. In the Congress of the Peoples of Dagestan 
held in Temir Khan Shura on 13 November and the Congress of Mountaineers of 
                                                                                                                                       
310 See J. V. Stalin, “Marxism and the National Question,” in Collected Works, vol. 2, (Moscow, 
1952-55), 307 and also see Joseph Stalin, 1942. Marxism and Nationality Question, New York: 
International Publishers. In addition, for a detailed analysis see Wixman, Language Aspects, 21-43. 
311 On the Bolshevik and then the Soviet nationality policy and the establishment of the Soviet 
Union see Terry Martin, 2001. The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the 
Soviet Union, 1923-1939, New York: Cornell University Press. 
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Terek held in Vladikavkaz on 17 November, Stalin read out Lenin’s decree on 
Soviet autonomy for Dagestan and the North Caucasus. He said that the new 
administration would “respect for traditions and the peculiarities of the region’s 
peoples but not their separation from Russia.”314 In relation with that he declared 
that Moscow would granted full rights of administration to people on the basis of 
their indigenous laws and customs. 
“If they wanted to be ruled by Shariat the regime would abide by it. This 
was music to minorities’ ears and they proclaimed autonomy on 20 January 
1921. At the same time Stalin hedged his promise by noting that all native 
peoples could live according to their customs but within the framework of 
the common constitution of Russia.”315 
 
On 20 January 1920, in compliance with these policy initiatives, the Central 
Executive Committee created two autonomous republics, Dagestan Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) and Soviet Mountain Republic (Gorskaia 
Sovietskaia Respublika), which comprised the Chechen, Ingush, Osetian, 
Kabardian, Balkar and Karachay territories, and incorporated them into RSFSR. 
The Soviet Mountain Republic however was short lived. Once Soviet power was 
firmly established, the regime divided the region into smaller ethnic territories in 
1921 and created six autonomous units from 1922 to 1924: Karachay-Cherkess 
Autonomous Oblast (AO) 12 January 1922, Kabardino-Balkar AO 16 January 
1922, Adyge AO 27 July 1922, Chechen AO 20 November 1922. With the 
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establishment of Ingush AO and North Osetian AO 7 July 1924 which republic 
ceased to exist.316 
Among the most interesting examples of the implementation of Soviet 
policy of fragmentation317 were those of the Karachay-Balkars and the Circassian 
populations. Despite the existence of a logical way of delineating the territories of 
these two peoples latitudinally, i. e., in the north a Circassian AO, and the south a 
Karachay-Balkar AO, the Soviets choose to split both peoples longitudinally into a 
Karachay-Cherkess and a Kabardino-Balkar territory. So from two people four 
were created.318 
Then using the language as a basis, the Soviet regime created and provided 
ethnic homelands to the different peoples, within which they were entitled to use a 
variety of ethnic institutions. These titular nationalities gained some privileges 
within their homelands and were permitted to use their own languages in the press, 
broadcasting and education. 
Stalin believed that the native languages would make Soviet power 
comprehensible. In line, “native cadres, who understood ‘the way of life, customs, 
                                                 
316 Later on depending on Moscow’s policies the territorial boundaries and the statutes of those units 
changed several times. On 26 April 1926 the Karachay-Cherkess AO was further divided into a 
separate Karachay AO and Cherkess AO, on 5 December 1936 the Kabardino-Balkar AO was 
elevated to ASSR status, and on 15 January 1934 the Chechen and Ingush territories were united in 
the one Checheno-Ingush AO and then elevated to ASSR status on 5 December 1936. 
317 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was consisted of hierarchical national-territorial 
units. At the top, there were the Union Republics (SSRs) which were the building blocs of the 
USSR. Then there were Autonomous Republics (ASSRs). These were sub-divisions of the larger 
union republics, designated as the territories of national minorities. The Autonomous Oblasts or 
provinces (AOs) were paced at the third level of hierarchy and the designated territory of national 
minorities living in a coterminous geographic area within a union republic. In addition to these AOs 
there were other oblasts, which were the basic non-national administrative units of the union 
republics. Beyond that there were the Krais or the border regions and Autonomous Okrugs or the 
national provinces. Krais were large territories of geographic or military significance, located in 
strategically important borderlands and Okrugs were the smallest of the national-territorial units. 
318 For a detailed discussion and the examples of Soviet delimitations see Wixman, Language 
Aspects, 137-141. 
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and habits of the local population’ would make Soviet power seem indigenous 
rather than an external Russian imperial imposition.” Thus he defined his sytem of 
cultures as “national in form, socialist in content”.319 
 
Initially, the Russians readily accepted Arabic as the official language of the 
newly established Soviet Mountain Republic and moreover, the Bolsheviks 
allowed the functioning of religious schools. However, by 1922 native language 
schools replaced by these schools.320 In 1924, with the exception of Dagestan 
where they remained until 1927, all Arabic or religious schools were closed. As an 
alternative the Bolsheviks introduced latinized alphabets to create written native 
languages. In this way, “the right of so called ‘independent development’ was 
recognized for each local language and separate dialect to became ‘state language’ 
in each autonomous republic or oblast along with Russian.”321 Moreover, Russian 
along with the native languages became the primary educational language 
throughout the North Caucasus in 1920s. 
This latinization process was strongly opposed prompting different 
reactions from the peoples of the North Caucasus. Even the local Communist 
leaders opposed it, as they were demanding a unified script. They wanted the 
languages to be brought closer together, not artificially divided.322 But, those who 
openly opposed this process were labelled bourgeois nationalists and most were 
executed. 
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Then Moscow decided to replace this latin script and openly instigated the 
policy of Cyrilization in 1938-9, which was viewed as forced Russification and met 
by revolts among the Karachays, Balkars, Ingush and Chechens. This was 
accompanied with the acceptance of Russian as the obligatory language in 
education and the assimilation process in the North Caucasus gained momentum.323 
 
Moreover, the Soviet government divided its population into two broad 
categories: eastern and western nationalities.324 This dictomy was based primarily 
on the developmental stage. The peoples of the North Caucasus, naturally, 
belonged to the economically and culturally ‘backward’ eastern nationalities group. 
“In the east, major problem was a lack of literate, educated titular nationals, 
and so the policy emphasis was an affirmative action in education and 
hiring to create national elites. Only after their creation would lingistic 
korenizatsia be possible.”325 
 
Then the formation process of native local leaders in the North Caucasus 
was gained a momentum, but the results were not complied with theory.326 
 
2- Politics in Exile: 
While the Bolsheviks, who were cementing their control over the region 
were suppressing the uprisings, the nationalist groups of the Mountaineers left the 
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North Caucasus. Apart from the leaders who were in İstanbul and Paris, some 
stayed in Tiflis and as a last attempt, formed the ‘Azerbaijan-North Caucasus 
Committee,’ (Azerbaycan-Kuzey Kafkasya Komitesi). On 22 February 1921, 
Haydar Bammat informed the European powers of the formation and the 
composition of the Committee through a radio broadcast.327 The basic aim of the 
Committee was, naturally, the liberation of Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus and 
the creation of a confederative state with Georgia and Armenia. As Bammat states, 
this Committee was the first real step towards the establishment of a Caucasian 
Confederation.328 On the day of its foundation, the Georgian government 
recognized the Committee as the provisional government of Azerbaijan and the 
North Caucasus. The advance and success of the Red Army, however, halted the 
realization of this idea, at least in the territory of the Caucasus. 
From then on, representatives of the formerly independent Caucasian 
Republics have to shift the base of their struggle for independence outside their 
homelands, especially to Europe. Paris was the first safe heaven. In fact, the 
Caucasian Republics already had delegations in Paris in charge of defending rights 
of their peoples at the Versailles Peace Conference. It is interesting to note that, in 
contrast to the attitude of the period of Civil War, the leaders of the former 
Caucasian Republics began to act in a spirit of compromise, and their 
organizations, publications and leadership intermingled and supported each other. 
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Again in contrast to the former period, the idea of establishing a Confederation was 
accepted as the most viable and realistic solution for the future of the Caucasus. 
The ideal of the Confederation was now not only a word for coalescing the leaders 
seeking a return to power, but it was the solution to the intractable internal 
problems the region faced because of nationalism and religious differences. 
In Paris, the representatives of the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Armenia, in response to Bolshevik occupation, decided to form a kind of a platform 
or unified body of structure.329 In order to strengthen their positions in defending 
their peoples’ rights, they drew up basic plans for the future Caucasian 
Confederation and outlined methods of cooperation. They signed a declaration on 
10 June 1921330 and submitted it to the Secretariat of League of Nations on 6 July 
via the representative of Georgia in Paris, in his name and the name of the 
representatives of the three other Caucasian republics. The Secretary-General 
communicated a copy of the Declaration to the Council and the members of the 
League of Nations on 19 July 1921.331 
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331 Note by Secretary-General, League of Nations, 19 July 1921, on the alliance, enclosing 
translation of declaration [FO 371/6273] in Caucasian Boundaries: Documents and maps 1802-
1946, 1996. In Anita L.P. Burdett, eds., Archive Editions, London: Oxford, 763-768. Hereafter 
Caucasian Boundaries. 
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This Declaration could be accepted as the first common manifesto of the 
Caucasian peoples in which the basics of the state structure and policies were 
clearly defined. 
In this Declaration, the signing parties declared their desire to eliminate all 
grounds of conflict which caused a discord in the current history of the region and 
stressed their wish to establish an union to ensure the benefits of independence, 
democratic government and economic prosperity for the peoples of the Caucasus. 
The Declaration accepted that the establishment of a close and brotherly 
union as absolutely essential for the consolidation of the independence of these 
republics as well as enabling the Caucasus to act as a connecting link between West 
and East, and between the Christian and Muslim worlds. Their common fate was 
the main basis of the Union. In order to promote a degree of confidence among the 
member nationalities, article IV of the Declaration, stated that the Caucasian 
Republics would refrain from entering into any agreement, action or understanding 
of an international character which might be prejudicial to this alliance. To secure 
independence it proposed the formation of a defensive military alliance among the 
confederate states against foreign aggression. 
While little emphasis was put on common economic interests with a word, 
significantly enough, the future promises and the relations with the foreign powers, 
and especially the neighbouring states, Turkey, Russia and Persia (Iran) were 
analyzed in detail. 
In the article VII, the Confederation’s possible relations with Russia and 
Iran were seen in terms of mutual economic and trade relations. In relations with  
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Turkey, however, the demarcation of borders had precedence. In the article it was 
stressed that: 
“they attach equal importance to the establishment of friendly and 
neighbourly relations with Turkey, the Caucasian Republics will endeavour, 
by their joint efforts, to strengthen these relations, subject to Turkey’s 
observing and respecting the inviolability of Caucasian territory as 
constituted by the frontiers of 1914.”332 
 
The Confederation was thus made reference to the problems between the 
Armenians and Turks. According to the declaration, this was one of the chief 
obstacles to establishing a union of Caucasian states. Therefore, the declaration 
accepted the solution of the problem as a condition for managing the establishment 
of a true Confederation. The signing parties uttered that: 
“[A] prompt and equitable territorial delimitation of Turkey and Armenia in 
accordance with their mutual interests and within the limits of Turkey will 
be guarantee for peace and quiet in the Near East, and that the strength and 
very existence of the Caucasian Republics and of their Union will depend to 
a large extent on this settlement, to which the Caucasian States will, by the 
joint efforts, contribute.”333 
 
In article IX by contrast, both Russia and Turkey were defined as occupying 
states and asked for all kinds of diplomatic means to put an end to this occupation. 
All treaties and agreements on the ceding of territory forced on the Caucasian 
States by neighbouring powers were regarded as having no legal force, and as 
being null and void. 
 
Nevertheless the atmosphere and the attitudes of the Great Powers at the 
Paris Peace Conference did not favor small nationalities. Therefore, these demands 
                                                 
332 Caucasian Boundaries, [FO 371/6273]. 
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were not realized, and the Caucasians were removed from the international stage 
for a time. 
 
A- The Union of Caucasian Mountaineers: 
The first formal organization of the Mountaineers of the Caucasus in exile 
was set up, quite probably in late 1923 in Prague, Czechoslovakia: The Union of 
Caucasian Mountaineers (Soyuz Gortsev Kavkaza). Czechoslovakia, as a sovereign 
state that emerged after the First World War under the leadership of Thomas 
Masaryk served to accommodate former White Russians. Along with this group 
there was a small but prominent North Caucasian minority. Thus, initially in this 
Union, some Cossack groups of the North Caucasus participated alongside the 
natives such as Nikolai Andreyevich Bigaev, was even nominated the chairman of 
the Union.334 The most important figure among the Mountaineers was Ahmet 
Tsalikov (Tsalıkkatı). 
The first general assembly of the Union was held on 29 April 1924 in 
Prague. In this meeting Ahmet Tsalikov was elected the President and, Murat 
Hatağogu (Khatagovko) as his deputy. V. V. Vazov was elected secretary and K. 
D. Guldiev, the treasurer. The other leading figure was Elmurza Bekovich 
Cherkaskiy. In addition, the auditing board was composed of N. A. Bigaev, 
Krımgirey Kuchmazukin, and Janbolat Jerikov. 
                                                                                                                                       
333 Caucasian Boundaries, [FO 371/6273]. 
334 We have no concrete information related with the founders, regulations and the date of the 
foundation. But during the first general assembly, which met in April 1924, it was mentioned that 
the activities of six months were reviewed. Therefore, apparently the Union had been active from 
November 1923. See, Aydın Turan, April 1997. “Kuzey Kafkasya Mültecilerinin Çalışmalarından 
Bir Kesit: Kafkasya Dağlıları Birliği (Soyuz Gortsev Kavkaza),” Toplumsal Tarih, 7(40): 46. 
Hereafter “Soyuz”. 
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The only source of first hand information on the Union was its periodical 
Kavkazskiy Gorets. This periodical, was the first political publication of the 
Mountaineers in exile. The first issue of Kavkazskiy Gorets was published in the 
spring of 1924, in line with the decision taken in the general assembly of the 
Union. Because of limited financial support, however, the Union’s administration 
had to cease the publication of the Kavkazskiy Gorets following the unified issue of 
2-3 in 1925. 
The objectives of the Union were indicated in the first issue of the 
Kavkazskiy Gorets. The first and foremost aim was the rehabilitation of Caucasian 
republics on the basis of federal principles. Beyond that, creating a political 
consciousness, uniting all former and fresh emigrants dispersed to the world into 
one central body, the establishment of contacts with other ‘brotherly unions and 
persons’, and with European help the development of programs to achieve these 
objectives.335 
Nevertheless the Union faced with a discord between the Mountaineers and 
the Cossacks, from the very outset.336 Alongside other Cossack members, 
especially the founding-chairman and the member of the auditing committee 
Nikolai Andreyevich Bigaev was strongly criticized by the Mountaineers. The 
main accusations were being ineffective and wasting the Union’s funds.337 As a 
result, the Union’s administration convened an extraordinary congress on 8 August 
                                                 
335 “Gortsy Kavkaza v Cekhoslavakii,” 1924. Kavkazskiy Gorets, 1: 70. See Turan, “Soyuz”, 46. 
336 Despite the conclusion of a four-point program on the Cossack problem was reached in a 
meeting that was held on 6 June 1924, both of these groups clashed with each other. A four-point 
program set out which noted that North Caucasus must be sovereign and independent state, that 
everyone would be equal in this new state, that the matter of this state’s boundaries be settled in the 
future, and that the Cossacks must live and work within the laws of this state. 
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1924 and revised the administrative set up. Hatağogu replaced Tsalikhov, with his 
consent as a chairman and Ahmet Nabi Magoma was named as his deputy. V. 
Beselov was charged with the duty of secretariat and K. D. Guldiev with the 
treasury. Only Elmurza Bekovich Cherkaskiy had kept his post as a member.338 
Beyond these disputes among its members, the activities of the Union, in 
the beginning focused mainly on the construction of communicative channels to 
establishing permanent contacts between the Caucasian emigrants and supplying 
them with the necessary resources for their survival in Europe. As a result, the 
Union managed to find financial support and scholarships from several European 
states, especially from Czechoslovakia. With these scholarships, fifteen students 
could study in Prague and Bruno and the Union successfully prepared the 
intellectual basis of the struggle in exile.339 
 
In the meantime, while the Mountaineers were endeavouring to establish 
their own organization, they also had close contacts with other Caucasian emigres. 
On every possible occasion, they issued declarations of solidarity and protested 
against the Bolshevik government. On 23 September 1924, the representatives of 
the four Caucasian republics issued a declaration on revolts in Georgia. In this 
declaration, which was signed by A. M. Topçubaşı (Azerbaijan), A. Hatisyan, V. 
Papazyan (Armenia), A Chkhenkeli, H. Ramishvili (Georgia), and A. Chermoev, I. 
                                                                                                                                       
337 For a further accusations see Aytek Kundukh’s reply (26 March 1927) “Otkritoe Pis’mo 
Predsedatelyu Soyuza Gortsev Kavkaza v ChSR M. Gatgogu,” Vol’nye Gortsy, (Prague), 1: 19. 
338 Kavkazskiy Gorets, 2/3, 1925. 
339 Among these students, Ahmet Nabi Magoma, Aytek Kundukh, Barasbi Baytugan, Kosta Zangi, 
M. Abatsiyev, Elmurza Bekovich Cherkasskiy, Cemalettin Kanukati, Nevruz Sunç and Murat 
Hatağogu could be pointed out. See “Gortsy Kavkaza Studenty Uchashchiesia v Cekhoslovatskiy,” 
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Haydarov (North Caucasus), the signing parties declared that they believed in the 
necessity of sincere and brotherly relations between Caucasian nations. The sole 
guarantee of the cultural and economic welfare of these four Caucasian republics 
would be the establishment of political and economic unity of those nations.340 
 
B- The Caucasian Independence Committee in Turkey: 
During this period the activities of the Caucasians were not confined to 
Europe. The North Caucasian, Georgian and Azerbaijani leaders who were living 
in exile in İstanbul, such as Dr. Hüsrev Sultanov, Ali Khan Kantemir and 
Aleksander Assatiyani, had informed the formation of the Caucasian Independence 
Committee341 issuing a declaration on 1 November 1924.342 
However due to the lack of financial resource the Committee was forced to 
work only on preparatory activities and until September 1925 could not take them 
to the implementation stage. It tried to ascertain to what extent the idea of the 
Confederation had matured and been prepared in the political circles and in the 
minds of masses. And how large was the circle of the active elements, the 
Committee could understand the enormous number of activists it draws on it from 
the very first beginning. As a result of the continued negotiations with the political 
                                                                                                                                       
1924. Kavkazskiy Gorets, (Prague), 1: 71-2 and “Khronika Soyuza,” 1925. Kavkazskiy Gorets, 
(Prague), 2/3: 135-6. 
340 Declaration des representants des gouvernements Nationaux des republiques du Caucase, Paris, 
23 Septembre 1924, see Vaçnadze “Hariçte Kafkasya”, 10. 
341 While Ahmet Hazer Hızal was giving the date of 1 November 1924 and labelling the committee 
as Caucasian Independence Committee (Kafkas Kurtuluş Komitesi-C.I.C.), the British Consulate 
General, in his report from İstanbul to Foreign Secretary named this committee as the ‘Committee 
of Confederation of Caucasia,’ (K.K.K.) and gave the date of formation as 7 October 1924. See 
‘British Consulate General, Constantinople to Foreign secretary, On Committee of Confederation of 
Caucasia, formed 7 October 1924’ [FO 371/11783] in Burdett, Caucasian Boundaries, 834-838.  
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groups of the peoples of the Caucasus, the Committee came to the conclusion that 
after bitter experiences and misfortunes the necessity and vitality of uniting the 
efforts of these activists who fought against the Bolsheviks for freedom and the 
creation of an All-Caucasian Confederation in future was now understood by all 
political currents in Caucasus.343 
Thus, in autumn of 1925 the Committee entered into more permanent 
relations with other groups of the peoples of the Caucasus. They endorsed once 
more that cooperation between activists from different ethnic groups in the 
Caucasus could only be possible under the colours of a united Caucasian front and 
in the future a Caucasian political union, which would be set up on the principles of 
a Confederation. In September 1925 the Committee having some small means, 
began a well planned work of organization, and proposed: 
 
“1) To form a system of relations with the Caucasian Republics, 2) There to 
form groups and agencies for work in the Republics, 3) To organize the 
more active elements of the Caucasian Emigration, 4) The creation of a 
party press for Caucasians and for the emigrants.”344 
 
In accordance with these principles, the Committee began to function 
among the Caucasian emigres. In his report, the British Consulate General in 
İstanbul, stressed that: 
 
“…[T]he military elements in Azerbaijan and in Northern Caucasus, which 
were in Turkey and in Persia united under the guidance of persons 
                                                                                                                                       
342 Vassan Girey Jabagiev, Ali Khan Kantemir, Aytek Namitok (Northern Caucasus), M. Tsereteli, 
A. Assatiyani, D. Vachnadze (Georgia), Hüsrev Sultanov (Sultanzade), Abdülali Emircan and A. 
Sheikhülislamzade (Azerbaijan) signed this Declaration. See Vaçnadze, “Hariçte Kafkasya”. 
343 Caucasian Boundaries, [FO 371/11783]. 
344 Caucasian Boundaries, [FO 371/11783]. 
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appointed by the K.K.K. and Georgian officers all over Europe were 
brought together into one Union and like in the past in Georgia they are 
working in full liaison with the national democratic party of Georgia which 
has its share in the K.K.K.”345 
 
The Committee organized a propaganda campaign and published printed 
materials. Moreover, it proposed to continue the commenced plan and to extent its 
framework, and in parallel to engage in forming requisite relations with those 
foreign states with an interest in weakening the Soviet Union. Establishment of this 
kind of relationship provided the possibility for receiving external protection and 
support for the work of the Committee, and in particular to receive sufficient 
quantity of arms and ammunition. The Committee believed that a rationally 
prepared action on the part of the entire Caucasus would create serious 
complications for Soviet Russia at home and abroad, and this justifies the 
expectation of success. 
At this time the British supported the activities of the Committee, and the 
Consul General in İstanbul recommended to London to support the work of this 
Committee against Soviet Union. 
“The work was commenced by the K.K.K. on a very modest scale but 
owing to its nature and character it will without fail grow up to that scale 
which is necessary in such a matter. Keeping that average scale it must be 
continued in the future and the following must be kept: 
1.The office of the K.K.K. 
2.The Persian section of the Committee, its office and means of liaison. 
3.The technical apparatus of the liaison (Kars, Arghadan –Tripev). 
4.The organisation of the K.K.K. in the Caucasian republics. 
5.The section of the K.K.K. in Europe for work amongst the ranks of the 
Emigration. 
6.The creation and labour of a Pancaucasian military circle. 
7.The Committees press conferences. 
                                                 
345 Caucasian Boundaries, [FO 371/11783]. 
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For the subject of all those objects the K.K.K. considers that £900 will be 
required per month.”346 
 
Nevertheless, because of the ‘close’ relations between the newly founded 
states of Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union, the activities of those anti-
Bolshevik or anti-Soviet groups were halted and its leaders were forced to leave 
Turkey or to keep in silence. 
 
C- Prométhée and the Amalgamation of Exiles: 
By the late 1920s, as a result of negative Turkish attitudes towards the 
Caucasian emigres and the death of Masaryk in Czechoslovakia, the Mountaineers 
began to search for a new safe heaven for their anti-Soviet independence 
movement. The atmosphere in Europe was favourable for the establishment of an 
anti-Bolshevik or Soviet front. Accordingly, the aforementioned Caucasian 
Independence Committee firstly moved to Paris in 1926. This allowed the 
establishment of close contacts between the members of the Committee and the 
Union of the Caucasian Mountaineers in Prague and the bulk of emigration who 
were living in Paris. 
Meanwhile, in May 1926 General Pilsudski came to the power in Poland. 
As Hostler stressed it, his official program was the political preparation for a 
possible war with the Soviets.347 He was aware of the importance of the anti-Soviet 
nationalist movements and accepted them as natural allies. He got a quick response 
from these groups and Russian emigres turned their faces towards Poland. 
                                                 
346 Caucasian Boundaries, [FO 371/11783]. 
347 Charles Warren Hostler, 1993. The Turks of Central Asia, London: Preager, 124. 
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Pilsudski, by allocating a considerable sum of money, strongly supported the 
activities of the emigres against the Bolshevik regime, which attracted émigré 
groups to Warsaw. And, with Polish financial support, the non-Slavic population of 
the former Russian Empire, except the Armenians, succeeded in setting up an 
overarching anti-Bolshevik political organization in 1926: the Prométhée.348 
The main contenders of all the anti-Bolshevik national parties of the 
revolutionary period in Russia took part in this newly established umbrella 
organization: Georgian Mensheviks, Azerbaijani ‘Musavat’, Crimean Tatars’ ‘Milli 
Fırka’, Turkistani ‘Milli Türkistan Birliği’ and the members of various North 
Caucasian and other non-Slavic groups.349 
The official publication of the Prométhée was its periodical Prométhée. The 
first issue of the Prométhée was published in November 1926 in Paris. In fact, 
beyond that the organization supplied the necessary financial means for the 
publication of several periodicals in different languages aimed at different 
nationalities. Among these were Trizub-Le Trident, Sakartvelo (Paris), İstiklâl and 
Kurtuluş (Berlin), Yaña Milli Yul (Berlin), Yaş Türkistan (Berlin-Paris), Volnoye 
Kazachestvo (Prague), Emel (Constanza), Severnyi Kavkaz-Şimali Kafkasya 
(Warsaw).350 
                                                 
348 For Prométhée see Etienne Copeaux 1997. “Prometeci Hareket,” Unutkan Tarih, Sovyet Sonrası 
Türkdili Alanı. In Semih Vaner, ed., İstanbul: Metis Yay., 17-52 and January-February 1993. 
“Promete Hareketi” Kırım, 2: 11-20. According to Muhlen Prométhée was set up in 1928 after a 
Caucasian freemasonry guild has moved from Warsaw to Paris. Patrik von zur Muhlen, 1984. 
Gamalıhaç ile Kızılyıldız Arasında: İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Sovyet Doğu Halkları’nın 
Milliyetçiliği,trnsl. Eşref Bengi Özbilen, Ankara: Mavi Yayınları, 20-1. Hereafter Gamalıhaç ile 
Kızılyıldız Arasında. 
349 Noy Jordaniya, Cafer Seydahmet, Osman Hoca, Mustafa Çokayoğlu, Ayaz İshaki, Said Shamil, 
Mehmed Emin Resulzade and Roman Smal-Stotskiy were the leading members of the Prométhée. 
However, Armenians, possibly because of the Turkish dominance refused to participate and 
cooperate. Muhlen, ibid., p. 20. 
350 Copeaux, ‘Prometeci Hareket’, p. 29 and, Hostler, ibid., pp. 124-5. 
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The Prométhée functioned through the Promethean Club in Warsaw. This 
club also had branches in Paris, Helsinki, and other European capitals. All national 
communities and governments in exile were represented in meetings, discussions 
and the planning of the political and propaganda actions. Beyond all those more or 
less public work; 
“the most serious and important activity was restricted to inner circles of 
the governments in exile, national communities, and the special desk of the 
Polish general staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who formulated 
plans for a possible future war and activities in the territory of the Soviet 
Union.”351 
 
D- The Free Caucasian Mountaineers People Party: 
In Prométhée, each national group functioned through their own national 
centers. In a way, the North Caucasian peoples set up their own organization or 
national center on 18 November 1926352: The Free Caucasian Mountaineers People 
Party (Narodnoy Partii Vol’nikh Gortsev Kavkaza). Later on, this Party renamed 
itself the Caucasian Mountaineers People Party (Narodnaya Partiya Gortsev 
Kavkaza) in Warsaw.353 
The Party, which defined as a political organization “shinning in exile”, was 
the first and the sole political party of the North Caucasians in exile.354 The party 
aimed at strengthening the spirit of the struggle for freedom among the North 
Caucasian intelligentsia. Therefore, as its main organizer, Said Shamil pointed out, 
                                                 
351 Hostler, 125. 
352 Barasbi Baytugan, 1931. “Znamenatel’naya data,” Gortsy Kavkaza, (Paris), 26: 4. Also see 
Aydın Turan, May 1997. “‘Promethe Hareketi’nde Kuzey Kafkasya Mültecileri: Kafkasya Dağlıları 
Halk Partisi (1926-1940)-I,” Tarih ve Toplum, 27(161): 49-57 and “‘Promethe Hareketi’nde Kuzey 
Kafkasya Mültecileri: Kafkasya Dağlıları Halk Partisi (1926-1940)-II,” June 1997. 27(162): 39-47. 
Hereafter KDHP. 
353 Barasbi Baytugan, “Znamenatel’naya data”. 
354 Vano Kavtaradze, 1991. “Kafkasya Konfederasyon Yolunda,” trnsl. Musa Ramazan, Kuzey 
Kafkasya Kültür Dergisi, (İstanbul), 83/84: 44. Barasbi Baytugan, “Znamenatel’naya data,” 4. 
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Warsaw was chosen as the center for the party and its initial activities, and the 
militant cadres were composed of the ‘the young intellectuals’ in Prague.355 Thus, 
it is not wrong to say that the Caucasian Mountaineers People Party was a 
continuation and the amalgamation of the Union of the Caucasian Mountaineers of 
Prague and Caucasian Independence Committee of İstanbul. Most of the leading 
figures of both parties like, Ahmet Tsalikhov, Elmurza Bekovich Cherkaskiy, 
Barasbi Baytugan, Adil Bek Kulatti, Mirza Bek Kulatti, Aytek Kundukh, Ahmet 
Nabi Magoma, Gazihan Bessolt, Cemalettin Kanukati, Kosta Zangi, Ahmet 
Canbek, Mehmet Girey Sunch (Sunç), Tavsultan Shakman and Ibrahim Chulik 
played a role in this new organization. 
From the beginning the Party quickly organized itself among the dispersed 
North Caucasian diasporas and making the Middle East, especially Turkey the first 
focus of its attention. Because of the policies of existing governments, it was not 
possible to establish branch organizations of the party. Therefore, in order to reach 
these groups, the first and most effective step was to be the substantial and 
enduring publication activities. Thus, the Party initiated its first periodical Vol’nye 
Gortsy in Prague, of which possibly 6 issues were published in 1927 and 1928 in 
Russian.356 Later on it was given the name of Gortsy Kavkaza/Kafkasya Dağlıları 
and renamed once more in May 1934 as Severnyi Kavkaz/Şimali Kafkasya.357 
                                                 
355 Said Şamil, 1995. “Said Şamil’den Muhaceretteki Kuzey Kafkasyalıların esir Vatan’ın 
Kurtuluşuyla İlgili Mücadelelerine Işık Tutan Tarihi Bir Mektup,” Birleşik Kafkasya, (Eskişehir), 3: 
49-50. 
356 The first issue of the Vol’nye Gortsy, which was the namesake of an earlier publication that 
appeared in Tiflis in 1920, was published on 26 March 1927. Then the second one was published on 
3 May 1927, and the third on 28 June 1927. The 4th and 5th issues were not available for me but the 
6th and possibly last issue was published on 19 January 1928. 
357 Gortsy Kavkaza appeared through 1928 as the North Caucasian National Defense Organ. It was 
continued with a Turkish component Gortsy Kavkaza/Kafkasya Dağlıları (1929-1934) and partially 
concurrent Severnyi Kavkaz/Şimali Kafkasya (1934-1939). 
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First hand information on the program and party regulation is only possible 
by the help of a declaration which was issued by the Party on 23 March 1927 and 
published in Vol’nye Gortsy. In this declaration, the party declared that its main 
aim was to establish a ‘national-territorial’ state that is a sovereign North Caucasian 
Federal Republic, in compliance with the basic principles, which had drawn up by 
the Andi Congress of 1917. In addition, everyone would have the right to vote, 
without discrimination on grounds of race, sex, and belief. Each and every civil 
liberty would also be guaranteed. The economic structure would be liberal in 
content. Commercial and industrial sectors will gain the precedence for future 
economic development. Therefore, the private sector will be encouraged to make 
investments especially in commercial and industrial fields of activities.358 
Within the pages of the periodical the Mountaineers openly declared that 
they were against the Russians. Red or white, Russians were not to be trusted and 
that the Mountaineers could not wait for new and better policies to be implemented 
by the Russians. Primarily, the Bolsheviks were implementing the policies of 
Tsarist Russia and thus, within the pages of Vol’nye Gortsy the Mountaineers did 
not hesitate to urge the leaders of the new regime: “Communists, repent before it is 
too late!”359 
 
The Party also rejected the proposals, put forward by the newly emerging 
Socialist League of East European Nations, to organize plebiscite in the lands that 
                                                 
358 For the text of the declaration see Vol’nye Gortsy, (Prague), 26 March 1927, 1: 1-2. 
359 “Otkliki Druzey ‘Vol’nikh Gortsev’,” Vol’nye Gortsy, (Prague), 3 May 1927, 2: 21. 
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were under Soviet rule after the liberation and expressed a will to be 
independent.360 
Despite its importance as the first official periodical of the Free Caucasian 
Mountaineers People Party, Vol’nye Gortsy never mentioned itself as a Promethean 
publication. On the other hand, its successors Gortsy Kavkaza and Severnyi 
Kavkaz/Şimali Kafkasya were outwardly Promethean publications and the basis of 
the Mountaineers’ struggle in exile took shape within the pages of these 
periodicals. Moreover, while they were waiting for the War to re-establish their 
state, the North Caucasians started to discuss the structure of the state and the basic 
difficulties posed by unification. From the beginning it became clear that the 
biggest challenge facing them in unification was the creation of a single nation. 
 
3- Creating a Nation? 
The North Caucasian emigres took the issue of creating a ‘North Caucasian 
nation’ seriously. Almost all the leading figures believed that the basic handicap to 
establishing a unified structure for the struggle for the North Caucasian territory, 
was the lack of a single, unique North Caucasian nation. Therefore, as Balo Bilatti 
emphasized, in sovereign North Caucasus, there would be no Avar, Kabardian, 
Balkar, Osetian, Chechen or Kumuk, but just a North Caucasian.361 Lack of this 
kind of an understanding was the main reason for the captivity of the North 
Caucasian peoples. 
                                                 
360 Related with the Socialist League of East European Nations and the position of the Party against 
it see Batraz, 3 May 1927. “Liga Sotsialistov Vostoka Evropy i Gortsy Kavkaza,” Vol’nye Gortsy, 
(Prague), 2: 18-19 and see the leading article of the No. 6, published on 19 January 1928, 1-5. 
361 Balo Bilatti, 1935. “Millet ve Dil,” Severnyi Kavkaz, (Warsaw), 15: 4. 
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Therefore, the North Caucasian intellectuals felt themselves to take this 
issue particularly and more seriously. For a first time, Barasbi Baytugan analyzed 
the nationality issue in Gortsy Kavkaza in reference to the psychological 
motives.362 He looked all the relationship between nation and union and 
emphasized that this kind of an amalgamation already existed in the North 
Caucasus. He pointed out that the common historical destiny, neighbourhood, and 
close connections for centuries were the main cements of this union. 
The most comprehensive article on the issue was Balo Bilatti’s ‘Milli 
Hareketlerin İdeolojik Esasları’ (The Ideological Principles of the National 
Movements). He wrote it in an academic manner, and discussed whether the North 
Caucasian nation is existed or not.363 
In this article, Bilatti asserted ‘the nations’ right to independence’ or self-
determination as the core of his argumentation. In the first part, he analyzed the 
development and transformation of this right from 17th century’s philosophers, 
Locke, Voltaire, Diderot, and D’Alemberte to the principles of Wilson. According 
to him, in the 19th century there were two main currents. The first, was brought into 
existence by small ‘prisoner nationalities’, to free themselves from the yoke of big 
imperial powers, such as the secessionist movements of 19th century in Turkey and 
Russia. The other was the current of small states aiming to unify to create a single 
powerful political entity, like the unification of the Germans and the Italians. 
                                                 
362 Barasbi Baytugan, January/February 1933. “Uzun Geçmişimiz Hakkında Birkaç Söz,” Gortsy 
Kavkaza, (Warsaw), 35/36: 26-30. 
363 Balo Bilatti, April 1934. “Milli Hareketlerin İdeolojik Esasları,” Gortsy Kavkaza, (Warsaw), 50: 
5-11. It was reprinted in Birleşik Kafkasya, (İstanbul), November-December-January 1965-66, 2(6): 
1-10. Hereafter “Milli”. 
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From this perspective, Bilatti suggested that the struggle of the North 
Caucasians against the Russian Empire was an example of the first type. It was 
based on the principle of the nations’ right to self-determination. Additionally, it 
depended mainly on the understanding of the ‘national unification of the 
mountaineers’. The Russians however, despite their strong support for the struggles 
of small nationalities in Europe, were inexorably fighting with all the nationalities 
that were struggling for their independence within the boundaries of Russia and 
Eastern Europe. Nevertheless Bilatti argues, the notion of the ‘sovereignty of 
nations’ reached its peak in the principles of Wilson. He believed that “this right 
could only be turned into a dynamic power, under the condition that, when a group 
of people associate themselves with a common interest and they accordingly define 
themselves as a nation”364 
Therefore, the key point was the creation of a nation. For this reason, in 
order to determine the ideological pillars of the North Caucasian independence 
movement, the phenomenon of ‘national sentiment’ and ‘nation’ have to be defined 
clearly. In the second part of his article Bilatti focused on the historical evolution of 
these terms. With the help of the main contenders like Mazzini, and E. Renan he 
reached his definition of a nation, which was mainly subjective in content. “The 
nation, first and foremost means a common sentiment and purpose, a spirit which 
disguised within a common historical past, and a will on the common destiny.”365 
According to Bilatti, this definition was in full compliance with the realities 
of the North Caucasus. Despite the existence of ‘tribal differences’, the North 
                                                 
364 Bilatti, “Milli,” 5. 
365 Bilatti, “Milli,” 9. 
  
 
139  
Caucasians have common historical background which was accepted as 
‘consecrated’ by each and every Mountaineer. 
“Civil and cultural values are the products of the common life continuing 
for centuries within the identical borders. At last, the ultimate objective of 
these values is living within the borders of the national boundaries 
collectively. 
The sole inconvenient condition in front of the North Caucasian national 
unity is the lack of common language. However, …the common language is 
not an indispensable instrument and has no important role over the 
establishment of a national union. Being a multi-lingual nation could not be 
disturbed anyone so much. Following the removal of the factors that are 
hampering the development of the North Caucasus, the language problem 
could be solved easily. The strength of the elements of the ‘national unity’ 
would help to solve this problem.”366 
 
Later on, in his article ‘Şimali Kafkasyalılar’ın Esareti,’ (The Captivity of 
the North Caucasians) which was published in Gortsy Kavkaza, Abat367 argued the 
issue from a different perspective and analyzed the reasons for the failure to 
establish a union or a nation in the North Caucasus.368 He particularly stressed that 
the indispensable and necessary conditions, which bind members of a nation 
together, such as religion, customs, language, race, and unified fatherland were, 
absent in the North Caucasus. Moreover, he pointed out, it was almost impossible 
to speak about the existence of ‘common enlightenment’, which was the main 
reason for the North Caucasians’ captivity. 
According to Abat, religion, language, blood and race, compatriotizm and 
common customs are the complementary elements of a nation. For the North 
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Caucasus however, he emphasized, none of these elements were sufficient to 
establish a social and unified identity. Then, in order to verify his argumentation he 
scrutinized all these components one by one. 
First of all, he stated that religious bonds and faith were not sufficient 
components to coalesce the members of a nation. Moreover, he believed that 
religion had never managed to form a social bond in the North Caucasus, or at least 
in certain parts. Osetia, Abkhazia and Georgia were inhabited mainly the Christian 
populations and beyond that Islam, because of the Arab influence was not 
concordant to the native customs and daily life in the other parts of the region. 
The customs that implicitly have nationalistic contents, he believed, left a 
mark among the North Caucasians. Except some primitive ones like tribalism, 
these customs concluded the stages of evolution for stating a nation in the North 
Caucasus. Therefore, the author emphasized that, from the perspective of customs 
and civilization, if the life of the North Caucasians had progressed naturally they 
would have reached a level, beyond that which British had achieved.369 
From the point of a race, the author stated that the North Caucasians had the 
‘superiority of race and blood’, but they were rather unconscious in their patriotic 
feelings. The lack of common enlightenment unfortunately disabled the North 
Caucasians to convert this love of country or patriotism to a conscious and 
organized struggle. 
Thus, at last, he was concerned with the reasons for the absence of a 
common enlightenment among the North Caucasians. The primary reason, which 
impeded the creation of a common enlightenment, was the lack of a common 
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written language. From this point of view, he shifted the focus of argument to the 
language issue and from then on the Mountaineers in exile, in order to solve the 
problem of creating a nation focused on the common language problem. 
 
4- Common Language: 
The lack of a lingua franca among the North Caucasian peoples has always 
been perceived as the root cause of almost all the problems of the region, mainly 
the inability to sustain a union. Arslan published the first analysis, ‘Kafkasya 
Dilleri’ (Caucasian Languages) on this language issue in Gortsy Kavkaza.370 It was 
the first detailed article that was written beyond the usual polemical intentions. In 
this article, Arslan tried to expose several possibilities related to the language 
problem for removing the obstacles, facing the North Caucasian union. He 
emphasized that, according to linguistic studies of that time having different 
languages was not an impediment to the North Caucasians’ becoming a united 
nation. Like common historical destiny and common political and economic 
situation, linguistic relations could allow the achievement of a union. The only 
requirement for to support this case to carry out this way was detailed studies of the 
linguistic pattern of the North Caucasus and to compare with the studies of 
linguists, such as Guldenstent, Pallas, F. Erkert, F. Müller, Dirr and Marr. To 
accomplish this aim, Arslan analyzed and discussed the arguments of linguists of 
his time and classified their works and at end he reached the conclusion that: 
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“People who are not benevolent to the Caucasus, were always passionately 
interested in asserting the multi-national and multi-lingual structure of the 
Caucasus. Even Russian researchers and writers, forgetting Russia’s multi-
national and multi-lingual structure, do not hesitate to defend this 
interpretation devotedly. If methods of superficial research, demagogy and 
the distortion of the facts would be given up and only the scientific and 
objective research methods applied, it would be clear that linguistic 
relations, like the historical destiny would enable the unification of the 
Caucasian nations.”371 
 
Abat’s article triggered long lasting and more polemic discussions among 
the North Caucasians on the language issue. From the aspect of speaking 
languages, Abat appraised the North Caucasus, as one of the most eccentric regions 
of the world. The number of languages that were spoken in the North Caucasus was 
more than usual, but significance of this, he said should not be exaggerated. With 
the help of other commonalties peoples of the North Caucasus can easily 
compensate every kind of shortcomings. 
 
“Among the North Caucasians, despite the existence of different languages, 
from the perspective of common features like race, patriotism, customs and 
traditions, style of life and clothing, religious beliefs and etc, there is 
tremendous and strong harmony.” 372 
 
Therefore, the first and the most important, but not most painful point for 
which the North Caucasian intellectuals had to work, should be the language issue. 
They have to find ways to arrange a common North Caucasian language, a lingua 
franca. This was a must for improving mutual cultural understanding and creating a 
unified, one and single nation. 
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Until this time, he pointed out, there was no any exertion to arrange and 
assemble languages. They remained as they were. There was no alphabet and 
intellectuals never endeavoured to make any arrangements to tackle this issue. 
Religious intellectuals preferred to communicate through Arabic. This lack of a 
means of communication resulted in the Russian invasion, and the North 
Caucasians never established a unified structure. Therefore, according to Abat, the 
first and foremost duty of the North Caucasian intellectual emigrants, was to work 
for the necessary language arrangements and achieve a unity of language before 
North Caucasian independence. 
For unity of language in the North Caucasus he proposed a two-staged 
project. Initially, he emphasized, the languages that were spoken in the region has 
to be specified. Their origins, vocal structures, transliterations, letters were to be 
defined and arranged in a unified manner. In making these arrangements, he 
suggested that the Latin script be used. Obstacles related to sounds which could not 
be found in other languages using the Latin script, could easily overcome by 
inventing special letters for the North Caucasian languages. 
The next step following the determination of the written languages would 
be the unification of some several languages. This arrangement, he believed would 
cause the establishment of a strong bond between the peoples of the North 
Caucasus. Then, he progressed the second stage of his project: to decide the official 
common language, which would be the means of communication among these 
peoples. 
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Abat was well aware that this was his most controversial point. 
Nevertheless, he stated in his article that the reason necessitates that the peoples of 
the North Caucasus has to make a choice between three different alternatives: 
“ 1- To adopt one of the main languages, in use in the region, that is 
Russian or Turkish, as an official language,. 
2- To assent one of the languages of the North Caucasus as an official 
language. 
3- To create a new language inspired by Esperanto and to adapt it as an 
official language.”373 
 
Abat believed and suggested that the first alternative should not be 
considered. For the second, because of the primitive structure and insufficiencies of 
those languages to embrace the whole population of the region, he pointed out, it is 
impossible to select one of them as an official language. For the third alternative, 
although it is very hard to realize, he argued that, it was not impossible to create 
such a language and moreover, it has an attractive side. If the North Caucasians 
could manage to create a simple language that composed of small numbers of 
words which has an optimum meaning, the peoples of the region would prefer this 
language and automatically began to use it. Then within a time a common language 
would emerged within the North Caucasian territory and the language problem 
would be solved.374 
 
With this article, Abat initiated a serious discussion among the North 
Caucasian emigres. Several intellectuals, published critiques, answers, and analysis 
in reply. The prominent Caucasian leader, Ahmet Tsalikhov using the penname A. 
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T., criticized Abat in his article ‘Kafkasya Dağlılarının Resmi Lisanları’ (The 
Official Languages of the Caucasian Mountaineers) and made his own analysis. 
“Today, we too, desire and demand the solution of the language problem 
firstly and urgently, because our movements are excessively intellectual not 
operational. As an instrument of the manifestation through which the flow 
of idea towards the each and every segments is ensured there is a need for a 
common language.”375 
 
According to the Tsalikhov, the North Caucasians, under these 
circumstances they have no option but to use Russian or Turkish as an official 
language at that time, because in general, Mountaineer Intellectuals can only speak 
Russian or Turkish. Therefore in all publications, at least for the time being, each 
and every Mountaineer has to accept both of these languages together. 
 
“Consequently, for the time being, in principle, we have to understand and 
accept the employment of both languages together in all the publications. 
Moreover, each Mountaineer, under the conditions in which his own 
personal language is not sufficient, has to know that the language that 
would be utilised in the fields of national idea and science are Russian and 
Turkish.”376 
 
At the end of his article, Tsalikhov, having suggested using of Latin script 
because of convenience and its international character, emphasized that the issues 
of language and script should be scrutinized broadly, and this kind of a discussion 
would be open to every North Caucasians. Tsalikhov asked the North Caucasians 
to scrutinize Abat’s alternatives in detail. By doing so, they can make the true 
choice. However, he suggested that the discussion should not be open ended. All 
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the young should defend their arguments but a decision should be taken as quickly 
as possible and then the work has to be started. 
Ahmet Tsalikhov’s proposal was not left unanswered. Severnyi Kavkaz, the 
successor publication of the North Caucasian emigration opened a discussion 
platform in its first issue published in May 1934. B.H. joined this discussion with 
an article titled ‘Şimali Kafkasya’nın Resmi Lisanı Ecnebi Bir Lisan Olmamalıdır’ 
(The Official Language of the North Caucasus should not be a Foreign One).377 
In the beginning, he agreed with the other authors that the lack of a unified 
official North Caucasian language was the main reason for the North Caucasians’ 
captivity and so long as an official language is not defined this captivity would last. 
However further, he claimed, it is impossible to agree an official language for a 
nonexistent state. Most North Caucasians are now living in exile and thus have no 
sovereignty. Moreover it is impossible to estimate when this sovereignty would be 
realized. On the other hand the process in the North Caucasus was on going and 
currently, he said, there were autonomies not only for each language but even for 
the all dialects in which these languages and dialects are written and read. 
Therefore the exiles, he stressed, could not decide themselves the official language 
of the possible sovereign state.378 He was well aware of the dominance of the 
Russian language in the region. Therefore, to speak of making a choice between 
Arabic, Turkish, or Esperanto, he claims to be nonsense. 
He believed that when the North Caucasian gained their freedom, they 
would prefer the most developed and comprehensive regional language as their 
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official language. Then, in contrast to his earlier analysis, he asserted that although 
there was no single language extending over the entire North Caucasus, a 
somewhat widespread language was already in existence: the Adyge language. 
Before the 19th century’s struggles and emigration, he points out, more than three 
million out of five million individuals living in the North Caucasus were Adyges. 
Their language, unfortunately, as the other regional languages had no script and 
thus they could not create any kind of science and knowledge. However, if the 
North Caucasians could defeat the Russians and establish their own state, the 
Adyges with their overwhelming majority would declare their language as the 
official language.379 
As it is understood from the Severnyi Kavkaz, the North Caucasian 
emigrants interested in the language issue. Therefore, the periodical made an 
announcement in its second issue in Russian and in its fourth in Turkish. 
 
“Naturally, we do not believe that finding a solution to the most 
complicated problem of language, through discussions in the pages of a 
periodical which published in exile would be possible. On the other hand 
we have no any doubt about the usefulness of this kind of a discussion. 
In our opinion, our dispersed structure to the varied numbers of countries do 
not allow us to utilize any other way to exchange our ideas in an extensive 
way. Without doubt, the exchange of ideas in a comprehensive way among 
the representatives of old and new emigrants, would bring us together and 
increase uniformity and capability. Moreover, we better understand our 
ideas reciprocally and most importantly, -if it exists- we assist each other by 
pointing our erroneous opinions. Through this way, for the future, we 
willmake the solution of the complicated language problem easier to a 
certain degree.”380 
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In this framework, the periodical’s Editorial Board declared that they would 
publish all articles on the language issue, even articles in which the authors which 
contradicted the line of the periodical. Nevertheless, they felt it necessary to point 
out that this doesn’t mean that the level of argumentation and objectivity will not 
be taken into consideration. Therefore, the participants of the discussion should be 
careful on writing on the language issue. 
The editorial board of the periodical concluded this announcement by 
underlining that the stance of the periodical would be clarified at the end of the 
discussion. 
 
Another very important article on the language issue was Arslan’s article 
‘Dil Mes’elesi Hakkında 1928’de Dağıstan’da Neler Söylenmişti’ (What was said 
regarding the language problem in Dagestan in 1928)381. In this article, the author 
showed the North Caucasian peoples’ interest towards their motherland and their 
concern for the events, which had taken place. The article also gives a historical 
perspective on the development of the discussions on the language issue. 
Arslan asserted that the language issue was not a newborn topic for the 
North Caucasians. Even in 1905, the North Caucasian intellectuals studied this 
issue. The political atmosphere and the Tsar’s regional administration however, he 
said, didn’t allow detailed discussion or the taking of the necessary steps to solve 
the problem. 
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Later on, it was taken into consideration in the Congress of Mountaineers in 
May 1917 and the special commission on cultural issues and education set up. This 
commission studied the issue in detail (See Chapter II). But the failure of 1918 did 
not allow the North Caucasian State to implement these decisions in the North 
Caucasus. 
In the following sections of the article, the author clarified the similarities 
between the approaches of the North Caucasians who were living in the North 
Caucasus and those in exile by comparing discussions which took place during a 
congress in Dagestan in 1928, and existing discussions from Severnyi Kavkaz. 
 
Another author Kosta (Kosta Zangi) joined the discussion by asserting a 
different argument. He pointed out that having a common official language was of 
course a big advantage, but for the North Caucasus in particular, the discussion of 
this issue would have no benefit, because of the existing situation. Therefore, “for 
the time being there was no need to dwell on this issue and assume a position.”382 
The participation of General Mikail Halil to the discussion brought about 
some serious reactions. As for the alphabet, Mikail Halil was in favor of the Latin 
script and, in order to overcome some obstacles related to particular sounds, he 
proposed some modifications. His analysis on the common official language 
provoked some reactions. 
“I have never been inclined to my fellow citizens who, by the help of the 
tombs and archaeological excavations, were trying to prove that the North 
Caucasian peoples had the same origin with the European nations like Kelt, 
Frank, Roman, Greek, Germen or etc. In my opinion, the native populations 
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of the North Caucasus are originally Turks or Tatars. Some tribes like the 
Kumuk, Balkar and Karachay could preserve their languages, but the other 
majority, like Avar, Lak, Chechen, Osetian, Abkhaz and Adige had 
forgotten their original languages and instead took their current 
languages.”383 
 
From that perspective, he defended the position choice had to be made, it 
could never be Turkey’s Turkish or Russian. The most suitable choice, in spite of 
its inadequate literary quality, would be the Kumuk language. 
The response, in a violent manner appeared suddenly. A Kabardian, 
Shurdumyiko Ali (Ahmet Ali Şurdum) replied to him in the next issues: 
 
“Not so Mr. Mikail, on the contrary, the Kumuks, Karachays and Balkars 
distorted their own languages as a result of social intercourse. …in 
designing the race connections I am not passionately inclined to the 
Europeans. …Today, while there are several excellent languages existing 
among our tribes and particularly the Adyge language is still more copious 
than most of the independent states’ languages, is it convenient that trying 
to dictate a Turkic language and dealing with the reorganization of the 
Kumuk language on behalf of the common language?”384 
 
“It could be asserted that the Adyge language, although it was deprived of 
the enlightenment, is copious than most of the nations’ languages”385 
 
This language and alphabet discussion continued until 1938 on the pages of 
the periodicals enthusiastically. Moreover through ‘the Commission for the 
Languages of the North Caucasus’, founded in 1933, the Kumuk language was 
chosen as the lingua franca for the North Caucasus. For the future they planned to 
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“unify the North Caucasian alphabets using the Latin alphabet” having used Latin 
with diacretics and diphthongs to create a 47-letter alphabet. They had undertaken a 
Polish-North Caucasian dictionary with 2,000 basic words in each language written 
in the new alphabet.386 
 
5- Caucasians in General: Caucasian Independence Committee: 
While the peoples of the Caucasus were continuing their activities within 
their own national centers in the framework of Prométhée, the setting up of an 
overarching organization encompassing all the peoples of the Caucasus still had 
some adherents. The leaders of the national centers of the North Caucasus, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia were also in favor of it and they actively took part in 
activities to set up such an organization. The activities of these groups were 
expressed firstly in Vol’nye Gortsy’s No. 3 published in July 1927.387 Later on, the 
establishment of the Caucasian Independence Committee-CIC (Komitet 
Nezavisimosti Kavkaza) was declared ostentatiously during celebrations for the 10th 
anniversary of the declaration of independence of the Caucasian states in Paris in 
1928. 388 
The Committee’s basic aim was to bring all Caucasian nations, that is the 
North Caucasians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and Armenians, together and to unite 
their efforts in the common struggle against the Bolsheviks or the Soviet Union to 
restore independence. The basic project of this Committee was the establishment of 
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a common state structure, which encompassed the Caucasus as a whole, in the form 
of a Caucasian Confederation. 
Members of the Independence Committee thought that they were on the 
brink of great events or decisive days that was a general war. It was stressed in the 
declaration that this will bring a solution “of the political drama of the old Tsarist 
Empire and, with it, the definite settling of the fate of” the peoples of the Caucasus. 
Those days were not so far away and this would be a last chance for the Caucasians 
to restart their war of independence. In such critical moments, however, “only the 
closest union of the whole Caucasus, the most whole learned collaboration of its 
leaders, resolved to carry on the struggle for the common ideal, can give the much 
desired victory.”389 
 
Nevertheless, disputes among the different nationalities, especially between 
the Armenians and Muslim groups caused the Committee’s failure to declare its 
main program until 1934. 390 
In June 1934, in No. 2 of Şimali Kafkasya Emir Hasan heralded 
reconciliation among the Caucasians and on 14 July 1934, the Caucasian 
Independence Committee concluded and signed the Pact of the Caucasian 
Confederation in Brussels391. The representatives of the National Centres of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and the North Caucasus signed this Pact.392 
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With that Pact, the parties declared that the complete sovereignty of the 
nations of the Caucasus was the main concern. The only possibility to attain this 
aim was the establishment of a union, geographically and economically. Therefore, 
as its political form, the Pact was proposing the establishment of a ‘Caucasian 
Confederation,’ in which, the participating nationalities could preserve their 
national characters and territorial integrity in the best manner possible. 
According to the Pact, the Confederation would represent all the 
nationalities of Caucasus as a whole in the international arena and preserve the 
integrity of the Confederation with the help of Confederation army, which would 
be made up of the armies of the confederated republics. For the resolution of the 
internal debates, Pact proposed the establishment of arbitration court, that is 
Supreme Court of the Confederation. 
Thus in order to make the Confederation work within these formulated 
principles, article 5 of the Pact revealed that, “as soon as possible a commission of 
experts will draw up a project or a draft constitution for the Constitution for the 
Caucasian Confederation.” This would serve as a basis for the work of the first 
Constituent Assembly of each republic. At the end, in article 6 of the Pact, it was 
stressed that there was a place for the Armenian Republic in the Confederation. 
At the same time by issuing ‘an Appeal to all Caucasian Patriots’, the 
Caucasian Independence Committee declared that it assumed the first period of its 
activity closed by the declaration of the Pact. “From today the Pact must serve as 
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the essential basis for all activity of the National Centers; henceforth they are 
united in the struggle for the conquest of the unalienable rights of the Caucasian 
peoples.”393 
Thus, the Caucasian Independence Committee, for the new phase of the 
Caucasian independence movement, revealed its intention to convene a conference 
to discuss its past activities and proposed to create a new organ to carry out the 
fundamental principles of the Pact.394 
 
The reactions of the Caucasian emigration to the signing of the Pact were 
generally positive. Criticisms had been made pro forma on two different points. 
One was related those who signed the pact on behalf of the North Caucasian 
emigration. Some Caucasians believe that the signatures were not the notable 
names of the North Caucasian emigration. The other point was related to the 
Armenian question. According to these criticisms, there was no need to declare the 
Pact without ensuring the participation of Armenians.395 
 
The proposed conference of the Caucasian Independence Committee held 
from 14-23 February 1935.396 After the election of the presidential board and 
determination of the agenda, the Secretary General of the Caucasian Independence 
Committee summarised the activities over the eight years of activities of the 
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Committee in light of the existing situation. Then, in order to revitalize the 
independent Caucasian Confederation, he asked the Conference, to set up a new 
and more influential Caucasian organization in compliance with the spirit of the 14 
July Pact.397 
The representatives of the three nations participating in Conference decided 
to form the Caucasian Confederation Council (Kafkasya Konfederasyon Şurası). 
This Council was set up on the basis of equal representation of the national centers 
of Azerbaijan, Georgia and the North Caucasus.398 The duties of the new body 
were also determined during this Conference. 
“ 1) To overthrow the Russian invasion government in the Caucasus, to 
make the Caucasian nations ready for the revival of the Caucasian republics 
and organize the unification of these republics in the form of Confederation. 
2) To establish political and organizational connections with the 
organizations of the other captive nations of the Soviet Union. 
3) The Caucasian Confederation Council is ready to establish contacts with 
revolutionary forces of the Russian nation who are unconditionally accepted 
the right to independence of Russian captive nations, and in favour of 
solving all kinds of international problems through peaceful means and 
arbitration. 
4) The Caucasian Confederation Council, during it’s struggle to accomplish 
its objectives, depends only on its own power, which comes from 
discontented nations, relies on the benevolence and the support of the 
Caucasian friends and refrains from taking any kind of steps that would be 
put them in threat. The Council, taking its member nationalities’ interests 
into account would stay, only, as the builder and the owner of the Caucasian 
politics.”399 
 
                                                                                                                                       
395 D. Vaçnadze, ‘Hariçte Kafkasya birliği hareketi tarihi II,’ Birleşik Kafkasya (Vereinigtes 
Kaukasien), (Munich), 6(23): 8. Hereafter “Birlik Tarihi II.” 
396 Vesikalar, 21. 
397 Vesikalar, 22. 
398 M. Resulzade, “Kafkasya Meseleleri V,” 7. 
399 Vesikalar, 25-26. 
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Following the elections of the members of the Council and talks, the 
Conference issued a declaration and began to function.400 
 
6- Caucasian Confederation Pact and the Opposition: 
The first, if negligible, opposition to the Caucasian Mountaineers People 
Party came from its predecessor, the Union of Caucasian Mountaineers. Despite the 
fact that new Party was established by most of its members, the Union did not 
cease exists. Presided over by Murat Hatağogu who was not allowed to participate 
to the new party, some opponent continued to work.401 Moreover, another 
opposition organization, the Union of Caucasian Nations (Kafkasya Milletler 
Birliği or Soyuz Naroda Kavkaza) was established by some North Caucasian 
emigres led by M. Abatsiyev and H. Hatayev. The Caucasian Mountaineers People 
Party refused these organisations vehemently. Of the opposition movements, 
‘Kavkaz’ set up by Haydar Bammat, the former Foreign Minister of the North 
Caucasian Republic of 1918 was the most organized and long-lasting one.402 
 
The basic social and political policies of the Kavkaz group403 could easily 
be followed from its periodical Kavkaz. The first issue of the Kavkaz was published 
in October 1934 in Paris. The members of the group were very knowledgeable 
                                                 
400 For the text of Declaration see Vesikalar, 57-60. And for the reactions of several numbers of 
media see Vesikalar, 29-44. 
401 Aydın Turan, April 1997. “Kafkasya Dağlıları Birliği (Soyuz Gortsev Kavkaza),” Toplumsal 
Tarih, 7(40): 49. 
402 For the analysis of a split among the North Caucasians see F. Daryal (Fuat Emircan), “Ön Söz,” 
and “Kafkas İşleri,” 1938. Kafkasya: Kafkasya Hakında Yazılar Dergisi II, F. Daryal, eds., İstanbul: 
Matbaai Ebuzziya, 3-4 and 65-68. Hereafter Yazılar Dergisi II. 
403 Attributed to the periodical Kavkaz that had been started to publish in October 1934 by Bammat 
in Paris, this group was labelled as ‘Kavkaz group’. 
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native Caucasians who had often participated in the work of their respective 
national movements and short-lived governments. While the Azeri and Georgians 
of greatest international prominence were connected to the Promethean front, this 
was not the case with the North Caucasians, who were instead bound up with 
Kavkaz. As a reflection of the ideology of the group the periodical had been 
publishing with the help of Japanese embassy in Paris and was partly printed in 
Berlin, Charlottenburg.404 
In fact, the ultimate goal of the group was not so different to the other group 
the realization of “the independence of the harmed fatherland”405 Their strategy, 
tactics, and world outlook nevertheless differentiated sharply. 
The Kavkaz group sought to establish the Caucasus as a ‘Switzerland of the 
East’ by adopting a decentralized canton system used in that country. It worked to 
stimulate Armenian interest, to promote a careful and tolerant religious policy, 
which would help in building up a genuine Caucasian nationality that would 
occupy a buffer state, a Caucasian Confederation, between Russia and the Middle 
East along borders already, established with Turkey and Iran. 
According to Bammat, distress and the economic crises after the Great 
World War caused the emergence of three different ideologies totally opposed to 
the basic principles of the pro-war period’s mentality. Among them, Marxism 
transformed into an ‘oligarchy of party bosses’ in the hands of the Bolsheviks in 
the Soviet Union. Contrary to that, fascism and national socialism, in Italy and 
                                                 
404 Patrik von zur Muhlen, Gamalıhaç ile Kızılyıldız Arasında, 34-35. 
405 “We learned at the expense of blood and the lost independece that we have no alternative of 
improvement but only the establishment of a Caucasian state that made up of all the nations of the 
Caucasus.” Haydar Bammat, “Hedefimiz,” 1936. Kafkas Almanağı, F. Daryal, eds., İstanbul, 6. 
Hereafter Almanak. 
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Germany, and Kemalizm in Turkey is still functioning with great support in all 
fields of social and political life. The achievements they realized forced other world 
governments to revise and modify their own policies. Thus, in the light of these 
developments, the peoples of the Caucasus were also to revise their own situation 
and arrange themselves.406 
In this framework, Haydar Bammat and his Kavkaz group openly 
repudiated the essential principles of international democracy and sympathized 
with national socialism and fascism. They defined themselves as nationalist and 
anti-Marxist and, openly preferred to act in line with Germany, Italy, and, Japan. 
Therefore, from the beginning, Bammat started to criticise the ‘Brussels 
Pact’ in the pages of Kavkaz. According to Bammat, the Brussels Pact was an 
arrangement of Georgian Mensheviks who controlled the Prométhée and it was just 
a Marxist set up407. Therefore, the Kavkaz group targeted Georgian socialists at 
first. Then, because of their close connections, they opposed Resulzade and his 
‘Musavat Party’ and, Said Shamil and his North Caucasian group. At last, although 
they were not active in Prométhée, their ideological proximity made the Armenian 
Dashnaks their rivals.408 
With the help of these groups or so-called parties, which were converted 
into a kind of ‘benefit fund’ and willing to make every kind of compromise for its 
survival, the peoples of the Caucasus could not achieve anything. They could not 
vote for the feelings of the younger generations, and their opportunity had passed 
                                                 
406 “Yeni Yollar,” Almanak, 8-10. 
407 Haydar Bammat, “Lehistan ve Kafkasya II,” (translated from the Kavkaz, No.8), Almanak, 26-
32. 
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them by. The Caucasians were in need of new direction.409 “The overwhelming 
majority of our emigres who were doomed to survive under extremely severe 
conditions, lost their confidence and faith.” These emigres, because of a lack of 
genuine leadership and ideal, began to refuse to join any kind of political activity. 
They are aware that the existing so-called leaders were in pursuit of their ‘comfort’ 
and ‘unimportant party works’. 410 
But on the other hand those ‘loyal and idealist’ Caucasian emigres 
vehemently requesting the establishment of a new organisation. Accordingly, the 
aim of the Kavkaz, was to assist Caucasian emigres to set up a genuine united 
political organisation. This organisation, he pointed out, had to have a program 
based on the historical realities of the Caucasus and which avoided imitating 
implicitly alien examples. He admitted that the only way to accomplish this aim 
was to establish a comprehensive union or confederation of the Caucasus. Logic, he 
pointed out, necessitates that. On each and every occasion from 1917, he stressed 
that sincere nationalist leaders of the North Caucasian Republic proposed it to the 
leaders of the Transcaucasian republics, but they never took these proposals 
seriously. Therefore, the idea of Confederation that was proposed by the Pact 
signed in Brussels was not a new phenomenon, but just a product of opportunist 
minds.411 
According to Bammat these groups were not trustworthy. They were mainly 
directed by the internationalist minds of the 1917 revolution and had no patriotic 
                                                                                                                                       
408 Muhlen, Gamalıhaç ile Kızılyıldız Arasında, 23. Muhlen quoting from Kantemir’s hand-written 
note titled “Caucasian Problem” in Federal Archive in Koblenz. (Die Kaukasische Frage, (BA), R. 
6/65). 
409 “Yeni Yollar,” Almanak, 10. 
410 Haydar Bammat, ‘Lehistan ve Kafkasya II,’ Almanak, p 31. 
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feelings at all. However, the basic needs of the Caucasians were nationalism and 
patriotism. Thus the Kavkaz group did not respect the proposals of Brussels 
Pact.412 
 
7- The Turn of Events: 
1934 was in fact a turning point for the Caucasians. For the last time they 
tried to establish a Confederation, at least on a paper. The contracting committee, 
however, was dissolved in 1935 and a Caucasian Confederation Council replaced it 
with no concrete contribution. Beyond that, the Armenians and Georgians 
separated themselves and began to work together, excluding the North Caucasians 
and Azerbaijanis. 
The first substantial initiative was the Armenian-Georgian League of 24 
May 1936. The foundation of the League was announced following the religious 
ceremony to sanctify the souls of the martyrs of the independence war in Armenian 
Church at Paris. The leading names who prepared the document were Arshak 
Jamalyan, the ex-foreign minister of Armenian Republic and Georgian Prince 
Vachnadze. The Declaration was signed by the representatives of Armenian 
Dashnaks and Georgian Mensheviks and published in the Armenian periodical 
Usaber.413 
The League was religious in content and aimed to establish a union on the 
basis of religion, excluding Muslims of the region. Nevertheless, it only served to 
                                                                                                                                       
411 Haydar Bammat, ‘Lehistan ve Kafkasya II,’ Almanak, p 31. 
412 It is clear from the position taken by Bammat’s group that they were very anti-socialist, seeing 
the Second International in the work of the Ukrainian and Georgian socialists in the Promethean 
front. That they were inclined towards the fascist powers of the day as an antidote to communism. 
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alienate Caucasian peoples, and was utilized by the Kavkaz group to criticise 
Prométhée. 
This declaration of the League caused a significant discord between the 
Caucasians centred on territorial problems. First of all, this group initiated a debate 
on the delimitation of the borders of the Armenian and Georgian republics with 
Turkey. In response, the Caucasian Confederation Council issued a decree after its 
meeting on 16 June and made this explanation. 
“1-Neither the Caucasian Confederation Council nor the national centers 
included in it, was previously informed of this declaration. The composition 
of the organisation propagating this declaration is still unknown to us. 
2-The Caucasian Confederation Council, in principle, is in favour of 
friendship and rapprochement between the Caucasian nations, but 
politically the existence of one single political organisation is a must. The 
Caucasian Confederation Council is already functioning, and of course the 
Armenians have a place in it.  
3-Forming political alliances between some of the nations of the Caucasus 
was a detrimental enterprise and could not be permitted by the Caucasian 
Confederation Council. It is evident that this kind of an enterprise will cause 
the collapse of the Caucasian union and create enmity between the nations. 
4-Moreover, the Caucasian Confederation Council reminds all the 
Caucasian nations that border problems and other conflicting issues will be 
solved by reciprocal agreements or forced arbitration following the 
salvation of the Caucasus.”414 
 
Moreover, in an article published in Severnyi Kavkaz, the North Caucasian 
emigres lobbied the Armenians and Georgians. They made a correlation between 
the policies of the Bolsheviks and the League, and described the declaration as the 
fabrication of the Bolsheviks.415 
 
                                                                                                                                       
413 For the text of the Declaration see Almanak, 55-58. 
414 This text was published in Severnyi Kavkaz/Şimali Kafkasya, 26, June 1936 and, Kurtuluş 20 in 
June 1936. It was reprinted in Vesikalar, 45-46, and Kafkasya (Der Kaukasus), (Munich), 14, 
September 1952. 
415 “Ermeni-Gürcü Birliği,” May 1936. Severnyi Kavkaz/Şimali Kafkasya, 25. 
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Haydar Bammat and Kavkaz also took this issue seriously and examined its 
connections with the ‘Brussels Pact’. With this declaration of the League, Bammat 
asserted that the arguments of the Kavkaz group were being verified. The Georgian 
Mensheviks, by taking sides with the Armenians made the validity of the Pact 
ambiguous. The Pact became null and void. As a result, the Kavkaz group 
advanced as a real organ representing the Caucasian confederation.416 
 
From the 1937 and 1938, war was in sight and the Caucasians, having no 
doubt on the collapse of the Soviet Union, started to deal with the issue of the 
border delimitation. While the Armenians and Georgians were dealing with their 
republics’ borders with Turkey, the fantasy of Greater Azerbaijan encompassing 
Iran Azerbaijan found adherents among the Azeri groups. Haydar Bammat started 
to criticise these ideas severely. He pointed out that, the situation and balance of 
power was changing throughout world. European states were separating into blocs 
and tremendous events were taking place in the Far East. All these events have to 
be analysed reasonably. The second chance for the Caucasians after 1918 was 
knocking on the door. Therefore, in order not to loose this chance, once again the 
Caucasian intellectuals had to be awake and organised.417 The mistakes of the past 
would not be repeated. From these mistakes new and reasonable path to 
independence has to be constructed. The key point in this way was the necessity to 
act in a unified structure. 
                                                 
416 Haydar Bammat, “Ermeni-Gürcü İttihadı,” Almanak, 58-60 and F. Daryal, “Yanlış Yol,” 
Almanak, 63-67. 
417 Haydar Bammat, “Yine Kafkas Hududları Meselesi,” Yazılar Dergisi II, 3-8. 
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Because of its geography, history, economics and ethnography, the only 
chance for Caucasian independence was Turkey and Iran’s exigency to see the 
Caucasus as a buffer between Russia and themselves. In order to utilise this 
exigency and to obtain the support, the Caucasians had to remove all obstacles 
between these countries and establish close neighbourly relations. Therefore, the 
most critical issue was the delimitation of borders. According to Bammat, the 
activities of some Georgian, Armenian, and even Azeri emigres from this issue 
were a big mistake. This just caused the interference by the Russians. More than 
that, solving the issue, essentially in line with the Caucasians’ demands became 
impossible. 
Bammat in his articles, in fact, indicated indirectly that some of the 
Caucasian territories were in the hands of Turkey. However, he said that the only 
possibility for agreement entailed the renunciation of these territories by Turkey. 
This could be painful but was necessary to attain sovereignty. 
In response to these arguments of Bammat and Kavkaz, the other group 
blamed them for giving Kars, Ardahan and Batum to Turkey and being pro-
Turkish. Bammat and the Kavkaz group in response defined Turkey and Iran as the 
partners that have common interests with the Caucasians.418 The existing cultural 
bonds and race connections attach these two nations to the Caucasians. Therefore, 
Bammat asserted relations with Turkey and Iran could only be friendly and cordial. 
Then he frankly stated that, he had never felt it necessary to conceal his 
Turkophilizm. He pointed that, for the all-Caucasian patriots who had a desire to 
                                                 
418 Haydar Bammat, “Türkiye ve Kafkasya,” Almanak, 67-70. Azerbaycanlı Mehmed Zade, 
“Kafkasyayı, Türkiye ve İrana Bağlayan Tarihi, Etnik ve Kültürel Rabıtalar,” Almanak, 76-80. 
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free the Caucasus, being pro-Turkish was a must in the service of their country. 
Caucasian emigres who opposed the Turks or Turkey, he argues, were overtly or 
covertly pro-Russian groups.419 
Then he explained his ‘Turkophilizm’ by correlating moral and cultural 
values of the Caucasus to Turkey. This was a psychological bond. In addition some 
objective criterion such as geographical position also forced them to be pro-
Turkish. Therefore Bammat’s aim, as some groups asserted, was not to remain 
under Turkish control.420 
 
While the Caucasian emigres were discussing not so relevant issues such as 
the borders, the German troops annexed Austria. This annexation or ‘Anschluss’ 
was gratified by the Kavkaz group and, received as the removal of one of the unjust 
consequences of the 1st world War. In Kantemir’s words, among the unfair 
treatments, the worst two were done to the ‘German and Turan’ worlds, therefore 
this was merely the overturning these injustices. What Hitler did for the Germans 
was akin to Atatürk’s achievements for Turks. By with the spread of national 
socialist ideology one of the anomalies of the post-world war period was recovered 
at the end. One nation in two states unified into one entity. Henceforth, there was 
one big Germany stretching along from the North Sea to the Mediterranean.  
The next step was not so far, the bells of a clash between the ideologies of 
Communism and national socialism were ringing. The war was closer than ever 
before. Therefore, the Caucasians would have to be prepared for their own terms.421 
                                                 
419 Bammat, “Türkiye ve Kafkasya,” 69. 
420 Bammat, “Türkiye ve Kafkasya,” 69. 
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However, the Nazi-German Pact in August 1939 put a dramatic end to the 
expectations of Haydar Bammat and caused the dissolution of the Kavkaz group.422 
Bammat, because of the shift in Nazi policy, disgruntled and disengaged from the 
Germans. He ceased to play an active role in politics, settled down Switzerland and 
increasingly devoted himself to religious subjects. 
For the Prométhée events could not perceived within the same psychology. 
In 1938 the name of the periodical was changed to La Revue de Prométhée, and an 
Ukrainian Aleksandr Shulgin, replaced Georges Gvazava as the editorial director. 
With the German occupation of Poland, they lost their most important financial 
support and with the German invasion of Paris in 1940 the publication of the 
periodical ceased.423 
 
From the side of the Caucasians in general and the North Caucasians in 
specific, The German occupation of Poland in September 1939 was the death of the 
idea of independence. Members of the Caucasian Mountaineers People Party 
fought against the German troops together with the Polish Army, but they had to 
abandon Warsaw after fall on 27 September.424 
 
                                                 
422 After the first German language edition of Kavkaz was appeared in 1937 the French authorities 
took steps against the émigré organization on its soil. In that year Bammat moved to Berlin and 
according to Muhlen, the next year he associated with German counter-intelligence. After the 
signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, however the publication of the Kavkaz probably banned by the 
Germans. Muhlen, ibid., p. 18. 
423 Muhlen, Gamalıhaç ile Kızılyıldız Arasında, 36-45. 
424 Muhammed Ayaz İshaki, March-December 1984. “Lehistan’dan gidiş,” Emel, 141/145, 120. 
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8- The World War II and the North Caucasian Emigres: 
World War II, initially, caused retrogression in the activities of the North 
Caucasian emigres. First of all, German policy, in contrast to the expectations of 
the North Caucasians, was arrogant and cynical, geared to the exploitation of non-
Russian nationalist sentiments within very tight parameters, for propaganda 
purposes only. The Germans never had an intention of giving the desired 
independence to the eastern peoples of the Soviet Union. Instead they planned to 
occupy and colonize all these regions. 
The first German initiatives were in the military area. By late 1941 and 
early 1942, in order to fight against the Soviets, along with the German troops, the 
Germans organized legions which consisted mainly of prisoners of war. For this 
they established Turkistani, Armenian, Georgian and Muslim legions. The latter 
later divided into two, the Azeri and North Caucasian and sent to the region 
together with the German troops.425 
The political dimension of German interest emerged relatively late. The 
German Foreign Ministry organized the first German initiative, to use the ‘Eastern 
Peoples’ of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1942. On the recommendations of 
Franz von Papen, the German ambassador to Turkey, the Foreign Ministry 
organized a meeting in Berlin called Adloniade.426 The names from the different 
and even rival camps were invited to Berlin, such as Said Shamil, Haydar Bammat, 
Ali Khan Kantemir and Ahmet Nabi Magoma. Interestingly enough, the first to 
                                                 
425 For the structure and the establishment of the legions see the detailed study of Muhlen, 
Gamalıhaç ile Kızılyıldız Arasında, 39-53. Also see, Tahir Çağatay, “Türkistan Kurtuluş Hareketile 
İlgili Olaylardan Sahneler,” 11; İskenderoğlu, August 1952. “İkinci Dünya Savaşında Kafkasya 
Gönüllüleri,” Kafkasya (Der Kaukasus), (Munich), 13: 25-26. 
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understand the German plans and distance himself was Haydar Bammat. 
Nevertheless, others with the intention of advancing the North Caucasian cause 
continued their activities. Said Shamil, who came to Berlin on 10 May 1942, 
strived to be seen as the chief representative of the emigrants in lobbying the 
Germans for support for an independent North Caucasus. Encouraged by the Grand 
Mufti of Jerusalem el Huseyni and the former president of Iraq, he sought a six 
month period to win over the support of the German government for North 
Caucasian independence which could be won under the flag of his grandfather, 
Imam Shamil.427 
Within that period, he instigated the establishment of the North Caucasian 
National Commission in the summer of 1942, which aimed to defend the rights and 
ideals of the North Caucasians on behalf of the German government. Nevertheless, 
with a feeling of disillusion ment, he left Germany in late 1942. From then Ahmet 
Nabi Magoma and Ali Khan Kantemir tried to represent the North Caucasian 
emigration and the activities of the Commission. Moreover, new names, prisoners 
of war joined their struggle for independence; among them Abdurrahman 
Avtorkhanov428, Ramazan Traho429, and Ramazan Karcha430. 
                                                                                                                                       
426 All the guests were stayed in Adlon Hotel, Berlin and the meetings held in the same place, 
therefore Muhlen gave this name to this initiative. 
427 Related with the activities of the Shamil and other groups in Berlin in order to Muhlen, also see, 
Müstecib Ülküsal, 1976. İkinci Dünya Savaşında 1941-1942 Berlin Hatıraları ve Kırımın Kurtuluşu 
Davası, İstanbul:n.p.; M. Resulzade, June-July 1952. “Kafkasya Meselesi V: Kafkasya Birliği Fikri 
Muhacerette,” Kafkasya (Der Kaukasus), (Munich), 11/12: 5-9; Ahmet Temir, 1998. 60 Yıl 
Almanya, (1936-1996)Bir Yabancının Gözü İle Geziler-Araştırmalar-Hatıralar, Ankara: Kültür 
Bakanlığı Yayınları, 217-269. 
428 Abdurrahman Avtorkhanov, a Chechen, (1908-). [aka Yuri Orlov, Abdurrahman Kunta] He was 
born in Grozny. A former communist who studied at the Red Professor’s College and a student of 
Bukharin, he was imprisoned for several years before making his way to the Germany in the course 
of the war. As a staunch anti-communist, scholar, educator and publicist he has numerous numbers 
of nationalist works. 
429 Ramazan Traho, after finishing 4 semesters in the faculty of Medicine at Moscow University, he 
continued his studies in the Faculty of Language and Literature, which he completed in 1934. Until 
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The North Caucasians, together with the other émigré groups submitted 
several notes and memorandums to the German government in which they asked 
for the establishment of independent republics of the revolutionary period but they 
gained almost nothing.431 In contrast, the Germans, in order to establish an 
umbrella organization allowed a Soviet prisoner of war, General Andrey A. Vlasov 
to organize a committee in the summer of 1944, called the Vlasov Committee. 
Under his leadership, this Committee almost at the end of the War, managed to 
establish an organization in Prague which would represent all the non-Slav 
populations of Russia, the Committee for the Salvation of the Peoples of Russia 
(Komitet Osvobozhdeniia Narodov Rossii or KONR) and in relation with it he 
founded the Russian Salvation Army (Russkaia Osvoboditel’naia Armiia or ROA) 
composed primarily of the prisoners of war.432 
The North Caucasian National Commission and the other émigré groups 
had never took part inthese organizations.433 They just rather carried out some 
propaganda, issued pamphlets, brochures and periodicals targeting the North 
Caucasian region434 and in October 1944 they established the Caucasian Council 
                                                                                                                                       
the World War II he worked in various academic and educational institutions, both in Moscow and 
the Caucasus. For his arrival in Germany see R. Traho, September-October 1951. “Stalingrad’dan 
Berlin’e,” Kafkasya (Der Kaukasus), (Munich), 2-3: 31-34. 
430 Ramazan Karcha, a Karachay, (-). He studied in the Philological Faculty of Rostov University. 
Worked in various institutions and learned organizations in the Caucasus.  
431 F. Daryal, March 1952. “Mecburi Bir İzah …Daha,” Kafkasya (Der Kaukasus), (Munich), 8: 29. 
432 Muhlen, Gamalıhaç ile Kızılyıldız Arasında, 160. 
433 See May 1952. “Kafkasya Cumhuriyetlerinin İstiklali,” Kafkasya (Der Kaukasus), (Munich), 10: 
1-3 and “Yalan ve İftira,” September-December 1951. Kafkasya (Der Kaukasus), (Munich), 4/5: 37-
38. 
434 The North Caucasian emigres published two different periodicals. Severnyi Kavkaz, in Russian 
was published by Ali Khan Kantemir and the other one, Gazavat, in Turkish, was published by A. 
Avtorkhanov with the pseudonym of Manius Mansur and targetting the legion. As Bezanis pointed 
it out, the Gazavat’s masthead apparently proclaimed that ‘God is above us and Hitler is with us’ a 
typical formulation in such publications, though it caused consternation in some quarters after the 
war. 
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which consisted of four Caucasian Committees.435 Nevertheless, the Germans 
surrendered and one of the episodes of the North Caucasians’ struggle concluded 
with a tragedy.436 
 
The North Caucasians’ collaboration with the Germans was not a function 
of their adherence to the Nazi ideology. It was just an example of their willingness 
to work with any and all to advance the North Caucasian cause and to intervene 
with German officialdom to win better conditions for their prisoners of war 
compatriots. They essentially, did their best to look after these young and often 
uneducated men. 
After the War, until the late 1940s, the North Caucasian emigres, like their 
Russian/Soviet counterparts remained aloof from every kind of political 
establishment. The main reason for this reluctance was, naturally, the post-War 
agreements between the allies, according to which all Soviet citizens who took part 
in the legions and the political organizations against Soviet Russia would be 
forcibly repatriated to Soviet Russia. Because of this, during the early post-War 
period the North Caucasians were restlessly trying to find secure places for their 
survival. The greatest numbers of the emigres therefore emigrated again primarily 
to America and Turkey. Some, who had a chance to escape from the repatriation, 
settled in camps like Limburg and Mittenwald in Germany. This made Munich, the 
                                                 
435 Related with this issue see Muhlen, Gamalıhaç ile Kızılyıldız Arasında, 162-165 and for the text 
of Caucasian Council’s declaration see Kırımal, “Matbuat,” 198. 
436 The tragedy on the Drau River is the most famous incident. Approximately 7,000 North 
Caucasians were forcibly repatriated from Austria to the Soviets, untold numbers killing themselves 
en route by leaping from train wagons. Their commander General Kılıç Girey accepted the same 
fate as his men, and was hung im Moscow on 6 February 1946. See, Asuman Ceyisikar, August-
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closest urban center to these camps as the main center of the émigré activities in 
late 1940s and early 1950s. During this early period, these emigres modestly 
initiated their political works within some religious organizations, like Islamic 
Society of Germany (Islamische Rat fur Deutschland).437 
The emergence of American-Soviet rivalry in early 1950s provided the 
impetus to the re-emergence of the genuinely political organizations and increased 
the activities of emigres. American political and financial support was well 
received. Firstly, the Americans, as part of their campaign against communist 
Russia formed the Council for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.438 
The first activity of the Council was the establishment of the Institute for 
the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR (Institut zur Erforschung der 
Geschichte und Kultur der UdSSR) on 8 July 1950 in Munich.439 The primary 
defined objective of the Institute was, through the “scientists and men and women 
of letters who have left the Soviet Union”, presenting “to the free world scholarly 
analyses of life in the Soviet Union.” The sole condition to become a member of 
the Institute was not being “a Communist Party member or symphatizer.” Beyond 
that “all members of the Soviet emigration who have scholarly qualifications are, 
                                                                                                                                       
October 1965. “Kuzey Kafkasyalı Mültecilerin 20. Teslim Ediliş Yıldönümlerinde,” Birleşik 
Kafkasya, (İstanbul), 5: 43-45. 
437 Muhlen, Gamalıhaç ile Kızılyıldız Arasında, 232. 
438 This Council in relation with the situation and the American policy renamed several times up 
until 1953. The American Committee for the Liberation of Russian Peoples, the American 
Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of the Soviet Union, American Committee for the 
Liberation of Bolshevizm and at last it took the name of the Council for the Liberation of the 
Peoples of Russia. J. Layons founded this Council or the Committee. Then some other names that 
were representing the anti-Russian or anti-Communist faction like Admiral Kerk and Vice-Admiral 
Stevens also leaded it. The Committee’s representative in Europe was Don Levin. 
439 This Institute was, later, renamed as the Institute for the Study of the USSR (Institut zur 
Erforschung der UdSSR). For the analysis on the activities and the history of the Institute see 
“Sovyetler Birliğini Öğrenme Enstitüsünün 10 Yıllığı,” 1960. Dergi, 6(21): 86-7. 
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therefore, eligible to participate in the work of the Institute irrespective of their 
place of residence.”440 
In this framework, the Institute sponsored conferences on the Soviet Union 
and gave modest grants for research by émigré scholars and published several 
numbers of books, brochures, pamphlets and periodicals.441 
As it is easily understood from these publications, the Americans’ and thus 
the Council’s main concern, like the Germans, was the establishment of a 
comprehensive oppositional organization, which encompassed all anti-Soviet or 
anti-Communist groups. In order to accomplish this aim, they established ties with 
the Russian political organizations. The most prominent Russian name for the 
Americans during this period was Aleksandr Kerensky, Following several meetings 
the Americans managed to establish an umbrella organization in October 1952; the 
Coordination Center for the anti-Bolshevik Struggle (Koordinationszentrum des 
antibolschewistischen Kampfes) in Munich.442 This Conference, in principle, 
accepted the February 1917 Russian Revolution as the point of departure and thus 
denied all the republics established after the Bolshevik Revolution.443 According to 
the Center’s regulation, the main executive body of the Center would be the Central 
                                                 
440 See the ‘foreword’ that placed in the first pages of all the publications of the Institute. 
441 Some of the Institute’s periodicals were as follows: The Caucasian Review, Vestnik (in Russian), 
Bulletin (in English), Byulleten (in Russian), Dergi (in Turkish), Ukrainsky Zbirnyk (in Ukrainian), 
Ukrainian Review (in English), Belaruskiy Zbornik (in Belarussian), Belorussian Review (in 
English). For the detailed list of the Institute’s publications see “Institute Publications,” 1956. The 
Caucasian Review, (Munich), 2: 153-156. 
442 For a detailed course of events in that period the issues of the Kafkasya (Der Kaukasus) are the 
most valuable source. The Russian organizations leaded by Kerensky, under the control of 
Americans organized meetings on 28 August 1951 in Stuttgart, on 3-7 November 1951 in 
Weisbaden and 19-21 June 1952 in Starnberg. 
443 A. Magoma, November 1952. “Muvaffakiyetsiz Bir Deneme Daha,” Kafkasya (Der Kaukasus), 
(Munich), 16: 7-10; and, “Weisbadencilerin Münih Konferansı,” October 1952. Kafkasya (Der 
Kaukasus) 15: 31; “Weisbaden Toplantısı Münasebetile,” November-December 1951. Kafkasya 
(Der Kaukasus), 4/5: 40-46. 
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Council, which would consist of 20 Russian, 20 non-Russian and 20 personally 
invited delegates. Related with non-Russian populations, the Center proposed 
plebiscite on independence following the liberation of Russia from the Bolshevik 
control.444 
This kind of a formation naturally disturbed and provoked each and every 
non-Russian emigres of the Russia. Therefore, the Center suffered from the outset 
due to the unwillingness of Caucasian and other non-Russian groups to cooperate 
with it. 
In this period the North Caucasians had, unfortunately, no consolidated 
political structure. The group consisting mainly of ‘new emigres’, under the 
leadership of Abdurrahman Avtorkhanov, established the Caucasian National-
Democratic Party and began to function in cooperation with the Russian groups 
and took part in the Center. Avtorkhanov, through his periodical Svobodny Kavkaz, 
was propagating the policies of the Center.445 
The ‘old or earlier emigres’, on the other hand strongly refused to work 
together with the Russian groups. This group, despite their close connections to the 
Americans evaluated the Center and the Russians as the enemy. These Russian 
organizations, according to this group, were unsuitable allies, because they were 
struggling for an indivisible Russia. Moreover, ‘newcomers’ who were working 
together with these groups, according to the ‘olds’, were the ‘usurpers’, former 
communists and ‘Nazi Collaborators. The old emigrants were functioning within 
the North Caucasian National Committee that was founded by Ahmet Nabi 
                                                 
444 A. Magoma, “Muvaffakiyetsiz Bir Deneme Daha,” 9. 
445 This periodical was published in the years 1951-53. From the old emigres only Vassan Girey 
Jabagi contributed regularly. All the other leading names were ‘the newcomers’. 
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Magoma and Ali Khan Kantemir. This group produced the periodicals of United 
Caucasus446 and Kafkasya447. On the initiative of Kantemir and Magoma, the North 
Caucasians, with the aim of analyzing the events and developments of the period, 
organized a Congress in Munich in September 1951 and expelled Avtorkhanov 
from the Committee. This was the real breaking point for the North Caucasian 
emigres. From then on they continued their struggle, ‘the North Caucasian struggle 
for the unification and independence’ separately. While the old group, together 
with other Caucasian groups working within the Caucasian Independence 
Committee that was established in December 1952, the youngsters organized their 
own structure together with the Russian groups. 
By the late 1950s, in correlation with the American-Soviet relations the 
activities of émigré North Caucasians in search of a unity and the independence 
diminished day by day. Moreover the natural removal of the prominent leaders of 
the struggle forced the remnants to change their policies and the style of the 
struggle. Nevertheless, these devoted fighters left behind them a tradition of 
struggle for the North Caucasians. In the volumes of printed material, they 
scrutinized each and every aspects of North Caucasian society and life and they 
constituted extensive blueprint for the Unified North Caucasian State. 
 
                                                 
446 Kantemir and Magoma published this periodical in Munich in Russian, Turkish, and English.  
447 Kantemir, Barasbi Baytugan and Balo Bilatti published Kafkasya (Kaukasus) again in Munich. 
The first issue was published in August 1951. Later by the No. 18-19 published in January-February 
1953, as an official organ of the Caucasian Independence Committee, it took the name Birleşik 
Kafkasya (Der Kaukasus) or The United Caucasus 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND REEMERGENCE 
OF UNITY 
 
After the Second World War, the Mountaineers’ activities in Europe 
became negligible. The activities of the North Caucasians, primarily the 
Circassians in Turkey, with the participation of some exiles from Europe 
revitalised slowly. 
During the early years of the new Turkish Republic, for domestic448 and 
international449 reasons, the North Caucasians could not lead an independence 
struggle in Turkey.450 By the beginning of multi-party democracy and after the 
establishment of Democratic Party rule, the activities of the North Caucasians were 
enhanced in the form of organizations established, and in periodicals and books 
published.451 Nevertheless the ideology and purpose of these new North Caucasian 
                                                 
448 Atatürk’s and Inönü’s state building policies under the one party system did not allow any of the 
other nationalism or nationalist activity. Thus a kind of an assimilation policy was carried out. Any 
talk of cultural peculiarity was barred, as separatism that ran counter to the whole thrust of Turkish 
policy which was to build a unified nation. Moreover, the policy of secularization of new Turkish 
society undercut the very reason North Caucasians had originally taken refuge in the Ottoman 
Empire. At last close relations between the leaders of the North Caucasians and the Ittihad Party of 
Ottoman period made the leaders of new State more hesitant with the activities of the North 
Caucasians. 
449 In that period Bolshevik or Soviet Russia was emerged as the sole friendly partner for Turkey. 
Because of the existence of serious problems with the other bordering neighbours, Turkey did not 
want to have a problem with Soviet Union and thus did not allow the irredentist activities of the 
North Caucasians in Turkey. 
450 Before the 2nd World War the North Caucasian publications in exile were forbidden to enter 
Turkey by governmental decrees. Without making any difference, the Promethean Gortsy Kavkaza 
and Severnyi Kavkaz and Bammat’s Kavkaz, didn’t allow spreading in Turkey. For the decrees see 
Başbakalık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, (BCA), 030.18.01. Later, even Ali Kahn Kantemir expelled and lost 
his Turkish citizenship in 1938. See BCA, 030.18.01 
451 For the emergence and the history of the North Caucasian organizations and the activity in 
Turkey see Erol Taymaz, “Kuzey Kafkas Dernekleri,” and Alexandre Toumarkine, “Kafkas ve  
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organizations in Turkey were very different to earlier European ones. “In Europe, 
an overt and covert political struggle was waged while in Turkey the keynote of the 
effort was preservation of an endangered community.”452 
These groups and their activities, in contrast to earlier European groups, 
interestingly enough, were not well informed on events in the Soviet Union and the 
North Caucasus region itself, nor were they particularly concerned with the 
situation there. 
 
During this period, the situation in the North Caucasus was much more 
dramatic than during the pre-War period. In late 1943 and early 1944 Stalin 
deported seven nationalities completely from their native countries to the Central 
Asia and Siberia, officially, for collaboration with the German armies. Among 
these nations were four North Caucasian nationalities: the Chechens, the Ingush, 
the Karachays and the Balkars.453 
Despite the Soviet claims of collaboration, the Germans in fact only reached 
to the Russian-inhabited Malgobek district in what is today northwestern 
Ingushetia and thus occupied only some parts of the Karachay and Balkar 
                                                                                                                                       
Balkan Göçmen Derneklerileri: Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik,” in Stefanos Yerasimos, ed. 
Türkiye’de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik. 2001. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 451-460 and 425-449. 
For a deatiled study on the North Caucasians publications see Lowell Bezanis, 1994. “Soviet 
Muslim emigrés in the Republic of Turkey,” Central Asian Survey, 13(1): 59-180. 
452 Bezanis, “Soviet Muslim emigrés”, 92. He also stressed that the “North Caucasian activism after 
1950 served several purposes: to connect, inform and help preserve the North Caucasian community 
in Turkey, to counter assimilation, to fight communism in and out of Turkey, and to accomplish this 
within the parameters of acceptable political behavior in Turkey.” 
453 The other three were the Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, and the Volga Germans. For a detailed 
account of the deportations see R. Conquest, 1960. The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, London: 
Macmillan & Co. Ltd. Alexandr Nekrich, 1978. The Punished Peoples: the Deportation and fate of 
Soviet minorities at the end of the Second World War, (trnsl.) George Saunders. New York: Norton. 
Abdurahman Avtorkhanov, “The Chechens and the Ingush during the Soviet Period and its 
Antecedents,” in The North Caucasus Barrier, 184-192. 
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territories in autumn 1942. They stayed until March 1943 and never reached the 
lands inhabited by the Chechens and Ingush. Thus Stalin’s accusations were 
unfounded. The selection of the peoples to deport, as Cornell put it, was the 
indication of the purpose of act: “the Chechens were traditionally the leaders of 
Caucasian rebellions, the Karachais and Balkars were both of Turkic origin, and 
were thus a potential pro-Turkish fifth column. These were the peoples seen as 
most dangerous to Soviet rule.”454 
In November and December 1943 all the Karachays were loaded on cattle 
wagons and transported to the Central Asia and Siberia. In February 1944 the 
Chechens and the Ingush, and in, March the Balkars followed them. In numbers, 
these deported North Caucasians comprised nearly half of the total deportees. The 
Chechens and Ingush alone totalled half a million. The former republics of these 
deported groups were, naturally dissolved and their territories were redistributed 
among the other neighbouring peoples. The peoples who used to live in the 
mountainous areas were forcibly resettled in the rural lowlands, while the Russians 
were drawn into the towns and cities. Not until the late 1950s were the deportees 
allowed return. Nevertheless, they lost more than a half of their populations over 
the course of deportation. 
In January 1957 the Chechen-Ingush ASSR and the autonomy of the 
Balkars, Karachays and Kalmyks was re-established. But the Soviet regime created 
a new discord among the Mountaineers. Clashes began to take place between the 
returnees and those who had been forcibly resettled in their former lands, with each 
                                                 
454 Svante E. Cornell, 2001. Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in 
the Caucasus, Surrey: Curzon, 31. 
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side claiming the right to the territory. The iron fist of the Soviet regime, however, 
suppressed these discords and clashes in a ruthless manner.455 
 
1- Perestroika and Glasnost’: 
Following the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as First Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1985. The Soviet Union 
experienced major social, political and economic upheavals. This was activated by 
the efforts of the reform-minded leadership to carry out a so-called well-planned 
comprehensive reorganisation of the country. This ‘revolution from above’ 
inadvertently fuelled a scale of ethnic unrest unparalleled in Soviet history, as the 
various nationalities of the world’s largest multi ethnic society seized the 
opportunities opened by glasnost’ (openness) and democratization to put forward 
demands for greater national self-determination.456 Moreover, the complex and 
three-tiered hierarchy of ethnically defined, administrative units, of the Soviet 
Union did not affect the situation positively.457 When the Union Republics 
demanded sovereignty in the late 1980s, autonomous republics and oblasts began 
to demand a higher status and greater rights. 
                                                 
455 The North Caucasian emigres were closely interested with the deportations and several numbers 
of articles were written on the issue. See, A. Bahadur, August 1951. “Kuzey Kafkasyada Halkın 
Toptan İmhası,” Kafkasya (Der Kaukasus), (Munich), 1: 10-12. Vassan-Ghiray Djabagui, 1955. 
“Soviet Nationality Policy and Genocide,” Caucasian Review, (Munich), 1: 71-80. R. Karcha, 1956. 
“Genocide in the Northern Caucasus,” Caucasian Review, (Munich), 2: 74-84. R. Traho, 1957. “The 
Restoration of National Autonomy in the Northern Caucasus,” Caucasian Review, (Munich), 4: 7-8. 
R. Karcha, 1957. “The Restoration of the Liquidated Republics and the Rehabilitation of the 
Deported Peoples,” Caucasian Review, (Munich), 5: 41-46. 
456 Graham Smith, 1996. “The Soviet State and Nationalities Policy,” in Graham Smith, eds., The 
Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States.London: Longman, 2-22. 
457 In late 1980s, the Soviet Union was consisted of 15 Union Republics (RSFSR and 14 SSRs) and 
administratively divided among 20 Autonomous Republics, 8 Autonomous Oblasts (AO). In 
addition to that, there were 6 Krais and several numbers of Okrugs. 
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The major disturbances started first in Union Republics, especially in Baltic 
Republics and Ukraine in 1987 and spread to the Transcaucasus in February 1988. 
Rather than formulating a coherent policy, Gorbachev’s approach to the 
nationalities question was to respond to each new ethnic crisis as it arose. This 
resulted in a tendency to treat each as a distraction from the central tasks of 
economic restructuring, glasnost’ and democratization, through which ethnic unrest 
could be largely resolved. 
The Caucasus was not an exception and, the catastrophic results of the 
aforementioned administrative set up could be seen explicitly. During the last days 
of the Soviet Union, the region was divided into four Union Republics: the 
Armenian SSR, the Georgian SSR, the Azerbaijani SSR, and the Russian Soviet 
Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR). In the last three, there were seven 
Autonomous Republics (ASSRs)458 and four Autonomous Oblasts (AOs)459. In 
addition to this, parts of the region belonged to the two big Krais within the 
RSFSR: Stavropol and Krasnodar. The peoples of the North Caucasus were living 
within the borders of these entities, except Armenia. The nominal nationalities of 
eight of which (5 ASSRs and 3 AOs) were ethnic groups of the North Caucasus.460 
This complex structure and the policies of perestroika and democratization 
made the Caucasus in general, and more specifically the North Caucasus more 
prone to ethnically based conflicts. The re-emergence of nationalist movements 
within the union republics, their feigned blindness towards the existence of other 
                                                 
458 Abkhaz, Kabardino-Balkar, North Osetian, Chechen-Ingush, Dagestan, Adzhar, and Nakhchivan 
ASSRs. 
459 Adyge, Karachay-Cherkess, South Osetian, and Mountain-Karabagh AOs. 
460 Abkhaz, Kabardino-Balkar, North Osetian, Chechen-Ingush and Dagestan ASSRs and Adyge, 
Karachay-Cherkess, South Osetian AOs. 
  
 
179  
small nationalities, and moreover, the possibility of breaking inaccessibly away 
from each other within the separate sovereign entities forced the peoples of the 
North Caucasus to become more reactionary. 
By 1988, peoples of the North Caucasus started to see their demands for 
national sovereignty and enhanced republican status as an expression of cultural 
anxiety and cultural sovereignty.461 As a result, the opportunity to form regional 
and national organizations was used to embark on a revival of the national cultures, 
languages, and national identities by the peoples of the North Caucasus. Ethnically 
based, homogenized socio-political organizations sprang up in the whole territory 
of the North Caucasus.462 These organizations, in those days, fulfilled a dual 
function: to put ethnic groups’ demands on the government agenda, and to serve as 
a platform for emerging leaders.463 In the last years of Soviet power, North 
Caucasus elites developed and presented images of nationhood within the spheres 
of these organizations. In the beginning, in almost all these organizations, the main 
concern was national-cultural development and basic rights for their peoples within 
the Soviet Union, in compliance with the basic tenets of perestroika and 
democratization. 
                                                 
461 Jane Ormrod, 1998. “The North Caucasus: confederation in conflict,” in Ian Bremmer and Roy 
Taras, eds., New States New Politics: Building the Post Soviet Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 99-100. 
462 Most of these front movements or organizations were established in 1988 and 1989: Chechen’s 
Bart (Unification) in July 1989, South Osetian Popular Front, Ademon Nykhas (Popular Shrine) in 
spring 1989, Ingush Niiskho (Justice) in 1988, the Karachay national movement Jamagat in 1988, 
Abkhazian Aydyglara, Cherkess Adygey-Khase, the Kumyk People’s movement Tenglik (Justice) in 
1989. The others were founded in 1990; Avar People’s National Movement Imam Shamil Front and 
Avar People’s movement, Lezgin National Movement Sadval (Unity), Nogay National Movement 
Birlik (Unification), the Lak People’s Movement Tsubarz, and Dargin’s Tsadesh (Unity). 
463 Anna Matveeva, 1999. The North Caucasus: Russia's fragile borderland, London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs: 11. 
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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the discourse of national and ethnic 
identity among the peoples of the Caucasus diverted its path. The North Caucasian 
peoples’ demands of the post-Soviet period broadened to include demands for 
increased economic and legislative autonomy and even the concepts of the nation 
state, whether fully sovereign or, as part of a republican structure. 
Consequently, in the early 1990s, the peoples of the North Caucasus issued 
declarations, one after another, upgrading the administrative status of their 
territories. This general tendency to establish sovereign entities caused the 
emergence of discord among the peoples in question. The already existing ‘land 
question’ arose as a basic reason for possible armed clashes among the peoples 
who had to live together as result of Soviet policies over the past century. 
In this context, the peoples of the North Caucasus had to face the legacy of 
the Soviet divide-and-rule policy and of deportations. While the discontented 
peoples were looking for the restitution of their ancestral lands, the forcibly settled 
peoples in turn were seeking to retain their existing status. At the same time, Turkic 
groups (Karachays and Balkars) were demanding their own sovereign union 
republics, while smaller entities like Shapsugs and the nationalities of Dagestan 
were in pursuit of reconstituting their autonomous administrative structures. 
Likewise, while Russian nationalism had not yet gained momentum in the 
region, Georgian nationalism, choosing the Osetians and Abkhaz as its target, 
already started to demonstrate its strength. The existence of this kind of nationalist 
threat gave rise to solidarity between the peoples of the North Caucasus. While 
each group has been establishing their own national organizations, the necessity for  
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an over-arching organization encompassing all the peoples of the North Caucasus 
started to sound overtly and loudly. 
Within this context, some leading figures of the national movements, in 
order to defend the rights and interests of the peoples of the North Caucasus in a 
more efficient way, started to discuss the viability of forming an umbrella 
organization, to be called the ‘pan-Caucasian movement,’ ‘Caucasian Home,’ 
‘union’ or ‘confederation’. As a stimulus behind this idea there was a belief that, 
despite the existence of religious and linguistic divergence, the peoples of the 
North Caucasus were one and the same, with shared customs, a way of life and 
common interests. Therefore, this movement to establish a comprehensive 
organization for the peoples of the Caucasus developed hand in hand with the 
spread of ethnically based homogenous organizations in the region. 
 
2- The Rising Georgian Nationalism, Abkhazia and the Formation of the 
Assembly of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus: 
The first concrete step in establishing a unified organization of the peoples 
of the North Caucasus was taken by the Abkhaz. The events of 9 April 1989 
created a negative atmosphere all around Georgia and Georgian nationalism paved 
way.464 Following the founding of the Congress of the Popular Front of Georgia in 
                                                 
464 On 18 March 1989, the People’s Forum of Abkhazia (PFA)- Aydgylara called a general 
assembly of the Abkhaz peoples in the historical village of Lykhny, in Gudauta district. This 
assembly with the participation of 30-thousand people, and also the local party and soviet 
authorities signed an appeal which proposed that Abkhazia should secede from Georgia and 
requesting the restoration of the status of Abkhazian ASSR of 1921-31. These demands were 
addressed to the Moscow and asked for the introduction of a temporary regime of ‘special rule’ 
from the center, that is direct subordination to the Moscow. As a response, mass rallies of protest 
against the Abkhazian demands from the villages of Abkhazia spread to the all other regions of 
Georgia. These demonstrations which were started out under anti-Abkhazian slogans quickly 
acquired a broader, pro-independence character, and the masses with the anti-Communist and anti-
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Tiflis (Tbilisi), on 25 June 1989, violence erupted in Sukhum over the 
establishment of a department of Tiflis State University in the city.465 The Georgian 
lecturers of Sukhum University refused to stay, as long as Abkhaz and Russian 
lecturers remained there. The Abkhaz then attacked a school, which was intended 
to house the Georgian University. At this time, neither side was strong enough to 
force the issue militarily. The battles between the Georgians and the Abkhaz over 
the Abkhazian question were relegated to the legislatures of the two republics.466 
This ‘power show-down’, incidentally, forced each side to revise its 
position vis-a-vis the other. The Abkhazians, with the proposal of the People’s 
Forum of Abkhazia (PFA)-(Aydgylara) took the initiative of uniting the peoples of 
the North Caucasus.467 As a result, in order to defend the rights and interests of the 
peoples of the North Caucasus, in late July they proposed the setting up an over-
arching socio-political organization to the representatives of the Chechen and the 
                                                                                                                                       
Soviet statements demanded the secession of Georgia from the USSR. But on 9 April, they were 
brutally dispersed by Soviet (Russian) troops under the command of General Rodionov, the 
Commander-in-chief of the Transcaucasian military district. A curfew was introduced in Tiflis and 
the former first-secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, J. I. 
Patiashvili, resigned. See Alexei Zverev, 1996. “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994,” in 
Bruno Coppieters, ed., Contested Borders in the Caucasus, Brussels: Vubpress, 40-41 and Svetlana 
Chervonnaya, 1994. Conflict in the Caucasus: Georgia, Abkhazia and the Russian Shadow, London, 
60. Hereafter The Russian Shadow. Then the leaders of the Aydgylara made public its appeal on 8 
July. In addition, see “Abkhazia –Problems and the Paths to their Resolution,” by Konstantin 
Ozgan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia, 1998, www.abkhazia-
georgia.parliament.ge/Publications/Abkhaz /Ozgan.htm. 
465 In fact, the Georgian SSR’s Council of Ministers issued an order for the establishment of this 
department already in May. 
466 Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts,” 42. During this three-day clashes 17 persons died (11 Georgians, 3 
Abkhazians and 1 Greek) and 448 were wounded. On 18 July a special regime of the conduct of 
citizens was introduced in Sukhum. See Chervonnaya, The Russian Shadow, 151. 
467 Aydgylara means unity in Abkhaz and it was established in 1988. An Abkhaz doctor of law, 
Taras Mironovich Shamba drew up the program of the Aydgylara, and his brother Sergei 
Mironovich Shamba, a historian, was elected as the chairman at the founding congress in Sukhum. 
Chervonnaya defined the Aydgylara as an interfront (internationalny front or fifth column) 
organization, which was set up by the initiative of Moscow. She claimed that the first draft of its 
program drawn up in Moscow and replate with arguments in favor of a socialist order and the 
indivisible and unbreakable Soviet union, stated that socialist Abkhazia must be a constituent part of 
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Kabardian national movements. In this context, an ‘initiative group’ consisting of 
Abkhaz Gennadi Alamiya, Oleg Domeniya, the rector of the Abkhaz State 
University, and Chechen Muhradzin Kottayev, a lawyer, managed to make contact 
with the representatives of the national front movements of Abkhaz, Chechen, 
Kabardian, Abaza, Ingush, Circassian and Adyge peoples. As a result, a 
Coordination Committee chaired by a Kabardian lawyer, Yuri Musa Shanibov, and 
a Consultative Committee, headed by Muhradzin Kottayev, were formed and they 
were given the task of organizing a Congress for all Mountaineers of the North 
Caucasus.468 
It is important to note that, despite the differences in motivation and the 
milieu, from the outset there was a striking similarity between the courses of events 
in 1917 and 1989. In both cases, the leaders of the movements were aware that in 
order to solve the problems and to defend the rights of the Mountaineers a unified 
front was essential. 
These committees managed to organize the First Congress of the Mountain 
Peoples of the Caucasus, which met in Sukhum, the capital of Abkhazia, on 25-26 
August 1989. Representatives of the Abkhaz, Abaza, Adyge, Ingush, Kabardian, 
Cherkess and Chechens took part. 
The improvement of the cultural rights of the Caucasian Mountaineers; the 
establishment of a political platform of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU); determining how the organization could best function, in compliance with 
                                                                                                                                       
the SU on the basis of Lenin’s principle of the right of nations to self-determination. The Russian 
Shadow. 57. 
468 Musa Y. Şenıbe (Shanibov), 1997. Kafkasya’da Birliğin Zaferi, İstanbul: Nart, 33-4. 
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the basic policies of perestroika and democratization; and shaping regulations to 
govern this new organization, were the main topics on the agenda.469 
Aleksy Gogua, the Chairman of the Association of Abkhaz Writers and 
Soviet Union parliamentary deputy, made the opening speech of the Congress: ‘A 
study on the situation of Abkhaz society’.470 The Congress, after bitter discussions 
especially between the Ingush and the Chechens took these decisions: 
“ 1-The prestige and all legal rights of the punished peoples of the North 
Caucasus have to be restored. 
2-Opponents of Perestroika have kept the Stalinist policies alive. The 
nationality policy of the CPSU does not serve the interests and legal rights 
of small nationalities, which were living in the autonomous oblasts and 
okrugs. 
3-In order to defend the rights and interests of the scarcely populated 
‘small’ peoples of the North Caucasus, political institutions will be founded. 
4-In order to obtain the return of the kinsmen who left the North Caucasus 
as a result of the Tsarist policy petitions will be submitted to the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR.”471 
 
Beyond that, the Congress adopted an ımportant decision on the 
establishment of the Assembly of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (AMPC) 
(Assembley Gorskikh Narodov Kavkaza). This new Assembly was defined as a 
socio-political organization of all the Mountaineers of the Caucasus and its 
proclaimed aim was the regeneration of the community of the Mountain peoples of 
the Caucasus, which Shanibov called ‘the Caucasian ethnos’. Moreover, the 
Assembly ultimately aimed to create a separate Caucasian Federal Republic with 
Sukhum as its capital. 
                                                 
469 For the Agenda of the Congress: “Kafkas Dağlı Halkları Kongresi (25-26 Ağustos 1989) ve 
Kafkas Dağlı Halkları Birliği,” January-June 1990. Kuzey Kafkasya, (İstanbul), 76/78: 10-14. 
470 In addition several number of intellectuals, mainly from Abkhazia made speeches during the 
Congress. 
471 “Kafkas Dağlı Halkları Kongresi,” 10 and also see www.kafkas.org.tr/TARIH/ 
daglihalklarkonkar. html. 
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As its first elected chairman, Yuri (‘Musa’) Mukhammedovich Shanibov472, 
pointed out the Assembly was born from the idea of the need for an independent 
national-democratic organization for the Mountaineers of the North Caucasus. 
Participants of the Congress, who were also the leading figures of the front 
movements of the North Caucasus, perceived the policy of glasnost’ as a chance to 
establish a more organized structure outside the existing administrative set up in 
the region. According to Shanibov, the future of the Mountaineers depended on the 
unification of powers against the forces that have been pursuing policies of 
invasion and destruction for centuries. Only the unification of these smaller peoples 
of the North Caucasus could serve to protect the interests of the Mountaineers.473 
 
The Assembly, or the union, defined itself a socialist, anti-nationalist and 
anti-racist organization and, according to the decisions and the regulations of the 
Congress, it would function in compliance with the basic policies of the CPSU. 
Nevertheless, despite its assertion to unite all the peoples of the North 
Caucasus, there was no place for the Russians and Cossacks and most of the other 
peoples of the North Caucasus did not take part in the Congress and the Assembly. 
Moreover, neither the representatives of the Turkic groups or the Osetians, nor 
most of the Dagestani groups took part. Even the Ingush had to be convinced by 
                                                 
472 He was born in the village of Staraya Krepest in Kabardino-Balkaria on 29 December 1936. He 
studied law at Rostov University. He worked for the Ministry of Justice and served as a regional 
prosecutor of the Terek Region and currently, is a senior lecturer at Kabardino-Balkar State 
University.  
473 From the personal interview with Shanibov that took place in Ankara in June 2001 and also see 
Musa Şanıbe (Shanibov), January 1991. “Yeniden Doğuşa Hizmet Etmek,” Kafkasya Gerçeği, 
(Samsun), 3: 14. 
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the Chechens to participate.474 This made the Assembly primarily an organization 
of the Circassians, i.e. Adyge and Abkhaz peoples with the participation of the 
Chechens. 
The Assembly, in its initial phase emerged as an anti-Georgian 
organization, but the tone of the first documents adopted was rather restrained. 
Thus, at the end of the Congress, while the Assembly was calling on the Abkhaz 
and the Georgians to shake hands, it submitted a petition to the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR complaining about the attitudes of the Georgians to the Abkhaz and 
appealed to Moscow to intervene.475 
In short, the new initiative of the Mountaineers to establish a unified 
structure was, from the outset, free from the idea of establishing a unified 
independent North Caucasian State. They objected to the creation of a unified body 
solely to defend the Abkhaz people and to secure their existence, within the 
sovereignty of Russian Federation. 
 
3- The Activities of the Assembly: 
During its first year, from its foundation Congress to the declaration of 
Russian sovereignty in June 1990, the Assembly focused its activities mainly on 
the Abkhazian problem. This was seen as a means of winning support from the 
neighbouring republics of the North Caucasus and Georgia, who were defined as 
                                                 
474 Related with this limited membership, Yandarbiyev asserted that, the Chechens, especially the 
Bartists opposed the idea of restraining the membership only with the Mountaineers of the 
Caucasus. Nevertheless, because of the clashes between the Abkhaz and Georgians, the other 
groups took the decision to name the Assembly as the Mountaineers. Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, 
1996. Bağımsızlığın Eşiğinde, (trnsl.) Prof. Dr. Ö. Aydın Süer, Ankara: 19. 
475 “Kafkas Dağlı Halkları Kongresi”, 13-14 and; www.kafkas.org.tr/TARIH/daglihalklarkonkar. 
html. 
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the sole ‘ugly force’ against the Assembly and the peoples of the North Caucasus, 
in that period. 
On 31 May 1990, the Assembly, in cooperation with the Aydgylara, 
organized its first meeting to protest to the Georgian government. It was attended 
by over 30-thousand people. At the end of the meeting, the Coordination 
Committee issued a declaration, signed by Y. M. Shanibov and the president of the 
Aydgylara, S. M. Shamba, to the UN General Secretary, Peres de Cuellar, Mikhail 
Gorbachev and Turgut Özal, the presidents of the USSR and Turkish Republic 
respectively.476 
In this declaration, the leaders of the AMPC and the Aydgylara, outlined the 
policies of the Russian Empire on the Mountaineers and their anti-Colonial 
struggle. They made the following demands: 
“1-21 May 1864, the date of the end of the Caucasian War, should be 
proclaimed as the day of ‘Caucasian War and remembrance of the victims 
of the exile’. 
2-The international program allowing the Mountaineers to set up cultural 
and scientific relations with the kinsmen living the outside the North 
Caucasian territory should be prepared. 
3-The suitable conditions for the return and the integration of the 
mountaineers in exile into their homeland must be arranged.”477 
 
This declaration was the first document of the Assembly establishing 
contacts with the international environment. 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Soviet’s adoption of a decree ‘on the recognition 
as illegal and criminal all acts against those who have been forcibly resettled, and 
on safeguarding their rights’, in November 1989, caused the intensification of 
                                                 
476 For the Russian and Turkish texts of the declaration see, Kafkasya Gerçeği, January 1991, 3: 4-5. 
477 “Kafkas Dağlı Halkları Kongresi,” 10. 
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ethnic disturbances in early 1990 regarding the land problems. Then, despite the 
fact that the Abkhazian question had priority in its October and November 1989 
sessions, the Assembly’s Coordination Committee at last turned its attention to the 
problems in the region. In order to strengthen and enlarge its area of influence, the 
Assembly had to deal with these land problems thoroughly. The claims of 
Shapsugs, the clashes between the Chechen-Auxhovs (Akkintsy) and Laks in 
Dagestan, and the problems and demands of the Ingush were all taken into account. 
These activities increased support for the Assembly among the other peoples of the 
region and enhanced its reputation among the masses. 
 
The Russian declaration of independence in June 1990 and President 
Yeltsin’s invitation ‘to take as much sovereignty as you can swallow’ changed the 
course of events for the leaders of the Assembly. For the first time, since the 
establishment of the Soviet Union they had a chance to establish a unified 
structure, which was to encompass the entire North Caucasus. Thus the leaders of 
the Assembly decided to revise the Assembly’s policies. 
On 22 September 1990, the First Congress of ‘the Representatives of All-
Former Autonomous Regions and Areas’ was convoked in Moscow. The AMPC 
took an active role in this Congress and Musa Shanibov was elected chairman. 
“The main objective of the Congress was to work out how to deal with the 
autonomies and ‘peoples having no statehood of their own’ in case the new 
democratic authorities were unwilling to sign the Union Treaty and attempted to 
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secede from the Soviet Union.”478 This was the Assemblies main concern and was 
the basis of its Second Congress held in Nalchik on 13-14 October 1990. In this 
Second Congress, events taking place in the entire Soviet Union, and possible 
repercussions for the North Caucasus, and specifically for the Assembly, in the 
near future, were taken into account. At the end of the Congress it was announced 
that a period of practical work to implement a program for a new state structure for 
the North Caucasus and Abkhazia was under way. Moreover, for the first time, 
special attention was to be given to the unity of the North Caucasian Mountaineers, 
put into effect on 11 May 1918 by the proclamation of the North Caucasian 
Republic. After almost seventy years, the North Caucasians remembered their ideal 
of a unified North Caucasian State and decided to follow in the footsteps of their 
ancestors. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the lack of national consciousness encountered 
during the early period, the Soviet regime deliberately created new nationalities 
with their own agendas. Therefore, in order to free itself from these particular 
national movements’ effects, the Assembly decided to strengthen its hand by 
establishing its own permanent organizational structure, free from national front 
movements and parties. To accomplish this, the member peoples were asked to 
organize regional conferences and elect their plenipotentiary representatives to the 
next congress. By so doing, the Assembly probably aimed for a legal basis and 
effectiveness for the decisions, which would be adopted in the next congress.479 
 
                                                 
478 Chervonnaya The Russian Shadow 87-8 and for the Declaration issued at the end of the Congress 
see Kafkasya Gerçeği, January 1991, 3: 6-7. 
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4- From Assembly to the Confederation: 
With the participation of the representatives of the 13 peoples of the North 
Caucasus,480 the Assembly organized the Third Congress of the National 
Democratic Movements and the Parties of the North Caucasus on 1-2 November 
1991, in Sukhum Drama theatre. 481 
In this Congress, the Assembly evolved into the Confederation of the 
Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC) declaring itself to be the legitimate heir 
of the North Caucasian (Mountain) Republic that was established on 11 May 1918, 
with Sukhum as its capital. This was, according to the Treaty, the start of the 
process of restoring the sovereign statehood of the Mountain peoples of the 
Caucasus.482 
According to Shanibov, realization of the idea of the Confederation was the 
result of the long and detailed work of special committees of the Assembly on 
integration. 483 This newly established Confederation consisted of the peoples of the 
member nationalities, not their existing official state structures. The delegates, as 
                                                                                                                                       
479 In fact there is no concrete information concerning the election processes, electorates and the 
candidates. In a personal contact with Shanibov I could not get any information on this issue. 
480 Abazin, Abkhaz, Avar, Adyge, Auxov-Chechen, Dargwa, Kabardian, Lak, North, and South 
Osetian, Cherkess, Chechen, and Shapsug delegates attended the congress. 
481 In an interview with Zarema Khadartseva published in Severnyi Kavkaz, No.41 (44), November 
1991, Shanibov pointed out that this Congress was regarded as the continuation of the first of 1917 
and the second of 1918. The 3rd, 4th and 5th congresses were not taken into account because the 
Bolsheviks convened them. But as it was discussed in Chapter II, the Second Congress was also 
held in September 1917 and there was no connection between the Bolshevik Congresses and the 
1917 congresses of Mountaineers. For this interview’s translation to Turkish see, “Kafkasya Dağlı 
Halkları Konfederasyonu Başkanı Şanibe Açıkladı: ‘Dağlıların Yüzyıllar Boyu Arzu Ettikleri 
Birliği Gerçekleştiriyoruz’,” Kafkasya Gerçeği, (Samsun), January 1992, 7: 2-4. 
482 Article 1 of “the Treaty on the Confederative Union of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus”, 
dated 2 November 1991. In order to see the English text of this Treaty, B. G. Hewitt, 1993. 
“Abkhazia: A Problem of Identity and Ownership” Central Asian Survey, 12(3): 267-323: Appendix 
4: 304-309. Article No.19 stressed that “the parties to the Treaty have chosen as place of residence 
for the leading organs (headquarters) of the CMPC the city of Sukhum, capital of the Abkhaz 
Republic.” With that, Shanibov stressed, the participating parties were intended to show Georgia 
that the Abkhaz were the inseparable part of the North Caucasian unity. 
483 Şenıbe, Birliğin Zaferi, 40 and “Kafkasya Dağlı Halkları” January 1992. Kafkasya Gerçeği, 7: 3. 
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proposed in the Second Congress in October 1990, were chosen by the national 
conferences of each member peoples. In the framework of the process of over-
arching integration, the Assembly aimed at evolution from separate national-
democratic front movements to the union of the Mountaineers that had for centuries 
been the dream of the peoples of the Caucasus.484 
During the Congress, the basic documents –the Declaration on the Alliance 
of the Caucasian Mountaineer Peoples, the Agreement on the Confederative Union 
of the Caucasian Peoples and the Treaty on the Confederative Union of the 
Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus- were prepared and ratified. 
In the Treaty, on the Confederative Union of the Mountain Peoples of the 
Caucasus: 
“the participating peoples declared that they would act in the spirit of 
fraternity, friendship and cooperation, with the aims of further developing 
and strengthening political, socio-economic and cultural ties between the 
Mountaineers of the Caucasus, following the principles of respect for state-
sovereignty, cooperation, mutual help and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of the republics which they represent.”485 
 
The Treaty built the organs of the Confederation in compliance with the 
principle of the division of powers between the legislative, the executive, and the 
judiciary. Each was to function in accordance with the “Statute concerning the 
leading organs of the CMPC”, ratified during the Congress and with regard to the 
laws of the republics of the region.486 
Article 7 envisaged the President, Presidential Council, and Chairman of 
the Court of Arbitration, the Caucasian Parliament or the Caucasian Assembly, the 
                                                 
484 Article No.2. 
485 Article No.3. 
486 Article No.8. 
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Chairman of the Committee of Caucasian Associations and the Coordinator for the 
Business of the CMPC as the supreme organs of the CMPC. 
As a legislative organ, the Caucasian Parliament or Assembly was 
proposed. This Parliament would consist of three plenipotentiary representatives 
from each member people who would be elected directly by the congresses of the 
participating peoples of the CMPC. The Parliament was not dependent on national 
parliamentary institutions, but was to have a direct link with them through people 
who were deputies simultaneously of the Caucasian and national parliaments. 
As an executive organ, the Treaty envisaged the Committee of Caucasian 
Associations, consisting of leading employees of the ministries, departments and 
public organizations of the republics, who would lead the various specialist 
associations. 
The President and the Presidential Council, which comprised of one 
representative of each nation, were to represent the Confederation. 
Article 12 of the Treaty conceived the establishment of the Confederation’s 
Court of Arbitration as its judicial organ. This court was given the duty of 
examining acute and complex problems between citizens of the Confederation, and 
also between citizens and the Confederation. Decisions of the Court would only be 
recommendatory in character. 
Preventing ethnic conflicts and guaranteeing stability in the region were 
among the most important aims of the Confederation. To accomplish these aıms, 
the Congress charged the Caucasian Parliament with drawing up a special statute 
on the status and functions of established forces for stability. This meant that the 
agenda of the Confederation would include the improvement of socio-cultural and 
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political co-operation between the peoples of the North Caucasus, and the creation 
of a united defence system against foreign aggression.487 
Beyond that, The Confederation set up 9 special commissions: National 
Consent or Reconciliation; Economic Integration; State and Law; Culture; 
Environment; Foreign Affairs; Religious Affairs; Defence, and Relations with the 
Diasporas.488 
During the Congress, Musa Shanibov, a Kabardin delegate, and Yusup 
Soslambekov489, a Chechen delegate, were chosen as President of the 
Confederation and Speaker of the Parliament respectively. In addition, 13 deputy-
presidents, one from each participating peoples were named.490 
On 3 November 1993, the deputy-presidents signed the Confederation 
Treaty, in the name of their own respective peoples, in an Abkhazian village 
Likhny that was the historical center of the Abkhazian State and culture.491 At that 
time, the Confederation, as Fiona Hill states, “because of the lack of a regional 
native leadership and in the absence of a powerful political party with a regional 
manifesto had the only vision that had been offered to the peoples of the region.”492 
 
                                                 
487 “Kuzey Kafkasya Halkları Konfederasyonu,” January 1994. Yedi Yıldız, 1: 20. 
488 Şenıbe, Birliğin Zaferi, 3-4. 
489 At the same time he was the head of the Committee on International Relations of the Chechen 
Parliament. 
490 The other leading names were as follows: Den’ga Khalidov (Abkhaz), Deputy Speaker of the 
Caucasian Parliament; Konstantin Ozgan (Abkhaz), the Chairman of the Committee of the 
Caucasian Associations; Zurab Achba (Abkhaz) Chairman of the Confederation’s Court of 
Arbitration; Gennadi Alamiya (Abkhaz), deputy-president and the Coordinator for the Business of 
the Confederation. Among the other deputy-presidents there were Kargiyev (North Osetia) and 
Torez Kulumbekov (South Osetian). 
491 Şenıbe, Birliğin Zaferi, 41. 
492 Fiona Hill, 1995. Russia’s Tinderbox: Conflict in the North Caucasus and its Implications for the 
Future of the Russian Federation, Cambridge: J. F. Kennedy School of Government, 25. 
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Nevertheless, the Confederation had some critical problems even from thıs 
initial phase.493 First of all not all the Mountain peoples of the North Caucasus 
joined it. Turkic groups: the Balkars; Karachays; Nogays, and Kumuks did not 
respond to the invitation of the AMPC. Moreover, Nogays and Kumuks were 
withdrawn from the membership of the Assembly as well. Dargin and Lezgin also 
did not take part. The Ingush, even though they had named delegates, did not 
participate.494 
Secondly, its members, as Shanibov stressed it, were peoples, or rather their 
‘representatives’, not republics. This gave the Confederation and its members the 
image of an opposition, which was confronting the existing native governments in 
the region, except Chechens and Abkhaz. Propaganda by an old political elite who 
knew how to strengthen their own positions by playing on the national aspirations 
of the North Caucasian peoples, criticised the Confederation and its leaders. 
Related to that, thirdly, the Chechen republic was the only member of the 
Confederation from the Russian part of the North Caucasus. This was essential to 
Confederation, but at the same time created a danger of Chechen supremacy in the 
Confederation, and consequently a danger of the Confederation becoming a tool of 
the Chechen regime. The higher number of Abkhaz officials active in the 
Confederation, compared to Chechens had no negative consequences for Moscow, 
at least for the time being. This Abkhaz supremacy meant, at least for the Russians, 
leverage against Georgia. But Chechen supremacy caused serious problems and 
created opposition. 
                                                 
493 Moshe Gammer, 1995. “Unity, Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus,” in Yaacov 
Ro'I, eds., Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. London: Frank Cass, 173-174. 
494 Şenıbe, Birliğin Zaferi, 3. 
  
 
195  
At last, internal, national and personal quarrels made the Confederation a 
more complex body. Due to different policy preferences of the Confederation’s 
members, the purpose of the Confederation’s existence was never clarified 
properly. This alone was the most critical handicap for its future.495 While the 
Chechens were in pursuit of total independence, all the other peoples, especially the 
Abkhaz were in favour of a kind of autonomy within the Russian Federation. 
Moreover, mutual territorial claims of the member peoples of the Confederation 
against each other and neighbouring peoples were clear. 
 
The leaders of the movement were well aware of all these troubles and of 
the possible reactions of the existing power centres in the region, from regional 
governments to Moscow. As Gennadi Alamiya, one of the deputy-Presidents of the 
CMPC, put it, the objective of collecting different nationalities under the umbrella 
of unified single state was so far from the realty. Instead, the Confederation aimed 
at the establishment of a loose body of democratic organisations, taking the 
example of the European Union, to consolidate economic, political social and 
cultural solidarity among the peoples of the Caucasus.496 Shanibov also perceived 
the establishment of the Confederation as the initial phase of the realization of a 
powerful North Caucasian State.497 He tried to assure possible opponents by saying 
                                                 
495 Cem Oğuz, June-August 1999. “The Unity of the North Caucasian People: The case of the 
Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus,” Perceptions, (Ankara), IV(2): 128. 
496 “Kafkasya Halkları Konfederasyonu. Hedef Avrupa Modeli Birlik,” July 1992. Kafkasya 
Gerçeği, (Samsun), 9: 11-2. 
497 “Kafkasya Dağlı Halkları Konfederasyonu Başkanı Şanibe Açıkladı:…” January 1992. Kafkasya 
Gerçeği, (Samsun), 7: 4. 
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that “…the parliament was not an alternative to existing governments, …its 
mission was rather to solve regional conflicts by peaceful means.”498 
 
5- Activities of the Confederation: 
With the establishment of the Confederation, the new executive bodies, in 
contrast to the Assembly, started to function regularly. The Confederation’s 
Parliament and the Presidential Council met almost every month in one of the cities 
of the member peoples. And, in those meetings, these bodies discussed the 
developments and disputes affecting the region directly or indirectly. 
 
During the first period, the most critical point was the new Russian 
Federation Treaty and draft constitution. Following the formation of the CIS, in 
order to prevent the disintegration of the Russian Federation, as was the case in the 
Soviet Union, the authorities in Moscow prepared a Federation Treaty in which a 
comprehensive reform of the Russian Federation’s administrative structure was 
taken into account.499 This Treaty was intended to be the fundamental document 
delimiting powers between the federal government and the constituent parts. Its 
finalisation was the main issue on the agenda of the leaders of the Russian 
Federation. 
 
                                                 
498 RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, January 1992. 5(31): 69. 
499 With that Treaty Moscow was intent to sign three documents with 89 subjects of the Russian 
Federation in 1992. The 89 subjects of the Russian Federation consisted of 21 republics, 1 
autonomous oblast, 10 okrugs, 6 krais, 49 oblasts and 2 cities with special status, Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. 
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The CMPC strongly opposed this treaty from the beginning because of its 
‘undemocratic character’. And, in compliance with the decision taken during the 3rd 
Congress, the Confederation protested to the Yeltsin administration for proposing 
and supporting this kind of an undemocratic Treaty to the peoples of the 
Federation. Thus the dispute between Moscow and the Confederation was already 
fuelled in the beginning of 1992. 
The Confederation put the issue on its agenda at the 5th session of the 
Parliament and Presidential Council in Grozny on 27 February 1992. According to 
the Confederation, although most clauses in the draft constitution tabled at the last 
Congress of the Peoples’ Deputies meet contemporary needs, the section on the 
structure of the state of the future Russian Federation was absolutely unacceptable. 
Its denial of the right to self-determination and demolition of the principle of 
national states, meant it would be a political disaster and would result in the revival 
of the Russian Empire, a return to the pre-Soviet period. Since it was undemocratic 
and placed the peoples of the North Caucasus in a dependent and unequal position 
with regard to Russia, the acting administrative bodies of the North Caucasus could 
only reject it.500 
The Confederation, as a best solution, requested a moratorium for the 
ending of disputes and clashes between the peoples of the North Caucasus. The 
leaders believed that this was the only way to establish a comprehensive and 
unified state of the peoples of the North Caucasus, without Russian intervention.501 
Yusup Soslambekov pointed out that if the current draft Russian constitution were 
                                                 
500 “Caucasus Parliament threaten military intervention in Abkhazia,” SWB SU/1319, B/5-6, 3 
March 1992. 
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adopted, the peoples belonging to the Confederation would declare general 
elections and create an independent confederative state from the Caspian to the 
Black Sea.502 
 
In its meeting on 22 March 1992 in Vladikavkaz, the Confederation 
Parliament issued a declaration503 stating that the Confederation was established to 
defend the political rights and freedoms of the North Caucasian peoples. In 
addition, it aimed to end imperial captivity and to secure the establishment of an 
independent state, therefore it was impossible, at that time, for the Confederation to 
accept this new Federal Treaty. 
Likewise, the Confederation tried to constrain the official and competent 
authorities of the existing republics of the North Caucasus by saying that the 
approval of this Treaty would contradict the freedom and the basic rights 
guaranteed to the peoples of the North Caucasus. Thus it would have no legal 
validity. 
Then the Confederation proposed its own solution and called for the legal 
disintegration of the existing Russian Federation. This disintegration would give 
equal status to all the republics which compromised the Russian Federation. Then, 
these equal republics would establish an independent Russian Federal Republic. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
501 For the text of CMPC’s Parliament’s resolution after the meeting on 28 February 1992 see: “A 
call to the peoples of the North Caucasus,” April 1992. Kafkasya Gerçeği, (Samsun), 8: 1. 
502 RFE/RL Research Report, 1(11), 13 March 1992. 
503 The text of the declaration was published in the newspaper Kavkazskiy Dom and for the Turkish 
text see Kafkasya Gerçeği, (Samsun), April 1992, 8: 2; and Marje, (Ankara) June 1992, 1: 28-29. 
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Despite the Confederation’s strong opposition and the propaganda work 
against the Federation Treaty, all the republics of the North Caucasus signed the 
Treaty, with the exception of Chechnya on 31 March 1992. 
 
6- The Split: From Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the 
Caucasus to the Confederation of Caucasian Peoples: 
By 1992, increasing demands for territorial change and structural reform in 
the North Caucasus; the growing influence of the Confederation as an independent 
and ‘anti-Russian’ organization, and the fear of the so-called ‘domino-effect’ 
caused by the Chechen declaration of independence, forced the authorities in 
Moscow to deal with the region in a more concrete and responsible manner.  
Through the newly established Ministry of Nationalities and Regional 
Policy504, Russian authorities tried to manage the conflicts and disagreements in the 
North Caucasus. However as Hill stressed, because of the lack of a blueprint for the 
future of the Russian Federation Moscow has to improvise and adopt ad hoc 
measures to address the issue of conflict in the North Caucasus.505 
In addition, the emergence of different trends in Russian politics, which was 
roughly, defined by Hill as ‘statism’ and ‘federalism’ made the situation in the 
North Caucasus more fragile. 
 
The second half of 1992 was a year of transformation for the Confederation. 
Existing disagreements in the North Caucasian territory began to escalate and turn 
                                                 
504 A ministry which was created in 1992 on the basis of a pre-existing State Committee for 
Nationality Affairs (Goskomnats). 
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into the military clashes. Thus, in addition to its socio-political character, the 
Confederation quickly gained the status of a military power. 
In the sixth session of the Confederation’s parliament on 21-22 March 1992 
in Vladikavkaz, the Confederation’s authorities decided to form a Defence 
Committee and an army. According to the provision approved by the parliament, 
the Confederation’s armed forces would be equipped with motorised rifles, 
armoured and artillery sub-units. In addition, air force and air defence sub-units 
would be formed. These armed forces were created, according to the leaders of the 
Confederation, for the safeguarding of the Confederation’s state sovereignty, 
resolution of inter-ethnic problems peacefully, and protection of citizens’ rights and 
freedoms.506 
Nevertheless, at least in the beginning, the leaders of the Confederation did 
not intend to establish a permanent military structure. They were establishing a 
volunteer army, to be activated on the existence of a clash affecting the region and 
the Confederation directly. During the South Osetian-Georgian conflict the 
Confederation sent 3 battalions, organized totally on voluntary basis, to intervene 
in the conflict. 
The Confederation established a command structure of its own in February 
1993, during the Abkhazian war. While Shamil Basayev, the commander of the 
Chechen volunteers, was appointed commander of troops, a deputy of the Adyge 
Supreme Soviet, Amin Zekhov was appointed chief of staff.507 
                                                                                                                                       
505 Hill, Russia’s Tinderbox, 30. 
506 “Confederation of Mountain Peoples’ Parliament Meets in Vladikavkaz,” SWB SU/1338, B/6, 25 
March 1992. 
507 “Confederation of Peoples of Caucasus forms command of its army,” SWB SU/1611, B/7, 12 
February 1993. 
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In the beginning, it was used by the Russian authorities, especially the 
military circles, against Georgia. But in time, because of the Confederation’s 
increasing anti-Russian and anti-federal discourse and attitude, the authorities in 
Moscow started to oppose the idea of any kind of an organisation outside Russian 
control. 
Moreover, the Georgian assaults on Abkhazia and the Confederation’s 
quick reaction to it, resulted in a rapprochement between Georgia and Russia. After 
talks between Yeltsin and Shevardnadze in late August508, the Ministry of Justice 
of the Russian Federation issued a statement in which the actions of the 
Confederation was defined as a gross violation of the Constitution.509 Accordingly, 
Valentin Stepankov, Procurator General of the Russian Federation instigated 
criminal proceedings against the Confederation for stirring up inter-ethnic strife, 
committing terrorist acts, and diversions, and taking hostages. In his accusation, the 
procurator stressed that despite the fact the Confederation has proclaimed itself a 
socio-political institution, it was clearly claiming the role of substitute for the legal 
bodies of a state power. The anti-constitutional thrust of this organization was 
displayed perfectly by the attempts to create a parliament, defence council and 
armed forces, the establishment of the post of commander-in-chief, the adoption of 
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documents calling for the continuity of terrorist acts.510 The Procurator entrusted 
the investigation of the case to its investigation department in which representatives 
from the ministries of security and internal affairs took part. 
The leaders of the Confederation quickly reacted and rejected the 
accusations and activities of Yeltsin and the Justice Ministry. Shanibov and 
Soslambekov stated that the Confederation did not recognize the jurisdiction, 
which intended to prosecute the organization for unconstitutional activities with 
regard to Georgia.511 
 
While the Russians were continuing peace negotiations between the Abkhaz 
and Georgians, they detained Shanibov as part of their policy of repressing the 
Confederation. He was accused of encouraging ‘internal disharmony’ and of 
signing a document on forming armed detachments to send to Abkhazia. 
Demonstrations, demanding his release began over the entire North Caucasus, 
especially Kabardino-Balkaria512 in repsonse. The demonstrators blockaded 
Nalchik airport and a state of emergency was declared.513 
On 27 September 1992, after the meeting of its parliament, the 
Confederation issued an appeal to the Russian Procurator General requesting him 
not to view the Confederation’s actions as unconstitutional. The appeal explained 
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why the Confederation’s president signed his decree on forming armed units to 
fight in Abkhazia.514 
While these demonstrations were continuing, Shanibov managed to escape 
from custody in Rostov and addressed a meeting in Nalchik on 28 September. In a 
television interview, Shanibov said: “We want peace, we want to preserve Russia 
as a commonwealth of peoples – of free peoples. We have not forgotten history, 
and we still feel for the Russian State. We do care about where it is heading.”515 
How he escaped is still unknown and is viewed suspiciously. While some 
claim he was released due to rising pressures from the Kabardian Peoples’ 
Congress and Adygey-Khase, and their fear of a possible opposition coup, there 
were also rumours that the Russian let him out to prevent unrest from spreading 
into other areas of the Caucasus. In addition, in an article published in Segodnya,516 
it was implied that he has close contacts with Russian military officials in the 
region. These close contacts made his ‘escape’ possible. 
 
In order to analyse the complex situation and position of the Confederation 
in the region and to decide on what policy to adopt towards Russia, the Fourth 
Extraordinary Congress of the Peoples of the Caucasus was organized in Grozny 
on 3-4 October 1992. 
In this Congress the first and most serious split in the Confederation 
emerged. Representatives adopted two different approaches on relations with 
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Russia. According to the first group, which consisted mainly of Chechens, the 
attitude towards Russia should be hardened, even secession should be considered. 
Dudayev, representing the first group suggested that the Confederation should set 
up a committee to investigate and judge the leaders of the North Caucasian 
republics where Russia had been allowed to send troops. This committee should 
even have the right to pass death sentences on them. The other group, including 
Shanibov and most of the Abkhaz were defended more moderate policies.517 In 
contrast to Dudayev, Denga Khalidov, the first deputy chairman of the 
Confederation, told the congress that they would need at least 10 years to form a 
true Caucasian confederation. During that period, a federal treaty should be signed 
with Russia and all North Caucasian republics. Dagestan and Abkhazia should also 
sign a similar treaty. During that period, the Confederation would form its own 
political system and begin to play a role in international politics. Khalidov, in 
addition, stated that the political structure of the Confederation would be “identical 
to that of the common European home”. Due account would be taken of the 
different character of the regions, and in international politics it would act as the 
legal successor to the Mountain Republic which existed in the Caucasus in 1918. In 
case official state structures in Caucasian republics pursued policies contradicting 
the republics’ ‘common interests’; the Confederation might organize acts of civil 
disobedience, and “use other means of political struggle”.518 
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Although the majority of participants defended the first approach, most of 
the leading cadre supported the second, and managed to maintain a moderate line. 
In the final declaration, the Confederation advised all socio-political organizations 
and movements to demand that the leaders of their republics seek real 
independence and, conclude treaties on political, economic and cultural 
cooperation between one another. Moreover, the formation of a joint regional 
security forces run along the lines of the national guard. In the event that the 
leaders of the republics rejected these measures, the Confederation threatened to 
organise peaceful actions of mass protest and civil disobedience to demand that the 
unpopular leadership resign and that elections to republican parliaments be 
organized ahead of schedule. 
After the Congress, Shanibov blamed ‘the third force’ without naming it. 
He went on to say that he appreciated Dudayev’s achievements in reviving national 
consciousness throughout the Caucasus, nevertheless he also stressed, “we are 
unanimous on global issues but somewhat differ on tactics, which manifest itself, 
inter alia, in the approach to the Russian-Caucasian mutual relations.”519 
“Chechnia has today become the flagship of freedom in the region”, he said, but, 
the other 15 peoples within the Confederation should for the time being link their 
future with Russia. 
 
Within the same days, especially after the outbreak of armed conflicts in the 
region Moscow was faced with the question of how to address regional disputes. 
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The Russian Federation Security Council set up a special Inter-regional 
Commission on the North Caucasus which was given the task of looking for ethnic, 
psychological and legal solutions to conflicts arising in the region that threaten 
Russia’s security of state and society.520 In addition to representatives from the 
Russian ministries of security, defence, finance, and economy, the then Russian 
Minister of Justice, Nikolay Fyodorov also took part in the commission as a deputy 
chairman. By this commission Yeltsin wanted a way of dealing with the region 
directly. 
The Security Council’s Committee produced two reports entitled ‘The 
Current Ethno-political Situation in the North Caucasus and the Path Toward its 
Stabilization,’ and ‘The Conception of Russian Nationalities Policy in the North 
Caucasus’. Both of reports singled out ‘national separatism’ on the part of the 
Confederation and the national movements in the republics as the root of all 
problems in the North Caucasus. 
The first report recommended that, instead of working with the new 
political forces such as the Confederation and other national movements, Moscow 
establish alternative organizations in the North Caucasus. The separatist urges of 
the nationalist movements could only be overcome if Moscow concentrated its 
efforts on increasing the popularity of as many pro-Russian socio-political groups 
in the region as possible. 
The second report, which outlined the tenets of Russia’s policy toward the 
region, affirmed that assisting the creation and growth in popularity of pro-Russian 
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oriented social movements was the primary method of tackling national separatism 
in the North Caucasus.521 
These reports and the Confederation’s increasingly anti-Russian stance 
were the turning points for the creation of a succession of regional organizations 
which would be favourably disposed towards Moscow and would provide a 
counter-weight to the Confederation and other national front movements. In this 
Moscow began to use mainly high ranking politicians and bureaucrats from the 
region, like Sergey Shakhray522 and Ramazan Abdulatipov.523 Regional official 
leaders were motivated to establish alternative regional pro-Russian organizations 
aimed primarily at weakening the Confederation 
 
Abdulatipov set up the first of these pro-Russian organizations, even before 
the publication of these reports. In autumn 1991, he convened a congress of the 
Assembly of Peoples of the Caucasus, which was intended to be a direct challenge 
to the Confederation. This Association was based in Moscow with a heavy 
representation of Moscow scholars and peoples from Dagestan. In 1992, this 
Assembly began to publish a magazine in Russian in Moscow, Ekho Kavkaza 
(Echo of the Caucasus) which gave concrete form to the idea of regional 
integration. Nevertheless, the Association failed to become a credible 
counterweight to the Confederation and, instead of drawing support away from the 
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Confederation it was one of the factors that galvanised it into action in 1991 and 
1992.524 
The second major organization was established in January 1993 during a 
regional round table meeting, organised by the Ministry for Nationalities and 
Regional Policy, and the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Nationality 
Policy, in Pyatigorsk and Kislovodsk, with the participation of the republics, of 
various national or ethnic movements and groups in the region. Shakhray and 
Abdullatipov took the lead during these meetings. 
The meeting was the first initiative in the North Caucasus that attempted to 
establish mechanisms for cooperation with the 93 representatives from 37 North 
Caucasian parties, movements and even the regional branches of the Russian 
political parties. This meeting ended with the adoption of a ‘Declaration on the 
Principles of Inter-ethnic Relations in the North Caucasus’. The declaration 
stressed that relations between the ethnic groups and nationalities in the region 
were based on equal rights for all peoples and on respect for the territorial integrity 
of the North Caucasian republics, krais and oblasts within the Russian Federation. 
On the second day of the meeting in Kislovodsk, the leaders of legislative 
and executive power in the region decided to create a North Caucasus Coordinating 
Council made up of representatives of the executive and legislative power. This 
body was to help unite the efforts of the republics and krais to maintain ethnic 
accord in the region, prevent and settle inter-ethnic conflicts and other crisis 
                                                 
524 Fiona Hill, Russia’s Tinderbox, 39. 
  
 
209  
situations in the North Caucasus and also to strengthen the integrity of the Russian 
Federation.525 
 
In line with Security Council’s Committee reports, the second major 
organisation focused on the region. The North Caucasian Democratic Congress, 
was established in Stavropol Krai with the participation of several anti-Dudayev 
groups from Chechnya. This organization was heavily controlled by Sergey 
Shakhray526 and marking a break with the radicalism of Chechnya, a leader of the 
Chechen opposition and former minister of the Soviet Union’s oil industry, 
Salambek Khadzhiev was elected head of the Political Council of the Congress. 
This Congress, as stated by Shakhray, was established to the preserve a 
unified Russian state, Russia’s chief priority in the Caucasus, that was. Thus it was 
intended to replace the Confederation and presented itself as the Confederation’s 
democratic alternative. Therefore, in contrast to the Confederation, the Congress 
professed common democratic priorities and registered with the Russian Federation 
Ministry of Justice.527 
 
Another North Caucasian organisation, the Association of Democratic 
Forces of the North Caucasus, was established in the beginning of April under the 
auspices of Abdullatipov, and registered by the Russian Ministry of Justice. 
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According to the Ministry, the organisation encompassed as collective members, 
eight associations and political parties in the North Caucasus, and had set itself the 
task of bringing together various public and political forces to achieve peace and 
reconciliation in the region and to develop friendship and cooperation there.528 The 
Association’s general-secretary was Schimidt Dzoblayev, and its executive 
committee was located in Moscow. 
 
In addition, Moscow began to be closely interested in the economic 
problems of the North Caucasus republics. Through the Council of Associations of 
Socio-economic Cooperation of the Republics, Territories and Regions in the North 
Caucasus, Moscow implemented a socio-economic development program, which, 
in fact, aimed to control the region and establish a foothold to prevent any kind of a 
separatist activity. 
 
7- The Cossack Factor and the CPC: 
During the October 1992 Congress, the Confederation renamed itself the 
Confederation of the Caucasian Peoples (CCP) (Konfederatsiia Narodov Kavkaza), 
representing a comprehensive and powerful consolidated body of organization, 
comprising mainly Cossacks and other peoples. In Shanibov’s words, this decision 
made this congress a turning point in the history of the entire Caucasus. At this 
very moment, he said, “the Caucasus was facing the acute question: to be or not to 
be”. 
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Initially, membership of the Assembly was restricted to mountaineers and 
native non-Slavic population of the North Caucasus. However, the reputation had 
been growing Confederation in parallel with the size of its member peoples. At last, 
the Confederation opened itself to the Cossacks of the region. By so doing, the 
Confederation’s leadership aimed to change the extremely negative view the 
Russian population of the North Caucasus had of it, and to neutralise Russian 
reservations about its activities. In fact, the Cossacks and other Slavic populations, 
during that period, were among the component parts of the North Caucasus and had 
a lot of power in the region, causing some territorial disputes with other North 
Caucasian groups. 
 
The Cossack revival went back to the period of 1989 and 1990. As Hill 
pointed out, Cossack clubs first began to spring up in the North Caucasus in 1989 
with Kuban Cossack clubs formed in Krasnodar and Don Cossack clubs in 
Stavropol. The first Congress of the Cossacks of the North Caucasus took place in 
December 1991. These clubs focused on ethno-cultural revival, encouraging a dual 
Russian-Cossack identity among the region’s Slavic inhabitants, and promoting 
Cossacks as indigenous inhabitants of the North Caucasus on a par with the non-
Russian “titular nationalities”.529 
Thus, the interests of these Cossack groups’ coincided with those of the 
peoples of the North Caucasus and their clubs inevitably clashed with nationalist 
organisations of the peoples of the North Caucasus. Summer 1992 to winter 1993 
saw the peak of confrontation between the Cossacks and the governments and 
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peoples of the North Caucasian republics. Following the meeting of the Union of 
Cossack Armies of Russia in Moscow in January 1992,  at which Sergey Shakhray 
participated a loose coalition of the Cossacks of Terek, Kuban, Don and Stavropol 
was established. 
In its early period, the Union of Cossacks of South Russia presented itself 
as a direct competitor to the Confederation. It issued demands on the recognition of 
the Cossacks as a repressed people, to the creation of national-territorial formations 
headed by an elected ataman with representation in organs of local governments at 
all levels. In addition, the Union offered to form a Cossack military force to guard 
Russia’s international borders in the region. 
To prevent this revival causing armed clashes with the North Caucasian 
peoples, the Confederation tried to accommodate the Cossacks as an “indigenous 
people” of the region. Then, in early 1993, the renamed Confederation met with 
Cossacks’ representatives to negotiate a cooperation agreement. The first official 
meeting of these groups was held in Pitsunda, Abkhazia on 4-5 April 1993. In this 
conference, the representatives from the Confederation and the Cossacks’ Union of 
the South Russia, decided there was to be roundtables of the Confederation and the 
Cossacks’ Union, with an agreement on different issues ensuing.530 
On 28 April 1993, in Stavropol, the representatives of the Confederation 
and the Cossacks’ Union signed an agreement on the principles of cooperation and 
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mutual assistance.531 This document guarantees collective security in case of the 
danger of the use of force against the Confederation and the Cossacks. 
The agreement proposed cooperation in defending rights and freedoms in 
the region, eliminating the use of force in solving territorial problems, and 
respecting the right of peoples to self-determination, without raising any territorial 
claims on each other. It stressed in particular that neither the roundtables, nor the 
agreement contradict the Russian Federation Treaty or the new principles.532 
 
The conclusion of this agreement was disturbed mainly to the authorities in 
Moscow. While Yeltsin and his cadre were seeking to co-opt the Cossacks against 
the secessionist movements and organizations in the North Caucasus, thıs initiative 
of reconciliation with the well-defined enemy of Moscow’s interests in the region 
provoked Russian interference. In June 1992 Yeltsin issued a decree supporting the 
Cossacks revival movement and the restoration of Cossack economic, cultural and 
patriotic forms of self-governance in the Russian Federation. The decree 
recognized the rights of Cossacks to practice traditional forms of local 
administration and land ownership in areas that would be defined by plebiscite. 
Under the provisions of the decree, Cossacks were to be given grants of land and 
Cossack regiments were to be created by the Ministry of Defence to defend 
international borders and maintain law and order. In March 1993, while the 
Confederation’s leaders were continuing their efforts to establish an alliance with 
                                                 
531 While Yusup Soslambekov and Musa Shanibov were signing the document on behalf of the 
Confederation, Vladimir Gromov, ataman of the all-Kuban host, Petr Fedesov, ataman of the 
Stavropol Krai Union of Cossacks, Pavel Shirminzhinov, ataman of the Union of Cossacks of 
Kalmykia, and Vasiliy Kaledin, ataman of the Don signed the document in the name of the 
Cossacks. However, ataman of the Tersk Starodubtsev refused to sign the agreement. 
  
 
214  
the Union of Cossacks of the Southern Russia, President Yeltsin signed an 
additional decree, ‘on the Reforming of Military Structures, Frontiers and Interior 
Forces on the Territory of the North Caucasian Region and State Support for the 
Cossacks’ that created Cossack units as part of the Russia Federation’s armed 
forces in the North Caucasus. 
This decree was specifically intended to address personnel shortages in the 
Russian forces of the North Caucasus Military District by taking advantage of 
Cossack desires to perform military service. 
Then, following the conclusion of the Confederation-Cossack treaty, the 
Cossack atamans of the region were invited, and travelled to Moscow, when the 
first Congress of the CCP with the participation of the Cossacks, was supposed to 
be convened. Later, the Cossack groups complained about the lack of coordination 
with the Confederation’s leaders on pre-congress materials. In addition, the 
Cossacks began to recall the problems with the Russian speaking population in the 
North Caucasus. 
Thus the agreement signed by the parties had almost no serious positive 
political consequences for either party or for the region. This brought the Cossacks 
and the Russians closer together and resulted in a split within the Confederation. 
The promising relations between the Cossacks and the Confederation during the 
conflict in Abkhazia began to deteriorate. 
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8- Increasing Russian Activity: 
By May 1993, high-ranking Russian officials started to visit the region and 
Moscow introduced new administrative structure. The North Caucasian Military 
District was transformed into a border-adjacent military district.533 By so doing 
Moscow aimed to significantly increasing their military potential in the Region, 
settling troops withdrawn from Germany, the Baltic countries and the 
Transcaucasus there.534 Then, in mid May, Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin 
and Russian Procurator General Valentin Stepankov, in order to attend the meeting 
of the North Caucasian Coordination Council in Nalchik, came to the region. In 
this meeting, Moscow’s anti-Confederation attitude became clearer. Abdulatipov 
said that he was afraid of the Confederation’s “possible plot against Russian 
interests”. In addition, Stepankov noted that his Office had prevented 
“confederation attempts to become a parallel state power” and expressed concern 
over confederation armed units participating in combat operations in Abkhazia.535 
Meanwhile, in June and July, the clashes in Abkhazia re-intensified and the 
rapprochement between Moscow and Tiflis gained momentum. The Confederation 
became one of the most important common subjects of this new system of 
relations. 
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In this period, especially during the second half of 1992 and the early 
months of 1993, Georgians intended to control the ethnic groups within Georgia 
and Shevardnadze was trying to strengthen his post. 
Throughout late 1992, Shevardnadze tried to get the Russian authorities to 
act against the Confederation. Georgian authorities accused Russia of failing to 
stop the activities of the Confederation. In his critiques, Shevardnadze always 
stated that if resolute measures were not taken, the anti-Georgian decisions and 
activities of the Confederation may involve other countries, especially Russia, and 
the events in Abkhazia may grow from local conflicts into a global 
confrontation.536 
He analysed the Confederation and described the its actions as 
“international terrorism reeking of fascism.” In addition, the Georgian authorities 
had always described Confederation volunteers from the North Caucasus as 
‘mercenaries’. 
 
In a Conference of the leaders of the administrative bodies and heads of the 
executive powers of the North Caucasus and southern Russia in Sochi on 13 July 
1993, regional security and conflicts were discussed. The most important names 
related with the Caucasus also took part: Andrey Kozyrev, the Russian Foreign 
Minister; Sergey Shakhray, Deputy Premier; Ramazan Abdulatipov, Deputy 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet; Viktor Barannikov, the Security Minister; and 
Boris Pastukhov, the Russian President’s special representative for the settlement 
of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. 
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At the end of the congress, the participants for the first time declared that 
they almost unanimously agreed that cooperation between Russian Federal bodies 
and the Confederation was impossible.537 
Under these circumstances, the Georgian authorities ‘earnestly requested’ 
that the Procurator General of the Russian Federation should consider the issue of 
the lawfulness of the activities of the Confederation with reference to its 
interference in the internal affairs of Georgia. The increasing role of the Chechens 
in the Confederation during this period did not benefit the Confederation. As a 
result of Georgian pressure the Russian authorities restarted discussions on the 
status of the Confederation. 
The most striking accusation of the Russian authorities was that the 
Confederation was not registered with the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Justice. 
In fact, the leaders of the Confederation had already put this issue on its agenda 
during the its parliamentary sitting on 26 November 1993 in Grozny. After bitter 
discussions they concluded that it was impossible, either for political or 
psychological reasons. This would result in, according to the leaders of the 
Confederation, the isolation of the Abkhazian from all the other peoples of the 
North Caucasus.538 Soslambekov said; 
“I personally am against it. Russia in my opinion should recognize the KNK 
[Confederation] a union of peoples of North Caucasus. After this, like 
Palestine for example, we could have our representative at the United 
Nations. …Russia must determine what is more important to it –the 
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personal ambitions of the politicians or stability in the south of the 
country.”539 
 
Because of the complete disarray of the federal policy owing to the 
deepening conflict between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, the 
situation in the North Caucasus remained relatively quiet and a decision on the 
Confederation was postponed. After the October crisis in Moscow, Yeltsin pushed 
forward his own version of the constitution and organized a referendum on 12 
December. Aware of the initial disturbances after the Federal Treaty of 1992, the 
chapters dealing with the delimitation of powers in the Russian constitution were 
rewritten and resubmitted to the republics and regions for approval prior to the 
referendum. The Confederation, as in earlier referenda, opposed the new draft 
constitution. In November, it appealed to the peoples of the North Caucasus to vote 
against the Constitution as it alleged that the article on the private ownership of 
land contained prerequisites for eliminating the traditional lifestyle of Russia’s 
people.540 
 
Before the referendum, Yeltsin with his team or the heads of the top 
Russian federal ministries and governmental departments visited the North 
Caucasus on 6-7 December, campaigning for the new constitution. During his visit, 
he attended a conference of all North Caucasian republican leaders in Nalchik and 
promised them more attention to their problems, which in essence meant more 
donations from the state budget. And, announced that on the day after the 
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referendum, and elections to the Federal assembly, a decree of the Russian 
President on the settlement of the long, protracted and tragic conflicts would be 
published.541 
Despite the words of support from the official leaders of the region, a 
number of republics that had initially signed the Federal Treaty, including Adygea, 
Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkess now rejected the constitution on the grounds that 
it violated the original provisions of the Treaty. Moreover, elections that were held 
at the same time as the referendum resulted in significant success for the Russian 
radical nationalists and communists. From then on, a new phase for the Russian 
Federation and of course for the Confederation began. 
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CHAPTER V 
REGIONAL DISPUTES AND THE CONFEDERATION 
 
In order to understand the Confederation’s growing influence among the 
peoples of the North Caucasus, the conversion of the regional problems from 
discord to military clash and the response of the Confederation to these clashes 
should be analyzed in detail. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North 
Caucasus faced with several ethnically based clashes primarily in 1992 and 1993. 
These clashes determined the Confederations rise and fall. 
In this context, while the organization was functioning under the title of 
Assembly, the dispute between the Chechens of Dagestan, named as Chechen-
Akkintsy (or Auxhovs) and Laks emerged as the first test to understand its power 
over the peoples of the North Caucasus. 
When the Chechens were deported from their lands in what was taken 
Eastern Chechnya, the territory forming the Aukhovsky district was given to 
Dagestan. The Laks were forcibly settled with the loss of 2,500 lives to the lands 
left by the Chechens and this region renamed as Novolaksky. After the return of 
these Chechens from deportation, they claimed the rehabilitation and asked for the 
resettlement to their lands of pre-deportation period. As early as 1989, the clashes 
erupted and the Chechens attacked to the tent-city of Laks settled near the village 
of Leninaul and Laks reacted quickly together with Avars. 
The Assembly took this issue into its agenda and Shanibov issued a call to 
the parties to prevent the clashes. In this call the Assembly was giving the massage 
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to the parties that “who will open the fire to its brothers first, would be damned 
eternally by the peoples of the Caucasus”.542 The clashing parties took this call 
seriously and the commission for settling the problem established with the 
participation of the representatives from the Dagestani government. By the work of 
this commission and by the help of the April 1991 law on the rehabilitation of 
repressed peoples, the solution was found to the conflict. The Laks, in a rare 
concession, agreed to resettle elsewhere in Dagestan, and the funding for their new 
homes was to come from the central government.543 This was accepted by the 
Assembly and its leaders as the first real success of the Assembly on solving the 
problems in the region without participation of outside powers. 
 
In November 1991, when the Assembly converted itself to Confederation, 
one of its constituent members, the Chechens declared the independence of the 
Chechen Republic. In response, Yeltsin imposed state of emergency in Chechnya 
with a decree and decided to send Russian troops to Chechnya on 9 November. 
This was the first serious threat to a well being of newly established 
Confederation. Therefore, in order to discuss the situation, the Confederation’s 
Parliament, and Presidential Council together with the Chechen Parliament met in 
Grozny on 9 November. In this meeting, Confederation declared that territories of 
the North Caucasus and Chechnya the combat area and decided to recruit 
volunteers on the territory of the North Caucasus to show Confederation’s support 
                                                 
542 Şenıbe, Birliğin Zaferi, 35. 
543 Svante E. Cornell, 2001. Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in 
the Caucasus, Surrey: 278. 
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to Chechens. Furthermore, a committee comprised of the representatives of the 
confederate members was formed and sent to Moscow.544 
The Russian Parliament, however, annulled the Yeltsin’s decree and lifted 
the state of emergency. This was increased the popularity of Dudayev, and 
Confederation’s leaders accepted it as the first victory of Confederation. 
 
Nevertheless from then on, the Confederation had always been faced with 
several conflicts, some of which were between the member peoples, namely the 
Ingush-Osetian conflict. However, from its initial phase, the Assembly’s and the 
Confederation’s main rival that defined as ‘ugly force’ in the region was Georgia. 
Georgian nationalism and expansionism were the main stimuli behind the 
establishment of the organization. 
The first nationalist movements that aimed at independence in the Caucasus 
were emerged in Georgia. Giorgi Chanturia’s National Democratic Party and Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia and Irakli Tsereteli’s Society of St. Ilia the Righteous were formed 
as loose alliances as early as in 1988 and targeted the Communist regime. These 
two movements shared the common feature and rather than advocating a cultural 
program, they were outright separatists, and rejected other ethnic groups living on 
the territories of Georgian SSR: the Abkhaz and South Osetians. 
The relations between the Confederation and Georgia thus had never been 
in friendly manner. As Otyrba put it out, with the conflict that broke out in South 
Osetia in 1990 and the beginning of war in Abkhazia in August 1992, it became 
clear that ethnic conflicts were indispensable elements of Georgian policy. The 
                                                 
544 Şenıbe, Birliğin Zaferi, 42. 
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conflict in Abkhazia would give Tiflis an opportunity to consolidate the Georgian 
nation while sparing Shevardnadze the risk of confrontation with the Abkhaz and 
Osetian armed groups.545. Nevertheless this policy brought disastrous results to 
Georgia and a process of consolidation among the national minorities against this 
new imperial power in the Caucasus began. 
 
Georgia’s problems with the Abkhaz and Osetians started as early as in 
1989, following the law strengthening the position of the Georgian language in the 
entire territory of Georgia was introduced. In this period, the Assembly, as 
Shanibov pointed out, from its early days faced with the ‘multifaceted evil’, i.e. 
Georgia, which was standing on the way of the rapprochement between the peoples 
of the North Caucasus. This made South Osetia and Abkhazia as the main 
playgrounds of the Confederation. 
 
1- The Georgian-South Osetian Conflict: 546 
Georgians regarded Osetians as relative newcomers to Georgian land and 
this made the Osetian claims worthless on the eyes of Georgians. Thus in that 
period, even the term ‘South Osetia’ has been wiped out of Georgian publications 
and replaced with Samechablo547, Shida Kartli (inner Kartli) or, later the Tskhinval 
                                                 
545 Otyrba, “War in Abkhazia,” 291-292. 
546 The best accounts of the Georgian-South Osetian conflict are Julian Birch’s articles: “Osetia: a 
Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm,” Central Asian Survey, 14(1): 43-74; “The Georgian/South 
Osetian territorial and boundary dispute,” in John Wright et al. Eds., 1996. Transcaucasian 
Boundaries, London, and “Osetiya –land of uncertain frontiers and manipulative elites,” Central 
Asian Survey, 18(4): 501-534. In addition see, B. Çoçiev (Chochiev)-M. Dzoev, eds., 1996. Güney 
Osetya 1988-1992: Gürcü Saldırıları-Tutanaklar, İstanbul. Nart Yayıncılık. 
547 It means, “land of the Machabelli” from the name of the Georgian feudal family, which allegedly 
ruled it. 
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region.548 In response, while the clashes between the Abkhaz and Georgians was on 
going in spring 1989, the nationalist leaders of South Osetia already established 
their own popular national movement Ademon Nykhas (Popular Shrine)549 and 
addressed an open letter to the Abkhaz in which they were supporting the 
secessionist claims. 
Then the Georgian parliament and government went on to take potentially 
discriminatory measures in September and November 1989 to make Russian and 
Georgian the official languages in South Osetia and to strengthen the position of 
the Georgian language within the would-be new republic. South Osetian authorities 
responded with a proposal giving equal status to Russian, Osetian, and Georgian in 
their oblast. Then, at the end of the month the oblast Soviet instituted Osetian as an 
official language in the region. This clearly marks the fact that September was the 
month in which the open clashes escalated. 
 
The real breaking point for the relations was the Georgian Supreme Soviet’s 
adoption of an election law banning the regional parties from running for the 
elections to the Georgian parliament in August 1990. South Osetian Supreme 
Soviet countered this move by upgrading its status unilaterally and proclaimed the 
establishment of independent South Osetian Soviet Democratic Republic on 20 
                                                 
548 Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts,” 43. 
549 This movement was founded in January 1989 under the chairmanship of Alan Chochiev. The 
leadership cadre, including Zora Abayeva and Kshar Djingkaev, were intent on secession from 
Georgia, to form a republic within or as a united Osetian republic, together with the North Osetia. 
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September 1990. The Georgian Supreme Soviet immediately revoked the decision 
on 21 September.550 
Nevertheless, the South Osetians continued to reject the policies of the 
Georgian government and on 16 October 1990, created an executive committee and 
called for the elections. The upcoming Georgian elections, however, distracted the 
Georgian leadership from dealing with the South Osetia instantly. 
The elections to the newly established South Osetian Republic’ Supreme 
Soviet held on 9 December 1990551 and as a counter move the Supreme Soviet of 
Georgia adopted a law abolishing the South Osetian autonomy two days later, on 
11 December. This counter-move provoked a justified negative reaction on the part 
of South Osetians. These Georgian attitudes perceived by South Osetians as a 
threat. They openly turned their face to Moscow and asked for a help to stop the 
Georgian aggression. In response, Gorbachev ordered the removal of the Georgian 
troops from South Osetia on 7 January 1991 and sent tanks to the area. In addition, 
the participation of the South Osetia to the all-Union referendum in March 1991 
and overwhelming vote for it made the relations more tense in the middle of the 
1991. 
In May 1991, surprisingly, South Osetians took a step back in and vote for 
abolishing their new Republic, restating it to an autonomous oblast, but now under 
the jurisdiction of Russian Federation. Meanwhile, during the mid-1991, the 
Georgian forces laid siege to Tskhinval for months and bombarded the city with 
artillery to force the population to flee. 
                                                 
550 Felix Corley, “South Osetia between Gamsakhurdia and Gorbachev: 3 documents,” Central 
Asian Survey, 16(2): 271. 
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On 28 November 1991, the South Osetian Soviet declared the area a 
republic and part of the Russian Federation. Then, on 22 December to gain 
recognition from former Union republics in the new circumstances of the 
collapsing USSR, it declared the independence of the South Osetian Republic. This 
declaration approved by the population in a referendum on 19 January 1992. An 
overwhelming 97% voted in favour of an independent South Osetia as a part of 
Russian Federation. 
In response, the new Georgian regime led by Eduard Shevardnadze initially 
seemed to adopt a more conciliatory stance vis-a-vis South Osetia. Nevertheless, 
the Osetian leadership refused to enter into negotiations until Shevardnadze pulled 
Georgian troops out of the region and lifted the blockade. 
 
At that stage, two important factors intervened the situation and changed 
the balance of power to the Osetians. The first factor was the North Osetia. North 
Osetians, by using the Russian card tried to pressure Georgians to stop the 
aggression towards the South Osetians. Especially, following the brake of 
temporary cease-fire on 13 May, all the political contact was broken off and North 
Osetia cut the pipeline supplying Georgia with Russian gas.552 A new cease-fire in 
early June again broke-down within a few days 
 
The other factor was the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the 
Caucasus. When the Georgian aggression was in its height, the representatives of 
                                                                                                                                       
551 According to the figures of the elections’ organizers, 71% of voters took part and 64 deputies 
were elected to the planned 75 seats. See Corley, ibid. p. 271. 
  
 
227  
the popular front movements in both North and South Osetia applied to join the 
Assembly of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus in March 1990 and then 
became the founding members of the Confederation. 
The Confederation officially took the South Osetian issue in its agenda at 
the 5th session of its Parliament on 27 February 1992 in Grozny. The parliament 
adopted a document in which it accused Georgia by attempting to play the South 
Osetian option against the Abkhaz people. In order to protect the honour and virtue 
of the Caucasian people against this attempt, Confederation’s Presidential Council 
and the Parliament warned Georgia to stop its aggressive actions towards the South 
Osetians and intimidated to announce general mobilization to send the North 
Caucasian volunteers to Abkhazia.553 
Then the South Osetian issue became one of the most important problems 
of the Confederation and in each session Presidential Council and the Parliament 
took the issue in detail. During the sixth session of the Parliament that was held on 
21-22 March 1992 in Vladikavkaz, the issue of the situation in South Osetia and 
the ways of stabilizing the situation in the armed conflict zone have been specially 
submitted for examination at the session. A parliamentary committee was set up 
and instructed to hold talks with authorized representatives of the provisional 
government of the Republic of Georgia and the full representatives of the South 
Osetia on the settlement of Osetian-Georgian relations.554 
 
                                                                                                                                       
552 “North Osetia imposes blockade of Georgia. Armenia badly affected,” SWB SU/1392, B/7-9, 28 
May 1992. 
553 “Caucasian Parliament threatens Military intervention in Abkhazia,” SWB SU/1319, B/5-6, 3 
March 1992. 
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Nevertheless, because of the intensification of the clashes, instead of 
continuing negotiations, the Confederation focused on the military solutions. 
Shanibov defined the South Osetia as an ‘open wound’ of the Confederation and he 
stressed that the seventh session of the Confederation in Tskhinval put forward 
concrete proposals. Among them the most concrete one was the decision to send 
the troops to the South Osetia.555 The Confederation threatened to intervene 
militarily if there was not an end to the genocide against the peoples of the 
Confederation by the Georgians. With this threat Confederation’s leaders were 
intended to sit the Georgians on the negotiation table. In line with that, Shanibov 
declared his inclination for meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze to stop the 
fratricidal war immediately. Moreover he pointed that the “confederation’s aim in 
this area of the Caucasus is to put an end to the carnage and move the conflict onto 
the level of political decisions. Our military presence there can be justified on 
condition that the CIS troops are withdrawn from there.”556 
 
Shanibov’s suggestion to the South Osetian-Georgian dispute was the 
military presence of the Confederation troops as the peacekeeping forces. Because 
“the confederation’s authority among the peoples of the North Caucasus was 
extremely high.” At the end of the May, Confederation’s Parliament and the 
Presidential Council held common session in Makhachkale. In that session, in order 
to prevent the annihilation of the South Osetians, the Confederation decided to take 
                                                                                                                                       
554 See “Confederation of Mountain Peoples’ Parliament meets in Vladikavkaz,” SWB SU/1338 B/6, 
25 March 1992 and RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, 3 April 1992, 75. 
555 SWB SU/1370, B/13, 3 May 1992. 
556 “Confederation of Mountain Peoples ready to intervene in South Osetia,” SWB SU/1371, B/7-8, 4 
May 1992. 
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more radical measures and Shanibov issued a call to Georgian and Russian 
leaderships and peoples. In this call Georgian Presidential Council was urged to 
stop the military aggression against the South Osetian peoples within ten days 
period. If not, the Confederation with its entire means would help the South 
Osetia.557 
 
Meanwhile the South Osetian Prime Minister, Oleg Teziyev arrested in 
Vladikavkaz on 12 June 1992 for organizing the attack in which four died, because 
the guns from the raid being found in his car. South Osetian armed detachment 
leaders thereupon threatened to divert forces from the defense of Tskhinval to 
Vladikavkaz to release their leader. In the face of this, the North Osetian Supreme 
Soviet Chairman Galazov, with the consent of the Russian Prosecutor General had 
Teziyev released. 
As a result of these developments, the Russian Supreme Soviet declared a 
state of emergency in Vladikavkaz and parts of the North Osetian territory on 12 
June, and the following day special troops from Nizhny Novgorod and the interior 
ministry troops from Moscow airlifted into the area to restore the calm. 
Under this atmosphere, at the end of the 10-day period, Musa Shanibov 
with a platoon of the Confederation’s Abkhazian battalion arrived in Vladikavkaz 
on 13 June 1992558 by the intend to help the Tskhinval’s defenders. Commenting 
on the action, Shanibov said “if the presence of the Confederation’s soldiers in 
                                                 
557 Şenıbe, ibid., pp.49-52. 
558 “Peace-keepers arrive in Vladikavkaz,” SWB SU/1409, B/4, 17 June 1992. 
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South Osetia does not stop Georgia and the battalion suffers casualties, Georgia 
would automatically find itself at war with the entire Caucasus.”559 
In Vladikavkaz, Shanibov made talks with Akhsarbek Galazov, the 
chairman of the North Osetian Parliament and General G. Kantemirov, South 
Osetian Foreign Minister and informed them about the mission of the 
Confederation and the platoon. Galazov, however refused to allow the 
Confederation’s troops’ passage to South Osetia by asserting that such a step would 
be fraught with unforeseeable consequences, including war throughout the 
Caucasus.560 Torez Kulumbekov also rejected the presence of the Confederation’s 
troops in Tskhinval and then Shanibov took the platoon to Nalchik after two days 
period of stay in Vladikavkaz on 15 June. 
 
On 22 June 1992, Galazov felt it necessary to call upon Yeltsin to send 
troops to help South Osetia win its independence from Georgia and unification 
with North Osetia. The North, it was proclaimed was itself ready to mobilize all 
adult males to defend those in the South Osetia if required to do so. The gravity of 
the situation and the possible escalation of this hitherto localized conflict to a 
Caucasian war positing Georgia against Russia was instrumental in engineering a 
rapprochement between Shevardnadze and Yeltsin. Thus on 22 June 1992, Yeltsin 
contacted Shevardnadze and the two “outside powers” agreed to meet to discuss 
Osetia in Dagomys, Sochi. During the talks the Russian and the Georgian leaders 
agreed upon a number of general principles as well as some more concrete 
                                                 
559 “Mountain Peoples’ troops unwelcome in Vladikavkaz,” SWB SU/1410 B/3, 18 June 1992. 
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specifics. Among the decisions was a cease-fire to be effective as of 28 June; 
withdrawal of Georgian troops from around Tskhinval; the setting up of a special 
control committee; and the deployment of a peacekeeping force composed of 
Russian, Georgian and Osetian troops was set up.561 
The agreement that signed in Dagomys in fact did not satisfy both of the 
conflicting parties. With the words of the Uryzmag Dzhiayev, the South Osetian 
Foreign Minister, the outside powers were “married us [Georgians and Osetians] in 
our absence”. The basic reason of the Osetian uneasiness was the deployment of 
the Georgian troops in South Osetia as a peacekeeping forces. Therefore, Dzhiayev 
added that, “we are pinning our hopes on Russia, but if no effect is forthcoming on 
its part, the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus could be such a 
force”.562 
 
The last meeting of the Confederation related with the Osetian-Georgian 
conflict was held in Ingushetian town Jeyrakh on 29 June. At the end of the 
Parliament’s sitting, Shanibov issued a statement on the Dagomys agreement, on an 
outline peace plan for the Georgian-Osetian conflict, and on the latest events in the 
region.563 He expressed Confederation’s concern that the armed confrontation 
could lead to a deterioration of the situation throughout the Caucasus. And the 
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Confederation’s most concrete solution was deploying the Confederation’s troops 
in peacekeeping role in South Osetia. 
 
Despite the Confederation’s belief of its success, after the Dagomys 
agreement, a relatively benign atmosphere facilitated between the Osetians and 
Georgians and of corse Russians. Especially by the beginning of the Abkhaz 
conflict this process gained momentum and the links between the Osetians and the 
Confederation gradually weakened. The conflict between the Osetians and the 
Ingush then strengthened this split and from the end of 1992, “historical strains in 
the relationship between the Osetians and the peoples of the North Caucasus come 
to the fore”.564 In other words, by the Russian intervention to the conflict and the 
Osetian preference towards Moscow evaporated the mood of cooperation and unity 
of the period of 1989-1991. Nevertheless, the Georgians attacked to Abkhazia and 
the relatively calm situation in the South Osetia forced the Confederation to turn its 
all activities to Abkhazia. 
 
2- The Ingush-Osetian Problem:565 
The basic reason of the clashes between the Ingush and the Osetians, the 
only incidence of large-scale inter-communal violence within the Russian 
Federation, was the dispute over the question of who should control the 
                                                 
564 Jonathan Aves, 1996. Georgia from Chaos to Stability? London: n.p., 35. 
565 For the detailed account see, Olga Osipova, 1997. “North Osetia and Ingushetia: The First 
Clash,” in Alexei Arbatov and et al. Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and 
American Perspectives, Cambridge: 27-82; Julian Birch, “Osetia: a Caucasian Bosnia in 
Microcosm,” Central Asian Survey, 14(1): 52-68; and “Osetiya –land of Uncertain Frontiers and 
Manipulative Elites,” Central Asian Survey, 18(4): 512-528; Felix Corley, 1994. “The Ingush-
Osetian Conflict,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September, 401-403.  
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Prigorodnyi rayon and the east of the Vladikavkaz in the North Osetian republic –
the Ingush or the Osetians. 
Of the two peoples, by the Caucasian standards, the ancestors of the Ingush 
certainly earlier inhabited the North Caucasus, long predating the arrival of the 
Osetians. The latter arrived in the northern part of Osetia in around the 6th century 
AD. Both of these peoples also divergent from the religious side; the Ingush were 
converted to Islam in the course of the 1860s, while the Osetians, to a considerable 
extent converted to Christianity under the Russian influence, though there have 
been a significant number of Muslim Osetians. Nevertheless, despite the existence 
of the tensions, the emergence of clashes between these peoples was relatively new. 
It basically was a result of the repeated recurving of boundaries in compliance with 
the Soviet divide-and-rule policy. Beyond that, the absence of clear and effective 
political structures and the general stability caused the intensification. 
After 13 years of exile, the Ingush were rehabilitated in 1957 by the decree 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR after the death of Stalin and 
the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was reinstated but the Prigorodnyi was 
not included in the restored territory. However, some returnees went back to their 
houses in Prigorodnyi only to find their lands and houses occupied by Osetians and 
others; the scenario for the future conflicts was thus prepared. A series of protests 
by the Ingush throughout 1970s and 1980s were met by the Osetians with both 
officially sponsored and unofficial countermeasures in areas such as housing 
allocation on jobs, as well as periodic curfews when small scale clashes occurred. 
When the Supreme Soviet of the SU adopted the decree “On the 
Recognition as Illegal and Criminal of All Acts Against the Peoples who have 
  
 
234  
Suffered Forced Resettlement, and on Safeguarding their Rights” in November 
1989, the Ingush had already revealed their demands by several occasions.566 Later 
on, in late March 1990, as a response to those Ingush claims, the Soviet of 
Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet set up a commission, called Belyakov 
Commission, in order to investigate the claims of the Ingush for the land. Nine 
months later, it concluded that the Ingush claim was well founded, and that the 
Prigorodnyi ought to be restored to the Chechen-Ingush ASSR from the North 
Osetian ASSR. It also requested the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR to take the 
matter on its agenda.567 
 
During 1990 and 1991, however, the situation became more complex. In the 
first place a split emerged between the Chechens and the Ingush. While Chechens 
were moving towards independence, the Ingush were still looking at Moscow for 
support in the conflict with the Osetians. Nevertheless, the growing weakness of 
the central government in Moscow and its apparent inability to stop the riot only 
complicated this dangerous situation. 
                                                 
566 In the course of 1988 and 1989, Ingush population via a powerful socio-political movement 
called Niiskho (Justice) that was based on national traditions and supported by the clergy and the 
Council of Elders –the heads of the clans (teips)- activated social mobilization among the Ingush. 
“…Niiskho called the first Congress of the Ingush people and made an appeal to the Central 
Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government to partition the Chechen-Ingushetian Republic 
and restore the Ingushetian Republic to its 1924-34 boundaries, which would include the Malgobek, 
Nazran, Sunzha, and Prigorodnyi districts. In addition to that, the Ingush collected some 60.000 
signatures on petitions in support of Ingush autonomy, and on 29 May 1989 an Ingush deputy to the 
Congress of People’s Deputies in Moscow similarly declared out essential to their culture and 
economic development.” In September 1989, a second Ingush congress in Grozny, also took up this 
appeal once more and reaffirmed that the Prigorodnyi was an unalienable part of Ingushetia, while 
advocating the re-establishment of a separate Ingush territorial entity, apart from the Chechen-
Ingush ASSR. 
567 See Cornell Small Nations, 412 and Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts,” 63. 
  
 
235  
Further clashes occurred in March and April 1991, when the armed Ingush 
tried to take over Osetians’ houses in Prigorodnyi. In response, the North Osetian 
Supreme Soviet declared a state of emergency in the district and instituted a 
curfew, document checks, confiscation of illegal weapons and the demolition of 
dwellings built illegally by the Ingush who did not have residence permits 
(propiska) in mid-April. 
Nevertheless, the Russian Supreme Soviet’s “Law on the Rehabilitation of 
Peoples Subjected to Repression” dated 26 April 1991 gave a new departure point 
for the Ingush for insisting their claims on a legal basis. The Ingush deputies to the 
Supreme Soviet were among those who lobbied heavily for the law, the Osetian 
deputies seldom attended the sittings and failed to take part in the debate. From 
then on, the Ingush justified their claims to Prigorodnyi by articles 3 and 6. Article 
6 indicated that former territories of the peoples involved would be restored. 
During a visit to the area in September 1991, Yeltsin also hinted Russian support to 
the Ingush territorial claims. Moreover, the Ingush in order to secure Russian 
support, complied with the Russian desire and did not take part in the Chechen-
Ingush Republic’s elections. In contrast to the Chechen declaration of 
independence, they held their own referendum in November 1991 and 
overwhelmingly supported the establishment of a separate Ingush Republic within 
the Russian Federation including the Prigorodnyi. 
While the Ingush received some encouragement from these developments, 
the North Osetians acted to protect their own interests by imposing state of 
emergency in December 1991, following an Ingush attack on a special police unit. 
This situation was to remain unaltered right up to the events of October 1992. In 
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October, they also took advantage of the Ingush weakness and created a National 
Guard of around 5,000 men, equipped with 20 armoured vehicles. 
 
3- The Conflict and the Confederation: 
The Ingush were among the founding members of the Assembly, but they 
did not take part in the establishment of the Confederation. In contrast, the Osetians 
were the founding members of the Confederation. The Confederation’s role has 
been minor in this conflict, however it is important to note that, it could actually 
have been used as an institutional framework to find a solution to the Prigorodnyi 
conflict, as Russian mediation was unlikely to be objective and disinterested. As it 
is pointed out by Cornell, the Confederation set up a committee to find a solution to 
the conflict and also proposed replacing the Russian peacekeeping forces with a 
joint North Caucasian force, an idea that has been favourably viewed by most 
North Caucasians, and indeed by the Ingush. Although the North Osetian side may 
prefer Russian mediation or rather no mediation at all, given the fact that it was the 
only Christian member of the organization and the closest to Russia, the 
Confederation was an option that was understood in the quest for a resolution.568 
 
The Assembly and later the Confederation, closely interested in the events 
in Ingushetia and the clashes between its member peoples. Following the Ingush 
referendum and the increasing tensions with possibility of armed clashes, the 
Confederation in its parliamentary meeting called for a moratorium on 15 
December 1991. With this moratorium the Confederation proposed a peaceful 
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solution to the dispute with the support of the Ingush and Osetians. The 
Confederation, later repeated this call once more on 28 February 1992 in Grozny. 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was collapsed, and throughout the early months of 
1992, the war of words between the North Osetia and the Ingush escalated without 
any larger disturbances. 
 
On 4 June 1992 the Ingush Republic was founded by a Russian Supreme 
Soviet decree which was to consist of three rural districts -Nazran, Malgobek, and 
Sunzha- with no defined borders, and no state institutions or administrative bodies 
of any kind. The sole decision-making authority rested with President Yeltsin’s 
representative in the republic, Isa Kostoyev, a former official in the Russian 
Procurator General’s Office. With this decree the transitional phase ranging until 
March 1994 was proposed to resolve all the questions related to it, including 
administrative issues but mainly its territorial delimitation. In a meeting in Nazran, 
the Ingush, including the representatives from Prigorodnyi, welcomed the new law, 
but declared that any such republic without Prigorodnyi would be unacceptable, 
and called for a congress of the Ingush people. In that power vacuum, the rural 
councils and tribal leadership played a symbolic role early on and to some degree 
filled in the gaps left by the absence of government structures. Nevertheless, the 
other group with any real authority in Ingush Republic at the time of the republic’s 
creation was religious organizations.569 
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In the meantime, the Confederation was still working on the issue and in 
order to discuss the developments in the North Osetia, the Parliament and the 
Presidential Council called a meeting in the town of Jeyrakh, in a mountain region 
of Ingushetia.570 
In this meeting, the Confederation offered the sides of the conflict taking a 
decision, which excludes the use of force on the solution of the land dispute. As a 
result, the solution to the problem of the partition of the disputed lands would be 
postponed and the eruption of the military confrontation (by the active participation 
of the Russians) would be obstructed for a time. On this way, the representatives 
from North Osetia, by the approval of the President of the North Osetian Supreme 
Soviet, put forward a package of proposals that was met with, after the intensive 
pressures from the Confederation, understanding by the Ingush side.571 
According to the proposals, the North Osetian Supreme Soviet and the 
government would prepare for the return of Ingush people who lived on the 
republic’s territory prior to their eviction in 1944 to their homes. The names of the 
settlements would reinstitute as they were in the pre-deportation period. The homes 
that were occupied by the Osetians or the representatives of other peoples at that 
time would be given back to the Ingush people. And, these peoples would pay 
compensation and give help to built shelters in any other region, at their own 
discretion, or they will be granted flats. The cemeteries belong to the Ingush that 
were damaged will be restored. North Osetia was prepared to help with the 
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publication of newspapers in the Ingush language and with the transmission of 
signals from the television station in Grozny. 
The main thing –once the state bodies of Ingush republic would set up, the 
Osetian side was ready to sit down at the negotiating table with official 
representatives of the authorities of Ingushetia to resolve territorial disputes. In 
order not to waste any time, the Confederation Parliament proposed convocation of 
urgent meeting, with the participation of legal and political experts and 
representatives of the elders and socio-political movements of the peoples 
concerned.572 
However, the difficulties in resolving the question of territorial 
rehabilitation for the Ingush soon became clear, and once again, as a result of “the 
active Russian participation” the Osetian side violated the agreement.573 On 3 July 
1992, the Russian Supreme Soviet announced a moratorium on raising the 
territorial problems until 1995, and criminal penalties were established for any 
unauthorised changes in territorial borders.574 
In the case of Ingush, this understood as move to prevent elections within a 
defined territory for the new autonomous republic’s parliament and thus prevented 
the setting up of both legislative and administrative structures. Thus, the 
provisional administration of the Russian parliament, under plenipotentiary 
representative General Viktor Yermakov was to remain in July 1992 up to the 
outbreak of the conflict in October. 
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By October 1992, the two sides were ready to clash. The Ingush centered 
their emphasis on two aspects: in the first place that the North Osetia had ignored 
the law on the rehabilitation of deported peoples by their restrictions on the 
registration of Ingush as permanent residents; by their bans on the buying and 
selling of houses; and by their imposition of repressive states of emergency in both 
Prigorodnyi and Malgobeksky rayons. They had also another new grievance: 
Osetian ignorance of the law on creation of an Ingush republic within the Russian 
Federation. 
The North Osetians had their own emphasis, in direct contrast to Ingush. 
They claimed that the Ingush had been stockpiling weapons in preparation for an 
armed confrontations; that their sovereign territory was not merely threatened from 
within by Ingush resettlers but likely to be attacked from without, i.e. from Ingush. 
As tensions rose between two communities, Osetians began to flee from 
Prigorodnyi to Vladikavkaz and Ingush to Ingushetia. The scene was thus set for 
tragedy. 
 
In October the clashes erupted. On 20 October 1992, a gas pipeline passing 
through the Prigorodnyi was blown up and an armoured personnel carrier of the 
Osetian militia crushed 12 year-old Ingush girl. During the same period, several 
Ingush were killed on the territory of North Osetia. On 23 October, crossfire 
between the Ingush and Osetian militia in the village of Yuzhnyi was the beginning 
of the intensive armed clashes. Then, a committee for directing the region, named 
as the Ingush Coordinating Council, formed in Prigorodnyi and decided to organize 
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self-defense units to patrol Ingush settlements on 24 October. Coordinating Council 
appealed to the Caucasian peoples and to the Confederation with a request for 
assistance in attaining the immediate return of Prigorodnyi rayon to Ingushetia.575 
The North Osetian leadership interpreted the creation of this body as an 
encroachment on the republic’s legitimate authority and the attempts at talks 
between the two sides quickly broke down and matters went from bad to worse. 
On 26 October 1992, the Russian Parliament’s leadership recommended a 
mixed Osetian-Ingush committee to work out a negotiated solution to the crisis, 
and Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov sent a telegram to the 
North Osetian authorities asking them not to use force. Similar telegrams arrived in 
Vladikavkaz from all North Caucasian republics and the Confederation.576 
 
Talks between the Coordinating Council, representatives of the 
administration from Nazran and the leadership of North Osetia did not prevent the 
explosion. It was then that the conflict moved into its acute phase. After a mass 
meeting was staged in Nazran, which initiated a more or less spontaneous armed 
march on the Prigorodnyi, the Ingush subsequently took control of most of the 
Prigorodnyi, and marched on Vladikavkaz.577  
On 31 October 1992, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Georgi Khizha (at the 
same time he was the head of the inter-regional commission of the Russian 
Federation) with around 3,000 Russian special purpose troops went to Vladikavkaz 
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in order to “restore law and order”.578 A state of emergency was introduced on the 
territories of the North Osetian Republic and Ingushetia and a decree was issued by 
President Yeltsin to enforce the actions of the troops on 2 November.579 More than 
that, with that decree Russian government set up a special interim administration 
for those districts and headquartered it in Vladikavkaz. Georgi Khizha was 
appointed head of this interim administration.580 The Russian “peace-forces” did 
not stop at controlling the Prigorodnyi. Within a few days, they moved into Ingush 
proper, and by 10 November they had reached the (still undemarcated) border 
between Chechnya and Ingushetia.581 
 
While the clashes between the component parts of the Confederation were 
on going, the Confederation has also been practicing a crucial transformation 
within itself. The Georgian aggression towards Abkhazia; Moscow’s move to 
investigate the Confederation; and the arrest of its president caused the major 
disturbances and demonstrations all around the Caucasus. 
Within this atmosphere, the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the 
Caucasus renamed itself as the Confederation of the Caucasian Peoples (CCP) 
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(Konfederatsiia Naradov Kavkaza) in its emergency congress held in Grozny on 4-
5 October 1992. 
In its first meeting in Grozny on 17-18 October 1992, the renamed 
Confederation discussed the clashes between the Ingush and Osetians. In that 
meeting North Osetia was described as the ‘spine’ of Russia in the region. That is 
to say, it was a republic that could easily change the political balance in the 
region.582 From then on, Osetians diverted their path towards Moscow and the 
relation between the Confederation and the Osetians started to become tense. 
 
Following the intensification of the strife among the Ingush and Osetians, 
Chechen Republic’s parliament held an emergency sitting in Grozny on 1 
November. “It is supposed to propose to make the peacemaking activity of the CCP 
in solving the conflict more active.”583 The leading figures of the Confederation 
also took in part at that sitting of the Chechen parliament, and Musa Shanibov 
declared that the clashes between the Osetians and Ingush in the Prigorodnyi region 
of North Osetia were “the greatest misfortune which could happen in the Northern 
Caucasus.” He underlined that the CCP would insist on urgent stopping of 
bloodshed and sacking of all disputable issues between the Osetians and Ingush by 
peaceful political means.584 In addition, Yusup Soslambekov, the head of the 
Confederation Parliament, declared that the Confederation was not going to join 
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either North Osetia or Ingushetia in their conflict, but would “play peacemaking 
role to immediately stop this armed conflict”. 
According to the participants of the session, the main burden was on “the 
empire forces of Russia and Georgia”. Shanibov accused Russia and Georgia for 
establishing serious contacts with North Osetia and Ingushetia, respectively. The 
conflict has become a burning point, which distracts the Confederation forces from 
confrontation in Abkhazia, Shanibov pointed out, “that is why Georgia is interested 
in this conflict.”585 
 
In those days, the main concern of the Chechen and Confederation leaders 
was preventing the spread of the clashes and advance of the Russian troops to the 
Chechen proper. Therefore, in order to mollify the Russian military circles, they 
oftenly denied reports that Chechen regiments were moving towards Vladikavkaz 
to support the Ingush. Soslambekov said that not a single volunteer of the 
Confederation would appear in the zone of the Osetian-Ingush conflict and added 
that “in the whole history of the Chechen and Osetian peoples they had never 
fought against each other and that this would not happen now, either.”586 
In fact, an Ingush delegation from the Prigorodnyi arrived to Grozny in the 
very early days of the conflict, on 31 October 1992 and asked for a support, 
especially for the arms. In addition, the Ingush expressed their hope that the 
Confederation and all “sound forces of the region”’ would be on their side.587 
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Beyond the rumours that the Chechen and Confederation’s armed formations have 
left Grozny for the Osetian-Ingush conflict area, the attitudes of both sides was 
much more different. 
During the aforementioned emergency session of the Chechen Parliament, 
the overwhelming majority of deputies spoke out against Chechnya’s involvement 
in armed conflict. Moreover, they insisted that the Chechen mass media would not 
publish any propaganda on participation of volunteers in the conflict. The 
parliamentarians spoke out for strengthening of guard of military units to prevent 
seizure of arms by the Ingush.588 
On 9 November, when the Russian troops had already reached the still 
undemarcated border between Chechnya and Ingushetia, Musa Shanibov demanded 
the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the zone of the Osetian-Ingush conflict. 
He pointed out that “following the withdrawal, we shall solve the problem within a 
month through negotiations”. He further added that the Russian authorities should 
stop their interference in the affairs of the Caucasus, particularly in the affairs of 
the Ingush and Osetians.589 
On 10 November 1992, Russian troops entered into the territory of 
Ingushetia and by evening they were in control of the situation. They reached 
undefined Chechen-Ingush border and occupied some of Chechen territory. 
Chechen Republic was not late to react and declared a state of emergency in the 
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republic. In connection with this Dudayev issued an ultimatum demanding that the 
Russian troops be withdrawn beyond the borders of the Chechen Republic.590 
The possibility of the diffusion of the armed clashes to the entire North 
Caucasus made the atmosphere more delicate and the Confederation quickly 
intervened. Musa Shanibov tried to appease the situation by saying panic caused by 
the introduction of Russian troops in Ingushetia was needless, and evaluated the 
situation which has come about “resulted from the fact that Ingush leaders, laying 
claims to a part of Chechen territory, gave wrong information to Russian military 
on the border between Chechnya and Ingushetia”.591 As a result, Russian troops, 
which were “misled”, occupied some settlements of Chechnya. However, yet, as a 
security move, the chairman of the Confederation ordered the partial mobilization 
of the entire territory of the CCP.592 Within the same day, on 10 November 1992, 
the representatives of the Chechen government and the Ingush side signed a 
protocol in Nazran. According to the protocol, until the formation of power 
structures in the Ingush Republic, the border between the two republics was 
recognized as being the line separating them up to their union in one autonomous 
entity in the year 1934. On the basis of this agreement, the Russian tanks started to 
leave the disputed regions on 11 November.593 
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The agreement and the restraint of Russia and Chechen republic in the 
Ingush-Osetian conflict took positive reactions from the Confederation’s side. 
Musa Shanibov commented on that and declared that “it may be that this is the first 
step towards changing Russian policy in the Caucasus”.594 
 
After failing to stop the Ingush side and to impede the entrance of Russian 
forces into the region, which were invited by North Osetia, the Confederation’s 
attitude toward the Ingush became of particular importance. Indeed, there already 
was a deterioration of relations between the two.595 Confederation assessed the 
introduction of the Russian troops in North Caucasus, specifically Ingushetia, as a 
result of the wrong actions of the Ingush leaders. A member of the parliament of 
the CCP told that: 
“the next session of the parliament would discuss the possibility of 
expelling Ingushetia because it had concealed its preparations for an armed 
attack on North Osetia. It’s now clear why there is not a single Ingush in the 
confederation volunteer units in Abkhazia”.596 
 
In addition to that, Haji Murat Ibrahimbeyli, Chairman of the Committee on 
Interethnic Accord of the CCP evaluated the Ingush demands for the return of 
Prigorodnyi rayon as the just demands. However, he added that, the Ingush leaders 
were to be blamed for: 
“expressing these demands in a frankly rude manner, whipping up hysteria 
at mass meetings in the months proceeding the catastrophe, and initiating 
the formation of forward-based armed detachments in the territory of the 
Prigorodnyi Raion.”597 
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The North Osetian side has also reacted negatively towards the 
Confederation, as opposed to the positive attitudes during the South Osetian-
Georgian discord. Akhsarbek Galazov turned down the proposal by the leaders of 
the CCP to replace Russian peacekeeping force by confederation units. He said that 
North Osetia was a sovereign republic within the framework of Russia (even it was 
still a member of the confederation) and confederation units’ presence on its 
territory would mean interference in the internal affairs of both Russia and North 
Osetia, and the consequences of this action may aggravate the situation.598 
 
By the Russian intervention, the conflict although the lack of armed clashes, 
turned into a protracted one rather than abated. Moreover, the impact of this 
conflict, however, went beyond the two peoples involved. Russians, beyond the 
permanent military presence, re-established total control over the North Caucasus 
by controlling this central part of the region. And, in addition to the 
Confederation’s failed attempt to find solutions for the conflict, the newly 
established Russian organizations began to emerge and assumed the task of 
facilitating a dialogue between the Ingush and Osetians. 
The clash, of course, had also negative consequences for both of the Ingush 
and the Osetians. For the Ingush, at the end of 1992, they were left in a far worse 
position than previous one. They lost most of their substantial foothold in 
Prigorodnyi, as well as many lives and livelihoods. For the Osetians, most of their 
population that were living in Prigorodnyi became the victims of an uprising and 
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attacked by the Ingush. And, both of the peoples faced with a new phenomenon 
emerged as a serious problem for the peoples of the North Caucasus: the refugee 
problem. 
Beyond that, as the most destructive consequence, the conflict, to a great 
extent, ruined the unity of the North Caucasian peoples that was institutionalized in 
the Confederation. As Shanibov stressed it direct confrontation among the two of 
its component parts caused a serious damage on the prestige of the Confederation, 
and resulted with a terrible moral defeat on the Confederation’s work. The 
Confederation’s intention to work, as a peacemaking and peacekeeping entity, has 
been blocked by its own constituent members, and as a result, considerably reduced 
the power of the Confederation. 599 
 
Nevertheless, the existence of a new conflict, at that time with an outside 
power, namely Georgia, did cause a dead blow to the Confederation, and, all the 
attention was turned toward Abkhazia. 
 
4- The Abkhaz-Georgian conflict:600 
Abkhazia had always been the Achilles heel of the Caucasian unity in 
1990s and as it was stressed several times by the leaders of the Assembly and the 
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Confederation, the peoples of the North Caucasus and even the other small peoples 
of the former Soviet Union saw their destiny in the fate of Abkhazia. By helping 
the struggle of Abkhazia, the peoples of the North Caucasus gained a sense of 
regional identity and the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus 
acquired an immediate and concrete task true to the meaning of its existence. 
 
As it was in the case of South Osetia, the Abkhaz strongly opposed the 
emerging nationalist policies and actions of the Georgians, and in return to the 
election of Zviad Gamsakhurdia as the President of the Republic of Georgia in 
October 1990, they elected an Abkhaz nationalist, Vladislav Ardzinba to the 
chairman of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet. 
Again similar to the South Osetian case, a major catalyst of tensions was 
the March 1991 all-union referendum. The Abkhaz, despite the existence of 
Georgian threats, took part in all-union referendum and voted in favour of the 
preservation of the union. Then, while the Georgia had declared its secession from 
the Soviet Union and independence on 9 April 1991, the Abkhaz, in response, 
declared their intent to become the part of the Soviet Union. 
During the course of the last months of 1991, the parties mainly negotiated 
on the proposal of the Abkhaz for the two-chamber parliament for Abkhazia. 
Despite the opposition from the Georgian side, the Abkhaz organized elections in 
October and December 1991 for this parliament. However, within the months, the 
parliament was paralyzed owing to the formation of two blocks: that of the 
Georgian deputies on the one side and the other ethnic groups’ deputies on the 
other. The Georgian deputies repeatedly rejected decisions that were taken by a 
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majority of votes. These disagreements led to a walkout by Georgian deputies who 
continued to meet in separate quarters. 
During this chaos, inter-Georgian tensions increased and descended into 
open warfare in Tiflis over the period of the last days of 1991 and the beginning of 
1992. An elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia fled to Chechnya and the Military 
Council of Sigua-Kitovani-Ioseliani was set up. Then in March 1992, 
Shevardnadze was brought in Tiflis and quickly made head of State Council, which 
run Georgia until the elections on 11 October 1992. The arrival of Shevardnadze 
obtained international recognition of Georgia, which implied the recognition of the 
borders, claimed by that country’s government and therefore the inclusion of 
Abkhazia in its territory. 
Meanwhile following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia proceeded 
to adopt its constitution of 1921, which made no reference to Abkhazia. The 
Abkhaz saw the adoption of this constitution together with the earlier nullification 
of its borders with Georgia, as a further downgrading of its already intolerable 
status. 
In June 1992, president Ardzinba of Abkhazia sent a draft treaty to the 
Georgian State Council in which a federative or confederative solution to the 
problem was suggested, which would safeguard Georgia’s territorial integrity. The 
draft contained provisions for the guarantee of the rights of all minorities in the 
territories under the Abkhazian and Georgian jurisdiction, and for rejection of the 
use of military force to resolve differences. The Georgian leadership nevertheless 
did not reply. 
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The Abkhaz retaliated by reinstating the 1925 constitution of Abkhazia, 
which defined Abkhazia as independent but “united with the Soviet Socialist 
Republic of Georgia on the basis of special union treaty.” Thus in practice 
Abkhazia declared its independence. But such a decision required a simple majority 
for the ratification by the Abkhazian Parliament. The Georgian members of the 
Abkhazian Parliament didn’t take part in this decision and started a campaign of 
civil disobedience.601 The State Council of Georgia, at the same time declared this 
decision null and void, on 25 July. 
While, in compliance with the appeal of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet 
dated 12 August, the negotiations on the future federative relations between 
Abkhazia and Georgia went on in Sukhum, the Georgian troops commanded by 
Tengiz Kitovani crossed into the Abkhazia on 14 August 1992. On that day, the 
Abkhazian parliament also was scheduled to discuss the draft treaty proposed to the 
Georgian State Council. The official reason for sending troops was to put an end to 
ongoing sabotage and looting, particularly on the railway line, and to search for, 
and free Georgian officials kidnapped by supporters of ousted Georgian president 
Gamsakhurdia. 602 
Within four days, Georgian troops commanded by Kitovani, Ioseliani and 
Karkarashvili entered Sukhum. Because of the surprise attack, Abkhazian National 
Guard failed to oppose and, as a result, Ardzinba’s government withdrew to 
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Gudauta, a city in the northern Abkhazia. Within a week the Georgians were up to 
the Russian border and had the Abkhaz bottled up in three cities: Sukhum, 
Ochamchira, and Tkvarchel, with only a region around the Gudauta truly in 
Abkhaz control. 
 
5- Confederation and the Abkhaz Conflict: 
The Georgian assault to Abkhazia created a serious reaction among the 
peoples of the North Caucasus. First of all, most of the peoples remembered the 
“ethnic death of the Ubykh which loomed large in the minds of all North Caucasus 
as a symbol of oblivion” and they determined “not to sit back and watch this fate 
befall the Abkhaz.”603 
The Confederation reacted to the conflict promptly and, the first volunteer 
troops under the command of the chairman of the Confederation Defence 
Committee Colonel Sultan Sosnaliev, arrived in Gudauta on 15 August 1992.604 All 
the other national front movements and public organisations around the North 
Caucasus including the Cossacks, as a response to the calls from the Confederation 
and the International Cherkess Association, under the slogan “Hands off 
Abkhazia!” started to organise committees for solidarity with Abkhazia. Meetings 
were held in Maykop, Cherkessk, Vladikavkaz, Makhachkale, Grozny, and Nalchik 
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and these centres were named as the relief centres to Abkhazia and volunteers 
started to gather.605 
On 17 August 1992, at a two-day special 10th enlarged session of its 
parliament in Grozny, the Confederation drew up a platform of solidarity with 
Abkhazia. At the end of the session, the CMPC parliament adopted a decision that 
the dispatch of Georgian troops to Abkhazia was accepted as ‘armed aggression’. 
The Confederation demanded the withdrawal of the Georgian troops and declared 
that, if the Georgian troops were not withdrawn from Abkhazia within 3 days, that 
is 21 August and to provide compensation for the damage inflicted during the 
occupation, the Confederation would declare war on Georgia.606 
In the beginning, this ultimatum was regarded in Tiflis as a bluff. President 
Shanibov, after seeing the Georgian refusal, however, signed a decree to all 
regional centres, on the start of hostilities on the territory of Abkhazia and Tiflis 
was declared a disaster zone on 21 August. The decree instructed the 
Confederation’s armed formations “to force their way” on to the territory of 
Abkhazia “by any means” and to “engage in hostilities if opposed by any 
forces”.607 Moreover, with this decree, the Confederation ordered the Georgians 
within the territories of the Confederation to be seized as prisoners of war. This 
                                                 
605 “Kabardin-Balkaria: Volunteers leave for Abkhazia,” SWB SU/1463, B/3, 19 August 1992; 
“Anti-Georgian meting in Chechnia,” SWB SU/1464, C1/2, 20 August 1992; And, Kafkasya 
Gerçeği, quoted from Qhuaze’s issue dated 26 August in October 1992, 10: 15. 
606 “Caucasian Confederation threatens war on Georgia: Dudayev refuses to arm,” SWB SU/1465, 
C2/2, 21 August 1992; “Anti-Georgian meeting in Chechnia,” SWB SU/1464, C1/2, 20 August 
1992; and Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts,” 50. 
607 For the Russian and Turkish text of order (ukaz) dated 21 August see “Kafkas-Abhazya Direnişi 
(Belgeler)” October 1992. Document No: 20, Kafkasya Gerçeği, 10: 15 and for the English text, 
“Mountain Peoples to take Abkhazia by any Methods,” SWB SU/1470, C1/1-2, 27 August 1992. In 
addition see, “Confederation of Mountain Peoples urges volunteers to fight Georgia,” SWB 
SU/1467, C2/3, 24 August 1992. 
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decree had profound consequences over the peoples of the North Caucasus and the 
volunteers began to arrive in Abkhazia via mountain paths.608 
The local authorities, much as they feared uncontrollable mass movements 
of North Caucasian peoples, could not stop the volunteers.609 However, in order to 
show their concern the issue and to control the population, the leaders of Adygea, 
Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and North Osetian Republics, 
Krasnodar and Stavropol Krais and Rostov oblast held an extraordinary meeting in 
Armavir, Krasnodar, on 22 August 1992. At that meeting they blamed Georgia 
with causing the armed clashes and adopted an appeal to the Russian President. To 
submit this report to Moscow a special delegation was also formed.610 Moreover it 
was decided to take urgent measures to provide humanitarian aid to the peoples of 
Abkhazia. In order to ensure security and cooperation in the North Caucasus, they 
also decided to form a permanent committee, consisting of the top leaders of the 
executive and legislative bodies of national-state and territorial formations.611 
 
Such a turn of events was extremely unwelcome to the Georgian and 
Russian governments. Shevardnadze denied all responsibilities for the military 
                                                 
608 “Unarmed and armed volunteers going to Abkhazia,” SWB SU/1467, C2/3, 24 August 1992; 
“Mountain Peoples to take Abkhazia by any Methods,” SWB SU/1470, C1/1-2, 27 August 1992. In 
his press Conference in Moskov on 23 March 1993, Taraz Shamba, a leader of the Aydgylara, said, 
“380 people from the North Caucasian republics were fighting on the Abkhazian side. See “Over 
700 Abkhaz had been killed and over 1200 wounded,” SWB SU/1646, B/4, 25 March 1993. At the 
height of the armed struggle the number of the Confederation troops was around 500, but for a 
“war” at that size it was a serious amount of force to change the course of the war. 
609 “Adygey deputy leader warns that Moscow could alienate North Caucasian people,” SWB 
SU/1469, C3/1-2, 26 August 1992. 
610 This delegation meets with Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy in Moscow on 21 August 
and handed over their appeal to Yeltsin and Khasbulatov. See, “Rutskoy receives delegation from 
North Caucasus republics,” SWB SU/1467, C2/2, 24 August 1992 
611 “Leaders of north Caucasian republics hold emergency meeting,” SWB SU/1466, C2/3, 22 
August 1992. 
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action in Abkhazia and following the unsuccessful attack staged on Gadauta, the 
Georgian State Council, after its extraordinary session announced local 
mobilization of the reservists into the national army on 23 August.612 
Shevardnadze evaluated the above-mentioned decree of the Confederation 
as a declaration of war and urged the Russian authorities to take resolute measures. 
Otherwise, he said, “the events surrounding the situation in Abkhazia may grow a 
local conflict into a global confrontation.”613 
Thus, on 24 August, Shevardnadze and Yeltsin sum up the situation on a 
telephone conversation and decided to meet on 3 September 1992 in Moscow.614 
According to the Georgian State Council’s press service, “the two men condemned 
the activities of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus which has 
announced its intention to defend the Abkhaz people.”615 Shevardnadze defined the 
decisions and actions of the Confederation as a gross intervention into Georgia’s 
internal affairs and asked Yeltsin to take responsibility over the borders and to 
close them to the ‘armed gangs’ from the North Caucasus sneaking into the 
Georgian territory.616 
This conversation changed the course of Russian involvement in the war.617 
On 25 August, the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice issued a statement where 
                                                 
612 ‘State Council announces local mobilization,’ SWB SU/1468, C1/1, 25 August 1992. 
613 “Mountain Peoples advance: report military success,” SWB SU/1469, C3/1 26 August 1992.. 
614 “Yeltsin and Shevardnadze talks on Abkhazia confirmed,” SWB SU/1470, i, 27 August 1992. 
615 “Yeltsin and Shevardnadze discus situation in Abkhazia,” SWB SU/1469, C3/3, 26 August 1992. 
616 “Shevardnadze to meet Yeltsin: State Council considers Abkhazian situation,” SWB SU/1470, 
C1/2-3, 27 August 1992 
617 At the beginning of the crisis Moscow chose to remain passive. The Russian government just 
released a statement on 18th August calling on the peoples of the northern Caucasus to display 
patience and good sense and abstain from actions that can further destabilise the situation in the 
region. See, SWB SU/1464, C1/2, 20 August 1992.And then a delegation of Russian deputies, under 
the leadership of the Sergei Baburin visited region. But the position of the Baburin as an opposition 
leader had no positive effects on the government’s policies. 
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it declared that the actions of the Confederation were a gross violation of the 
constitution of the Russian Federation. The Ministry accused the Confederation of 
claiming the role of the legal bodies of state power. The Confederation’s attempts 
to create a parliament, defence council and armed forces, the establishment of the 
post of commander-in-chief, the adoption of documents calling for the commission 
of terrorist acts were accepted as the proofs.618 The investigation of the case was 
entrusted to the prosecutor’s office investigation department. Investigation group, 
made up of officers from the ministries of Security and Internal Affairs, started to 
investigate the issue.619 In addition, the acting prosecutor of Kabardino-Balkaria 
issued a statement addressing to the leadership of the Confederation where he 
stressed that the decree signed by the Confederation’s leaders on 21 August 
declaring Tiflis a disaster zone is unlawful. He demanded the Confederation to 
cease its unlawful actions.620 Moreover, Russian internal troops and frontiersmen 
took the control of the frontier with Georgia and they established checkpoints and 
frontier posts to control the illegal crosses of borders.621 
While the judicial bodies of the Russian Federation were working on the 
legality of the decisions and actions of the Confederation, President Yeltsin 
convened a summit on Abkhazia on 3 September 1992 in Moscow. As a 
constructive response, Shanibov declared that from 1 to 4 September, the CMPC 
has stopped sending volunteers to Abkhazia. And, the result of the talks would be 
                                                 
618 “Mountain Peoples acting outside the law according to Russian Justice Ministry,” SWB SU/1470, 
C1/2, 27 August 1992. 
619 “Proceedings against Confederation of Mountain People instituted,” SWB SU/1471, C1/2, 28 
August 1992. 
620 “Kabardin-Balkaria judiciary chief denounces Caucasus confederation,” SWB SU/1474, C1/1, 1 
September 1992. 
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litmus test for the Confederation’s decision to continue sending the volunteers. 
Shanibov, however, did not refrain to confess his pessimism over the course of the 
meeting.622 
During the talks, Shevardnadze mainly criticised the role of ‘mercenaries’ 
of the Confederation in Abkhaz issue. In an interview he defined the Confederation 
as:  
“on their merits, the actions of its leadership can only be described as 
international terrorism reeking of fascism. 
The Confederation is carrying out aggression and is interfering in our 
internal affairs from the territory of those republics. Radio transmitters 
coordinating combat operations in Abkhazia are operating over there. It is 
from there that gunmen come to murder our citizens and orders are issued to 
sow terror in our capital. And all Georgians who are citizens of those 
republics have been declared hostages.”623 
 
The Moscow meeting concluded with a stillborn agreement of 4 September 
under the signs of Yeltsin, Shevardnadze, Ardzinba, and the leaders of the krays 
and oblasts bordering the North Caucasus.624 
The principal aspect of the agreement was the reaffirmation of the territorial 
integrity of Georgia. The implementation of a cease-fire on 5 September, disarming 
and withdrawal of illegal armed forces active in Abkhazia, and the reduction of the 
Georgian armed forces to a number sufficient to prevent the sabotage of railways 
and other important installations were also agreed. The agreement also provided for 
the resumption in Sukhum of governmental functions by legitimate authorities of 
                                                                                                                                       
621 “Volunteers from North Caucasus returning home from Abkhazia,” SWB SU/1478, C2/3, 5 
September 1992. 
622 “Mountain Peoples’ Confederation seeks to unite Caucasus,” SWB SU/1477, C2/2, 4 September 
1992. 
623 “Shevardnadze interviewed on unrest in Abkhazia,” SWB SU/1476, C1/3, 3 September 1992. 
624 For the full text of the agreement see, SWB SU/1478, C2/1, 5 September 1992. 
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Abkhazia by 15 September 1992, and called on the UN and CSCE to support the 
principles of the agreement. 
Shevardnadze said, “if we do not manage to implement the accords that 
have been reached, the Caucasus will turn into a second Lebanon.”625 The cease-
fire, however, was never fully implemented. The Georgian side blamed the Abkhaz 
for the lack of willingness to implement the agreement, and for attacking the 
positions vacated by the Georgian troops. In addition, Shevardnadze insisted on the 
attitudes of the volunteers of the Confederation. His main concern was the removal 
of those volunteers from Abkhazia. Therefore at the third round of negotiations 
which began, on 15 September in Adler, the Georgian side has set a ten-day grace 
to the Abkhazian leadership for the withdrawal of the volunteers of the 
Confederation. They warned the Abkhaz that, when the deadline expired, the 
military command would retain the right to ensure the withdrawal of the 
uncontrolled, illegal armed detachments from Abkhazia using all possible 
means.626  
In response, the Abkhaz authorities stressed that the Georgians did not 
withdraw their troops as agreed and that they consistently violated the cease-fire. 
Later, Ardzinba clarified the issue of volunteers by saying “the withdrawal of 
confederation units is possible only after the forces of the State Committee leave 
Abkhazia.”627 
 
                                                 
625 “Press conference: Ardzinba expresses doubts about document,” SWB SU/1478, C2/2, 5 
September 1992. 
626 “Cease-fire agreed at meeting of control commission,” SWB SU/1488, C1/1, 17 September 1992. 
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In those days in order to pressurise the Confederation, the Russian 
authorities arrested Shanibov on 23 September.628 He had been accused of 
encouraging ‘international disharmony’ by signing a document on forming armed 
detachments to be send to Abkhazia. Nevertheless, the demonstrations with the 
participation of thousands in late September in Nalchik629 forced Russians to turn a 
blind eye when Shanibov escaped arrest and appeared in Nalchik before the crowds 
on 28 September.630 
 
Shanibov’s escape made the internal strife within the Russian Federation on 
the policies towards the North Caucasus more evident. While Yeltsin and Kozyrev 
were in favour of the policies for supporting Shevardnadze, the Russian Military 
and some other groups such as Sergei Baburin’s631 were less inclined to pressurise 
Abkhazia in favor of Shevardnadze. In this context, Chairman of the Defence and 
Security Committee of Russian Parliament, Sergey Stepashin accused Russia’s 
                                                 
628 “Head of Caucasian Mountain Peoples under investigation,” SWB SU/1495, i, 25 September 
1992. 
629 “Demonstrations in Kabarda-Balkaria support mountainmen’s leader,” SWB SU/1497, C2/2, 28 
September 1992. Following the deaths, the president of Kabardin-Balkaria, Valeriy Kokov 
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SWB SU/1498, B/4, 29 September 1992. 
630 Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts,” 50-1. “Nalchik demonstration continues; situation relatively calm,” 
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631 Baburin was elected to the Russian Parliament in 1990 with the support of Democratic Russia 
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law-enforcement agencies by acting abominably and, actually made it possible for 
Shanibov to flee from custody.632 
 
Following the successful Abkhaz offensive with the support of the 
Confederation forces to Gagra in October, Kitovani clarified the Georgian State 
Council’s position that Georgia must be a unitary state in which there was no place 
for any type of autonomous area. In a departure from his earlier position, on 3 
December Shevardnadze stated before the Parliament that a peaceful solution to the 
conflict in Abkhazia was no longer possible, only the military means could solve 
the issue and that this would have to happen soon. 
Most of the 1993 saw a military stand off with the two forces facing each 
other across the River Gumista, to the north of Sukhum. During which, the Abkhaz 
continued to consolidate their strength and positions over the early summer as 
Shevardnadze’s troubles continued unabated in Mingrelia, and towards the end of 
July 1993, it looked as if just one more push was needed for them to take Tiflis. 
In this period the support and the presence of the Confederation troops or 
the volunteers, which Georgians named as the ‘mercenaries’ was apparent. 
Shevardnadze, most of the time, blamed Russian ‘military circles’ of supporting the 
Abkhaz. In his official telegram to Yeltsin in March 1993 he stated that: 
“particularly difficult situation had arisen after a number of actions were 
carried out in Abkhazia by forces known to Yeltsin. As a result thousands 
of Russian citizens acting as mercenaries and also acting Russian 
                                                 
632 After the mid-1992, a policy shift occurred in Moscow, which has been described by Mohiaddin 
Mesbahi as a switch from a Euro-Atlanticist to a Euroasianist perspective. Russian policy turned 
back toward a conservative “Great Russian” approach. See, Mohiaddin Mesbahi (eds.), 1994. 
Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domestic and Internationsl Dynamics, 
Gainesville: University Press of California, and “Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus,” 1993. Central Asian Survey, 12(2): 181-215. 
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servicemen had been directly involved in military actions against 
Georgia.”633  
 
On 17 March 1993, the Georgian parliament adopted a law on mercenaries. 
According to this law henceforth criminal proceedings would be instituted against 
mercenaries who participated in the armed conflicts on the territory of Georgia. 
Terrorists would be deprived of their freedom for from 10 to 15 years or be shot, 
depending on the degree of their guilt.634 
Despite the Georgian accusations, the Confederation, never did hesitate to 
declare its support to Abkhazia, but in all cases it openly and strongly rejected the 
Georgian pretensions of the Russian support to the Confederation. Because it 
seems probable that, with the help of Abkhazia, the Confederation recovered the 
lost prestige during the Osetian-Ingush conflict. After its success in Abkhazia, the 
Confederation engaged widespread support among the North Caucasian peoples. In 
addition to the inclusion of Akki, Dargin, Lezgi, Rutul, Karachays, Nogays, and 
Kumuks even the Cossacks participated in the work of the Confederation as 
observers. 
This caused the increasing of the Russian interest towards the conflict and 
the North Caucasus in general. Despite the conclusion of a cease-fire in the 
Georgian-Russian summit in Moscow on 14 May 1993, the armed clashes 
intensified once more in July. On 2 July, the Abkhazian parliament asked Yeltsin to 
force the Georgian authorities to leave their forces from Abkhazia. At the same 
time it issued a call to Shanibov for help. Shamil Basayev, the Confederation’s 
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troops commander in Abkhazia responded this call by ordering combat readiness in 
response to the escalation of combat operations on 4 July. The next day, at a 
session of its Presidential Council held in Nalcik, the Confederation announced a 
total mobilization of volunteers for fighting in Abkhazia against the Georgian 
troops.635 
Thereupon, the press center of the Georgian parliament released a statement 
by the parliamentary collegium and express the hope that the peoples of the North 
Caucasus would not be provoked by any appeals and intervene to aggravate the 
conflict and pose a threat the whole Caucasus region.636 
In addition, Shevardnadze described the Confederation’s decision as a 
‘serious trouble’. Moreover with his special envoy Aleksandr Kavsadze (the 
chairman of the Georgian human rights and inter-ethnic relations committee), he 
sent a letter to the Russian Deputy Premier Shakhray, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, 
Security Minister Barannikov, and Procurator General Stepankov on 6 July. In this 
letter, he condemned the decisions of the Confederation and pointed out that “such 
actions by the confederation is nothing other than rude interference in the internal 
affairs of a sovereign state. Moreover, it is an undisguised aggression against 
Georgia.” He appealed these Russian officials “to take all measures to stop the 
illegal infiltration of Russian citizens representing this organization as well as 
transportation of military equipment to the conflict zone, because a general 
Caucasian war is becoming a reality.”637 
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Interestingly, Shanibov denied the above-mentioned order of Basayev and 
said that the Confederation, its Parliament or the Presidential Council has never 
made any decision to create a Confederation force in Abkhazia. The volunteer 
activity, he said was resumed by the region’s national democratic movements 
without the participation of the Confederation, and all the volunteer detachments 
were part of the Abkhazian army. The creation of a separate force under the title of 
the Confederation was, according to Shanibov, something undertaken by the 
volunteers themselves and was a testimony that the volunteer movement was 
running out of control.638 
In contrast, in Shanibov’s words, the Confederation’s efforts aimed 
primarily at mobilizing the public opinion in the Russian Federation, Georgia, and 
the entire Caucasus to prevent a further deepening of the armed conflict in 
Abkhazia. Moreover, he stressed once more that “we do not control the volunteers’ 
movement, because this mechanism is acting without us.”639 This was the first 
concrete sign of a discord among the leaders of the Confederation. 
 
On 7-8 July, the Abkhaz forces reinforced with the North Caucasian 
volunteers attacked from the sea on Sukhum. The Russian authorities protested the 
Confederation and for the first time they declared that the cooperation between the 
Russia’s federal bodies and the Confederation was impossible. The warring parties, 
hoping to avoid further casualties and under strong pressures from Moscow agreed 
                                                 
638 “President of Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus on Abkhaz Conflict,” SWB SU/1740, 
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to a new Russian mediated agreement in Sochi, on 27 July. This new agreement, 
which came into effect on 28 July 1993, like its predecessor proposed a cease-fire 
that was monitored by UN and the withdrawal of the Georgian troops and 
weaponry within 15 days and the subsequent restitution of the legitimate 
governments of Abkhazia.640 
The Confederation assessed the conclusion of the Agreement ‘positively’ 
and the armed formations from the North Caucasus started to withdraw from 
Abkhazia. Amin Zekhov, the chief of staff of the Confederation’s armed forces, 
said that the troops of the Confederation would leave Abkhazia according to the 
cease-fire agreement over 10 to 15 days, on condition that the Georgian side also 
withdrew its troops.641 
 
The Georgian side, however, did not comply with the agreement and 
Ardzinba issued a statement to the UN and other powers on 9 and 11 September 
respectively, in which he warned the dangers of the Georgian non-compliance. The 
executive committee of the Congress of the Kabardian People, replied at first and 
issued a statement calling on Georgia to fulfil the conditions of the Sochi 
Agreement and urged the North Caucasian volunteers to be ready to return to 
Abkhazia, if Georgia continued to fail to comply with its undertakings. 
 
                                                 
640 This was the third attempt at putting an end to the fratricidal war and Vakhtang Goguadze, the 
speaker of the Georgian parliament, Sokrat Dzhindzholia, Deputy Chairman of the Abkhazian 
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At the end of the September, while the Zviadist forces were entering the 
town of Gali, the Abkhaz forces organized a new offensive and captured Sukhum 
on 27 September 1993 and drove the Georgian forces out of the Abkhazian proper. 
Within two weeks of the fall of Sukhum, Shevardnadze went to Moscow, 
ostensibly to attend a meeting with Yeltsin and the leadership of Azerbaijan and 
Armenia. The four leaders agreed on the need for collective action to stabilize the 
situation in the Caucasus. In his speech at this meeting, Shevardnadze declared his 
intention to join the Commenwealth of Independent States (CIS) and argued that 
Russia and the other CIS states should help the Caucasian countries to maintain 
their collective security. 
 
The Confederation took the clashes between the Abkhaz and the Georgians 
as a chance for recovering its previous prestige, which had been wounded during 
the clashes between the Osetians and the Ingush. This was the reason of 
Confederations insistence on the Abkhaz cause. To put the importance of Abkhazia 
Shanibov said that the peoples of the Caucasus and other small peoples of the 
former Soviet Union saw their destiny in the fate of Abkhaz. According to him, 
Abkhazia was an important test case for this principle. The fight of Caucasian 
peoples for the freedom of Abkhazia was actually the struggle for their own 
freedom. He believed that if the Abkhaz, with the help of volunteers from the North 
Caucasus region, could show that an attack on such a people couldn’t take place 
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without serious resistance, this would discourage future attacks on any of the North 
Caucasian peoples. 
However, despite the success of the Confederation and the Abkhazia, the 
developments did not result in a consolidation and the emergence of true 
Confederation. Russia managed to achieve its desire of forcing Georgia to accept 
the membership of the CIS and to secure military bases to control the region. In 
addition, the Russian authorities decided to establish their own organizations in the 
region to neutralize the Confederation. Moreover, the possibility of the Chechen 
supremacy and the reaction from the other members of the Confederation caused 
the alienation between the members of it. 
 
6- The Chechen Struggle642 for Independence and Seeking for a United 
Front: 
The Chechens and the Abkhaz had always been the cardinal components of 
the Assembly and later the Confederation. During the struggle between the 
Confederation and Georgia, the Chechens comprised the main combat force and 
provided the necessary financial means and ammunitions. Nevertheless, the 
increasing tensions between the Russians and Chechens, beyond the destruction of 
the Chechen independence, caused internal strife within the Confederation as well. 
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The Chechens, as it was in the other peoples of the North Caucasus, has a 
dual sense of identity: that of Mountaineer and, more narrowly but strongly, the 
national one as a Chechen or Nokhchi. In compliance with this dual identity while 
they had been living in their independent state from 1992, under the leadership of 
Djokhar Dudayev on the one hand, they were trying to establish an independent 
larger North Caucasian State on the other. However, because of the serious 
economic problems and power struggles between the Chechen teips, the fragile 
political stability in Chechnya disintegrated and the political fragmentation started. 
In response to the demonstrations that were asking the president’s resignation, 
Dudayev dissolved the parliament and imposed a curfew by issuing a decree in 
April 1993. Then, in addition to Yaragi Mamodayev, Salambek Hajiev, and Doku 
Zavgayev, even his former allies of Dudayev, like Omar Avtorkhanov, Bislan 
Gantemirov and, Ruslan Labazanov had started to oppose him. 
 
Similarly, because of Dudayev’s ambitions to control the ‘pan-Caucasian’ 
movement, the relations between the Confederation and the Chechen Republic 
began to deteriorate. The ‘Dudayev factor’, thus, caused the alienation between 
Chechens and other peoples of the North Caucasus. Dudayev believed that with its 
economy, history, geographic location as well as the impact of current 
developments, the Chechens should play the leading role in the efforts toward 
independence and unity in the North Caucasus.643 He put the Chechen Republic 
into the center of the struggle of the North Caucasian peoples but chose Russia as 
its main rival, while the other peoples of the North Caucasus, especially the 
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Abkhaz were willing to side with Russia against Georgia. Therefore, this basic 
difference of an outlook resulted in a split within the Confederation. 
 
In fact, from the outset, Dudayev intended to establish an organization, 
which encompassed the whole Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, Georgia and even 
Armenia. To accomplish this aim, together with Zviad Gamsakhurdia he set up a 
‘Caucasian Home’ (Kavkazskiy Dom) or International Caucasian Home Forum644 in 
September 1992 for the purpose of uniting the local peoples in their struggle for 
freedom and national independence. This was, like the Confederation, an informal 
alliance heralding political and economic integration in the form of a 
Confederation. 
 
Nevertheless, this initiative of Dudayev, especially in cooperation with 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia created distress in the Confederation. Gamsakhurdia accepted 
by the Confederation’s leaders as the leader of the Georgian nationalism and 
blamed in every condition as the instigator of the Georgian assaults on the Abkhaz. 
Dudayev, however, from the early days of Gamsakhurdia’s escape from Georgian 
territory supplied him a safe shelter. In several occasions the Confederation 
expressed its distrust and dissatisfaction at the former president’s presence in 
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Chechnya.645 Thus, the Confederation described this new Caucasian Home 
movement as a rival under the control of Gamsakhurdia. 
In March 1993, the consultative council and the highest religious council of 
the Caucasian Home held a joint session in Grozny and approved the structure of 
the leading bodies of it, which comprised three councils: the Consultative Council, 
the Collective Security Council, and the Highest Religious council.646 Then later, in 
a joint session of the bureaus of the Consultative and higher Religious councils 
participants adopted a decision to create a Caucasian Home Security Council.647 
 
In August 1994, the Chechen opposition with the support of Moscow 
declared Dudayev deposed, claiming to have established control over most of the 
territory of Chechnya, and clashes between government forces and opposition 
intensified. In September, after Dudayev had inflicted a harsh defect on the 
opposition, did Gantemirov, Avturkhanov, and Khajiev agree to cooperate and in 
September and October they attacked to capture Grozny by the help of the 
Russians. 
 
During these clashes between the Chechen groups, the Confederation took 
the issue into its parliament’s agenda. After the joint session of the Chechen 
Presidential Council and the Confederation’s Parliament in Grozny, on 23-24 
August 1994, the Confederation “resolutely backs the desire of the Chechen 
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Republic for freedom and independence”.648 In order to achieve this end, the 
Confederation declared its full support to Dudayev’s policies and condemned the 
activity of the opposition forces. In addition, it was declared that, in case Russia 
started armed aggression against Chechnya, the Confederation would come to the 
defense of Chechen sovereignty.649 
This declaration, naturally, caused dissatisfaction among the Chechen 
opposition. The Chechen opposition’s Interim Council issued a statement on 6 
September 1994 and accused the Confederation of interference in Chechnya’s 
internal affairs. In this statement, the Interim Council stated that “a civil war 
against the people in the Chechen republic has been unleashed with direct 
participation of the Confederation of Caucasian Peoples in the person of 
confederation leaders Musa Shanibov and Ibragim Beyli”.650 
Then the council voiced the inadmissibility of a third party’s interference in 
Chechen internal affairs and warned the Confederation that any similar action 
would receive “adequate estimation of the Chechen people and the mercenaries 
will be destroyed right on the spot under the laws of the wartime”.651 
The following day Ibragim Beyli replied the Interim Council’s statement 
and stressed that “the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus has never 
interfered and will not interfere in the internal affairs of that republic unless Russia 
sends in its troops.” Moreover, he rejected the Interim Council’s statement alleging 
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that mercenaries under the Confederation flag were operating on Dudayev’s side. 
He noted that the after the war in Abkhazia the Confederation disbanded its armed 
structures, and there was no appeals or orders whatsoever on this score and, 
consequently, announced no mobilization of volunteers.652 
 
On 29 November 1993, Russian President Yeltsin warned to all those 
taking part in armed confrontation in the Chechen republic and demanded that, 
within 48 hours of this appeal to stop the armed clashes and declare the a cease-
fire. “If this demand was not met by the set deadline, a state of emergency would 
be introduced on the territory of the Chechen republic and all the forces and means 
at the disposal of the State would be used.”653 
While the opposition complied with Yeltsin’s ultimatum, Dudayev and his 
Chechen government assessed this ultimatum negatively and the address by Yeltsin 
was described as contradicting international legal norms.654 
 
Then the Confederation of the peoples of the Caucasus held an emergency 
session of its Parliament in Nalchik on 4 December. At the end of the session, 
Confederation’s parliament issued a resolution in which the Confederation declared 
that it considers Dudayev as the sole legitimate Chechen leader. In addition, the 
resolution also pointed that if Russian troops invade Chechnya, the republics of the 
Northern Caucasus would start severing the Federation Treaty and bilateral 
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agreements with Russia. Moreover, in line, the Confederation’s Parliament adopted 
an appeal to the Russian Federal Assembly and to the Russian President and 
government and stressed that the multi-ethnic population of the Caucasus was 
against military confrontation between Russia and Chechnya, and against the 
invasion of Chechnya by Russian troops. Then, the session decided to convene an 
extraordinary congress of the peoples of the North Caucasus in Nalchik or Maykop 
on 10 December to discuss ways of rendering assistance to Chechnya.655 
On 6 December, a meeting was held between Pavel Grachev, Russian 
Defense minister, and Dudayev in Mozdok, where both parties agreed to seek a 
peaceful solution to conflict.656 However, while Grachev was trying to make peace, 
after a meeting of the Russian Security Council on 9 December, Yeltsin ordered his 
government to restore order and disarm all armed factions in Chechnya.657 
In order to implement Yeltsin’s decree, troops of the Russian Federation 
Defense and Interior ministries, moving in three columns entered the Chechen 
territory on 11 December.658 
 
Meantime, the Confederation convened the extraordinary congress to 
discuss the situation in the North Caucasus, specifically in Chechnya in Nalchik on 
10-11 December 1994. At the end of the Congress, first of all, in order to meet the 
representatives of the power ministries (defense, counterintelligence, and interior) 
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of the Russian Federation in Vladikavkaz, a delegation was formed. 659 Then, 
another delegation, which includes around 500 people, has been formed. This 
delegation was intended to go to Grozny to form a human chain around the town in 
order to avert a tragic development of events and to defend the city against the 
Russian invasion.660 
Moreover, Congress sent telegrams to the President, chairmen of the 
Federation Council and the State Duma, in which it demanded that the talks 
processes should continue and that pressure by force should be stopped. In a 
special statement, it was pointed out that “unless the tragic development of events 
and the use of force halted, the peoples of the Caucasus would be called upon to 
leave the Federation Treaty of the Russian Federation.”661 Likewise, in the appeals 
to the leaders of the North Osetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia 
the Confederation demanded to hinder the movement of Russian troops towards 
Chechnya. Moreover the Congress decided to set up an operational headquarters to 
coordinate the activities of the Mountaineers in entire North Caucasus. 
 
The Confederation with its all forces prepared itself to a ‘war’ with Russia 
and Ali Aliyev, head of the Confederation’s parliament declared that in order to 
coordinate the activities of the Confederation’s troops on the spot, the headquarters 
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of the Confederation would move from Sukhum to Grozny.662 Then, on 14 
December 1994, the Confederation of the Caucasian Peoples announced the 
beginning of the mobilization of the volunteers to aid Grozny. Ali Aliyev, signed 
the instructions to the members of the Confederation where he asked the formation 
of mobilization centers in Sukhum (Abkhazia), Lazarevo (Krasnodar territory), 
Maykop (Adygeya), Cherkessk (Karachay-Cherkessia), Vladikavkaz (North 
Osetia), Nazran (Ingushetia), Makhachkala (Dagestan) and Nalchik (Kabarda-
Balkaria). In addition, operational centers were to be set up in Nalchik and Grozny 
to coordinate the actions of volunteers. Amin Zekhov, the Vice-President of the 
Confederation from Adygea (a member of the local parliament also), charged with 
the coordination of these operational centers.663 
 
In response, the Russian government issued a statement and pointed out that 
these activities of the Confederation were illegal and formation of these 
‘mobilization centers’ to recruit volunteers to fight for Chechnya in the Chechen 
Republic and other areas of the Northern Caucasus should not be not allowed. The 
statement stressed that the mobilization for active military service comes within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian President.664 
Moreover, beyond the Russian protest, this decree for the mobilization of 
the volunteers to fight in Chechnya resulted in a split among the Confederation 
itself. The decision was signed by the head of the Confederation Parliament, Ali 
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Aliyev and had the backing of the Confederation’s chief of staff, Amin Zekhov. 
However, the President of the Confederation, Musa Shanibov, objected the 
formation of volunteer detachments.665 Therefore, as a result of the heavy pressures 
from the Chechen side Shanibov resigned from his post on 18 December 1994, by 
giving the reason of deteriorating health after an incident in Abkhazia in 1993 in 
which he was wounded.666 Nevertheless, the basic reason behind the resignation 
was the discord on the issue of mobilization. According to Denga Khalidov, the 
deputy chairman of the Confederation Parliament, “Shanibov was, evidently, find it 
hard to take decisions that require resolve, consistency and the like, in connection 
with the events developing in Chechnya”. In addition, he pointed out that, 
“Shanibov did a lot of good at the time when the CCP was establishing itself, 
particularly during developments in Abkhazia. He has done enough, considering 
his age.”667 
 
Following the removal of the Shanibov, under the leadership of Ali Aliyev, 
mobilization centers set up in the North Caucasian cities. According to Khalidov, 
the first centers founded in Makhachkale and Khasavyurt (Dagestan), Nalchik 
(Kabardino-Balkaria), Maykop (Adygea), Sukhum (Abkhazia), Nazran 
(Ingushetia), Vladikavkaz (North Osetia) and Cherkassk (Karachay-Cherkessia). 
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Khadzhi-Murat Ibragim-Beyli, a member of the Confederation presidium, however, 
said at a news conference in Moscow on 26 December that Confederation was not 
recruiting volunteers for the Chechen war. He stressed that “representatives of 
every republic and every people are already in Chechnya.” He noted that the 
Confederation had not set up recruiting centers to recruit and train volunteers for 
Chechnya. However, he added that the Confederation of course naturally 
coordinated volunteers’ movements in the region. Ibragim-Beyli recalled that 
representatives of 16 ethnic groups of the Caucasus adopted a resolution at a their 
congress denouncing the use of force to settle the Chechen crisis and urging “help 
to the Chechen people at the time of hardships.”668 
From then on the Russians were emerged as the main rivals of the 
Confederation and this made the work of Confederation problematic. In addition, 
of the internal strife within the Confederation resulted in the dismemberment of the 
Confederation. None of the North Caucasian peoples or the regional 
administrations, (except some individual initiatives) did not want to fight together 
with the Chechens against the Russian troops.669 
Thus, by the Chechen war of 1994, the Confederation faced with the 
disintegration process. The Russian interference ant the Chechens’ struggle for 
their own territories, resulted with the dismemberment of the North Caucasian 
peoples. While the Abkhaz and other Circassian groups began to function within 
the frame work of International Circassian Association, the Turkic peoples 
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preferred to follow their own path and established their own union. Some other 
groups, such as Osetians at last, choose establishing closer alliance with the 
Russian. Thus the Confederation took the shape of a ghost organization. 
                                                                                                                                       
in Makhachkale. The Dagestani authorities however interfered with a reason of possible upheavals 
among the peoples and the Parliament inevitably postponed its meeting. 
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CONCLUSION 
The North Caucasian peoples or the Mountaineers, who were the genuine 
settlers of the North Caucasian geography, constituted a multi-lingual and multi-
ethnic society. From the earlier periods of history tribe was the main social 
structure and thus the source of the Mountaineers’ identification in the region. 
These settled agricultural and pastoral North Caucasian tribes lived, separately 
mainly in villages, called aul in mountainous regions and yurt in the lowlands that 
comprised principally of one tribe, even in the 17th century. In time, because of the 
economic and legal relationships, and of security concerns, settlements or rural 
communes comprised of several tribes named jama’at in Dagestan and tuqum 
among the Vaynakhs, began to form. These rural communes, in late 18th and early 
19th centuries became socio-political and territorial entities united by common 
economic and defence aims, rather than a purely tribal one. In the late 18th century, 
(especially in Dagestan) there were about 60 communities or principalities with a 
constantly changing social structure. Nevertheless, in these earlier periods, these 
Mountaineers, mainly were the believers of Islam, continued their daily lives under 
the nominal rule of Ottoman Empire. On their daily, however, they ruled 
themselves through council of elders, which was made up of representatives of 
each clan and tribe in the commune. Beyond the existence of temporary alliances 
between several communes, primarily against the another North Caucasian 
commune and rearly against the ‘foreign powers’, because of the lack of 
communication and outrageous geographical conditions, consolidated and 
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permanent relationships and thus alliances could not be set up in the North 
Caucasus. 
By the beginning of the 19th century these jama’ats, however, as a result of 
the emergence of aggressive enemies, i.e. Russian controlled Cossacks, began to 
develop permanent central political formations. The most powerful among them 
included the Shamkalat, the Avar Khanate, the Khanate of Ghazi-Kumuk and the 
principalities of Kaytak and Tabasaran. Over time, with the expansion of these 
associations, ruling dynasties came into being. The way in which these dynasties 
came into being and the titles they used varied from one jama’at to another. While 
in some parts they took the name Khan or Sultan, in others they used the titles of 
Maysum, Ustmi, Shamkhal or Qadi. These central rulers, in parallel with the 
establishment of their authority, began to remove local rulers by appointing their 
own agents as governors, mostly named naib or bek, to the jama’ats under their 
authority, and in turn they formed the local gentry. 
Nevertheless, all these political structures were transitory bodies with 
enduring struggles within themselves and with the outside rival powers. Therefore, 
it is not possible to speak about the existence and even the establishment, of a 
coherent social or political governing body, which encompassed the entire, or at 
least the great part of the North Caucasus. 
Nevertheless, with the coming of alien great aggressive power with the 
intention of occupying the North Caucasus changed the course of event severely. 
The Russians appeared on the scene of the Caucasus for the first time in the middle 
of the 16th century and initiated the great power rivalry, mainly with the Ottomans, 
that lasted for more than two centuries. This resulted in a striking change within the 
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attitudes and the political formations of the Mountaineers. They faced with an 
aggressor and defined a common enemy that forced the Mountaineers to set up a 
common front to balance it. In the second half of the 18th century, during the reign 
of Catherine the Great, the Russian Empire at last established its dominion 
southward to include the northern shores of the Black Sea. The Empress, in order 
to demonstrate her belief in its future importance to the Empire, labelled these 
newly conquered territories as ‘New Russia’ and focused the Empire’s attention 
southward. 
The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed in 1774, concluded the six year 
Russo-Turkish war, and following it, the annexation of Crimea in 1783, marked 
Russian dominance over the Ottomans in the Caucasus. Thus, the Crimean Tatars, 
the main agents and the vassals of the Ottoman Empire formally became the 
Russian vassals and their territories transformed from the historic northern bastion 
of the Ottoman Empire into the southern bastion of the Russian Empire. After that, 
with the establishment of the first Russian province, or guberniya, in May 1785 
with its center in Yekaterinodar the North Caucasus underwent drastic changes. 
From then on the Russian civil and military officials started to interfere directly in 
the internal affairs and the daily life of the Caucasus and of course the 
Mountaineers. Thus, for the first time, at least nominally the Mountaineers were 
subjected to an ‘infidel’s rule’. The most conspicuous result of this interference and 
rule was the emergence of reactionary movements among the Mountaineers. Under 
the auspices of the Naqshbandiya, Islam surfaced as the most dynamic and 
comprehensive political force and by the help of its network among the Chechens 
and Dagestanis instigated a struggle in entire Chechnya and Dagestan. 
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The Naqshbandiya was in fact introduced into the North Caucasus in early 
18th century and established its first roots primarily in Dagestan. Until the arrival of 
Russian forces prominent sheikhs or tariqat leaders always fulfilled the roles of 
spiritual guides and supervisors of the existing local rulers. Nevertheless, because 
of the failure of traditional local authorities and their cooperation with the Russians 
the Naqshbandiya, as the sole institution, which could reach beyond petty tribal 
loyalties and offer an ideology capable of uniting these various peoples into a 
broader independent political movement, emerged as a reactionary force. 
The emergence of this movement called ‘muridizm’ was not accidental. It 
coincided with the establishment of the new Russian province and Mansur’s 
proclamation of ghazavat. Moreover, the Ottomans’ last defeat, and thus their 
forced relinquishment of all positions and claims in the Caucasus after the 1828-29 
Russo-Turkish war, also coincided with the emergence of the new Imam, Ghazi 
Muhammed. These were the basic results of religious reactions to the alien 
Christian power, the Russian Empire. 
Mansur, the de facto religious and national leader, laid the foundation for a 
future union and prepared the ground for the later Naqshbandi Imams who saw 
themselves as his disciples. Although Mansur himself never mentioned a 
brotherhood, nor did he try to establish a Sufi network, he left a long-lasting legacy 
in the North Caucasus. Mansur, had a prominent role in the Islamisation of the 
central North Caucasus, mainly the Ingush and Osetians. He consolidated 
Naqshbandiya and thus Islam in these territories. He managed to establish contacts 
with the Chechen, the Ingush, and Dagestani communes and even the Kabardian 
and Circassian princes and for the first time in the North Caucasus established a 
  
 
283  
common front in the struggle with Russians. In spite of Mansur’s defeat, the new 
Imam, Ghazi Muhammed emerged, almost 50 years later, as new leader who 
bridged the gap between the ‘political’ and ‘spiritual’ Naqshbandiya and merged 
the two into a unified movement. He once again declared a ghazavat against the 
infidel’s rule in 1830. His successors, Hamza Bek and Shamil managed to 
exterminate the existing local rulers and instead of being spiritual guides and 
supervisors they took the real authority into their hands and became the official 
leaders in the North Caucasus. 
Those new leaders’ position was very different to that of the earlier local 
leaders. These Imams accepted the Sharia as the only guarantee against the 
corruption of the North Caucasian peoples by Russian colonial rule, and so they 
called upon Muslims to replace the traditional adat system, which was identified as 
the main obstacle to unification, with Sharia-based legislation. Through 
comprehensive administrative, fiscal, and military measures based on an orthodox 
version of Sharia, they established a new central state encompassing Chechen, 
Ingush, Avar, Kumuk, Lezgin and Ghazi Kumuk territories. His authority through 
the Kabardians penetrated, at least nominally to the Circassian areas. 
These Imams saw the Mountaineers as a totality and denied the existence of 
tribal differences, accepting Islam as the primary denominator of the unified North 
Caucasian identity. Thus, Imam Shamil finally established the North Caucasian 
Imamate as the first unified North Caucasian State in the 1840s. Through his naibs, 
he brought isolated tribes and jama’ats under a unified Sharia-based legal system 
and ensured the coordination of efforts to resist the Russians. In line with this,  
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again through his naibs, at least theoretically, Shamil managed to spread his rule to 
the Circassian lands and thus the entire North Caucasus. 
Nevertheless, increasing Russian military might and emerging native 
resistance or reluctance to comply with the comprehensive changes in the social 
structure and daily life triggered Shamil’s downfall. Despite his defeat, because of 
his deep-rooted reforms, Islam substantiated its place among the Mountaineers 
irreversibly and became one of the principle components of the Mountaineers’ self-
identification during this period. 
 
The defeat of Shamil however, caused drastic changes in the demographic 
and political balances in the North Caucasus in favour of the Russian Empire. 
Between 1864 and 1878 a significant percent of the North Caucasian population, 
mainly the Circassians, were forcibly expelled to the Ottoman lands and dispersed 
throughout the territories from Balkans to the Middle East. The remaining religious 
leaders were either killed or exiled and the Sufi brotherhood discarded the idea of 
ghazavat and open resistance, with remaining groups forced into an underground, 
semi-clandestine existence. However, when the opportunity to rebel against the 
Russians presented itself, they took the lead to organize the masses. Meanwhile, the 
newly settled Cossack and Russian populations, began to dominate the region and 
thus, during the last quarter of the 19th century Russians managed to suppress and 
subjugate the North Caucasus. 
 
This inevitably shifted the centre of the struggle of independence outside 
North Caucasian territory. While Russian’s ‘divide-and-rule’ policy was creating 
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divisions and frictions among the Mountaineers, the North Caucasians used the 
1877-78 Russo-Ottoman war to struggle for independence, but the defeat of the 
Ottomans left the Mountaineers’ dream of returning to the Caucasus and 
establishing their own state was unfulfilled. From then on, in compliance with 
Ottoman policy and the tradition of loyalty to the host state, North Caucasian 
emigrants in the Ottoman Empire had to keep silent until 1908. Afterwards, the 
new regime allowed these emigrants to set up their own organizations in İstanbul. 
These organizations became the engines of the independence struggle and in 
correlation with of their increasingly intensified activities the Mountaineers 
struggle grew in the homeland. 
Through the Circassian Association of Union and Relief, which was 
established by Gazi Mehmet Paşa, the son of Imam Shamil, as a social 
organization, the North Caucasians of the Ottoman Empire revatilized their 
political activities to liberate the motherland. Nevertheless they did not find the 
opportunity to realize their objective until the beginning of the First World War. A 
confluence of interests brought the Association and the leaders of the ruling party 
of the Union and Progress into alliance and the political activities of the emigrants 
increased impressively. When the First World War broke out, the North Caucasians 
took an active part in the formulation of a confederal state, which encompassed 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and the North Caucasus as a ‘buffer state’ between 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Enver Pasha vehemently supported this idea and 
took an active part in the activities to organize an anti-Russian movement in the 
Caucasus. 
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During this period, the Russian viceroys ruled the Mountaineers, who were 
living in the North Caucasian territory. Despite the fact that the tariqats had still 
survived under-cover and were continuing their spiritual guidance among the 
Chechen and Dagestani peoples, a class of young North Caucasian elite, who were 
educated in Russian schools emerged and gained a foothold among the peoples of 
the North Caucasus. Despite their small number, these young peoples managed to 
take the destinies of their peoples. This new group, because of their education were 
familiar to the Russian society and the western thought and way of life. Some had 
close contacts with the Russian political parties and currents, had a part in the 
Empire’s political life. Nevertheless they failed to establish common political 
North Caucasian or Islamic political movement. As was the case with North 
Caucasian emigrants in Ottoman lands, World War I and then the Russian 
Revolution in February 1917 changed the course of events in the North Caucasus. 
These North Caucasian elites defined the Revolution as a ‘miracle’ and used the 
mottos of the French Revolution, ‘liberty, equality, and fraternity’ on every 
occasion. In line with this they organized a Congress with the aim of establishing a 
union or a common political structure encompassing all the peoples of the North 
Caucasus, from the Black Sea to the Caspian coasts. Thus, the Alliance of the 
Unified Mountaineers of the North Caucasus and Dagestan, including the 
Circassian tribes, Chechens, the Ingush and all of the Dagestani peoples, with a 
political program and a draft Constitution, emerged. Initially, the leaders of the 
movement undoubtedly agreed with the ideals of the Revolution, and the Alliance 
accepted itself as a constituent part of Russia. The first and the foremost priority of 
the Congress was the establishment of Federal-Democratic state structure in 
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Russia. In their program, Mountaineers defined Russia as a ‘big mosaic’ and 
demanded autonomy and self-governance for their own territories. This was the 
ultimate ideal for these people for that time. 
The Bolshevik Revolution and the beginning of the ‘Civil War’ in Russian 
territories, however, changed the course of events. As a result of the Turkish 
advance towards the Caucasus, these two North Caucasian independence 
movements, in exile and at home met. During the Trabzon Conference, both of 
these groups for the first time, at least officially, analyzed the issue of North 
Caucasian independence with the Ottoman government, which resulted in the 
declaration of North Caucasian independence in İstanbul on 11 May 1918. 
The independent North Caucasian Mountaineer Republic, nevertheless, 
could establish its authority in the North Caucasus only for a limited time with the 
help of the Ottoman armies, composed primarily of Ottoman Circassians. The 
discords between the Ottomans and the Germans, and at last their complete defeat 
in war and the great power rivalry over the Caucasus, unfortunately caused the 
collapse of the Independent State. In this rivalry although the Ottomans and 
Germans were apparent allies, the Germans interfered with developments in the 
region in pursuit of their own interests, at the expense of the Ottomans and thus the 
Mountaineers. 
During this time, in contrast to the Shamil’s era, the foreign powers openly 
participated in and even directed the course of events. The Turkish advance gave 
the Mountaineers a chance to establish their own Republic, but the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire halted the activities of the Mountaineers. Then the British, in an 
alliance with Denikin, affected the destiny of the Mountaineers negatively. 
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Moreover, the ideological difference between the Mountaineers personal desires for 
ruling the region and ever-changing alliances between the groups caused 
consolidation of the Bolshevik power and their supremacy in the region. 
 
By 1920 Bolshevik forces controlled the region entirely. The last resistance 
movement of the Mountaineers led by Said Shamil, the great-grandson of Imam 
Shamil and the religious leaders, Uzun Haji and Najmuddin of Hötzo (Gotsinskiy) 
continued until summer 1921. Although, initially, they had achieved some 
successes, with the arrival Red Army in spring 1921, the Bolsheviks managed to 
suppress the movement. In fact the North Caucasian leaders, either Bolshevik, 
nationalist or religious all the time defended the unity of the North Caucasus. They 
just differentiated the method through which this unity was being established. 
On 20 January 1920, however, in compliance with the premises of Soviet 
nationality policy, two separate autonomous republics, Dagestan Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic and Soviet Mountain Republic, which comprised of 
Chechen, Ingush, Osetian, Kabardian, Balkar and Karachay territories were 
established and incorporated into RSFSR. The latter however was short lived. Once 
the Soviet power was firmly established, the regime adopted a policy of dividing 
this region into smaller ethnic territories in 1921 and artificially created six 
autonomous units from 1922 to 1924. Then by using language as a basis, the Soviet 
regime created and provided ethnic homelands for the different peoples of the 
North Caucasus, within which they were entitled to use a variety of ethnic 
institutions. Thus the process of ‘creating nations’ and ‘national territories’ initiated 
by the Soviet Russia. This caused the emergence of atomised social and political 
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structure in the North Caucasus and started the alienation process among the 
peoples of the North Caucasus. The best example of this alienation process was the 
separation of Circassian peoples into three distinct titular nations, i.e. Adyge, 
Cherkess, and Kabardian. 
 
While the Bolsheviks had been suppressing the uprising and taking the 
whole region under their control, the nationalist groups of the Mountaineers were 
forced to leave the North Caucasus. From then on, representatives of the formerly 
independent Caucasian Republics had to shift their struggle for the independence 
outside their homeland, especially to Europe. Paris was the first new centre for the 
struggle followed İstanbul, Prague, and Warsaw. 
These ‘new emigrants’ were directly affected by the political atmosphere of 
the post-War period and, until the late 1920s remained scattered and confused. In 
this early period, the North Caucasians’ first priority was securing their own 
survival. The emergence of the anti-Bolshevik currents in Europe, primarily within 
the new states of Czechoslovakia and Poland, had changed the course of events and 
broken the bewilderment of the exiles. Leaders of these states, such as Pilsudski, 
were the most ardent anti-Bolsheviks. Their financial support made the 
establishment of the émigré organizations for all the nationalities of the former 
Russian Empire possible. Including of course the North Caucasians. 
 
The first formal émigré organization of North Caucasians, the Union of 
Caucasian Mountaineers, was established in Prague. As it is easily understood from 
its name, their main aim was ‘unification’. Following the establishment of the 
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Promethean bloc, their activities became heavily political in content and, in 
contrast to the on going process in the Caucasus, the idea of establishing 
comprehensive Caucasian Confederation gained precedence. 
In that period, the North Caucasian emigrants, despite internal splits, 
willingly supported the idea of Confederation. Their main difference was not on the 
nature of the end, but just on the strategy that would have to be followed. They, 
with a strong belief in the collapse of Bolshevik, or Soviet Russia, continued their 
struggle against Bolshevism as the successor to the chauvinism and imperialism of 
Romanov rule. They hoped that the World War, which was looming, would result 
in the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the problem was who would lead the War 
against the Soviet Union or whom the North Caucasians would support? 
Accordingly, two main currents emerged. While Haydar Bammat and his 
Kavkaz group supported Germany and Italy, i.e. Nationalist Socialism, the 
Prometheans supported the European democracies, i.e, Britain and the other newly 
emerged smaller states. 
Despite ideological differences, both groups thought it essential to make 
necessary preparations for establishing their independent state’s infrastructure. 
Because they believed that the primary reasons behind the failure in 1917-20 were 
the lack of leadership of a cadre and program for a functioning state. Thus, during 
this period, they dealt with the problems and solutions in detail. The problems of 
language, nationality, form of state, relations with the neighbouring states, 
economy, and etc. were all scrutinized in the pages of the North Caucasian émigré 
publications, such as Vol’nye Gortsy, Severnyi Kavkaz, and Kavkaz. 
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Aware of the fragility of North Caucasians or the other Caucasians future 
states, the idea of establishing a Confederation comprised of all the former 
Republics of the Caucasus (North Caucasian, Azeri, Georgian, and even the 
Armenian Republics) began to take precedence as the most viable and realistic 
solution for the future of the Caucasus. The ideal of the Confederation was now not 
only a word for coalescing the leaders in seeking a return to power, but it was the 
solution to the intractable internal problems the region faced because of 
nationalism and religious differences. Stemming from this, the leaders of the 
Caucasian emigrants signed several agreements and issued declarations in which 
they accepted that the establishment of a close and brotherly union as absolutely 
essential for the consolidation of the independence of these republics as well as 
enabling the Caucasus to act as a link between West and East, and between the 
Christian and Muslim worlds. Their common fate was the main basis of the Union. 
1934 was a turning point for the Caucasians. They made a last try to 
establish a Confederation, at least on a paper. All the leaders of North Caucasian, 
Azeri and Georgian emigrants heartily signed the document. Armenians, however, 
because of mainly the religious concerns and the possible Turkish domination 
never took part. The contracting committee, however, was dissolved in 1935 and a 
Caucasian Confederation Council replaced it with no concrete contribution. 
Beyond that, the Armenians and Georgians separated themselves and began to 
work together excluding the North Caucasians and Azerbaijanis. 
The War anxiously awaited started without delay. Nevertheless the emigres 
received it with scepticism. The Nazi-German Pact in August 1939 put a dramatic 
end to the expectations of North Caucasians. This caused retrogression of the 
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activities of the émigré groups. Apart from some minor efforts, North Caucasian 
activities for unity and independence diminished. The Germans planned to colonize 
the North Caucasus and had no intention of giving the Mountaineers their desired 
independence. 
The Second World War resulted in the consolidation of Soviet power. 
While the ‘old’ North Caucasian emigrants, Bammat, Chermoev, and others were 
abandoning the struggle in disillusion a small number of ‘new’ emigrants who were 
born and brought up in the Soviet regime, such as A. Avtorkhanov, R. Karça and 
R. Traho continued their struggle against the Communist regime together with 
other émigré groups. Their works, however, far from the political and military 
struggle and only covered some scholarly works on the peoples of the North 
Caucasus in the Soviet Union. 
The most important achievement of this group is probably their success on 
bringing the Soviet deportation of North Caucasian peoples, namely the Chechens, 
the Ingush, Karachays, and Balkars to light and informing the world. In late 1943 
and early 1944 Stalin deported seven nationalities from their native countries to 
Central Asia and Siberia, on the face of it, for collaboration with the German 
armies. Not until the late 1950s were these deported peoples allowed to return. 
Nevertheless, they lost more than half of their populations over the course of 
deportation. This caused the re-change in the balance of the North Caucasus and 
made a profound effect in the minds of deported peoples. Nevertheless, over time 
the North Caucasian émigré movements, in parallel with American-Soviet 
rapprochement and the natural removal of the leading figures came to an end. 
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These devoted fighters left a tradition of struggle behind them. In the 
volumes of printed material they scrutinized each and every aspects of the North 
Caucasian society and outlined an extensive blueprint for the unified North 
Caucasian State. 
 
With the developments in the North Caucasus following the election of 
Mikhail Gorbachev as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) in March 1985, the North Caucasian desire to establish a unified 
independent state came to the stage again. The complex structure, which was 
created by Soviet policies of perestroika and democratization, faced several 
ethnically based conflicts. The re-emergence of nationalist movements within the 
union republics, their feigned blindness towards the existence of other small 
nationalities, and moreover, the possibility of breaking away forced the peoples of 
the North Caucasus to become more reactionary. 
By 1988, similar to the case after the February Revolution of 1971, peoples 
of the North Caucasus, at the outset, started to demand national sovereignty and 
enhanced republican status as an expression of cultural anxiety and demands for 
cultural sovereignty. The opportunity to form regional and national organizations 
was being used to embark on a revival of the national cultures, languages, and 
national identities by the peoples of the North Caucasus. Ethnically based, 
homogenized socio-political organizations sprang up throughout the whole territory 
of the North Caucasus. 
In the final years of Soviet power, the North Caucasian peoples, from Avars 
to Shapsugs, developed and presented images of nationhood within the spheres of 
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these organizations. In the beginning, in almost all these organizations, the main 
concern was national-cultural development and the rights of their peoples within 
the Soviet Union, in compliance with the basic tenets of perestroika and 
democratization. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the discourse of national and ethnic 
identity among the peoples of the Caucasus diverted its path. The North Caucasian 
peoples’ post-Soviet demands have broadened to include demands for heightened 
economic and legislative autonomy and even the concepts of a state, whether fully 
sovereign or, as a part of a broader republic. 
Consequently, in the early 1990s, the peoples of the North Caucasus issued 
declaration after declaration upgrading the administrative status of their territories. 
This general tendency of establishing sovereign entities, however, caused the 
emergence of discord among the peoples in question. The already existing ‘land 
question’ arose as a basic reason for possible armed clashes among the peoples 
who had to live together as result of the Soviet policies for almost a century. 
In this context, the peoples of the North Caucasus had to face the heritage 
of the Soviet divide-and-rule policy and of deportations once more. While these 
peoples were asking for the restitution of their ancestral lands, the forcibly settled 
peoples were in turn seeking for to retain existing status. At the same time, Turkic 
groups (Karachays and Balkars) were seeking their own sovereign union republics 
while, smaller entities like Shapsugs and the nationalities of Dagestan were in 
pursuit of reconstituting their autonomous administrative structures. 
Likewise, while Russian nationalism did not yet gain momentum in the 
region, Georgian nationalism, choosing the Osetians and Abkhaz as its target, 
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already started to demonstrate its. The existence of this kind of nationalist threat 
caused solidarity among the peoples of the North Caucasus. While each group has 
been establishing their own national organizations on one hand, the necessity for an 
over-arching organization encompassing all the peoples of the North Caucasus 
started to sound overtly and loudly, on the other. 
Within this context, some of the leading figures of the national movements, 
in order to defend the rights and interests of the peoples of the North Caucasus in a 
more efficient way, started to discuss the viability of forming an umbrella 
organization to be called whether ‘pan-Caucasian movement,’ ‘Caucasian Home,’ 
‘union’ or ‘confederation’. A stimulus to this idea was the belief that, despite the 
existence of religious and linguistic divergence, the peoples of the North Caucasus 
were one with the same customs, way of life and common interests. Therefore, this 
movement of establishing comprehensive organization for the peoples of the 
Caucasus developed hand in hand with the spread of ethnically based homogenous 
organizations in the region. 
It is important to note that despite differences in motivation and in the 
milieu, at the outset there was a striking similarity between events of 1917 and 
1989. In both cases, the leaders of the movements were aware that in order to solve 
the problems and to defend the rights of the Mountaineers the only option was the 
establishment of a unified front. This reality was revealed itself as a logical 
consequence of the diffused structure of the region and the strength of the rival 
force, whether Russian, Georgian or another one. 
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The first concrete step to establish a unified organization of the peoples of 
the North Caucasus was taken by the Abkhaz. They managed to convene the First 
Congress of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus on 25-26 August 1989 in 
Sukhum. In that Congress, after the long period, the first all-embracing 
organization of the Mountaineers, the Assembly of the Mountain Peoples of the 
Caucasus was established. This new Assembly was defined as a socio-political 
organization of all Mountaineers of the Caucasus and proclaimed aim to be the 
regeneration of the community of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. 
Nevertheless, in spite of its comprehensive title, the Assembly, initially only 
attracted the Chechens, the Ingush and the Circassian peoples, including the 
Abkhaz and thus had an image of restricted organization. 
The Russian declaration of independence in June 1990 and President 
Yeltsin’s invitation ‘to take as much sovereignty as you can swallow’, however 
changed the course of events for the leaders of the Assembly. For the first time, 
after the establishment of the Soviet Union they had a chance to establish a unified 
structure encompassing entire North Caucasus. Thus the leaders of the Assembly 
decided to revise the Assembly’s policies. Accordingly, with the participation of 
the representatives of the 13 peoples of the North Caucasus, the Assembly 
organized the Third Congress of the National Democratic Movements and the 
Parties of the North Caucasus on 1-2 November 1991, in Sukhum. In this 
Congress, the Assembly took a vital step andevolved into the Confederation of the 
Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus declaring itself to be the legitimate heir of the 
North Caucasian (Mountain) Republic established on 11 May 1918. This was,  
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according to the Treaty, the start of the process of restoring sovereign statehood to 
the Mountain peoples of the Caucasus. 
Nevertheless, the Confederation had some critical problems even from its 
initial phase. First of all not all the Mountain peoples of the North Caucasus joined. 
Turkic groups; the Balkars, Karachays, Nogays, and Kumuks did not respond to the 
invitation to join the Assembly. Moreover, Nogays and Kumuks withdrew from the 
Assembly as well. Dargin and Lezgin also did not take part. The Ingush, even 
though they had named delegates, did not participate Moreover, its members were 
peoples or rather their ‘representatives’ not republics. This gave the Confederation 
the image of opposition. The existing regional governments and their leaders 
assumed negative, even hostile attitudes to the Confederation. At last, internal 
ethnic and personal quarrels made the Confederation a more complex body. Due to 
different policy preferences of members the Confederation’s raison d’etre was 
never clarified properly. While Chechens were accepting this body as an initial 
phase of independent North Caucasian State, the Abkhaz evaluated it as solidarity 
organization with their struggle with Georgia. Russians intended to use it as a 
leverage against Georgia and the Circassians a accepted it as the means of helping 
their close kinsmen, the Abkhaz. This was the most critical handicap for its future 
The second half of 1992 was also another year of transformation for the 
Confederation. Existing disagreements in the North Caucasus began to escalate and 
turn into the military clashes. Thus, in addition to its socio-political character, the 
Confederation immediately gained the status of a military power. This 
transformation, however, resulted in open discord and a split within the 
Confederation. In the 4th Extraordinary Congress of the Peoples of the Caucasus 
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organized in Grozny on 3-4 October 1992, this split came to light. The 
representatives took two different approaches on Russia. The first group, which 
consisted mainly of Chechens, the only policy towards Russia should be a 
hardening of attitude and possible secession. The other group consisted mainly of 
Circassian peoples and most of the Abkhaz, defended more compromising and 
moderate policies. They preferred to stay in the jurisdiction of more powerful state, 
i.e. Russia. 
Meanwhile, increasing compromise between Russia and Georgia (i.e. the 
main rival of the Confederation at that time), and the intensifying clashes between 
the peoples of the North Caucasus affected the Confederation adversely. The 
Confederation failed to help these inter-Mountaineer claims and clashes. 
Meanwhile, the Russians, because of the Chechen supremacy in the 
Confederation, after the submission of Georgian leaders to Russian will and the 
Georgian participation to Commonwealth of Independence States, decided to 
establish their own umbrella organizations in the North Caucasus. These 
organizations, established by existing official administrations of the North 
Caucasian autonomous regions’ leaders under the control of Russia made the 
Confederation a marginalised body and diminished its authority and power. The 
reconciliatory attitudes of other members of the Confederation, mainly the Abkhaz 
and Circassian, resulted in the emergence of rival factions, directed by the 
Chechens, within the Confederation. This group also established its own 
organization, the Caucasian Home, ultimately aimed at the formation of a broader 
Confederation together with Azerbaijan and if possible Georgia. 
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In this perplexing situation the founding leaders of the Confederation lost 
their bases in the Confederation and the life of the North Caucasian peoples. Apart 
from this, the beginning of the Russian-Chechen War, and the apathy of other 
Mountaineer peoples to the Chechen cause at last brought the collapse of the 
Confederation. The Confederation, because of the lack of massive support of 
Chechens, the Abkhaz and in relation with them, the Circassians, turned a marginal 
ghost organization. 
 
The Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was just an 
episode of the North Caucasian struggle for unification and liberation. Although its 
tragic end, it added one more volume to the Mountaineers’ experience of struggle. 
Today, the establishment of a North Caucasian union would be accepted as a 
utopian. In the view of political, territorial, and religious differences between the 
Mountaineers and more important than the existence of Russian and Georgian 
supremacy would make the regional integration a speculation, but, the process is 
going on and there is an undeniable fact that among the North Caucasians there 
was, is and will be a belief that the Mountaineer peoples have the common identity 
and myth of North Caucasian unity which would be turned into a reality under the 
suitable conditions. 
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APPENDICES 
LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE670 
I) Ibero-Caucasian Language Group 
A) Southern Caucasian Group; 
1- Kartvelian (Georgian), 
2- Mingrelian, 
3- Svanetian, 
4- Laz. 
B) Northwest Caucasian Group; 
1- Abkhaz, 
a) Abkhaz, 
b) Abaza, 
c) Ubykh. 
2- Circassian (Adyghabze), 
a) Eastern (Kabardinian), 
i- Kabardin (Baksan), 
ii- Bes(le)ney. 
b) Western (Adyge), 
i- Bzhedug, 
ii- Shapsug, 
iii- Abadzekh, 
iv- Temirgoy. 
C) Northeast Caucasian Group; 
1- Vaynakh, 
a) Ingush, 
b) Chechen, 
c) Batsbi. 
2- Avaro-Andi-Dido Group, 
a) Avar, 
b) Andi, 
i- Andi, 
ii- Botlikh, 
iii- Akhvakh, 
iv- Godoberi, 
v- Bagulal, 
vi- Tindi, 
vii- Chamalal, 
viii- Karata. 
c) Dido, 
i- Dido, 
ii- Khvarshi, 
                                                 
670 Ronald Wixman, pp. 87-88. Hewitt, CAS, 1999, 18 (4). Bennigsen-Wimbush, Muslims of the 
Soviet Empire. 
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iii- Bezheta, 
iv- Khunzal, 
v- Ginukh. 
d) Archi. 
3- Lak-Dargin Group, 
Dargin (Kaytak, Kubachi) and Lak. 
4- Samurian group. 
Lezgin, Agul, Rutul, Tsakhur, Tabasaran, Udi, 
Shakhdag. 
II) Altaic (Turkic) Language Group; 
A) Oghuz group, 
1- Azeri, 
2- Turkmen. 
B) Western Turkic or Kipchak group, 
1- Karachay-Balkar, 
2- Nogay, 
3- Kumyk. 
III) Indo-European Language Group, 
A) Iranic group, 
1- Eastern Iranian (Osetian), 
2- Western Iranian (Tat). 
B) Slavic Group (Eastern Slav: Russian and Ukrainian), 
Armenian. 
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POPULATION OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS (1897 Russian Census)671 
Language :     Population : 
Abkhaz            72,104 
Cherkess            46,286 
Kabardinian            98,561 
Karachay            27,223 
Balkar             34,232 
Osetian           171,716 
Chechen           226,496 
Ingush             47,409 
Kist                  413 
Avar            212,692 
Dargin            130,209 
Lak, Tabasaran, etc.            91,880 
Lezgin            159,213 
Kumyk             83,408 
Nogay              64,080 
Udi                7,100 
Tat              95,056 
 
 
                                                 
671 Source is Ronald Wixman. In the 1897 census data was not presented by nationality, but rather 
by declared native language. In this data, the number of Abkhaz population included both Abkhaz 
and Abaza, both being considered one people with one language at this time. The Balkars were 
referred to as Mountain Tatars (Gorskie Tatary). The Kists were later reclassified as Ingush and the 
figure representing Tats included both Tats and Mountain Jews. 
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POPULATION OF NORTH CAUCASIAN PEOPLES (1926, 1959, 1970 
AND 1989)672 
 
Ethnic Group  1926 : 1959 : 1970 : 1989 : 
Mingrelians  242,990     --         --          -- 
Svanetians    13,218     --      --      -- 
Abkhaz    56,957   65,430   83,097  90,713 
Abaza     13,825   19,591   25,448 
Circassians 
 Adyge    65,270   79,631 108,711 124,941 
 Cherkess     --         30,453   46,470   52,356 
 Kabardinian 139,925 203,620 321,719 394,691 
Karachay    55,123   81,403 131,074 156,140 
Balkar     33,307   42,408   66,334   88,771 
Osetian  272,272 412,592 541,893 597,802 
Ingush     74,097 105,980 186,198 237,577 
Chechens  318,522 418,756 785,782 958,309 
Avaro-Andi-Dido 197,392 270,394 482,844 604,202 
Laks     40,380   63,529 188,804 204,370 
Dargins  108,963 158,149 202,297 231,805 
Lezgins  134,529 233,129 382,611 466,833 
Aguls       7,563     6,709 246,854 280,431 
Rutuls     10,495     6,732   71,722   78,196 
Tsakhurs    19,085     7,321   11,103 
Kumyks    94,549 134,967 188,792 
Nogay     36,274   38,583   51,784 
Tabasaran    31,983   34,700   55,188 
Tats     28,705   11,463    22,441   30,817 
Mountain Jews   25,974   25,225      9,389   19,516 
Udi       2,455     3,678      5,919 
 
                                                 
672 The numbers of the 1926 and 1959 censuses were from Wixman, ibid, pp.84-85. The numbers 
from the 1979 and 1989 censuses were from Paul B. Henze, “The Demography of the Caucasus 
according to 1989 Soviet Census Data,”Central Asian Survey, Vol.10, no.1/2, pp.147-170. The 
figures related with the Chechens, Ingush, Kabardinians, Balkars, Adyge, Karachay and Cherkess 
were reflecting populations of the respective nationalities existing within the whole USSR. The 
number of the Osetians was controversial because of the dispersed status of the Osetians. 
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SLAVIC POPULATION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS 
 
Ethnic Unit :  1979 : 1989 : Change: 
Chechen-Ingush ASSR 350,346 308,395    -11,8 
Dagestan ASSR  197,572 175,424    -11,2 
Kabardino-Balkar ASSR 248,492 255,569       2,8 
North Ossetian ASSR  213,162 201,026      -5,7 
Adyge AO   299,948 310,096        3,4 
Karachay-Cherkess AO 171,202 183,550        7,2 
TOTALS           1,480,722        1,434,650       -3,2 
 

